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Abstract.
This work analyses the evolution of the Italian legislation on charities from 1860 to
1890. The first two chapters broadly discuss the themes of poverty and welfare
reform, and the attitudes of the leaders of the Risorgimento to poor relief and social
justice. The third chapter focuses on the origins and evolution of the Piedmontese
charity legislation which was extended to the entire Peninsula upon unification.
Chapters four and five explore the characteristics of the charity systems in force in
Central and Southern Italy before the unification - to evaluate the efficacy of the
Piemontese legislation in those contexts - and look into the interim legislation on
charities introduced in 1859 and 1860 by the provisional governments. Some
attention is also paid to the provisions to relieve poverty during the process of
political unification. Chapter six focuses on the general attitude of the new State
towards poverty and assistance and gives an account of the origins and parliamentary
debate of the act of 3 August 1862. This was modelled on the Piedmontese act of
1859, but contained various alterations which relaxed central and peripheral
control. Chapter seven gives an account of the implementation of this Act, describes
the attempts made in the 1870s by the central authorities to bring the charities to
heel, analyses the bill proposed by Nicotera in 1877, the response of the charities in
the welfare congresses of 1879 and 1880, and the mini-reform proposed by
Depretis in 1880. Chapter eight is devoted to the analysis of both the methods
followed by the Royal Commission set up in 1880 to inquire into the charities, and
its results. Particular attention is paid to the structure of the charity system.
Chapter nine analyses the Act of 17 July 1890 and broadly assesses its
implementation. Chapter ten attempts some general conclusions.
1
1. Poverty and systems of charity.
1.1. From virtue to sin.
- If you don't like going to school, why don't you learn at least a trade, to
earn your bread honestly?
- If you really want to know [...] of all trades of this world I like only one [...]
that of eating, drinking, sleeping, enjoying myself and being a vagabond from
dawn to sunset. [...] - For your information, - replied the Talking Cricket with
his usual calm - all those who follow this trade end up almost always in hospital
or in prison ^.
This dialogue could fit well in any treatise on poverty, but it belongs to Pinocchio , a
favourite childrensbook written in 1883 by Carlo Lorenzini, a Florentine prefecture
employee. When Lorenzini died in 1890, the first edition was not completely sold,
but as late as the early 1970s the book had been translated in over two hundred
languages, and printed in six million copies 2. Pinocchio has been variously
interpreted 3. In our opinion it is probably the best popular compendium ever
th<.
written of the international ideology and mythology on poverty and "work ethic, which
dates back to the mid-fifteenth century. Geppetto was a poor man and named his
creature accordingly:
-
... This name will bring him good luck. I knew an entire family of Pinocchi:
Pinocchio the father, Pinocchia the mother and Pinocchi the boys, and they were
all well off. The richest was a beggar - 4.
Pinocchio was a stereotype of a poor person, as portrayed in the literature on
poverty ot/erseveral centuries: thoughtless, improvident, naturally prone to idleness.
From the outset Pinocchio was warned how society treated beggars. After killing the
1 Carlo Collodi (Carlo Lorenzini), Le avventure di Pinocchio (Franceschini, Florence,
1953), p. 21. Our translation.
2 Vittorio Frosini, 'Pinocchio come satira politica', in id. Intellettuali e politici del
Risorgimento (Bonanno, Catania, 1971), pp. 152-6, 159-60. For biographical
information on Carlo Lorenzini see also Giovanni Spadolini, Autunno del Risorgimento
(Le Monnier, Florence, 1972), pp. 118-121.
3 A review of some interpretations can be found in the quoted article by Frosini (pp. 160-
72), who notes that Pinocchio represents Italy's poor, but emphasizes the politico-
satirical elements of the novel. G. Spadolini, Autunno del Risorgimento , cit., pp. 115-8,
interprets the novel as a metaphor of bourgeois morale and work ethic. He sees
Pinocchio's rebellion against Geppetto and the self-redemption process as the key
events. The Fatina dai Capelli Turchini represents the 'bourgeois miracle'. Alberto Asor
Rosa, 'La cultura', in Storia d'ltalia , vol. 4, part 2 (Einaudi, Turin, 1975), pp. 925-40
emphasizes the centrality of the blunt message conveyed by Pinocchio to Italy's poor,
but does not link it to the ideology on vagrancy and poverty.
4 Collodi, Le avventure di Pinocchio , cit., pp. 13-14.
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boring Talking Cricket, he felt hungry. There was nothing to eat in Geppetto's home,
so Pinocchio set out for the nearby village 'hoping to find someone charitable who
would give him an aim of bread'. But instead of bread he got a cold shower.
Nevertheless he refused to follow the advice repeatedly delivered by Geppetto and the
Fatina dai capelli turchini - that only those unable to work have a right to assistance,
and unrepentant able-bodied vagrants must either work or starve to death - and
ended up in the worst company, in a cataclysm of misfortunes of his own making. He
met the Cat and the Fox - stereotypes of the vagrant beggars, those cerretani skilled
in all sorts of artful deceits as immortalized in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries by Teseo Pini and Rafaele Frianoro, and their accomplice, the fraudolent
innkeeper - I'oste del Gambero Rosso . This stereotype too was in line with the
Piedmontese legislation that regarded innkeepers with suspicion and treated them as
the natural allies of unlawful vagrants 5. The conclusion of the parable was
predictably in harmony with the tenets of the work ethic. Pinocchio learned his
lesson through painful experience and became judicious, hard working and studious.
But there was no easy reward for abandoning the mischievous path of vagrancy. For
months Pinocchio worked like a slave as a farm labourer, getting a pittance in
return. In addition he made straw baskets - an activity typical of workhouses - to
support the old and sick Geppetto, and studied late at night, reading airs, fce >■*.«. book and
writing with a stick dipped in cherry juice. He learned to save and be frugal, and
slowly improved his status to a level of extremely modest and sober comfort, as was
considered appropriate to the poor. Only at the very end, when Pinocchio had fully
accepted the social limitations of his condition, did the Fatina repay his unconditional
generosity and filial affection with a miraculous and rich reward. So the book ended
on anunrealistic note. Pinocchio, magically born as a wooden puppet, was magically
transformed into a handsome boy. But the price of this transformation was harshly
realistic. Underneath the fantastic setting of the novel, and the wealth of colourful
inventions which followed one another at a very brisk pace, lay a brutally simple
message. To survive, the poor had only one option: hard work. And they should be
prepared to get just the bare minimum from it. All dreams of easy enrichment were
the
out of"question. This is hardly surprising. Poverty was the daily experience of large
masses of Italians. Illiteracy still dominated but mass primary education was
5 Collodi, Le avventure di Pinocchio , cit., passim; Piero Camporesi (ed.), II libro dei
vagabondi (Einaudi, Turin, 1980, 2nd ed.), passim; Ada Lonni, 'Controllo sociale e
repressione di polizia delle classi subalterne da Vittorio Amedeo II a Carlo Alberto', in
Aldo Agosti, Gian Mario Bravo (eds.), Storia del Movimento operaio del socialismo e
delle lotte sociali in Piemonte, vol. 1 (De Donato, Bari, 1979), passim and partic. pp.
159-60, 165.
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becoming more widely available. An appropriate national children's book was needed,
and was duly as well as skillfully produced by the cultural establishment of the new
Italy, and targetted at the lower strata of society - although any child would
supposedly take enjoyment and moral benefit from it.
The tenets on the nature of the poor and their proper treatment enshrined in the
adventures of Pinocchio were a far cry from the medieval teaching of the Church, for
in the Middle Ages the poor were portrayed as the living image of the suffering
Christ. Jesus had taught compassion and self-denial. He told the young rich man to
sell his assets, distribute the proceeds to the poor, and follow him intipoverty. He told
his disciples that the poor were blessed, and that any human action for or against
these most miserable of men was effectively an act for or against the Master himself.
He taught that earthly treasures perished, whereas those of the spirit would last for
ever. He had harsh words for the rich, and warned them that they would find it almost
impossible to enter the kingdom of God 6. These powerful images dominated the
relationship between rich and poor for centuries. In the Middle Ages not all the rich
- like St. Francis of Assisi or Valdo of Lyon - were prepared to follow literally the
teaching of Jesus. But most of them worried sufficiently about their own spiritual
health to find less drastic ways to set their hearts at rest. Rich merchants would
budget a yearly sum for alms, and bequeathed substantial assets to the church for
charity, as well as for requiem masses. The poor were thus incorporated in the
ideological framework of medieval society as providers of spiritual benefits to the
rich. This attitude started to change between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
when poverty gradually became less of a virtue and more of a problem. Meanwhile
donations and bequests formed the financial basis of almshouses, hospitals, hostels
for pilgrims, etc., which greatly expanded during the thirteenth century 7. These
6 Matthew, 5: 3-7, 6: 19-21, 19: 16-30, 25: 31-46; Marc, 10: 17-31; Luke, 6: 20-
38, 18: 18-30, 11: 13-33, 13: 12-24, 16: 19-31.
7 Bronislaw Geremek, 'II pauperismo nell'eta preindustriale (secoli XIV-XVIII)', in Storia
d'ltalia, vol. 5, part 1 (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp. 669-85; Jean Pierre Gutton, La
societe et les pauvres en Europe (XVI-XVIII siecles) Presses Universitaires de France,
1974, pp. 93-7; Brian Pullan, 'Poveri, mendicanti e vagabondi (secoli XIV-XVII), Storia
d'ltalia, Annali, 1 (Einaudi, Turin, 1978), pp. 981-1047; Catharina Lis, Hugo Soly,
Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe (The Harvester Press, Brighton,
1979), pp. 14-25; Michel Mollat, 'Complexite' et ambiguite' des institutions
hospitalieres: les statuts d'hopitaux (les modeles, leur diffusion et leur filiation)', in
G.Politi, M. Rosa, F. Delia Peruta (eds.), Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna
(Biblioteca Statale e Libreria Civica, Cremona, 1982), pp. 3-12; Idem, / poveri nel
Medioevo (Laterza, Bari, 1983), pp. 102-33, passim and partic. 120-33, 137-217;
Stuart Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in western Europe', in Id., The poor in
Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Methuen, London & N. York,
1986), pp. 17-19; Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., Death and Property in Siena, 1205-1800.
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charity systems were Abasedj locally) and decentralized, but they were not
completely indiscriminate. Distinctions were made between deserving and
undeserving poor - hang-abouts, impenitent drunkards, incorrigible vagrants -
especially from the fifteenth century onwards 8; and special charities were set up as
early as the mid thirteenth century to help the shamefaced poor (poveri vergognosi),
that is those nobles or rich bourgeois who had fallen ^destitution, but were
prevented by their social status from either begging or accepting a humble
occupation 9.
In Italy the Church retained control of these locally based and decentralized charity
systems - either directly or through confraternities 10 - up to the fourteenth
Strategies for the Afterlife (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London,
1988).
8 B. Geremek, 'II pauperismo nell'eta preindustriale (secoli XIV-XVIII)', cit., pp. 677-85;
S. Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in western Europe', cit., pp. 18-19.
9 The term 'shamefaced poor' literally translates into poveri vergognosi , and is used by
English historians. See B. Pullan, Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice. The Social
Institutions of a Catholic State, to 1620 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971), p. 229; S.
Woolf, The Poor in Western Europe , cit., pp. 9, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 33, 77, 81, 88-9,
120, 137-40, 144, 160, 192, 208. Shamefaced poor were those destitute nobles
deemed worthy of special treatment by the charitable organizations. Help was handed
over discreetly, in order not to disclose their predicament, as they were considered a
category apart, not be confused with the plebeian destitute. Charities for shamefaced
poor provided a social self-defence mechanism of the higher classes. With the passage
of time the category came to include members of the middle bourgeosie, like merchants,
artisans, and the like, but many statutes maintained the clause that only once
conspicuous families should be supported. The distinction between shamefaced poor and
common poor - whether deserving or undeserving - was long-lasting. The Opera pia dei
poveri vergognosi ed aziende unite in Bologna still exists today. In 1873 the
Congregation of Charity of Milan supported 811 shamefaced poor and 7,620 poveri
comuni. The former enjoyed average individual benefits of 74.22 a year, the latter got
only 34.74 lire each. See Aristide Rava, 'Sulle Opere pie Bolognesi', R.B.P., No. 3,
1874, p. 196; F. Sebregondi, 'Dell'unita d'intenti della pubblica beneficenza', R.B.P., No.
1, 1874, p. 12; B. Pullan, Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice. The Social Institutions
of a Catholic State, to 1620 , cit., pp. 229-232, 238, 267-72, 285, 373-4; Idem,
'Poveri, mendicanti e vagabondi (secoli XIV-XVII), Storia d'ltalia, Annali, 1, cit., pp.
1038-43; Giovanni Ricci, 'Poverta, vergogna e poverta vergognosa', Societa e storia,
No. 5, 1979, pp. 305-37; Id., 'Da poveri vergognosi a ex nobili poveri. Privilegio della
poverta e discesa sociale nella Toscana napoleonica', inTimore e carita. I poveri
nell'ltalia moderna , cit., pp. 359-74; Id., 'Naissance du pauvre honteux: entre
I'histoire des idees et I'histoire sociale', Annates E.S.C., No. 1, 1983, pp. 158-77;
Silvana Musella, 'II Pio Monte della Misericordia e I'assistenza ai "poveri vergognosi"
(1665-1724)', in G. Galasso, C. Russo (eds.), Per la storia sociale e religiosa del
Mezzogiorno d'ltalia, vol. 2, pp. 291-347 (Guida, Naples, 1982).
10 For the origins of confraternities, their welfare activity, and their evolution see
Giuseppe Martini, Storia delle Confraternite italiane con particolare riguardo al
Piemonte (Franchini, Turin, 1935); B. Pullan, La politica sociale della repubblica di
Venezia, 1500-1620 (II Veltro, Rome, 1982) (Italian transl. of Rich and Poor..., cit.),
vol. 1, Le Scuole Grandi, I'assistenza e le leggi sui poveri, pp. 41-95; 125-70; Mario
Fanti, La Chiesa e la Compagnia dei poveri in Bologna. Una istituzione di mutuo soccorso
5
century. Thereafter, and especially around the1450s, the city magistrates started to
take them over, in a first attempt to group assets and institutions to achieve some
degree of centralized control of both the administration of the assets and the
distribution of relief. In Italy this process of centralization and laicization was
strongly opposed by the ecclesiastical hierarchies, and did not end the influence of the
Church on welfare administration. Both State and Church increased their efforts to
control charities and hospitals, with varying results - according to local
situations11. Moreover, a new variety of charities - Monti di Pieta and Monti
Frumentari - were set up by the Franciscans in cities and villages during the second
half of the fifteenth century, to provide the poor with low interest loans in money or
kind. At long last theologians were finding a way out of the impasses of the strict
prohibition of usury. Violent upsurges of anti-semitism accompanied the foundations
of Monti di Pieta, which soon fell prey to maladministration and swindles, but ended
nella societa botognese fra il Cinquecento e il Seicento (Dehoniane, Bologna, 1977);
Idem, La Confraternita di S. Maria delta Morte e la Conforteria dei condannati in Bologna
nei secoli XIV e XV (Quaderni del centro di ricerca di studio sul Movimento dei
Disciplinati, 20, Perugia, 1978); Giancarlo Angelozzi, Le confraternite laicali
(Queriniana, Brescia, 1978); Riccardo Bottoni, 'Le confraternite milanesi nell'eta di
Maria Teresa: aspetti e problemi', in Aldo De Maddalena, Ettore Rotelli, Germano
Barbarisi (eds.), Economia, istituzioni, cultura in Lombardia nell'eta di Maria Teresa (II
Mulino, Bologna, 1982), vol. 3, pp. 595-607; Maura Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Confraternite
romane e beneficenza pubblica tra il 1870 e il 1890, in Ricerche per la storia religiosa
di Roma, 5 (Storia e Lett., Rome, 1984); Andreina De Clementi, 'Confraternite e
confratelli. Vita religiosa e vita sociale in una comunita contadina', in Fondazione Lelio e
Lisli Basso-lssoco, Annali, vol. VII, Subalterni in tempo di modernizzazione (Angeli,
Milan, 1985), pp. 245-90; Roberto Rusconi, 'Confraternite, compagnie e devozioni', in
Storia d'ltalia, Annali 9 (Einaudi, Turin, 1986), pp. 471-508; Danilo Zardin, 'Le
confraternite in Italia settentrionale fra XV e XVIII secolo', Societa e storia, No. 35
(1987), pp. 81-138; Eric Cochrane, Italy 1530-1630 (Longman, 1988), pp. 111-8.
1 1 Brian Pullan, La politica sociale della repubblica di Venezia, 1500-1620 , cit., vol. 1, Le
Scuole Grandi, Tassistenza e le leggi sui poveri, pp. 218 ff; Alessandro Pastore,
'Strutture assistenziali fra Chiesa e Stati nell'ltalia della Controriforma', in Storia
d'ltalia, Annali 9 , cit., pp. 433-41; S. Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in
western Europe', cit., pp. 19-20; E. Cochrane, Italy 1530-1630 , cit., p. 117.
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the traditional monopoly of the Jewish money-lenders 12. During the counter-
reformation period, new associations of lay and ecclesiastics - like the Compagnia del
Divino Amore - and such newly founded orders as the Jesuits and Teatini - infused
fresh energies into the charitable activity of the Catholic Church, muring a
fundamental contribution to the elaboration of a new strategy to tackle poverty. The
old welfare structures were inadequate to cope with the increasing pauperization of
the urban masses, due to the spreading of commercial capitalism. The poor were no
longer regarded as mere providers of spiritual benefits for their benefactors, but as
a dangerous threat to social stability. Although charitable activity was still perceived
as highly meritorious, the emphasis was shifting towards the necessity of punishing
the poor, educating them, and re-inserting them into society. The new strategy -
based on the treatise of Vives De subventione pauperum , but supported by thinkers
as [far/Theologically) afield as Erasmus, Luther, and Loyola - was shared by both
Catholics and Protestants. It aimed at forbidding begging, centralizing relief funds,
12 B. Pullan, La politica sociale della repubblica di Venezia, 1500-1620 , cit., vol. 2, Gli
Ebrei veneziani e i Monti di Pieta, pp. 473-524, 641-90. For Moriti di Pieta see also A.
Pastore, 'Strutture assistenziali fra Chiesa e Stati nell'ltalia della Controriforma', cit.,
pp. 451-7; Vittorio Meneghin, Bernardino da Feitre e i Monti di Pieta (LIEF, Vicenza,
1974); Renata Segre,'Bernardino da Feitre, i Monti di Pieta e i Banchi ebraici', Rivista
Storica Italiana, vol. XC (1978), pp. 818-33; Maria Giuseppina Muzzarelli, 'Un bilancio
storiografico sui Monti di Pieta: 1956-1976, Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia,
vol. XXXIII (1979), No. 1, pp. 165-83. For Monti Frumentari, their origins, evolution,
maladministration and related debate see G. Scalamandre 'Dei Monti Frumentari nelle
provincie napoletane', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, pp. 110-118; Sante Cettolini, 'I Monti
Frumentari', R.B.P., No. 4-5, 1896, pp. 293-307; Ignazio Stelluti-Scala, Le Istituzioni
di beneficenza nella provincia di Ancona (Barbera, Florence, 1893), pp. 231-5; Giustino
Fortunato, II Mezzogiorno e lo Stato Italiano. Discorsi politici (1880-1910) (Laterza,
Bari, 1911), pp. 31-49; Giovanni Masi, 'I Monti frumentari e pecuniari in provincia di
Bari', in Studi in onore di Aminitore Fanfani (Giuffre, Milan, 1962), vol. V, pp. 342-
409; Franco Venturi, 'II Conte Bogino, il Dottor Cossu e i Monti Frumentari', Rivista
Storica Italiana, Vol. LXXVI (1964), No. 2, pp. 470-506; Luigi Parente, 'Un gruppo di
pressione borghese dell'Ottocento borbonico: i Monti frumentari e i Monti pecuniari,
Critica Storica, vol. XIX (1982), No. 2, pp. 163-200; Mario Sensi, Vita di pieta e vita
civile di un altopiano tra Umbria e Marche (secoli XI-XVI) (Storia e Lett., Rome, 1984),
pp. 87-129, 179-205; Domenico Sacco, 'I monti frumentari in Basilicata tra Settecento
e Ottocento', Bollettino storico della Basilicata, No. 2, 1986, pp. 77-109.
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setting minimum benefits, and forcing the able-bodied poor to work in purpose-built
institutions 13.
Abolition of mendicancy and poverty by setting the poor to work in institutions
remained a constant of welfare policies all over Western Europe from the sixteenth
century onwards. Yet in most cases these plans tended to collapse after periods of
initial success. For instance, the welfare reform carried out by Victor Amadeus II in
Piedmont in 1717 - on which we will expand later - as well as those of the Pontiffs
in Rome, and the Dukes of Modena in the late 1600s neither solved the problem, nor
spread beyond the boundaries of the main cities. Workhouses, Ospizi di Carita ,
Alberghi dei Poveri , and the like, were intended as self-sufficient and even profit-
making institutions, as well as training centres for the young. In reality they were
often unprofitable, and indeed expensive to run. They increased the distortions of
already imperfect labour markets, arousing opposition from independent producers.
It seems that the workhouse was a solution only where - and so long as - a strong
economy requiring cheap unskilled labour made .it good business for
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, renfermement was often unpopular with the rich as
well as with the poor, and the former did not give up almsgiving and other traditional
methods of benefaction 14.
13 B. Pullan, La politica sociale delta repubblica di Venezia, 1500-1620 , vol. 1, Le Scuole
Grandi, I'assistenza e le leggi sui poveri, cit., pp. 213-305; J. P. Gutton, La societe et
les pauvres en Europe (XVI-XVIII siecles), cit. pp. 94-121; C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and
capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 53-96 and partic. 82-96; A. Pastore,
'Strutture assistenziali fra Chiesa e Stati nell'ltalia deila Controriforma', cit., pp. 444-
50; S. Woolf, 'Introduction; the poor and society in western Europe', cit., pp. 8, 17-31;
E. Cochrane, Italy 1530-1630 , cit., pp. 111-41. For the debate on the origins of the
new strategy, and on the links between Protestant and Catholic ideas and projects see
Luigi Donvito, Mario Rosa, ' Pauperismo, carita e assistenza pubblica in Francia e in
Italia nell'eta moderna', Ouaderni storici, No. 27 (1974), pp. 914-32; Flavio Baroncelli,
Giovanni Assereto, 'Pauperismo e religione nell'eta moderna', Societa e storia, No. 7
(1980), pp. 169-201; Mario Rosa, 'Chiesa, idee sui poveri e assistenza in Italia dal
Cinque al Settecento', Societa e storia, No.10 (1980), pp. 775-806; Robert Jutte,
'Poor Relief and Social Discipline in Sixteenth-Century Europe', European Studies
Review, vol. 11 (Jan. 1981), pp. 25-52; Michele Fatica, 'II "De Subventione pauperum"
di J. L. Vives: suggestioni luterane o mutamento di una mentalita collettiva?', Societa e
storia, No. 15 (1982), pp. 1-30; B. Pullan, The Old Catholicism, the New Catholicism,
and the Poor', in Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna , cit., pp. 13-26; Edoardo
Grendi, 'Ideologia della carita e societa disciplinata: la costruzione del sistema
assistenziale genovese (1470-1670)', ibidem, pp. 59-76.
J. P. Gutton, La societe et les pauvres en Europe (XVI-XVIII siecles), cit. pp. 122-57; C.
Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 116-29; Luigi
Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nell'ltalia del Settecento', Transactions of the Fifth
international congress on the Enlightenment, in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century, vol. 191 (Oxford, 1980), pp. 914-20; A. Pastore, 'Strutture assistenziali fra
Chiesa e Stati nell'ltalia della Controriforma', cit., pp. 444-50; S. Woolf, 'Introduction;
the poor and society in western Europe', cit., pp. 28-31. Criticism of workhouses, as
well as fanciful alternative solutions can be found in Melchiorre Gioja, 'Problema: quali
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In Italy Alberghi dei Poveri, Case d'lndustria, and traditional charities - run by
the clergy, confraternities, city authorities, founders, or administrative boards set
up according to the founders' will - coexisted well into the twentieth century.
Reforms had been carried out in the period of the Enlightenment in Lombardy,
Tuscany and the duchies of Modena and Parma 15. They were based on the concept -
diffused in Italy by the Modenese economist Ludovico Ricci - that alms foster idleness
sono i mezzi piu spediti, piu efficaci, piu economici per alleviare I'attuale miseria del
popolo in Europa. Discorso popolare. (Colle note aggiunte alia seconda edizione
dell'Aprile 1817)', in M. Gioja, Opere minori (Ruggia, Lugano, 1834), vol. X, pp. 265-
375, passim and especially pp. 280-320. For case studies see E. Grendi, 'Pauperismo e
Albergo dei Poveri nella Genova del Seicento', Idem, La repubblica aristocratica dei
Genovesi (II Mulino, Bologna, 1987), pp. 227-79 (originally in Nuova Rivista Storica,
No. 4, (1975); M. Fatica, 'La reclusione dei poveri a Roma durante il pontificato di
Innocenzo XII (1692-1700)', Ricerche per la storia religiosa di Roma , 3 (Storia e
Letteratura, Rome,1979), pp. 133-79; Irene Polverini Fosi, 'Lo stato e i poveri:
I'esempio senese fra seicento e settecento', Ricerche Storiche , X (1980), pp.93-115;
M. Fatica, 'La regolarizzazione dei mendicanti attraverso il lavoro: I'ospizio dei poveri
di Modena nel Settecento', Studi Storici, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1982, pp. 757-782; Marco
Dubini, ' "Padroni di niente". Poverta e assistenza a Como tra medioevo ed eta
moderna', in Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna , cit., pp. 103-20; Roberto
Navarrini, Carlo M. Belfanti, 'II problema della poverta nel ducato di Mantova: aspetti
istituzionali e problemi sociali (secoli XIV-XVI)', ibidem, pp. 121-36; Paolo Simoncelli,
'Note sul sistema assistenziale a Roma nel XVI secolo', ibidem, pp. 137-56; I. Polverini
Fosi, 'Pauperismo ed assistenza a Siena durante il principato mediceo', ibidem, pp.157-
64; Daniela Lombardi, 'Poveri a Firenze: programmi e realizzazioni della politica
assistenziale dei Medici tra cinque e seicento', ibidem, pp. 165-84; Giovanni Muto,
'Forme e contenuti economicidell'assistenza nel Mezzogiorno moderno: il caso di Napoli',
ibidem, pp. 237-58; Aurelio Musi, 'Pauperismo e pensiero giuridico a Napoli nella prima
meta del secolo XVII', ibidem, pp. 259-74; Lodovico Branca, 'Pauperismo, assistenza e
controllo sociale a Firenze (1621-1632): materiali e ricerche', Archivio storico
toscano , No. 517, 3 of 1983, pp. 421-462; Saverio Russo, 'Potere pubblico e carita
privata. L'assistenza ai poveri a Lucca tra XVI e XVII secolo', Societa e storia , No. 23,
1984, pp. 45-80; Daniela Lombardi, 'L'Ospedale dei mendicanti nella Firenze del
seicento. "Da inutile serraglio dei mendici a conservatory e casa di forza per le donne',
ibidem, No. 24, 1984, pp. 289-311.
1 5 A. Pastore, 'Strutture assistenziali fra Chiesa e Stati nell'ltalia della Controriforma',
cit., pp. 462-5; A. Setti, 'Ludovico Ricci o la beneficenza pubblica nel secolo scorso',
Nuova Antologia , vol. 53, 1880,; 'Le opere pie di Reggio d'Emilia', R. B. P., No. 3,
1880, pp. 234-235; Andrea Balletti, L'Abbate Giuseppe Ferrari-Bonini e le riforme
civili della beneficenza nel secolo XVIII (Calderini, Reggio Emilia, 1886), pp. 123-128;
Statistica del Regno d'ltalia , Le opere pie nel 1861 , Lombardia (Le Monnier, Florence,
1868), pp. V-XI; 'Una splendida pagina della storia della beneficenza italiana. La
Congregazione di Carita di Milano', R.B.P., No. 9, 1888, pp. 679-683; Storia di Milano
(Fondazione Treccani , Milan, 1959), vol. XII, pp. 360-372, 375-376; vol. XIV, pp.
801-831; Riccardo Bottoni, 'Le confraternite milanesi nell'eta di Maria Teresa: aspetti
e problemi', in Aldo De Maddalena, Ettore Rotelli, Germano Barbarisi (eds.), Economia,
istituzioni, cultura in Lombardia nell'eta di Maria Teresa , cit., vol. 3, pp. 595-607;
Ada Annoni, 'Assistenza e beneficenza nell'eta delle riforme', ibidem, pp. 897-990;
Luigi Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nella Toscana settecentesca', in Timore e carita. I
poveri nell'ltalia moderna , cit., pp.185-210; Gabriella Ferri Piccaluga, 'La riforma
della pubblica assistenza sotto il governo di Maria Teresa: I'architetto Francesco Croce
e la costruzione dell'albergo dei poveri di Milano', ibidem, pp. 211-24.
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and poverty and should be restricted if not abolished, and were aimed at centralizing
controls, grouping assets, and coordinating the distribution of relief 16. The French
continued the process of centralization and rationalization of welfare administration.
There were local variants, but charitable funds were mostly merged in the
municipally based Congregations of Charity, and supervised by the Interior Ministry.
Depots de mendicite' were set up to free the cities from beggars and set them to
work17. The novelties introduced by the French had little time to take root and were
abolished by the restored monarchs nearly everywhere; but, even where they were
partially maintained - as in the Papal States and the Bourbon Kingdom - they
16 Ricci's arguments (1787) echoed those of the Encyclopedie. In England similar attacks
on indiscriminate poor relief had been launched as early as 1704 by Defoe (Giving Alms
no Charity and employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation ). They were further
developed by Townsend, Alcock, Malthus, Burke and Bentham at the end of the
eighteenth century, and contributed to the reform of 1834. In Belgium, the Netherlands,
Austria and Prussia reforms based on similar tenets were elaborated and implemented
with various results around 1780. See Augusto Setti, 'Ludovico Ricci o la beneficenza
pubblica nel secolo scorso', cit., pp. 428-467; Karl Polanyi, Origins of our time. The
great transformation (Gollancz, London, 1945), pp. 112-21; J. R. Poynter, Society and
Pauperism. English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795-1834 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1969), pp. 39-76, 106-212, 223-48, 272-329; J. P. Gutton, La societe et les pauvres
en Europe (XVI-XVIII siecles), cit., pp. 158-95; S. Woolf, 'La formazione del
proletariato (secoli XVIIl-XIX)' in Storia d'ltalia, Annali 1 (Einaudi, Turin, 1978), p.
1065; C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 194-
214; Alan Forrest, The French Revolution and the Poor (Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1981), pp. 10, 16-20, 26-28; Colin Jones, Charity and bienfaisance. The treatment of
the poor in the Montpellier region 1740-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1982),
pp. 2-3.
1 7 For the Napoleonic welfare reforms in Italy see Daniele Menozzi, 'Pauperismo e
assistenza nel triennio giacobino. II caso di Bologna', Ibidem, pp. 297-315; Daniela
Maldini, 'II depot de mendicite' del dipartimento di Po: analisi di una struttura
assistenziale del Piemonte napoleonico', ibidem, pp. 331-46; Giovanni Assereto,
'Aspetti dell'assistenza pubblica a Genova nei primi anni dell'ottocento', ibidem, pp.
347-58; S. Woolf, 'The treatment of the poor in Napoleonic Tuscany, 1808-1814', in
Annuario dell'lstituto storico Italiano per Teta moderna e contemporanea, vol. 23-
24,1971-72, (Rome 1975), pp. 435-74 (now in Woolf, The Poor in Western Europe in
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries , cit., pp. 76-117); Woolf, 'Problems in the
history of pauperism in Italy, 1800-1815', in Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia
moderna , cit., pp. 317-30 (now in Woolf, The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Centuries , cit., pp. 128-45); Edoardo Bressan, Poverta e assistenza in
Lombardia nell'etd napoleonica (Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-Roma-Bari, 1985), pp. 5-39;
Lucia Valenzi, 'La poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del governo francese', in Aurelio
Lepre (ed.), Studi sul regno di Napoli nel decennio francese (1806-1815) (Liguori,
Naples, 1985), pp. 59-79; Gabriella Botti, 'L'organizzazione sanitaria nel Decennio',
ibidem, pp. 81-98; D. Maldini, 'La legislazione napoleonica e il pauperismo in Piemonte',
in Ercole Sori (ed.), Citta e controllo sociale in Italia tra XVIII e XIX secolo (Angeli,
Milan, 1982), pp. 125-39; Maria Adele Teti, 'L'amministrazione del la pubblica
beneficenza in Calabria Ultra dal 1809 al 1830', Ibidem, pp. 141-43.
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appeared incapable of altering substantially the monopoly enjoyed by uncoordinated
and privately-funded charities 18. This monopoly was certainly strongly embedded in
the Italian cultural traditions; but, as evidence of success and failure of welfare
reforms elsewhere in Europe indicates, the scant success of welfare reform was
probably due to the stagnant state of Italian economy. In the absence of strong labour
demand, there was little advantage in rendering the distribution of relief more
selective. Excessively discontented poor were a threat to public order. The
complaints against indiscriminate alms of Ricci and his fellows were an indicator of
the changing mind of the bourgeoisie, and their awareness that industry needed free
labour. But they alsolii^lifted a situation of chronic labour surplus. Alms could not
eliminate poverty, and probably had a degrading moral effect on their recipients. But
conversely all attempts to force the poor to work were bound to fail, unless a strong
economy could take full advantage of workhouses, thus rendering free work in
factories and farms more palatable than coercive employment. In any stagnant
economy, abundant alms, or coercion to work in artificially created workfare
schemes, made little difference, in this respect the Tuscans Pompeo Neri and
Francesco Maria Gianni, as well as the Piedmontese Giambattista Vasco were more
realistic, as they analysed mendicancy and cyclic unemployment in the context of the
whole economy, and thus rufed the possibility of banning beggary by means of
compulsory settlement or coercive work schemes 19.
1.2. 'Giving alms no charity and employing the poor a grievance to the nation'.
The Papal States offered a fine example of how a welfare system largely based on
private charity but partly financed by the state worked in a stagnant economy, where
the population growth was not matched by the growth of resources. Domenico
Demarco attributed this imbalance to
For the Bourbon Kingdom see below, chapter 5. The statistical enquiry of 1880 showed
that the Italian charities were extremely fragmented and decentralized. It seems
reasonable to infer that whatever levels of centralization had been achieved earlier,
they had no permanent effect. See below, chapter 8.
P. Neri, 'Memoria sulla Mendicita' [1767], in F. Venturi (ed.), Illuministi Italiani, Tomo
III, Riformatori Lombardi, Piemontesi e Toscani (Ricciardi, Milan-Naples, 1958), pp.
967-78; F. M. Gianni, 'Discorso sui poveri' [1804], ibidem, pp. 1003-27; G. Vasco,
'Risposta al quesito proposto dalla Reale Accademia delle Scienze con suo programma
de' 4 Gennaio 1788: Quali sieno i mezzi di provvedere al sostentamento degi operai
soliti impiegarsi al torcimento delle sete ne' filatoi, qualora questa classe d'uomini cosi
utile al Piemonte viene ridotta agli estremi dell'indigenza per mancanza di lavoro
cagionata da scarzezza di seta', ibidem, pp. 799-807.
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...the development of a threefold unhealthy process: the extreme misery of the
farm-labourers and shepherds of the Agro Romano and latifundia; the
destitution of the populace in the towns; the abundant relief provided by
private individuals and the State 20.
Between 1816 and 1848 the population grew by a quarter, whilst the means of
subsistence decreased. In the province of Bologna the wheat production increased by
only a ninth in the period 1819-1846. The same trend applied to other
agricultural products 21. The number of farm-labourers grew constantly, as a
result of the impoverishment of the other groups of peasants. These were either
sharecroppers or medium and small landowners 22. Sharecropping contracts varied
by zone and were usually more generous on the plairuthan in the mountain areas, but
in general, sharecroppers were poor, deprived of proper tools and seed, and greatly
indebted to the land-owners. The working and living conditions of the tenant-farmers
were appalling. Only long-term leaseholders (enfiteuti ) had ItfssPrecontracts and
enjoyed relatively better conditions 23. The medium and small land-owners were
even worse off. A sharecropper could sometime rely for help on the generosity of his
land-lord, but the medium and small proprietors had to pay land-tax and other local
contributions, on top of the indirect taxes which vexed all categories of citizens.
Between 1815 and 1845 the land-tax doubled, while the prices of wheat and other
agricultural products dropped. This created a situation in which the land revenue did
not suffice to pay the direct and indirect taxes. Around Ravenna, in 1848, the land
tax amounted to 4.34 scudi for every 100 scudi of puka*value, swallowing up the
entire revenue of the land. With the addition of indirect taxes, the total tax rate
20 Domenico Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio (Einaudi, Turin, 1949), p.23.
21 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio , cit., pp. 87-88; Renzo Paci, Agricoltura e
vita urbana nelle Marche: Senigallia fra Settecento e Ottocento (Giuffre, Milan, 1962),
pp. 135-141; Mario Caravale, Alberto Caracciolo, Lo Stato pontificio da Martino V a
Pio IX (UTET, Turin, 1978), pp. 625-29, 689-94.
22 Sharecropping prevailed in the Marches, in Umbria, in the province of Bologna and in the
Romagne, and was also very common in Tuscany. Sharecropping was a contract where
the land-owner paid for the land-tax and upkeep of the farmhouse, receiving from his
tenant a share of the products. Literally this was a half, but effectively it was usually
more. The sub-varieties of sharecropping were endless and rooted in local tradition. In
the province of Ferrara the most common agrarian contract was the boaria - a
variation of sharecropping contract in which the tenant received a fixed salary in
money (boaria pura), or part in money, part in kind (boaria mista ). See Demarco, II
tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 36-39.
23 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 40-45. The emphyteutic contracts,
of classic origin, were long-term leases where the tenant was due - as the name
implies - to improve the land by cultivating it. The rent was either paid in kind (1/6 -
1/8 of the products), or in money. In this case the sum was fixed at the beginning of the
contract and could be increased only at the renewal. See Ettore Favara, 'Enfiteusi', in
Novissimo Digesto Italiano, vol.VI (U.T.E.T., Turin, 1960), pp. 538-553.
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reached 6% of the estimated value. Thus, to pay taxes, the farmers were obliged to
mortgage their properties at interest rates which were usually higher than those of
land revenue. Mortgaged properties were 37% of the total in the province of Bologna
- ten million scudi jrotfl a total of twenty seven - and in the whole State they were
one third of the total (220 million scudi). Medium and small land-owners as well as
sharecroppers were prey to the usurers, since there were no modern rural banks
and the Monti Frumentari were of little use. A few rich land-owners were ready to
swallow up the small properties, and their destitute ex-owners had no choice but to
join the ranks of the farm-labourers 24.
Farm labourers were increasing in number, but their job opportunities were
shrinking, for demand was affected (both/by) the general crisis and the introduction of
prairie-cultivation, that required little labour. Moreover, agricultural crisis
generated stagnation in manufacturing. The artistic craftsmanship and the woollen
manufactures of Rome were in crisis, like the woollen and silk mills of Bologna. The
salaries of the urban workers were low, while the prices of food, rents, and taxes
were rising 25. The outcome was an increase in pauperism, vagrancy, mendicancy
and crime. Demarco estimated that around the 1850s 17.65% of the Papal States'
population consisted of 'servants and poor' 26. Another indicator of the growing
poverty was the rise in crime. In the province of Rome and Comarca the criminal
cases had been 4,706 in 1843, 5,894 in 1844, 7,121 in 1845, 7,179 in 1846,
and 4,360 in the first semester of 1847 27.
24 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 46-55; Idem, Pio IX e la
rivoluzione romana del 1848. Saggio di storia economico-sociale (Soc.Tip. Modenese,
1947), pp. 82-83. Between 1837 and 1846 in six communes of the province of Bologna
- Molinella, Baricella, Persiceto, Medicina, Budrio, and Castenaso - farmers and
tenant-farmers decreased by 6.7%, wage-labourers incresead by 10.6%, while land¬
owners, merchants and artisans increased by 4.7%. See Demarco, II tramonto dello
Stato Pontificio, cit., p. 58, fn.2.
25 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 55-62; 79-93; Enzo Piscitelli, 'Le
classi sociali a Bologna nel secolo XVIII', Nuova Rivista Storica , XXXVIII (1954), pp.
103-105, 110,113-116; Paci, Agricoltura e vita urbana nelle Marche..., cit., pp. MS-
MS; M. Caravale, A. Caracciolo, Lo Stato pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX , cit., pp.
629-31, 694-98.
2® Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 22-24. Other data indicate that
Bologna in 1775 had 16,000 beggars, about 23% of the city's population. In 1844 the
proportion of 'assisted, mendicants, and people of uncertain occupation' was 18.62%,
according to one estimate, 17.5% according to another. See E. Piscitelli, 'Le classi
sociali a Bologna nel secolo XVIII', cit., pp. 107-108; Luigi Dal Pane, Economia e societa
a Bologna nell'eta del Risorgimento (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1969), pp. 619-621.
27 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., p.102. The Comarca included the
towns of Albano, Frascati, Genzano, Palestrina, Subiaco and Tivoli, see ibidem, p. 19,
fn.2.
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The Papal government used three methods to keep poverty at bay: food-price laws
(leggi annonarie), to keep the bread price artificially low, public works -
uncoordinated and improductive - set up each winter to give relief to the unemployed
labourers pouring into the towns from the mountains and countryside, and alms
provided by both the Treasury and private charity. The annona system was
abandoned in 1800, when the cereal market was liberalized. However it seems that
no economic reform capable of modernizing agriculture accompanied the abandonment
of the annona , as the principal objective of switching to the free market was still
that of securing cheap food supplies for Rome 28. Public works and alms continued.
The Papal States abounded in charities and welfare schemes, as noted by a number of
foreign authors, notably Sismondi and Bowring 29. The latter calculated that in 1835
State welfare expenditure was about 300,000 scudi, i.e. 3.78% of the total. Most of
the sum (260,000 scudi) came from the general revenues, while 40,000 scudi
were from the state-lottery proceeds 30. Most of this expenditure was fragmented in
a variety of small benefits 31. On top of this there were private charities, whose
revenues around 1835 amounted to about 260,000 scudi a year, according to
Bowring. Welfare expenditure kept growing. In 1842 in Rome it averaged 820,000
scudi, of which 440,000 Trom the treasury and the rest from the charities. The
Commissione dei sussidi alone distributed benefits for a total of 112,388 scudi. The
majority of the subsidized -16,846 people - received daily benefits, while another
1,420 got monthly or occasional benefits. In Rome, the peple depending on out-door
28 For the mechanism of the food laws see Franco Venturi, '1764-1767: Roma negli anni
della fame', Rivista storica italiana , LXXXV (sept.1973), pp. 514-543, notably 514,
516-521, 531-543; Mario Tosti, 'Poveri, carestia e strutture assistenziali nello Stato
della Chiesa: il caso di Perugia (1764-67)', Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia , No.
1, (1983) pp. 143-172, notably pp. 165-169; Alberto Guenzi, 'Sistema annonario e
controllo sociale a Bologna nei secoli XVII e XVIII', in E. Sori (ed.), Citta e controllo
sociale in Italia tra XVIII e XIX secolo , cit., pp. 293-306. For the passage to the free
market see Renata Ago, 'Popolo e papi. La crisi del sistema annonario', in Annali della
Fondazione Basso-lssoco, Vol. VII, Subalterni in tempo di modernizzazione, cit., pp. 17-
47.
29 Sismondi, 'De la condition des cultivateurs dans la Campagne de Rome', Etudes
d'economie politique, tome II, Paris, 1838, pp. 63-64 66, quoted in Demarco, II
tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., p. 97, fn. 1; John Bowring, 'Report on the
Statistics of Tuscany, Lucca, the Pontifical, and the Lombardo-Venetian States, with a
special reference to their commercial relations', London, 1837, Parliamentary Papers,
Reports from Commissioners , XVI, 1839, pp. 90-91, also quoted by Demarco, II
tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., p. 97, fn. 1 and passim.
30 Bowring, ' Report...', cit., pp. 72; 74; 90.
3^ For instance, the destitute girls of Rieti were awarded each year four dowries of 7.50
scudi each; 30 scudi were divided in seven awards for the destitute of Todi, who
attached so much importance to these minimal alms that the Royal Commissioner for
Umbria, Pepoli, agreed on maintaining the tradition for 1860. See A.S.T., Sez. I,
Governi Provvisori, 1859-61, Umbria, Mazzo (henceforth: M.) 5, ff. 19, 20.
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relief provided by the State were 11.81% of the population, a figure likely to
increase if , private alms were counted. On top of this there were the Pope's
alms, amounting to at least 30-40,000 scudi a year. Papal alms were usually
distributed on the occasion of the main religious festivities, and were particularly
generous after the election of a new Pontiff 32.
Alongside state and private alms, public works for the unemployed were the other
distinctive feature of the welfare system in the Papal States. These works were
highly profitable but were often the only means of survival for large numbers of
unemployed labourers, especially in winter. In the autumn of 1830 the Mayor of
Senigallia - who had been refused permission to appropriate for public works a sum
exceeding the 4,000 scudi approved in the city's budget - stressed that, out of
21,000 people, 15,000 depended on those works for survival 33. In Rome alone the
public works expenditure rose from 26,000 scudi a year under Pius VIII (1829-
30) to 33,377 in 1835, reached its peak in 1837j coinciding with the cholera
epidemic (66,000 scudi) and declined around 1842, when 52,000 scudi
were just enough to keep occupied 1,000 workers a day. The daily pay was low and
constantly decreased over the years: from twenty bajocchi plus bread under Leo XII
(1823-29), to fifteen bajocchi in 1842. On the other hand, according to the
accounts of foreign travellers, the discipline was so lax and the workers so lazy, that
such low salaries were really gratuitous benefits. The number of applicants was huge
and the admission rules set up by the City authorities strict. Yet, in periods of social
crisis and unrest, the rules had to be loosened, as in 1848, when about 2,000 people
were admitted to the public works 34.
In that year the whole charity system of the Papal States collapsed. In a desperate
attempt to keep peace and order the Commune of Rome spent on public works various
32 Bowring, 'Report...', cit., p.90; Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp.
96, 98, fn. 1; id., Pio IX e la rivoluzione romana del 1848. Saggio di storia economico-
sociale, cit., p.10; R. Paci, Agricoltura e vita urbana nelle Marche: Senigallia fra
Settecento e Ottocento , cit., p. 144. The Legazione of Bologna was awarded 300 scudi
a month for benefits and alms plus a special contribution at Christmas. In 1858 this
amounted to 1,059.68 scudi of which 870.70 were distributed to more than 6,300
people in small benefits of 25, 15 and 10 bajocchi. The remaining 188.98 scudi were
divided in fewer and bigger benefits for very needy families and charities. See A.S.T.,
Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow.,1859-61, Romagne, M. 45, f. 4: the Intendent of Bologna, No.
2419, Sez.I, Aug. 1859, to the Finance Dept., Bologna; A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov.
Provv.,1859-61, Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 43, f. 9/2: the Int. of Bologna, No.
6834, Sez.I, 10 Dec. 1859, to M.I., Bologna.
33 R. Paci, Agricoltura e vita urbana nelle Marche: Senigallia fra Settecento e Ottocento,
cit., pp. 141-143.
34 Demarco, II tramonto dello Stato Pontificio, cit., pp. 98-100; Pio IX e la rivoluzione
romana del 1848. Saggio di storia economico-sociale , cit., p. 123.
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funds belonging to other departments. But this was not enough. At the beginning of
November 1848 the salaries of the welfare workers had to be cut, and this provoked
the first riots which were a prelude to the great insurrection of Rome. The same was
happening in Bologna, whose exhausted finances could not support 9-10,000 people.
In August 1848 the figure was reduced to 6,000, but in the autumn the Commune had
to open new work schemes. The system perpetuated itself in a vicious circle. During
the reforming period which opened the Pontificate of Pius IX a new approach to the
problem of poverty had been attempted, and many speeches had been made about the
need to educate the young to provide them with useful skills and to prevent idleness.
Even something practical was done, for a technical school was opened in Rome. But it
was too little and too late. Thus, when the crisis came, the government could only
rely on appeals to private charity, pious Committes of ladies and priests, public
works, benefits and food-price laws 35. These were the last effects of a system judged
as follows by John Bowring in 1837:
... Perhaps nowhere can the consequences of indiscriminating charity be better
traced than in the Roman States, - nowhere is money scattered with more
liberal hand,- nowhere is there more mendicity, more squalor, more
wretchedness, more idleness, more want. The supply of money is regulated by
the demand for misery which injudicious almsgiving creates, the universality of
beggary removes all sense of its shame and the motives to labour are swept
away by the stronger and ever present motives to idleness 36.
1.3. Processes of impoverishment.
Following the tracks of the writers of the Enlightenment both Bowring and Demarco
attributed the increase in pauperism to the overabundance of indiscriminate alms,
although the latter described the mechanisms of peasant proletarianization. In our
opinion both were right to point out that throwing money at the problem of poverty
was no solution. Rather, it made it worse, since the money spent on unproductive
charity had to be recovered through taxes which were ultimately paid by the poor.
But they failed to see the root of the problem, for in the Papal States pauperism
stemmed from increasing fiscal pressure and economic stagnation in both agriculture
and manufacturing. The ineffectivess of that welfare system and the distortions it
introduced in the economy can only be fully understood in that context. As Stuart
Woolf put it
35 Demarco, Pio IX e la rivoluzione romana del 1848. Saggio di storia economico-sociale,
cit., pp. 12-13, 19, 22, 33, 41-42, 44-47, 55, 122-126, 131.
33 Bowring, 'Report...', cit., p. 90.
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... Whether approached quantitatively or qualitatively, in terms of composition
or causality, the history of the poor can only be fully analysed when studied in
relationship with both long-term structural and short-term conjunctural
changes in the economy and in society 3^.
A detailed account of the economic transformations occurring in nineteenth-century
Italy and their pauperizing effects would add unduly to the length of this work, but it
is necessary to describe the general economic context in which charities operated and
legislation on charities evolved, to see what rationale underlay legislative change, or
the lack of it.
By the eighteenth century the Italian economy had undergone a transformation whose
origins dated back to the sixteenth century. The control of cities over the countryside
had been greatly reduced. Urban production was limited to luxury goods for a
restricted market, while the countryside provided food to the cities, as well as
agricultural produce and semi-finished manufactures for the export market. Thus in
the context of the international economy Italy had receded to the role of provider of
raw and semi-raw materials. Within the internal economy the cities produced little
and enjoyed privileges - notably cheap food supplies regulated by the food laws, to
keep the populace tranquil - and the countryside produced for both the cities and the
export market. Moreover, the countryside also provided the greatest share of fiscal
revenue, since it was the principal generator of income. The rural population
suffered devastating long-term effects from the combination of heavy fiscal
pressure, forced surplus extraction through the food laws, and the recurrence of
plagues and dearth - due either to natural causes, or to war, or both 38.
Around the 1730s the economy of the peninsula began to move out of secular
stagnation, although not uniformly. Population increased, cities grew, roads and
ports were improved, the banking system became stronger. These factors, combined
with the European trend of high agricultural prices, stimulated agricultural
productivity, which rose considerably. Forests were cleared, marshlands were
reclaimed, marginal land was put under cultivation. At the beginning of the
37 S.J Woolf, 'Problems in the history of pauperism in Italy, 1800-1815', in Timore e
carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna , cit., p. 317 (now in The Poor in Western Europe ,
cit., p. 128). See also Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in Western Europe',
ibidem, pp. 9-11; Woolf, 'La formazione del proletariato (secoli XVIII-XIX)', cit., pp.
1049-50; C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industriai Europe , cit., pp. xi-
xv.
38 S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3 (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp.
23-32; Idem, 'The poor, proto-industrialization and the working class: Italy (sixteenth
to nineteenth centuries)', in id., The Poor in Western Europe, cit., pp. 50-55; Idem, 'La
formazione del proletariato (secoli XVIII-XIX)', cit., pp. 1050-55.
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ninenteenth century the arable land had increased by at least ten percent. But these
modifications of the Italian agrarian landscape were not everywhere synonymous vVit'k
capitalistic transformation. In the South cultivation remained by and large extensive,
based on cereal monoculture, and with low yields. By contrast in the Centre-North -
notably in Lombardy - agriculture became intensive. New cultures were introduced,
such as maize, rice, fodder, and the mulberry tree. Cattle and dairy production
increased, cultural rotations accelerated, silkworm breeding spread considerably, as
did silk reeling, which became an important source of income, and was increasingly
organized by the capitalistic landlords. These transformations - combined with the
increasing efficiency of tax collection - adversely affected the peasants, whose living
standards worsened. Pauperism and mendicancy increased 39.
The favourable economic trend was reversed after the fall of Napoleon. Agricultural
prices fell all over Europe. After the famine of 1816-1817, Italian agriculture had
to compete on the European markets in unfavourable conditions. In the mid-
nineteenth century bad harvests and the pebrina - a disease of the silkworm - had
serious and long-lasting effects on the weakest economies of the peninsula. Those
areas where modernization had started during the previous period of prosperity
reacted rather well. The silk industry of Lombardy not only resisted the crisis, but
became stronger. In Piedmont modernization of the infrastructures and
industrialization continued at a moderate but steady pace. In these areas the spreading
of capitalistic farming liberated masses of dispossessed peasants, but the close net of
economic activities involved in a manufacturing economy that was still largely
proto-industrial, meant that pauperism could be contained within certain limits. But
those areas where the extension of arable was unaccompanied by the introduction of
modern farming, and thereby did not benefit from any subsequent economic
development, entered a long period of crisis. As a result, agrarian contracts became
harsher and the conditions of peasants worsened. Rural pauperism became
structural, as it was the outcome of long-term agricultural stagnation 40.
Whether caused by stagnation, or by economic change, pauperism was a widespread
condition, as evidence gathered by recent research abundantly shows 41. Indicators of
39 S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3 (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp.
32-45; Alberto Caracciolo, 'La storia economica', ibidem, pp. 515-62; Dino
Carpanetto, Giuseppe Recuperati, Italy in the age of reason 1685-1789 (Longman,
London & N. York, 1987), pp. 2-53.
40 Alberto Caracciolo, 'La storia economica', cit., pp. 563-68, 577-85, 616-45.
41 Among the vast bibliography see R. John Rath, 'The Habsburgs and the great depression
in Lombardy-Venetia', 1814-18', The Journal of Modern History, XIII, No. 3 (Sept.
1941), pp. 305-20; Bruno Caizzi, 'La crisi economica del Lombardo-Veneto nel decennio
1850-59', Nuova Rivista Storica, XLII (1958), pp. 205-22; Anna Lucia Forti Messina,
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both the falling living standards of peasants, and their defensive strategies are
sparse, but abundant. They concern diet, temporary and permanent emigration, and
alternative employment. Traditionally the diet of the poor tended to beMhbalanced and
lacking in essential nutrients 42. However further changes in the popular diet
occurred all over western and central Europe after 1750, as peasants responded to
impoverishment by switching to cheaper and faster growing foods. Wheat, barley and
rye were replaced by potatoes in northern Europe, and by maize in southern Europe.
Maize polenta became the staple food of peasants in the plains of northern and central
Italy, while the poor of the mountains resorted to potatoes, cabbage, turnips, and
chestnuts. Maize did not replace wheat and barley in southern Italy, but meat
disappeared from the peasant diet, and wine consumption increased. Diets almost
exclusively based on polenta were low in essential proteins and vitamins and caused
pellagra, a complex of disturbances of the nervous system which could ultimately
lead to manic depression and dementia. Goitre and mental degeneration (cretinismo)
due to malnutrition were endemic In the Alpine valleys. In northern Italy throughout
the nineteenth century pellagra and other mental conditions linked to malnutrition
'Agitazioni e scioperi operai a Milano all'indomani dell'unita', Nuova Rivista Storica, Lll
(1968), pp. 73-113; Franco Delia Peruta, 'Le campagne lombarde nel Risorgimenlo, in
Idem, Democrazia e socialismo nel Risorgimento (Riuniti, Rome, 1973, 2nd ed.), pp. 37-
58; Idem, 'I contadini nella rivoluzione lombarda del 1848', ibidem, pp. 59-108; Idem,
'Per la storia della societa lombarda nell'eta della Restaurazione', Studi storici, 2
(1975), pp. 305-39; Idem, 'Aspetti della societa italiana nell'ltalia della
Restaurazione', Ibidem, 2 (1976), pp. 27-68; Alberto Cova, 'II problema dell'alto
prezzo dei generi alimentari a Milano negli anni 1871-1874', Bollettino dell'Archivio
per la storia del Movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, 1 (1974), pp. 52-77; Volker
Hunecke, 'Comune e classe operaia a Milano (1859-1898), Studi Storici, 3 (1976), pp.
63-96; Carlo Carozzi, 'Le abitazioni nei capoluoghi di provincia italiani intorno al 1880:
alia ricerca di alcune differenze tra Nord e Sud', Storia urbana, 3 (1977), pp. 141-71,
now in A. De Clementi (ed.), La societa' inafferrabile (Lavoro, Rome, 1986), pp. 133-
48; Paolo Macry, 'Borghesie, citta e Stato. Appunti e impressioni su Napoli. 1860-
1880', Quaderni storici, 56 (1984), pp. 339-83, now in La societa' inafferrabile , cit.,
pp. 149-80.
42 Anna Bellinazzi, 'Malnutrizione cerebrale e ipoalimentazione da poverta (secoli XVII-
XVIII)', in Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna, cit., pp. 375-90.
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were the cause of at least fifty percent of internments in mental hospitals, whose
geographical distribution mirrored the gravity of the problem 43.
Temporary emigration was a traditional self-defensive device of the peasant
economy, in Italy as in Europe, dating back to the Middle Ages. It provided some extra
cash and relieved the household of mouths to feed during the winter months. But,
during the ninenteenth century, in Italy as in Europe, demographic growth and the
increasing capitalistization of agriculture made temporary emigration a solution no
longer viable to many. Hence growing numbers of peasants resorted to permanent
emigration to the Americas. The phenomenon first concerned the north of Italy -
notably Liguria, Piedmont and Venetia - and later in the century spread to the south
of the peninsula. The peaks were reached in the early 1900s. In 1903 the average
number of emigrants was 500,000, between 1909 and 1913 the yearly figures rose
from 626,000 to 873,000 44. Emigration was the last resort of those who could
find no job at home, and was common in those areas where slow economic growth did
not match the growing supply of labour. But where the economy was healthier the
rural poor could resort to another strategy to make ends meet. Rural industry was
quite old, dating back to the sixteenth century, when manufacture moved from the
cities to the countryside. Also known as the putting-out system, it was the base of
commercial capitalism throughout western Europe. Small-holders, tenant-farmers,
and wage-labourers were a large reservoir of cheap labour for the textile merchant-
entrepreneurs. In winter, when cultivation required little or no time, the whole
peasant family could switch to spinning, weaving and knitting. The value of fixed
43 C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 180-1; C.
Lis, Social change and the labouring poor. Antwerp, 1770-1860 (Yale Univ. Press, New
Haven & London, 1986), pp. 86-101; S. Woolf, 'The poor, proto-industrialization and
the working class: Italy (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries)', in id., The Poor in Western
Europe, cit., pp. 58-9; Gauro Coppola, 'La pellagra in Lombardia dal Settecento alia
prima meta dell'Ottocento', in Mario Romani (ed.), Le campagne lombarde tra Sette e
Ottocento (Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1976), pp. 141-71; Patrizia Bresolin, 'Contributo
alia conoscenza delle condizioni di vita dei contadini lombardi tra Sette e Ottocento' in
Sergio Zaninelli (ed.), Questioni di storia agricola lombarda nei secoli XVIII-XIX (Vita e
Pensiero, Milan, 1979), pp. 11-96; Enrica Melossi, 'Gozzo e cretinismo nelle vallate
alpine', Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 391-8; Alberto De Bernardi, 'Pellagra, sviluppo
capitalistico e disturbo mentale. Alcuni temi di ricerca', ibidem, pp. 399-416.
44 C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 188-94; S.
Woolf, 'The poor, proto-industrialization and the working class: Italy (sixteenth to
nineteenth centuries)', in id., The Poor in Western Europe, cit., pp. 56-7; Valerio
Castronovo, 'La storia economica', in Storia d'ltalia , vol. 4, part 1 (Einaudi, Turin,
1975), p. 149; Brunello Mantelli, 'Emigrazione', in Storia d'ltalia, 1 (La Nuova Italia,
Florence, 1978), pp. 281-301; M. Paci, 'Mercato del lavoro', Ibidem, 2, pp. 629-36;
Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, Maurizio degli Innocenti, L'emigrazione nella storia d'ltalia
1868/1975 (Vallecchi, Florence, 1978), 2 vols.; Ercole Sori, L'emigrazione italiana
dall'Unita alia seconda guerra mondiale (il Mulino, Bologna, 1979).
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capital involved was low, and merchants paid low wages - far lower than those of
urban textile workers - making therefore handsome profits, but for the peasants it
was a source of much-needed extra cash 45.
This is no place to enter the details of the debate on proto-industrialization 46, but
it must be stressed that rural industry played an important role in Italian
industrialization. According to recent research, in northern Italy proto-industrial
forms of production seem to have survived longer than in other parts of Europe,
thriving alongside the slowly-developing factory system. State-protected heavy
industry - steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, electricity - was to develop only at the end
of the ninenteenth century, whilst the first phase of industrialization was based on
the expansion of textile production which availed itself of both rural industry, and
factories. Thus for a long period the factory system did not oust rural industry, but
rather grew with it. The silk industry of Lombardy offers a typical example.
Moreover, capitalistic farming was slow to spread. The Inchiesta Jacini showed that
as late as 1884 big capitalistic farms, medium specialized farms, and small
intensive cultivations covered no more than one fifth of the total arable area.
Capitalisation of agriculture accelerated at the turn of the century in the north and
centre of the peninsula, but latifundia and extensive cultivation remained dominant
in the South 47. The peculiarity of the Italian mode of industrialization, and the slow
45 F. Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II, The wheels of
commerce (Collins, London, 1982), pp. 316-44; C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism
in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 33-39, 63, 104-8,134-5, 141-53.
4® Franklin Mendels, 'Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization
Process', The Journal of Economic History, vol. XXXII (1972), pp. 241-61; Gay L.
Gullickson, 'Agriculture and cottage industry: Redefining the Causes of Proto-
industrialization', The Journal of Economic History, vol. XLIII (1983), pp. 831-50; F.
Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II, The wheels of
commerce , cit., pp. 297-349; Carlo Poni, 'Premessa', Ouaderni storici, No. 52 (April
1983), pp. 5-10; F. Mendels, 'I rapporti tra artigianato e rivoluzione industriale nelle
Fiandre', Quaderni Storici, No. 59 (August 1985), pp. 343-72 and especially 348, 356-
9.
47 V. Castronovo, 'La storia economica', cit., pp. 99-101,117-25, 139-44; Idem, II
Piemonte (Einaudi, Turin, 1977), pp. 8-12; Giuseppe Berta, 'Dalla manifattura al
sistema di fabbrica: razionalizzazione e conflitti del lavoro', in Storia d'ltalia, Annali, 1
(Einaudi, Turin, 1978), pp. 1081-1106; Raffaele Romanelli, L'ltalia liberate (1861-
1900) (II Mulino, Bologna, 1979), pp. 285-305; Gianni Toniolo, Storia economica
dell'ltalia liberate 1850-1918 (II Mulino, Bologna, 1988), pp. 108-23; S. Woolf, 'The
poor, proto-industrialization and the working class: Italy (sixteenth to nineteenth
centuries)', in id., The Poor in Western Europe, cit., pp. 60-71; Franco Ramelia, Terra
e telai. Sistemi di parentela e manifattura nel Biellese dell'Ottocento (Einaudi, Turin,
1983); Salvatore Ciriacono, 'Protoindustria, lavoro a domicilio e sviluppo economico
nelle campagne venete in epoca moderna', in Quaderni storici, No. 52 (1983), pp. 57-
80; Alain Dewerpe, 'Genesi protoindustriale di una regione sviluppata: I'ltalia
settentrionale', in A. De Clementi (ed.), La societa' inafferrabile (Lavoro, Rome, 1986),
pp. 31-50; Roberto Romano, 'Le basi sociali di una localizzazione industriale: I'industria
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pace of agrarian transformation had important consequences for the whole issue of
poor relief. Charitable organizations tended to be stronger in the cities, while in the
countryside charities were usually few and poorly endowed 48. Thus the urban poor
had some chances of relief in times of distress, but for the rural poor recourse to
charity was probably the most difficult option, while family and village solidarity,
self-deprivation, and creation of additional sources of income through rural industry
dirf-
or emigration were those most at hand. Nowhere in Europevthe factory-system spread
quickly and linearly, but its large-scale introduction was often accompanied by
welfare reform. The necessity to make labour freely available to industry suggested
fchi
1o limit assistance to those unable to work, by abolishing out-relief to the able
bodied, or making it as selective as possible, for free work must be more attractive
than assistance. At least, this was the aim of social reformers. But theory and
practice often parted company, as the English experience showed 49. However, out-
relief rationalization was probably a less impelling necessity in a context where
charities did not provide over-abundant benefits, and where employment in industry
often did not entail total separation of the workers from their peasant background. A
family whose members partly span and wove at home, partly worked in the nearby
workshop, while other members tended the land, and yet others were abroad, sending
remittances from time to time, was less likely to require high levels of assistance,
than a family whose sole source of income was factory work. The latter was fully
cotoniera lombarda', ibidem, pp. 51-62; P. Corner, 'Manodopera agricola e industria
manifatturiera nella Lombardia postunitaria', ibidem, pp. 63-72; S. Ciriacono,
'L'industria a domicilio nel Veneto. Note a margine di un modello', Ibidem, pp. 73-92
(these four articles originally appeared on Annates E.S.C., 1984, pp. 896-914; Storia
urbana, No. 4, 1978, pp. 1-19; Studi storici, 1984, pp. 1019-27; A. Lazzarini (ed.),
Trasformazioni economiche e sociali nel Veneto tra XIX e XX secolo (Istituto per le
ricerche di storia sociale e di storia religiosa, Vicenza, 1984), pp. 567-88).
48 This was abundantly proved by the statistics of 1880. See below, chapter 8. The
pattern was the same in France. See Roger Price, 'Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-
Nineteenth- Century France', European Studies Review, vol. 13 (Oct. 1983), pp. 428-
38.
49 C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 153-71,
194-214; M. A. Crowther, The workhouse system 1834-1929 (Methuen, London,
1983); Anne Digby, British welfare policy. Workhouse to Workfare (Faber, London,
1989), pp. 29-47, 126-31; Michael M. Rose, 'Introduction', in Michael M. Rose (ed.),
The poor and the city: the English poor law in its urban context, 1834-1914 (Leicester
Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 2-13; Keith Gregson, 'Poor law and organized charity: the
relief of exceptional distress in north-east England, 1870-1910', ibidem, pp. 94-125.
The English reform of 1834 largely fell short of its targets. Out-relief was not
eliminated, and the workhouses - originally intended for the able-bodied - became the
last resort of those unable to work. In the industrial cities, in particular, the
workhouses could not cope with the high number of unemployed at recession time. The
Poor Law commissioners had to compromise, and more flexible forms of temporary
out-relief were eventually set up, with the help of independent charities.
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exposed to recession. The former drew its subsistence from a variety of activities
which were unlikely to slump all at the same time. Recent research suggests that
mutual support even in fast-developing centres 50~ oill the more so when the
workforce was still largely integrated in a rural context. This had relevant
consequences not only for the formation of the Italian proletariat 51, but also for
welfare policy.
50 C. Lis, Social change and the labouring poor. Antwerp, 1770-1860 , cit., pp. 150-62.
S. Woolf, 'The poor, proto-industrialization and the working class: Italy (sixteenth to
nineteenth centuries)', in id., The Poor in Western Europe, cit., pp. 47-9, 69-71;
Giovanni Gozzini, 'L'archivio della pia Casa di Lavoro a Firenze', in Passato e Presente,
No. 17 (May-August 1988), pp. 173-8.
neighbourhood solidarity still played an important role in providing
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2. Attitudes to poor relief during the Risoraimento.
2.1 .The moderates.
Welfare policy must be seen in its economic context, but its complexities and
nuances rest upon ideological premises. Therefore we now turn to the opinions of the
makers of the Risorgimento on poverty and poor relief, to see how their views
influenced the evolution of Italian charity legislation. We will first investigate the
approach of the moderates, given their hegemony in the unification process; and we
will pay particular attention to the Piedmontese, given their leading role within the
Italian moderate movement 1.
Restoration Piedmont was no haven of free-thinkers and social reformers.
Censorship was heavy. The clergy enjoyed the favour of the court and was opposed -
with a few exceptions - to any plan of enhancing public instruction that would
challenge its hold on the masses. Likewise, the privileged orders of society regarded
with great suspicion any effort aimed at the moral and intellectual emancipation of
the labouring poor. Those who actively pursued such undertakings - like the Abbot
Ferrante Aporti with his kindergartens, and Lorenzo Valerio with his 'Letture
popolari', later renamed 'Letture di famiglia' - had to behave very cautiously. Those
members of the propertied classes who were sensitive to the misery of the masses
were, by and large, happy with charitable donations, benefit balls, charity lotteries,
and the like. Nevertheless, the Piedmontese moderates - as well as those of the other
Italian states - were aware of the problems posed by pauperism. There was concern
for the conditions of the peasantry, working conditions in the manufactories were
being investigated and debated, and the evils of child and women labour were
publicized. A variety of pamphlets, books and articles were written to suggest
remedies and ways to improve the effectivness of charitable organizations 2.
A remarkable essay was the Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti
di beneficenza e delle carceri, written by Count Carlo llarione Petitti di Roreto and
1 For an overview of the Italian moderates see S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale',
in Storia d'ltalia, 3, (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp. 327-42, 350-61, 377-9, 466-96.
2 For a thorough discussion of all these topics see Gian Mario Bravo, Torino Operaia.
Mondo del lavoro e idee sociali nell'eta di Carlo Alberto (Fondazione L. Einaudi, Turin,
1968), but see also S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit.,
pp. 335-9. Among the essays on pauperism see the anonimous Oualche cenno sulla
mendicita e sui mezzi di estirparla (Turin, Pomba, 1834), and P. G. Massino Turina, La
beneficenza ordinata a sistema ossia ricerca delle cause della miseria e dei modi pratici
per fermarne il corso (Casuccio, Casale, 1850).
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published in 1837 3. As indicated by the title, charities and prisons were treated as
separate sections of a single theme. This was far from inappropriate, as some might
object - explained the author - for
... the poor man often leaves the road in which he begs to go to jail to expiate either
the infractions committed by begging, or some more serious crime stemming from
the idleness and vices born out of begging; furthermore, sometimes, once out of
jail, disgraced in public opinion, destitute, deserted by everybody, he is forced to
beg, or to resume his previous unlawful behaviour. Therefore properly managed
prisons contribute to correct the abuse of mendicancy and serve to support the
class of the poor... 4.
At the bottom of the social ladder, the alternative was between workhouse and jail.
Petitti reckoned that charities were better managed privately under state
guardianship. Many charities had deviated from their original purposes, but often
governments had gone too far in correcting abuses and - in an effort to set up a
system of public charity - had forgotten the intentions of the founders. For Petitti
this respect was a cornerstone which must not be removed, since it guaranteed a
continuous flow of bequests and donations. Thus he openly disagreed with the Lombard
philanthropist, Folchino Schizzi, who recommended both merging the charities and
reforming their purposes, on the grounds that the founders would be only too happy
to see their money better employed, and that a single administration would provide a
more efficient service, having at hand the entire picture of local welfare resources.
Petitti reckoned that mergers could be contemplated only exceptionally in small
centres with very few charities. Otherwise central government interference must be
limited to the approval of statutes and regulations. General guardianship must be
entrusted to a provincial congregation of charity, formed by political and ecclesiastic
authorities and (jocal/prominenT\ citizens. This congregation would appoint the
3 Count Carlo llarione Petitti di Roreto (1780-1850) was a lawyer. In 1815 entered the
Piedmontese civil service. He served as vice-lntendant at Chambery in 1816 and as
General Intendant at Asti and Cuneo from 1819 to 1826. From 1831 he was councillor
of State in the finance section. In 1848 he was appointed Senator. He was a great
scholar of socio-administrative problems. Among his numerous writings must be
remembered 'Del lavoro dei fanciulli nelle manifatture. Dissertazione', in Memorie della
Reale Accademia delle scienze di Torino (1841), tome III, pp. 209-306, in which he
analysed child labour and requested adequate legislation. See Antonio Fossati, II
pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour (Federazione Fascista del Commercio
della Provincia di Torino, 1932), pp. 83-5; Gian Mario Bravo, Torino Operaia. Mondo
del lavoro e idee sociali nell'etA di Carlo Alberto, cit., pp. 70-5; Carlo Pischedda,
Giuseppe Talamo (eds.), Tutti gli scritti di Camillo Cavour (Centro Studi Piemontesi,
Turin, 1976), vol.2, p. 581, fn. 21.
4 Carlo llarione Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri (Bocca, Turin, 1837), vol.II, pp. 391-2.
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managers of the charities if the founders had not already given directions, and would
check and approve budgets and accounts every year 5.
The idea that the state must monitor the charities to ensure their efficiency was not
new in Piedmont in the mid 1830s, so in this respect Petitti articulated and
substantiated a point of view shared by many of his peers in the civil service and the
aristocracy. What was more interesting was the assertion that welfare must be
funded by the State when private funding was inadequate. Petitti was very cautious on
this point. He stressed that, in all branches of the public administration, any attempt
to establish universal principles often produced controversial effects. Hence he set
no specific rules for financial liability. In general, if a welfare establishment was to
serve the whole state, its expenditure would be met by all taxpayers. If it was solely
for local use, only those Provinces and communes concerned would contribute 6.
Petitti's persuasion of the duty of the state to promote and fund poorhouses and
workhouses was based on a thorough assessment of current opinion on poor relief and
pauperism, as well as on his direct experience in local administration. In the past the
misinterpretation of religious precepts allowed masses of able-bodied beggars to be
idle. This was wrong. Charity must be enlightened, and set to work the able-bodied
poor. But those who maintained that the number of the poor was proportional to the
abundance of relief were mistaken. Indiscriminate charity had perhaps the
undesirable effect of fostering poverty, but there was abundant evidence that poverty
could be rampant also where charity was well administered. England offered the best
example. In many places there were abuses, but in others the system was properly
managed. Yet, even there, poverty did not disappear. Moreover, if the poor rate were
the cause of poverty, why was poverty so widespread in Ireland, where the poor rate
did not apply? Poverty was not only a normal condition of mankind, but also tended to
increase wherever there was a large proletariat - as in England. The daily need of
goods and commodities was increasing, while the number of the proletarians, living
from hand to mouth, was also increasing. These people could be made jobless by a
variety of factors, hence mendicancy. Petitti criticized Melchiorre Gioja for having
completely misinterpreted the facts that occurred in Savoy in 1816-17, to
demonstrate the soundness of his theories. He condemned the collections made in
Bonneville to provide daily soup to the poor from December 1816 to July 1817. Had
5 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I, pp. XXVII-XXVIII, 50-2, 161-2, 167-83; vol. II,
pp. 80-7; Folchino Schizzi, Sulla pubblica beneficenza nel Lombardo-Veneto. Cenni del
traduttore, in Joseph Marie De Gerando, II Visitatore del Povero (Truffi, Milan, 1828),
vol. I, pp. XIII-XXVIII.
6 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. XXVI-XXVII, 55-60, 171.
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Gioja known the real situation, he would have known that a terrible famine afflicted
Savoy in that period, and that similar remedies were also taken by several Swiss
communes, as they were the only means to save large masses from dying of hunger.
Similarly, Gioja condemned the workhouses, but he did not take in account that often
the market offered no jobs. His abstract and absolute principles did not help to solve
practical and specific problems. Those who maintained that the abolition of relief
would force everybody to work, should be able to prove that there was never a
shortage of jobs. Improvidence and idleness must not be overlooked as causes of
misery, but they were not the only causes. Petitti also rejected as excessively harsh
the so-called restrictive charity, i.e. granting help only when the state of need was
caused by absolutely unforeseeable events. This was a cruel concept, for improvidence
must not exclude compassion. Abundant and well-administered relief would diminish
- not increase - pauperism. Petitti would not rule out private almsgiving, providing
it was judiciously dispensed - especially to the shamefaced poor. But he was strongly
critical of Duchatel and Naville, who suggested abolishing any form of poor rates and
state contributions, leaving the poor at the exclusive mercy of private almsgiving.
Petitti's argument against this was that poverty was increasing, whilst donations
were not. The abolition of any form of state intervention, and the inadequacy of
private almsgiving, would make the crowds of poor an easy prey to political
agitators. Fierce repression would then be the only remedy 7.
Like most philantropists of his time, Petitti put at the core of his system the
distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. The former were obliged to beg,
the latter chose to 8. All difficulties in governing mendicancy lie in distinguishing the
7 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo delta mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.1., pp. 1-8, 14-18, 37-39, 53-55, 71-73; M.
Gioja, ' Problema: quali sono i mezzi piu spediti, piu efficaci piu economici per alleviare
I'attuale miseria del popolo in Europa. Discorso popolare (Colle note aggiunte alia
seconda edizione dell'Aprile 1817)' , in Opere minori, vol. X (Ruggia, Lugano, 1834),
pp. 265-375, passim, and partic. pp. 273-4, Frangois Marc Louis Naville, De la charite
legale, de ses effets, de ses causes, et specialement des maisons de travail et de la
proscription de la mendicite, (Paris, 1836), 2 vols; Charles Duchatel, Comte Tanneguy,
De la charite dans ses rapports avec I'etat moral et le bien etre des classes inferieures
de la societe (Mesnier, Paris, 1829). On the two latter works see also Arnaldo
Cherubini, Dottrine e metodi assistenziali dal 1789 al 1848. Italia - Francia -
Inghilterra (Giuffre, Milan, 1958), pp. 317-22.
8 As far as we know, only the Tuscan Francesco Maria Gianni classified the poor in a
different manner. He dismissed as a myth the opinion - common to many, like
Giambattista Vasco, Gioja, and Folchino Schizzi - that often beggars accumulated
fortunes, and categorized as 'natural poor' all those - artisans, rural and urban wage
labourers, factory workers, etc. - who were either temporarily out of job, or too old
and sick to work. These natural poor were the labour reserve army upon which rested
the wealth of a nation, and society had a duty to support them during the times of
distress, for their contribution to the economy was far greater than their temporary
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true from the false poor, but there was no ready-made solution. Baron De Gerando
suggested asking the beggar his address and visiting him at home. The false poor
would most certainly run away at such a request, or give a false address. The true
poor would welcome the benefactor, who would thus assess the needs of his protege',
and carefully dispense help and advice, closely monitoring the development of the
situation. De Gerando had built up a complete system of social control on these
premises, and his Visitor of the Poor had become the vade-mecum of the charitable
persons, but Petitti found his ideas wholly impractical. Hence he resorted to the
traditional cliches - the true poor would show signs of shame and distress, whilst the
false poor would show those of his vices, hypocrisy, greed, etc.- and concluded that '
Only the public administration can successfully intervene in this regard, but even
then there is no other means but prohibiting beggary and assisting the poor after
having classified them as able-bodied, unable to work, and shamefaced' 9.
As for the dream of counting the poor, Petitti had no illusions. First of all, the
criteria were difficult to fix. Secondly, poverty was a continually fluctuating
condition, likely to follow unpredictable variables - market, weather, harvests, etc.
Any attempt to make comprehensive statistics of the poor, or beggars, was a self-
deception on the part of those statisticians who were fascinated by figures rather
than interested in social reality. Those who believed that the mere addition of data
collected with different criteria and in different situations would give the total
number of the poor - like De Villenueve, who had produced unrealistic statistics of
Europe's poor - were fools. However, local statistics of the poor were useful for
administrative purposes. They served to monitor the phenomenon, make correct
provisions, assess the effect of provisions already made, etc. Petitti suggested setting
up an annual register of the mendicants - classified by able-bodied, invalids and
shamefaced - in each town and in each ward of the major cities. This register must
contain all personal data, the causes which brought the family or person to misery,
maintenance bill. The other category was that of the 'fictitious poor'. These were the
direct outcome of faulty legislation, or corrupt costums engendered by ancien regime
practices. In this group fell army veterans, ex-servants, valets and courtiers -often
supported with pensions at the expense of wealth producers, the shamefaced poor -
created by primogeniture rights, those who could not exert a trade because of guild
restrictions, those who were imprisoned for debts or failure to pay taxes. Only moral
and legislative reform could eliminate the fictitious poor. See F. M. Gianni, 'Discorso sui
Poveri' [1804], in F. Venturi (ed.), Illuministi Italiani, Tomo III, Riformatori Lombardi,
Piemontesi e Toscani (Ricciardi, Milan-Naples, 1958), pp. 1003-27.
9 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. 11-13, 19-28; Joseph Marie De Gerando,
II Visitatore del Povero (Truffi, Milan, 1828), vol. I, passim and notably pp. 13-33,
36-51, 56-71, 126-67,177-85, 204-22; vol. II, passim and notably pp. 3-10, 132-
33, 160-212, 263-79. See also below, 2.3.
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the provisions taken, etc. The local congregation of charity would check the
information and pass it on to the provincial Intendant, who would report to the
provincial congregation suggesting the appropriate remedies 10.
This proposal was part of a general plan of reform, which combined together
private and public action. First of all it was necessary to remove the causes of
mendicancy by promoting industry and trade, introducing moderate taxation,
especially on goods of popular consumption, and banning gambling, inns and all those
places where the poor were likely to waste money. The government should also plan
useful public works - especially roads, that favour trade - implement food laws to
facilitate abundant supplies of cheap food, in a free-trade context, favour public
primary and technical education, implement laws to minimise ruinous litigation
among families, set up awards for good deeds, especially when performed by the
lower classes, favour saving banks, friendly societies, and private charitable
societies. The shamefaced poor would be entrusted to private charities, and
eventually to the congregations of charity. Collection boxes labelled with the names of
local charities would be put in the churches, so that charitable persons knew the
destination of their donations, and almsgiving could be rationalized. All these
measures should increase the job opportunities of the able-bodied, and enhance the
means to support those unable to work; but, if private foundations were insufficient,
the state must set up new establishments financed by proportionatepublic
contributions. Once jobs were available for the able-bodied beggars, shelter was
given to those unable to work, and out-door relief to the shamefaced poor, there
would be no justification for begging. The government would issue a number of public
warnings - that the invalids were admitted to the poorhouses and the able-bodied to
the workhouses, where they would enjoy better treatment if they entered
voluntarily, that persistent beggars would be arrested, punished, and locked up first
in the workhouses and eventually in jail 11.
1 0 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e dette carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. 112-22; Jean P. De Villeneuve-Bargemont,
Economie politique chretienne, ou recherches sur la nature et ies causes du pauperisme,
en France et en Europe, et sur les moyens de la soulager et de la prevenir (Paris,
1834), vol. II, pp. 3 ff. Similar remarks on the difficulty of making statistics of the
poor can be found in J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique (Renouard, Paris,
1839), tome I, pp. 83-93. Detailed local statistics of the poor were the basis for the
remedies suggested by the anonymous author of Qualche cenno sulla mendicita e sui
mezzi di estirparla , cit., pp. 21 ff.
1 ^ C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo delta mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. 28-44, 71-73. Criteria for setting up
public works and for ensuring cheap food supplies in a free trade context were given at
pp. 382-414.
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Poorhouses and workhouses would be administered either privately or by state
officials, depending on their funding, but all would be centrally monitored. The new
workhouses set up with public funds must have separate sectors for voluntary and
involuntary inmates, rather than mixing deserving and undeserving poor. The work
must be easy to execute and sell. Raw materials should come from the local market.
The inmates should be encouraged to work by linking the quality of treatment to
productivity. They must be adequately paid, if feasible. Part of the salary must go in
a reserve fund to enable the inmates to leave the house and set up their own trade.
Inmates could leave permanently only when they could prove that they had means of
subsistence, but temporary exit permits must be granted. The house must be
salubrious and clean, food must be adequate but not too abundant or luxurious. Bones,
for instance, could provide nourishing soups. The inmates' clothes must be made in
the workhouse. For the other works it was advisable to have workshops set up by
skilled artisans within the workhouse. Inmates could also be hired out to
entrepreneurs, and work could be given at home to the poor. As for the sale of the
manufactures, agreements with other public establisments were advisable, to avoid
dumping. The inmates must receive basic literary and technical instruction. The
involuntary inmates must be divided into three groups. Indisciplined, on the way to
reform, and reformed. These would eventually be transferred to the voluntary
sector, where they would enjoy better treatment. Discipline must be strict, but no
cruel means must be used. As for those unable to work, they should be sheltered in
the existing poorhouses. No new poorhouses should be established, and logistic
problems should be solved by means of agreements between establishments.
Transport to the poorhouse must be paid by the commune where the beggar lived, and
he or she must be accompanied by the police, to prevent him or her from pocketing
the travel allowance and reaching the poorhouse on foot, begging on the way.
Maintenance must be charged to the congregation of charity of the commune of
residence, or the commune itself, if the congregation had no means 12.
Petitti regretted the lack of statistical data on the charities of the Sardinian
Kingdom. Unlike those of the poor, statistics of charities could be based on sound
elements, hence they were worth while setting up, although they too should be
regarded as flexible administrative tools, rather than as rigid collections of figures.
He laid down detailed rules, from which one can infer that he considered important
12 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. 58-71. The rules for workhouses were
almost identical to those recommended by Folchino Schizzi, Sulla erogazione dei sussidj
elemosinarj e sulla instituzione delle case di ricovero e d'industria ecc. Pensieri
economici (Cremona, 1826), passim and notably pp. 19, 25, 28-29.
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not only information on assets and administration, but also that on the treatment of
the inmates, the nature of relief, and the number of recipients 13. Had the later
statistics of the Italian charities been based on such criteria, we would now be able to
assess not only the patrimonial and administrative structures of the system, but also
the structure of the distribution of relief. But Petitti's suggestions were ignored by
the statistical establishment of the new Italy. Nor were many of the tenets on which
Petitti's reform plan rested, better-destined. On 29 November 1836 King Charles
Albert issued regulations for the foundation of new poorhouses by private charities.
They enforced strict state control on their management, but no state funds were made
available to fill in the large gaps left by private initiative. Petitti - who had
composed his ponderous work before the issue of the letters patent - inserted them at
the end of the first volume, and expressed great satisfaction for such provident
legislation. It was evident that he wanted to avoid any criticism of the King. So he
ignored the fact that the criterion of mixing together in the same establishment able-
bodied and invalids was contrary to his own theories. He forgot his previous
arguments in favour of public contributions for the workhouses, and stressed the
goodness of these dispositions, in that they expressely ruled out any poor tax, arguing
that private initiative was always preferable to a direct state intervention. He
praised the decree as a decisive step in the direction of a state regulated system,
emphasizing the importance of the concept of diverting the left-overs of the other
charities to the poorhouses. He forgot his remarks about the inadequacy of the
existing charities, declaring that the huge patrimony of the charities would surely
suffice 14. However, Petitti's other tenet, that the state must closely monitor the
administration of the charities, was not lost. Not only the letters patent of 29
November, but also the edict of 24 December 1836, which partly reorganized the
system, enforced stricter administrative controls 15. But all the rest of Petitti's
ideas - notably the concept that the state must fill in the gaps in private charity -
encountered no favour in the Piedmontese administration.
Legal charity was a subject of interest also for Cavour. His treatment of it was not
as systematic as Petitti's, and his opinions differed, although there was some common
ground. He first wrote on the subject in 1834. The British ambassador in Turin, Sir
13 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol. II, pp. 92-103, 148-9. Also Gioja recommended
statistics of the welfare services not solely concerned with patrimonial issues. See
Opere Minori, vol. VIII (Ruggia, Lugano, 1834), pp. 137-65.
14 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol. I, pp. 449-51. The text of the letters patent of
29 Nov. 1836 was at pp. 443-8, and is examined below, chapter 3.5.
1 5 For details on the edict of 24 Dec. 1836 see below, chapter 3.5.
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Alexander Foster, had requested information on the Piedmontese poor-relief system
from Cavour's father, who was Mayor of Turin. This information was for the final
Report of the Commission on the Poor Laws, a section of which was devoted to a
survey of the systems in force in the rest of Europe. The Marquis of Cavour felt
unable to satisfy Sir Alexander's request, thus he passed the task of gathering
information to his son - who was going through a difficult period of depression and
uncertainty. The Etat de la Mendicite' et des Pauvres dans les Etats Sardes was not an
extensive piece of research, nevertheless it offered realistic and substantially-
correct information on the state of the welfare services and the poor in Piedmont.
Cavour was well aware of the flimsiness of the safety network offered to the
labouring poor by the Piedmontese charities, and their state of administrative
disarray. He also described the low standards of living of the urban and rural
labourers in some detail, admitting that they could not reasonably save anything, and
that any misfortune was bound to throw them in a state of indigence 16.
The interest of the young Count in the issues related to pauperism was to last
several years. In 1835 the Etat de la Mendicite... was followed by the Extrait du
rapport des commissaires de S. M. Britannique qui ont execute une enquete generate
sur /'administration des fonds provenant de la taxe des pauvres en Angleterre -
written again at his father's suggestion 17. It was an account of the Old English Poor
Laws and the events and arguments that surrounded the reform. Cavour fully
endorsed the opinion of the English Commissioners on the deleterious effect of out¬
door relief and the allowance system, and expressed considerable favour for the
workhouse system as a deterrent against idleness, and as an effective means of
freeing the labour market 18. The Extrait... - which had been published anonymously
1 6 Poor Laws, Appendix F, part II, in Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners,
vol. XXXIX (1834), Session 4 February- 15 August 1834, pp. 648, 653-59. Besides
Cavour's Etat (enclosure D) the part of the appendix F concerned with Italy contained a
report on Turin's lunatic asylum, by the inspector Borsarelli (enclosure A), two
anonymous memoirs of the deaf and dumb home and the orphanage of Genoa (enclosures
B and C), another note on beggary in Genoa, by the Marquis Brignole Sale, late mayor of
Genoa (enclosure E), a report on Savoy by Monsieur de Vignet, Senator in Chambery
(enclosure F), and a Report on the State and Condition of the poor at Venice, by Consul-
General Money. See ibidem, pp. 648-64. Cavour's Etat de la Mendicite'... is now also in
C. Pischedda, G. Talamo (eds.), Tutti gli scritti di Camillo Cavour, cit., vol. I, pp. 451-
66. For its origins and content see Rosario Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-
1842) (Laterza, Bari, 1969), pp. 406-21. More details from Cavour's account below,
chapter 3.4.
1 7 For the origins of the Extrait ... see R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-
1842), cit., pp. 421-23; Francesco Sirugo (ed.), Camillo Cavour, Scritti di economia,
1835-1850 (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1962), pp. 3-4.
1 8 See the Extrait... in F. Sirugo (ed.), Camillo Cavour, Scritti di economia, 1835-1850 ,
cit., pp. 3-29; C. Pischedda, G. Talamo (eds.), Tutti gli scritti di Camillo Cavour , cit.,
vol. I, pp. 473-500. A thourough account of both the Extrait... and the making of the
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in Piedmont at the express desire of its author - was very well received by the
Piedmontese intellectuals - notably Cesare Balbo, Carlo llarione Petitti di Roreto,
and Giacomo Giovanetti. The First Secretary for the Interior, Count La Scarena,
bought 200 copies and sent them to the provincial Intendants and the most illustrious
personages of the Kingdom, so that everybody could see the dire effects of legal
charity - for thus state-funded relief was called. Cavour's Extrait... became the
principal source on the English reform for the Piedmontese intelligentsia and
aroused much interest. Many agreed with La Scarena that a privately-funded system
of relief was far better than the English system which had caused so many troubles,
but some - notably Petitti and Giovanetti - pointed out that the Piedmontese charities
needed overhauling and the State should put them under stricter control. This was
partially achieved in 1836 with Charles Albert's Edict of 24 December. Plans and
preliminary inquiries to reorder the charities' administration were under way well
before the publication of the Extrait..., thus it would be incorrect to attribute to
Cavour's writing alone the merit of persuading the King and shaking up the
bureaucracy. But the debate aroused by the Extrait... might have given a useful push
to a notoriously indecisive sovereign19.
Unlike Cavour, other European intellectuals were not favourably impressed by the
outcome of the English reform. The most famous of these critics of the workhouse
system were Naville and Buret. They argued that the English workhouses were
inhumane, mixing together deserving and undeserving poor, dividing husband from
wife and children from parents, and treating the poor like criminals 20. Cavour
disagreed, and wrote two essays - that he however never completed nor published -
to defend the English reform. In 1835 he had travelled in France and England, where
English reform in R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-1842), cit., pp. 423-
40. See also A. Fossati, II pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour , cit., pp. 95-
7. For the origins and implementation of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 see K.
Polanyi, Origins of our time. The great transformation (Gollancz, London, 1945); J. R.
Poynter, Society and Pauperism. English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795-1834 (Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London, 1969); M. A. Crowther, The workhouse system 1834-1929
(Methuen, London, 1983); Michael M. Rose (ed.), The poor and the city: the English poor
law in its urban context, 1834-1914 (Leicester Univ. Press, 1985); Anne Digby,
British welfare policy. Workhouse to Workfare (Faber, London, 1989), pp. 29-47,
126-31.
19 R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-1842), cit., pp. 441-50. More
information on this point in chapter 2.5. For the personality of Charles Albert see S.
Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 366-8, 374-6.
2 0 Francois Marc Louis Naville, De la charite' legale, de ses effets, de ses causes, et
specialement des maisons de travail et de la proscription de la mendicite' (Paris,
1836), Eugene Buret, De la misere des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France
(Paris, Paulin, 1840). See also A. Fossati, II pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo
Cavour , cit., pp. 97-8.
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his visit to the workhouses of Liverpool and Manchester had reinforced his conviction
that a state-run and funded welfare system linking assistance to coercive work in
institutions offered the best solution to pauperism and was not excessively harsh on
the poor. These two essays are important, for they show that Cavour was persuaded of
the goodness of the new English poor law, but was not sure whether that system was
practicable in his own country. Both give the impression that Cavour was aware of
the incompleteness of his arguments, but was too influenced by those of the British
commissioners to take a fresh look at the issue, and perhaps re-think the whole
question, taking on board some of the points made by Naville and Buret. As pointed out
by Romeo, in his first writings on the English reform, Cavour had attributed all
wrongs to the way in which poor relief was administered under the Old Poor Laws.
But in his comment to Buret's book, he admitted that pauperism was the effect of the
whole organization of society and production, and could not be blamed solely on poor
relief administration. Hence he found himself in contradiction with his own earlier
assertions. On the other hand, once the problem of pauperism was set in the wider
context of economic development, to focus solely on poor relief administration
became too restrictive. The incomplete refutation of the critics of the new poor law
was Cavour's last active involvement in the debate on pauperism and welfare reform.
The project, elaborated in 1834 with his brother Gustavo, of writing a book on
pauperism in Europe was abandoned 21.
After the early 1840s Cavour's opinions on poor relief must be retraced in various
articles - notably those written on II Risorgimento - and in sparse parliamentary
speeches. From the articles it appears that first the English experience, and later the
events of 1848 persuaded Cavour that the only way to prevent disastrous social
unrest was to better the lot of the poor. But how? To guarantee work for all was
impossible, for thus production would not be geared to the market, but to the number
of potential workers, with absurd results. The creation of a national industrial
reserve would be equally inefficient and economically disastrous. Yet, any society
which had reached a high level of wealth and economic development had the duty to
support those in need of basic subsistence. But this principle needed very careful
21 A. Fossati, II pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour , cit., p. 97; R. Romeo,
Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-1842), cit., pp. 451, 547-64; C. Pischedda, G.
Talamo (eds.), Tuff/' gli scritti di Camillo Cavour, cit., vol. 2, pp. 543-60 ('Sul
pauperismo', on Naville's book), 637-42 ('Observations sur I'ouvrage de Mr. Buret
intitule' "Des classes laboriueses en France et en Angleterre"'); Denis Mack Smith,
Cavour (Methuen, London, 1985), p. 21. Sparse notes indicating Cavour's interest in
pauperism, poor relief and working-class salaries in C. Pischedda, G. Talamo (eds.),
Tutti gli scritti di Camillo Cavour, cit., vol. 1, pp. 60-4, 367-81, 408-11; vol. 2, pp.
503-12, 519-27, 579-83.
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application, and relief must always be less attractive than work. The dilemma of
whether in Piedmont the state must set up a system of legal charity, or not, remained
unsolved 22. Despite his theoretical persuasion that any advanced capitalistic society
must invest part of its wealth in education and welfare, in practice Cavour did not
regard social reform as a direct concern of the state, probably because the
Piedmontese economy was not yet so advanced. As a landlord he had a benevolent
paternalistic attitude towards his workers, and expected that the philanthropy of the
rich would suffice to keep the balance. On the other hand, he was unwilling to
recognize the alarming evidence of the worsening living standards of the labouring
masses, and preferred to believe that things were improving. He was theoretically in
favour of laws regulating the employment of children and women, but never came
round to proposing such laws to Parliament 23. However, Cavour's parliamentary
speeches clarify the evolution of his position. As far as charities were concerned, he
made several interventions to facilitate the acceptance of bequests, decentralize
controls, favour kindergartens, and establish an inspectorate of charities and prisons
within the Interior Ministry 24. He wanted to abolish charity lotteries, which he
regarded as the source of all sorts of abuses, and in 1852 he strongly backed the
reform of the administration of the Company of St. Paul - which was the largest
charity of Turin and was still administered by the confraternity of St. Paul - on the
grounds that charities must conform to the spirit and general legislation of their
time, and the state had a duty to reform them 25.
22 Articles in II Risorgimento of 15 Dec. 1847, 11 and 17 March 1848, now in F. Sirugo
(ed.), Camillo Cavour, Scritti di economia, 1835-1850 , cit., pp. 289-90, 322-30.
See also A. Fossati, II pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour , cit., pp. 52-62,
100-1; A. Cherubini, Dottrine e metodi assistenziali dal 1789 al 1848. Italia - Francia -
Inghilterra , cit., pp. 363-7.
23 A. Fossati, II pensiero e la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour , cit., pp. 85-6, 106-7;
Mack Smith, Cavour, cit., pp. 35, 102-4; Maura Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e
beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione Piemontese da Carlo Alberto
all'unificazione amministrativa', in Rivista Trimestrale di diritto pubblico, No. 3
(1980), p. 996.
24 A. Omodeo (ed.), C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1932), vol. 1 (1848-1850), pp. 234-42 (15 and 16 Oct. 18490; vol. 2 (1850-1851),
pp. 3-8 (20 Febr. 1850); vol. 3 (1851) (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1933), pp.75-84
(17 and 18 Febr. 1851), 467-9 (15 May 1851); A. Saitta (ed.), C. Benso di Cavour.
Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1973), vol. 15 (1859-1861), pp. 65-
72 (4 April 1859).
25 L. Russo (ed.), C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1936), vol. 5 (1851-1852), pp. 325-34 (20 Febr. 1852); A. Omodeo (ed.), C. Benso di
Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1941), vol. 9 (1853-1854),
pp. 321-9, 332-4 (6 March 1854); A. Saitta (ed.),C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi
parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1957), vol. 11 (1854-1855), PP- 78-81 (11
Dec. 1854), 224-6 (1 Febr. 1855).
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During his speeches of February 1851 in the Senate in favour of a tax-exemption
for kindergartens Cavour defended legal charity - that had many opponents among the
Senators - and gave a very questionable definition of it. He agreed that legal charity
had olii4d vantages,, notably that of relaxing family bonds, but he repeated his opinion
that all advanced economies would have to set up a system of legal assistance.
Furthermore, he said that all endowed charities - providing their administrative
rules were approved by the government and were not alterable by the managers -
formed a system of legal charity. The English system and the Piedmontese one -
argued Cavour - differed only in extension. In Piedmont there was a less extended
system of legal charity, but that was the only difference. Some years later he went
further, suggesting that - mutatis mutandis - Piedmont spent the same amount on
welfare as England 26. In fact, there was a fundamental difference between the
English and the Piedmontese system, for one was based on the poor-rate, whilst the
other was based on privately-funded establishments which enjoyed only occasional
state contributions, and could not guarantee uniform and constant levels of assistance.
We cannot say whether Cavour was really persuaded of his own arguments, or simply
used them to win over his opponents. But a later speech seems to indicate that the
Count was fully aware of the differences he had previously minimized. In the early
Spring of 1858 Parliament considered a petition from 810 wealthy citizens of Aosta,
who complained of the exorbitant number of beggars in the city, and requested that
mendicants be forbidden to beg outside their communes of residence. The Chamber
Commission proposed to send the petition to the Interior Ministry to study the
problem and devise a law to solve it. Cavour - who was then Prime minister, and
minister of the interior and foreign affairs - disagreed. To enforce compulsory
settlement of the beggars entailed the obligation to assist them, and hence a poor tax.
This was extremely dangerous because the country was not ready as yet for a fiscal
and social reform affordable only by highly-industrialized countries. The petition
could be sent to the Ministry for further study, but Parliament should not endorse
26 A. Omodeo (ed.), C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1933), vol. 3 (1851) , pp.75-84 (17 and 18 Febr. 1851), notably pp.76-7, 82-3; A.
Saitta (ed.),C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1957), vol. 11 (1854-1855), p. 311 (17 Febr. 1855). See also A. Fossati, II pensiero e
la politica sociale di Camillo Cavour , cit., pp. 98-102; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie
e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione Piemontese da Carlo Alberto
all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 992-3. Cavour's argument that whenever
charity was somehow regulated by law it was legal charity, might have been taken
from Naville. See below 2.3.
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the ill-considered request of Aosta's propertied classes 27. In our opinion this
demonstrates that Cavour knew very well that the system in force in Piedmont was
not one of legal charity, and that the definition he gave in the Senate in 1851 was
rather instrumental to the contingencies of the debate. Thus the traditional view that
Cavour was favourable to legal charity must be put in context, to avoid
misinterpretation. He was theoretically favourable to state intervention in the
welfare sphere, along the lines of the English reform of 1834, but he never put his
persuasion into effect, for in his judgement the Piedmontese economy was not ready
for such a step.
It is noteworthy that Cavour studied quite thoroughly the English welfare system,
but did not show an equal interest in those in force in Italy. Probably this had to do
with his cultural formation, which put him in much closer contact with France and
England than with Italy. Before the war of independence Cavour only travelled once -
in 1836 - through Lombardy and Venetia, to buy some sheep in Hungary on behalf of
his father. On that occasion he intended to visit the Papal States and Tuscany, but was
impeded by the Papal States' quarantine regulations 28. Cavour's European education
certainly gave him great advantages, but also meant that he had no first-hand
awareness of the predicaments of the Italian people outside Piedmont, and was
consequently little inclined to study any related issue. An example of this can be found
in the harsh treatment he reserved for Sardinia, which stemmed from his great
ignorance of, and distaste for, the island's problems, and from his refusal to believe
its appalling poverty 29. As a result, Cavour left very few clear indications on
welfare policy to his successors. The state had the right to reform obsolete charities,
and the duty to control their assets' administration via local authorities. The
establishment of state-financed workhouses to set the poor to work would eventually
become inevitable, but this depended on the development of the economy. Indications
of how to deal with the other welfare systems of the Peninsula just did not exist, for
Cavour never thorougly studied the issue. We will see later in this work the full
extent of the consequences of this lack of knowledge.
27 A. Saitta (ed.),C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1969), vol. 14 (1857-1858), pp. 117-21 (8 March 1858). The Chamber Commission
finally agreed with Cavour.
28 Mack Smith, Cavour, cit., p. 20.
2 9 Mack Smith, Cavour, cit., pp. 104-6. For example, in 1853 he dismissed allegations on
Sardinia's poverty on the basis of the increasing consumption of sugar and coffee in the
island, as if such an indicator - taken in isolation - had any significance. See A. Omodeo
(ed.), C. Benso di Cavour. Discorsi parlamentari (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1939), vol.
7 (1853) , pp. 70-1.
37
Petitti was a man of the older generation, who did not survive to see the great
novelties which the future had in store for Piedmont. Cavour was to be the major
artificer of the new Italy, but died before the outcome of his efforts fully unfolded.
Both agreed on two basic points, but with significant differences. They reckoned that
the State must monitor the administration of the charities, but Petitti was very
respectful of the intentions of the founders, whereas Cavour was favourable to
radical reforms. Both thought that poor relief and social control of mendicancy
required state intervention. The difference was that for Petitti the poor tax to fund
workhouses was an immediate necessity, whereas Cavour - as late as 1858 -
reckoned that Piedmont was not ready yet to undergo such a momentous fiscal and
social reform. Little of the common ground shared by Petitti and Cavour could be
found in the position of Marco Minghetti, a Bolognese of great learning, a fine
politician, and a champion of liberalism, who is traditionally seen as Cavour's
intellectual and political heir 30. He did not devote any specific writing to pauperism
or poor relief, but his ideas on the subject can be found in his major work, Delia
economia pubblica e delle sue attinenze colla morale e col diritto . Like any convinced
liberal, Minghetti believed that free enterprise, free trade, and economic
competition were the most effective means to improve the lot of mankind. Therefore
those who complained that in the capitalistic economies the increase of wealth was
connected to the spreading and worsening of pauperism, were mistaken. Minghetti
conceded that the greater availability of goods brought about by industrialism and
free trade could provoke greed and dissatisfaction, and hence relative poverty, but as
far as absolute poverty was concerned, he had no doubt that the masses were much
better-off in the age of capitalism than ever before.
...Who could deny that the hovels of the poor have improved, are more salubrious,
and safe from bad weather? When does it happen today what was once
commonplace, that hundreds of people sleep on the streets [...]? Those lurid and
dilapidated houses where the beggars used to shelter and contract all sorts of
diseases from the pestilential air and contagious promiscuity, are they not
disappearing thanks to private enterprize and public building programmes? Has
body and clothing hygiene not visibly improved? Has free trade not made available
to the most modest purses those goods which were once accessible only to the
very rich? For instance, has the use of lingeries, wool and cotton not become
extremely common? 3^
30 Bologna, 8 November 1818 - Rome, 10 December 1886. See a chronology of his life in
Raffaella Gherardi (ed.), Marco Minghetti. Scritti politici (Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri, Rome, 1986), pp. 57-63.
31 M. Minghetti, Delia economia pubblica e delle sue attinenze colla morale e col diritto (Le
Monnier, Florence,1859), now in R. Gherardi (ed.), Marco Minghetti. Scritti politici,
cit., p. 141 (quotation), also 251-2.
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However, he admitted that pauperism was a problem in the industrial centres, where
the workforce had no defence against economic fluctuations. This situation was the
outcome of economic competition, but was also typical of a transition period between
two modes of production. The guilds were gone, and with them the protection they
offered the workers, while saving, patronage, association, cooperation, and assurance
- with which lay the new form of social security - were not yet sufficiently diffused
among the lower classes. Hence the recourse to public charity. It was possible - as
some claimed - that pauperism would disappear only in a context of perfect
competition, but Minghetti reckoned that the problem could not be solved solely by
economic means. Economic competition entailed a number of moral and political pre¬
conditions, without which social malaises like pauperism could easily emerge. It was
necessary to be prudent and make good use of wealth, to avoid unsafe speculations.
Self-interest should never override morality, generosity and charity. The State must
guarantee justice, and moderately intervene when necessary 32. Yet public assistance
was not a duty of the state. There was no juridical compulsion to bienfaisance, only a
moral duty. Ideally private and free charity was sufficient to cater for all the poor
for it
... is ennobled by priceless merits. She does not wait for indigence to knock at her
door [...], but she chases and cures it; moreover, she is endowed with that
foresight which can tell the true from the false poor. Finally, she engenders a
feeling of sweet happiness in the benefactor, and one of gratitude in the recipient,
and thus improves the mind and soul of both.
Unfortunately, private charity could not always cope, especially when the streets
were filled with crowds of unemployed, who caused not compassion, but fear. Under
such circumstances the state must intervene and dispense relief, to guarantee public
order. Nevertheless, those economists who stressed the dire social effects of
indiscriminate public relief, were right. So the state must refrain as much as
possible from any such action, and rather put its energy intbbliminating the causes of
misery 33. Ultimately, Minghetti's politico-economic system rested upon the pre¬
requisite that the great majority of the rich were good-hearted and moral:
...they will always have at heart the industrious charity, which spontaneously,
wisely, and generously helps all miseries. [...] wherever private enterprise can
reach, the government must retreat, as its action is more expensive, less wise,
less effective, and always devoid of that affection, without which the grandiosity
of the arts, the dignity of the sciences, and the sweetness of bienfaisance lose
the fragrance of perfection 34.
32 R. Gherardi (ed.), Marco Minghetti. Scritti politici , cit., pp. 248, 250, 252-5.
33 R. Gherardi (ed.), Marco Minghetti. Scritti politici , cit., pp. 372-5, quotation p. 373.
3^ R. Gherardi (ed.), Marco Minghetti. Scritti politici , cit., p. 387.
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It was a very fragile basis on which to found a welfare policy, as the performance of
Italian charity legislation - enforced in 1862 and inspired by these principles -
would demonstrate. About thirty years later Minghetti offered a different version of
his ideas. The ingredients were the same, but their dosage differed. His confidence in
the value of liberty was unshaken, yet he admitted that private interest did not
always coincide with the public good, for it was not true that man was always able to
chwse the best and act honestly. He still saw state interference as subsidiary to
private initiative, but stressed that it was time for the state to introduce legislation
to regulate children's and women's work, guarantee the basic rights of all manual
workers, safeguard the victims of industrial accidents, etc 35. But by that time
Minghetti had long ceased to dominate Italian politics. Moreover, talk of social
legislation was no novelty by that time.
The moderate Piedmontese old guard - with alllte>defects and shortcomings - could
not be accused of ignoring the problem of poverty. Some solutions were proposed,
within the framework of 'legal charity'. Cavour took over from them and re-
elaborated their concepts with one eye on the purse of the state, and the other on the
complexities of economic development. He was very cautious in his conclusions, but
there is some evidence to suggest that, had he lived on, Italian welfare policy might
have gradually taken a different shape. But Cavour died, and his liberal pragmatism
was replaced with liberal dogmatism. We need not expand now on the consequences of
this in the field of charity legislation, for they are among the objects of our research.
Here it remains to be seen what alternatives were on offer from the other side. Were
the democrats any better prepared to tackle the problem of poverty?
2.2.The democrats.
In 1897 Jessie White Mario wrote that she saw Garibaldi cry only twice, in the
foundling homes of Palermo and Naples. Quoting from her husband's memoirs she
added that
In a month we visited almost every convent and charity [...] The General intended
to uncover the hitherto intact secret of those antisocial seclusions, he wanted to
find out and put right unpunished disorders and unknown sufferings [...] I never
saw him so deeply upset as during the visit to an hospice for foundling girls. He
heard from their lips the moving story of their daily suffering: the infected bread,
the scarce food, the uncollected garbagej...] The General [...] cried with them and
35 La legislazione sociale. Conferenza tenuta da Marco Minghetti al teatro Castelli in Milano
il 28 maggio 1882, con note (Treves, Milan, 1882), now in R. Gherardi (ed.), Marco
Minghetti. Scritti politici , cit., pp. 765-84.
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none of us could keep his eyes dry. And when the brutish wardens tried to make
excuses, his terrible look left them speechless and terrified. He left two
attendants to investigate and report, and silently mounted his horse 38.
Jessie added that if she reported - almost forty years later - what she saw in Sicily
during the winter of 1861-62 in foundling homes, orphanages, and hospitals, she
would be accused of exaggeration and calumny 37. So it appears that the Thousand's
leaders came into direct contact with the welfare establishments of Southern Italy
but - whatever pious intentions Garibaldi had to clear away abuses and injustices -
there is evidence that he failed 38. Undoubtedly, he had very little time, and a lot to
do. The overhauling of charities and welfare establishments required time, energy,
staff skilled in accountancy and management, and a knowledge of laws and traditions
that could not be gathered overnight. Above all, charity reform required a clear
vision of 'what to do next', a long-term social program which alone could make sense
of unpalatable and even unpopular shake-ups, cuts, and restructurings. We will
later see in some detail what was done first by the democrats and later by the
moderates for reordering the southern charities and eliminating the more scandalous
abuses. Here we must look at the overall approach of the democrats to social and
welfare problems, to see whether they had alternative solutions to those offered by
the moderates. It could be argued that this is irrevelant, for the democrats grabbed
power for a moment, but failed to hold on to it and thus - even if they had
alternatives in mind - they did not stand a chance of putting them into practice.
Conversely, in our opinion, whether the democrats had thought over the problem of
poverty and elaborated their own original strategy, or not, is extremely
relevant, for it might help to understand if they ever stood a real chance of
maintaining their power in the first instance: whether they were an alternative to
the moderates, or just trailed in their shadow 39.
The democrats were aware of the poverty and backwardness of the masses, and saw
themselves as the providers of democracy and social justice, but they differed as to
the methods of delivering the goods. Clara Lovett has lucidly expounded their
positions, and we will follow her categorization 40. At the far right of the spectrum
was Cattaneo. He was well informed on socio-economic questions, but felt - like the
33 J. White Mario, Le opere pie e I'infanticidio legale (Minelli, Rovigo, 1897), pp. 8-9. The
foundling home was that of I'Annunciata of Naples.
37 J. White Mario, Le opere pie e I'infanticidio legale , cit., p. 10.
38 See below, chapter 5.5.
39 For an overview of the Italian democrats see S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in
Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 307-23.
40 Clara M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 (Harvard Univ. Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982), pp. 48-66.
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moderates - that free trade and enterprise would gradually improve the lot of the
poor, and hence saw no need for radical social change 41. To the left of Cattaneo,
Lovett places the southerners Ricciardi and Petruccelli, the Sardinian Asproni, the
Tuscans Guerrazzi and Rubieri. They had no great faith in the beneficial effects of
free trade on the poor, but their understanding of the causes of poverty was rather
shallow, for they did not go beyond political and moral factors, and ignored the
economic ones. For them the solution of the poverty problem depended on the
implementation of good laws that would crush ascriptive privilege, introduce fair
taxation, and favour a more equitable distribution of wealth. They did not question
the class structure of society, and openly opposed radical social legislation during
the Roman republic, and the peasant occupations of the public demesne in the South.
Ricciardi, in particular, elaborated two draft bills for the abolition of beggary - one
during Garibaldi's dictatorship, and the other in 1862 - which were remarkable for
their abstractness, and epitomized his incapacity to grasp the roots of popular
misery and discontent 42. As late as 1877 Ricciardi had not made much progress, as
he persisted in suggesting his favourite and ill-conceived remedies. Taxes should be
levied only on property, and professional and industrial profits. Land inheritance
laws should be tightened, and limits imposed to the amount each citizen could possess.
Any surplus land should be auctioned to favour the spread of small holdings.
Useless charities should be abolished, and the others grouped and reformed.
Charities' land should be confiscated and replaced by state bonds. However, this was
unlikely to happen, thus the honest and wealthy of every town should form charity
committees which would make lists of the poor in collaboration with the police.
Funding would come from donations, lotteries, municipal funds. The committees
should collaborate with the local charities to help those unable to work, provide jobs
to the able-bodied, and promote popular education and mutual help 43.
Mazzini stood in the middle ground between these moderate social reformers and
those who advocated social revolution. He knew the dire social consequences of
capitalistic development, and did not believe in the gospel of economic progress. He
also learned from the experience of the early 1820s and 1830s that the national
4^ C. M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 , cit., p. 53, but see also
Id., Carlo Cattaneo and the politics of the Risorgimento, 1820-1860 (Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1972), pp. 75-9, and S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia
d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 343-50.
42 C. M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 , cit., pp. 53-5. For
Ricciardi's drafts on beggary see below, chapts. 5.5. and 6.1. For his role in the
democratic movement see also F. Delia Peruta.'Per la storia dell'emigrazione
meridionale', Nuova Rivista Storica , vol. 1 (1966), pp.429-52.
43 G. Ricciardi, Guerra alia poverta! Cenni sulla quistione sociale (D'Orsi, Naples, 1877).
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revolution needed the contribution of the masses, and these must be enticed into
action by material incentives. But, especially after 1832, he increasingly distanced
himself from the concept of class struggle. His idealistic vision of a classless society
- where the bonds of associationism would dispel the egotism of class-interest -
prevailed over the awareness that the labouring masses could be persuaded to fight
for better living standards, but could hardly understand the abstract values of moral
revolution. The scholars of Mazzini are divided on the interpretation of this change of
emphasis. Some see it as a clear-cut change of direction. Others stress that it was the
result of a coherent evolution of his thought. However, what is relevant here, is that
Mazzini dreaded ciass war, and thought that political unification was the first
priority. For this it was necessary not to scare off the propertied classes with
radical social programs. Only when the masses were united by the bonds of a common
language and nationality, could the process of their social emancipation start. This
would be achieved by means of association, cooperation, and education. Furthemore,
when Mazzini talked of the workers, he had in mind the artisans. He did not consider
the peasantry, and never understood the importance of agrarian reform, despite the
arguments of other fellow democrats 44.
Several, infact, disagreed with Mazzini's idealistic approach. According to Lovett,
Ferrari, Macchi, Bertani, De Cristoforis, Maestri, Montanelli, Rusconi, Guastalla,
De Boni, Mauro and Musolino '... shared the conviction that the Italian Revolution
must be a social revolution...'. Still their approach, although more realistic than that
of Mazzini, was paternalistic; and they too had a limited vision of the masses, as
mainly composed oj- smallholders, sharecroppers, and artisans. These small
producers must be sheltered from the spreading of monopoly capitalism by political
and financial institutions, while wealth concentration must be obstructed by tough
inheritance laws 45. The limits of this approach became evident when brigandage
exploded in the South. In 1861 Giuseppe Ferrari went South on a fact-finding
mission, and later made a strong intervention in the Chamber, urging the government
to recognize the need for agrarian reform, and distribute the demesne to the landless
peasants. He clearly acknowledged that banditry stemmed from the appalling misery
44 C. M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 , cit., pp. 49-51, 55-60;
S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 309-14, 322-3,
449-66, 508; Franco Delia Peruta, 'Mazzini e la societa italiana', in Idem, Democrazia
e socialismo nel Risorgimento (Riuniti, Rome, 1973, 2nd ed.), pp. 7-35; Idem, Societa e
classi popolari nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento (Ediprint, Siracusa, 1986), pp. 1-14.
45 C. M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 , cit., pp. 60-3. See also
S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 449-66; F. Delia
Peruta, Societa e classi popolari nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento , cit., pp. 13-5, 16-7 and, for
Bertani, Virginio Paolo Gastaldi, Agostino Bertani e la democrazia repubblicana. Lettere
a Paolo Mileti (Giuffre, Milan, 1979), pp. 24-5, 36-57.
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of the peasantry and that, by putting the South to fire and sword, the state would gain
nothing, and probably lose a lot 46. Still, in April 1862, nineteen democrats
published a letter in 'II Precursore', that showed how muddled their understanding of
the southern question was. Popular discontent originated from the 'bureaucratic
invasion' which replaced Garibaldi's dictatorship. Piedmontese ruling methods had
killed the enthusiasm and unity aroused by Garibaldi. Brigandage was sustained by
Rome, hence it was paramount to conquer Rome to stop the flow of supplies which
kept it alive. It was true that education, roads and railways, and land reform were
necessary to enlighten the masses, improve the economy, and win the affection of the
people. But these were long-term remedies, that would not give immediate results.
...meanwhile the civil war can spread even further, and it is necessary to nip it in
the bud. To this end, rather than material force, \will be/rnost~ effective) the
presence in the southern provinces of the Man who broke their chains in the name
of Italy and Victor Emanuel. There is no doubt that the sacred fire - which makes
the people happily undergo the sufferings involved in any great revolution - burned
in the South when Garibaldi appeared, died when he left, and will I13Hup the souls
again, at his return. Free men will find new confidence, the partisans of the old
regime and those who dream new dynasties will be terrified. Amidst the
enthusiasm of the multitudes applauding Italy, Rome, Victor Emanuel, and Garibaldi
- with no need of bloodshed - brigandage will die of asphyxia 47 .
The fact that land occupations had been bloodily repressed in Sicily by order of
Garibaldi and Crispi, and that in the continental South Garibaldi did virtually nothing
to ease the misery of the peasantry, was simply ignored 48. The same sort of
ambiguity can be found in Bertani. In March 1862 he had founded the Associazione
Emancipatrice Italiana, which should become the kernel of the democratic party, and
was targetted at the quick completion of unification. But the ill-planned expeditions
of Sarnico and Aspromonte alarmed the government, which in August 1862 dissolved
48 C. M. Lovett, Giuseppe Ferrari and the Italian Revolution (The University of North
Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 160-70. For brigandage in the South see Brunello Mantelli,
'Brigantaggio meridionale', in Storia d'ltalia, 1 (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1978), pp.
69-76; John A. Davis, Conflict and Control. Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy
(MacMillan, London, 1988), pp. 169-82.
47 'II Precursore', No. 102 (29 April 1862), now in Renato Composto, I democratici
dall'Unita ad Aspromonte (Le Monnier, Florence, 1967), pp. 236-40. The signatories
were Giuseppe Montanelli, Giuseppe Lazzaro, Luigi Miceli, Giuseppe Libertini, Francesco
Lovito, Filippo De Boni, Aurelio Saffi, Bruto Fabricatore, Francesco Curzio, Antonio
Mordini, F. Mandoj-Albanese, Girolamo Pallotta, Vincenzo Vischi, Oreste Regnoli,
Benedetto Cairoli, Francesco Crispi, Salvatore Calvino, B. Musolino, G. Carini.
48 Franco Molfese, 'Lo scioglimento dell'esercito meridionale garibaldino (1860-1861)', in
Nuova Rivista Storica, vol. XLIV (1960), pp. 2-14; Alessandro D'Alessandro, 'II
Governo provvisorio Lucano ed i moti contadini', Ibidem, vol. XLV (1961), pp. 140-7; S.
J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 499-501, 507. See
also below, 5.5.
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the Associazione Emancipatrice 49. So Bertani devised another plan. In January 1863
he took inspiration from a public subscription launched by the government to help
the victims of the bandits, and proposed - with Antonio Mosto and Clemente Corte - to
petition the government to permit them to send troops of volunteers south to fight the
brigands. Probably he saw this as a means of reconstituting the Garibaldian army,
which would then move to conquer Rome from the south. It was not only a politically
naive plan - the government was not so stupid as to give permission - it also showed
that Bertani's understanding of the Southern question was opposed to that of Ferrari.
Perhaps the plan was wholly concerned for the conquest of Rome, but to try and
reconstitute the revolutionary army on the pretext of the repression of the southern
unrest, indicated that for Bertani the revolting peasants were merely an excuse for
playing war again - in the name of the motherland. The files we consulted show no
evidence that the government welcomed the proposal, although signatures were
collected. Many of those who replied to the appeal feared that the government would
not grant permission. Many also expressed discouragement, and reckoned that only a
direct appeal from the General could revive the enthusiasm of the old days. But none
pointed out the social implications of Bertani's proposal 50. However, later in 1863,
Bertani came to his senses and tried - unsuccessfully - to unite the Parliamentary
Left in a mass resignation to protest against the Pica act, which extended military
power, established the death penalty without trial for the bandits, and prescribed
harsh punishment for those who helped them 51. Later still - around 1867 - Bertani
acquired first-hand knowledge of the brutish misery of the peasantry in the Roman
latifundia, and hence came to realize the importance of land reform. He was the first
to investigate the socio-hygienic conditions of the Italian peasantry and the state of
49 R. Composto, I democratici dall'UnitA ad Aspromonte , cit.; Alessandro Galante Garrone,
I radicali in Italia (1849-1925) (Garzanti, Milan, 1973), pp. 64-74; V. P. Gastaldi,
'Garibaldi, Bertani e la democrazia radicale', in Aroldo Benini, Pier Carlo Masini (eds.),
Garibaldi cento anni dopo. Atti del convegno di studi garibaldini. Bergamo, 5-7 marzo
1982 (Le Monnier, Florence, 1983), pp. 352-65, especially 362-5.
50 M. R. M., Carte Agostino Bertani, Cartella 51, plico XXX, f. 1: Circular letter from
Genoa, 29 January 1863, signed Clemente Corte, Antonio Mosto, Agostino Bertani; f.
2: Progetto ed adesioni per la formazione di una legione di volontari per combattere il
Brigantaggio. Gennaio 1863; ff. 3-90: collection of letters of warm approval; f. 93:
petition from Castiglione dello Stiviere, 1 Jan. 1863, to the Italian Parliament.
Twenty-eight signatures, mostly from artisans and manual workers.
51 V. P. Gastaldi, Agostino Bertani e la democrazia repubbiicana. Lettere a Paolo Mileti,
cit., pp. 25-35. For the Pica act see Roberto Martucci, Emergenza e tutela dell'ordine
pubblico nell'ltalia liberale. Regime eccezionale e leggi per la repressione dei reati di
brigantaggio (1861 -1865) (II Mulino, Bologna, 1980), passim and especially pp. 111-
38.
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the health services, and to propose a radical bill to overhaul the latter 52. He could
not be blamed for having made no progress in his understanding of the issue of social
justice, but it is difficult not to see the episode of the brigand-fighters' petition as an
embarrassing blot on his democratic record. On the other hand, the slow evolution of
his approach to the social question probably well epitomizes the problems of most
democrats when they attempted to arrange a fruitful marriage between their airy
patriotic ideals and the opaque and brutish reality of Italian society.
Only a small group of democrats - Pisacane, Pianciani, Guggino, Landi, Siliprandi
- believed the masses capable of making a social revolution, and saw themselves as
their spokesmen and leaders. They were less paternalistic than the other democrats,
and they correctly addressed the land question. Pisacane in particular had the vision
of a socialistic revolution springing from the rural southern masses. Yet, with the
exception of the Sicilian Landi, an abstract belief prevailed that the Italian peasantry
was naturally inclined to non-violence, and hence the possibility that to unleash the
revolutionary energy of the masses would lead to civil war was overlooked 53. These
optimistic theories were put to the test when Pisacane went to free the bandits jailed
in Ponza, confident that the peasants of the mainland would join them to make a
revolution. But the expedition lacked contacts with the southern democrats - who
were weakly organized - and was ill-timed, for those peasants who were most likely
to support it, were in Apulia for the harvest. The Bourbons easily persuaded the
inhabitants of Sapri not to help a band of fugitive prisoners, and Pisacane's
revolution was quickly crashed. Undoubtedly - as argued by Leo Valiani - Pisacane's
theories were too advanced for his time 54. But they were also abstract and rigid, as
they made inadequate provision for the need to prepare the social revolution at
grass-roots level.
There is no doubt that the democrats had thought over the problem of poverty, and
had elaborated a variety of strategies to tackle it. But these strategies were often in
contrast with one another, and were not grounded in a thorough analysis of the
economic and socio-cultural determinants of the problem. These strategical
52 A. Galante Garrone, / radicali in Italia (1849-1925) , cit., pp. 117-26; V. P. Gastaldi,
Agostino Bertani e la democrazia repubblicana. Lettere a Paolo Mileti, cit., pp. 46-8; F.
Delia Peruta, 'Sanita pubblica e legislazione sanitaria da"Unita a Crispi', in Studi
storici, vol. 21, No. 4 (1980), pp. 713-59, now also in Idem, Societa e classi popolari
nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento , cit., pp. 197-244.
53 C. M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830-1876 , cit., pp. 64-5; F. Delia
Peruta, Societa e classi popolari nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento , cit., pp. 15-6; S. J. Woolf,
'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp. 454-6, 464-6.
54 L. Valiani, 'II socialismo di Pisacane' in idem, Scritti di storia. Movimento socialista e
democrazia (Sugarco, Milan, 1983), pp. 160-87.
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differences were the outcome of different visions of the targets of the Italian
revolution. Mazzini was obsessed with national unification, and had a vision of the
new Italy as a classless society, where cooperation would replace class-interest and
competition. Hence he ruled out radical social reforms, which would inevitably
engender class struggle. At the other extreme, Pisacane wanted a social revolution
that give real economic power to the dispossessed. But his methods ignored the
cultural differences which made the poor incapable of understanding his message,
and he paid for his mistaken judgement with his life. Between the vision of Mazzini
and that of Pisacane lay a variety of half-baked compromises between the interests
of the rich and those of the poor, which could not bring about any substantial social
change. Although many democrats disagreed with Mazzini, and the issue of social
justice mattered for them - whether out of love or fear of social revolution - no
effective alternative emerged to Mazzini's line. The democratic initiative in the
Spring of 1860 would prove paramount to the completion of the unification process,
but the abscence of a clear and unanimously agreed social program ensured that the
hegemony remained in the hands of the moderates. As pointed out by Cavour in
1846, and by Gramsci a century plater, or ~sojj the democrats voiced the interests of
the middle classes and a section of the high bourgeoisie. They had at heart social
conservation rather than revolution. They posed no real threat or alternative to the
moderate hegemony, for they did not represent the interests of the poor 55.
2.3. The excellence of public bienfaisance.
Apparently the democrats paid little attention to the question of what to do with the
charity systems in force in the various states of the peninsula - with the sole and
unoriginal exception of Ricciardi. They probably reckoned that fair taxation, tough
inheritance laws, credit facilities for the small producers, mass education, and
cooperation would quickly solve the poverty problem, and thereby eliminate the need
, WOLltoi
f-ova social safety net. But in reality the possibility that the Risorgimento^bring about
55 Gramsci, II Risorgimento (Einaudi, Turin, 1949), passim, and especially pp. 46, 69-76,
81-7, 103-7; S. J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., p.
339, 497-508. See also Walter Maturi, Interpretazioni del Risorgimento (Einaudi,
Turin, 1962), pp. 617-27; Alfonso Scirocco, Democrazia e socialismo a Napoli dopo
I'Unitd (1860-1878) (Libreria Scientifica Ed., Naples, 1973), pp. 5-29. The attempt by
Rosario Villari, Mezzogiorno e contadini nell'etd moderna (Laterza, Bari, 1977), pp.
233-66, passim, and particularly 235-54, 259, to demonstrate the opposite appears
weak, abstract, and contradictory.
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radical social change was doomed from the outset, and hence old-style bienfaisance
was to remain the only source of relief for the poor.
The Utopia of setting up schemes capable of exorcising mendicancy never died out
completely. As late as 1870 a Venetian lawyer, Enrico Salvagnini, elaborated a
project of internal colonization which might have appeared clever, had it not been
based on the mistaken belief that the South of Italy was extremely fertile and free
from any poverty problem of its own. He proposed establishing a fund - financed by
the charities and independent shareholders - to buy uncultivated land in the South,
especially Apulia, Campania, and Sicily. The inmates of orphanages and foundling
homes would move into the colonies at the age of about ten. They would be trained, and
eventually settle as farmers, with their own plots, in newly-built villages, that
would become generators of income and trade for the entire area 56. The idea of
settling the poor in agrarian colonies was not new in Italy, and was based on
experiments made in Belgium and Holland - which were not a complete success 57. In
the mid 1830s the Piedmontese Piola had proposed setting up establishments of that
kind - and funded in broadly the same way - on derelict land belonging to rural
Communes. The colony of beggars was part of a larger project of rational
privatization of the Piedmontese commons, and would be organized in military-
monastic style 58. However, none of these projects - which tried to entice the rich
into allegedly profitable investment - succeeded, and it is noteworthy that the
underlying concepts were instead put into practice by the Socialist Co-operative
5 6 Enrico Salvagnini, La nostra ricchezza nella nostra miseria. Considerazioni e proposte
(Tip. della Gazzetta, Venice, 1870).
57 J. Arrivabene, 'Expose' de la Situation des Institutions de Bienfaisance pour les
Pauvres, dans le Royaume des Pays-Bas, pendant I'Annee 1829', in Poor Laws,
Appendix F, part II, Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners, vol. XXXIX
(1834), Session 4 February- 15 August 1834, cit., pp. 610-19; E. Ducpetiaux, 'De la
Situation des Colonies Agricoles en Belgique, en I'Annee 1832', ibidem, pp. 619-27. A
critical assessement of the Dutch and Belgian agrarian colonies can also be found in J.
M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique (Renouard, Paris, 1839), Tome IV, pp. 43-
91. See also C. Lis, Social Change and the labouring poor. Antwerp, 1770-1860 ( Yale
Univ. Press, New Haven & London, 1986), pp. 147-8.
58 A. Piola, Considerazioni sulle terre incolte del Piemonte con indicazione dei mezzi e dei
metodi di dissodamento applicabili anche alle altre terre incolte d'ltalia nell'interesse
del pauperismo (Botta, Turin, 1836). Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della
mendicita, degli istituti di beneficenza e delle carceri , cit., vol.I., pp. 73-80, was
favourable to the idea - much debated at the time and also discussed by Piola - of
distributing plots of common and uncultivated land to poor families, for he saw some
chances of success, if the operation was carefully ran and monitored. But he was
opposed to free or compulsory agrarian colonies, given the failure of such experiments
in the Low Countries.
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movement 59. Ideas like those of Piola and Salvagnini were Utopian variants of the
legal charity approach, and never entered the realm of policy-making, for the post-
unification years saw the triumph of the opere pie, under the rule of the law of 3
August 1862, and according to the persuasion of its compiler, Minghetti. This act
established minimal state control of the independent relief activity of agencies as
diverse as dowry trusts, hospitals, and almoner charities. We will later examine the
origins and details of this legislative framework, as well as its outcome. Here we will
focus on the ideological background of the prevailing approach to poverty and poor
relief among philanthropists and charity administrators.
The text-book of nineteenth-century bienfaisance was Baron Marie Joseph De
Gerando's Le Visiteur du Pauvre - prized in 1820 by the Academy of Lyon, and by
the French Academy with the Montyon prize - translated in Italian in 1828, and in
English in 1833. In 1839 De Gerando published De la bienfaisance publique, which
perfected and completed the model outlined about twenty years earlier, but did not
substantially modify the premises upon which it rested 60. Le Visiteur du Pauvre
might appear a naive apology of christian charity at its most spontaneous and
sentimental level, but a careful reading reveals a cleverly-built and fully-fledged
project of social control. At the core of De Gerando's system was the tenet that social
inequality was the means devised by Divine Providence to prepare and educate
humanity on this earth to a better future world, through the exercise of virtue.
Social inequality stemmed from economic progress and stimulated Christian charity.
This was an individual virtue and did not consist in passive almsgiving, but actively
involved the donor as well as the recipient in a closely-knit and long-lasting complex
of reciprocal interactions 61. De Gerando fixed a small number of golden rules, that
appeared simple, but were full of ideological implications and practical consequences.
Each of these rules corresponded to a precise aim of the system.
59 Guido Bonfante, Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, Maurizio Degl'lnnocenti, Giulio Sapelli, II movimento
Cooperative) in Italia. Storia e problemi (Einaudi, Turin, 1981); John Earle, 'Draining
the Ostia marshes. A co-operative achievement', in History Today, vol. 34 (July
1985), pp. 27-32.
60 Joseph Marie De Gerando, Le Visiteur du pauvre: memoire qui a rempote le prix propose
par I'Academie de Lyon sur la question suivante: 'Indiquer les moyens de reconnaitre la
veritable indigence, et de rendre I'aumdne utile a ceux qui la donnent comme a ceux qui
la reqoivent' (Colas, Paris, 1820); id.,The Visitor of the Poor , transl. by J. Tuckerman
(London, 1833); Id.,11 Visitatore del Povero (Truffi, Milan, 1828), 2 vols.; Id., De la
bienfaisance publique (Renouard, Paris, 1839), 4 vols. For the European debate in the
1830s on legal, private, and public charity see A. Cherubini, Dottrine e metodi
assistenziali dal 1789 al 1848. Italia - Francia - Inghilterra , cit., pp. 314-62.
J. M. De Gdrando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 1-10.
The first golden rule aimed at a broad distinction between the false poor - i.e. the
professional and unrepentant beggar, incapable of self-redemption, and hence
unworthy of help - from the true poor - i.e. those who were driven to beg by utter
destitution, and wanted to improve themselves. The problem of distinguishing
between the deserving and the undeserving poor was an old one, that had tormented
philanthropists for centuries. It was never satisfactorily solved, and consequently
huge charitable assets had been wasted, while carelessly distributed relief had
fostered idleness, immorality, and disease, society had been deprived of precious
labour , and the charitable rich had grown diffident 62. De Gerando found an
ingenious and simple solution. The rich, once approached in the street by a beggar,
should not give him or her any alms, but talk to him or her, ask for the home
address, and promise to come and visit later. The false poor would give a false
address, or run away, thereby sparing the Visitor any further trouble. The true poor
would gratefully and shamefully receive the rich in their stinking hovels 63. The
first personal contact established, the Visitor must not become complacent, but work
hard to educate the poor and gain full control of them. The second golden rule was
aimed at finding out the true predicament of the poor, and was based on the tenet that
the latter - even the true ones - had an inner propensity to cheat, lie, and to extract
the maximum benefits from the gullible rich. Hence the Visitor must not believe
their stories, but cross-question them - in true inquisitorial style - study their
psychology and their homes, interrogate the neighbours, and cross check in any
possible way the soundness of their confessions. These lengthy investigations would
permit the correct application of the third golden rule, that only minimal help must
be granted, always ensuring that living on relief would be less comfortable than
living on earned income. Thus the Visitor, having painstakingly assessed the needs of
those under his protection, must avoid careless generosity. No relief should be given
in money, for it would be squandered on the spot, but only the bare necessaries must
be provided - on a weekly basis and in the smallest quantity - for otherwise the poor
would greedily consume the goods in a few days, or would sell the surplus, and
shortly plead for more. No luxuries must be allowed. Potatoes, economic and
32 J. M. De Gerando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 14-16. In De la bienfaisance
publique , cit., tome I, pp. 82-3, De Gerando expanded further on the evils of false
poverty: 'Si la misere reelle est une grande calamite sociale, que sera-ce de la fausse
indigence lorsq'elle vient a se propager, a se confondre avec la veritable? Le systeme
entier de I'economie gen6rale en est ddrangd: la faineantise est provoquee; le mensonge
triomphe; le vice regoit des encouragements; les dons de la bienfaisance sont detournes
de leur destination, la paix publique est menacee; les moeurs regoivent une profonde
atteinte. Ce sont surtout les faux pauvres qui suscitent la guerre de la pauvretd contre
la richesse'.
33 J. M. De Gerando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 16-33, vol. II, pp. 166-70.
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nutritious soups of lentils and chick peas, as well as straw bedding were strongly
recommended. Old garments of the rich would fit the poor perfectly. And so would old
household tools. The family and relations of the rich would find moral edification and
sweet delight in mending old pots and pans, broken chairs and garments, and could
entertain themselves by organizing collections of old rugs and furniture. Nothing
would be wasted. In other words, the Visitor must ensure that the fourth golden rule
was clearly understood: once the patronage relationship was established, there would
be no room for cheating or exploiting on the part of the poor. The Visitor was in
control and decided what was good for them, delivering relief according to his or her
own severe judgement. A corollary of the minimum-relief rule was that, whenever
possible, the poor must not be given subsistence means, but work. An elderly cripple
could still be employed as a janitor. Old women with their hands paralyzed could still
peddle at the street corners with petty goods for sale hung around the neck. The blind
could still use their hands. And so on, and so forth. The Visitor had plenty of social
connections that enabled him to find jobs for his proteges, and must use his
imagination to ensure that no-one with the slightest residue of physical ability was
allowed to idle. This indeed was in the interest of the poor, for only by being forced to
earn their own living could they improve themselves both morally and materially. De
Gerando made only one exception. The shamefaced poor deserved less harsh a
treatment. For the expert eye of the Visitor it was easy to spot them, regardless of
their social degradation. Their shame, manners, and inner dignity singled them out of
the stinking crowd of the paupers. They could be trusted at face value, with no need of
investigations, they could be given money, and granted more generous relief. Regard
must be had to their sensibility and former status, for they still belonged to the
class of the Visitor, rather than to the underclass of the common poor 64.
All this applied to the adults. But the children of the poor were not forgotten by De
Gdrando. They were at the very core of his social control project. Poor working
parents abandoned their children all day long, and allowed them to grow as
mischiev^ous little vagabonds. Furthermore, they hated the thought that their
offspring might become superior to them, and hence did their level best to obstruct
their education. So, among the first duties of the Visitor was to explain to these
people that education meant skills, and hence better jobs, and prosperity not only for
the children, but also security for the parents in their old age. Once the parents were
persuaded, the Visitor must place the small children in adequate schools, and the
older ones - who were already working - in evening or Sunday schools. Popular
J. M. De G6rando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 36-55, 66-7, 166-7, 177-
85, 207-23
schools were in short supply, but never mind: the provident Visitor and his powerful
friends would found them with little effort. Child labour was an important source of
income for a poor family, thus the Visitor must not only provide extra support to
compensate for the lost income, but must also check that the untrustworthy parents
did not misuse the resources destined to the children, and constantly monitor the
progress of his little proteges. Little by little he would become the master of their
tender minds - the seeds of bourgeois thinking would thus be sown in the very field of
the potential enemy. Of course, education was a double- edged weapon. The educated
young poor risked being attracted by pernicious readings. To this end the Visitor
must not only supply adequate literature, but also stimulate production of popular
booklets on topics like geography, natural history, chemistry, physics, mechanics
and geometry. History was not mentioned, perhaps lest the poor applied their
reasoning to it 65.
De Gerando's book abounded in descriptions of the crowded, stinking and appalling
hovels of the poor, where the air was corrupted and infants languished for lack of sun
and exercise. Yet he did not suggest building decent houses for the working classes,
for this would upset the very foundations of his system, which was devised by an
aristocrat to fit the interests of the aristocracy. He depicted a static society, where
the poor could not move from their hovels, otherwise the noblemen would lose the
opportunity to make themselves indispensable as leaders of the new bienfaisance.
Ideally, each wealthy family should patronize a poor family, so the present logistics
of the cities, where the poor were scattered amongst the rich in lofts, basements, and
cellars, was the best possible. The lady of the 'piano nobile' could easily send soup to
the elderly woman in the loft. The rich would incur no extra expenses to be
charitable, for they could usefully dispose of their left-overs, while this close
person
network of solidarity was the best assurance against social unrest. No poor"vvould
dare loot the home of his rich neighbour, were he also his vigilant benefactor. De
Gerando admitted that the role of Visitor of the poor was a bit unpalatable - despite
the fact that most rich had plenty of time to spare. One could visit the poor between
lunch and tea, but it took courage to enter those grottoes for the first time, it took
imagination and perseverance to win over the diffidence of the poor, and to find the
truth amidst their customary lies. Yet, there was a higher reward - which
encompassed the practical and political advantages of becoming a Visitor - for the
65 J. M. De Gbrando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 142-65. The entire second
volume of De la biefaisance publique, cit., was devoted to the problems and importance
of popular education. Here De Gerando did not advocate compulsory primary instruction,
and the idea of supplementing the parents' income to permit the children's education was
replaced by that of attaching a school to those factories employing children.
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rich themselves would be morally transformed and spiritually renewed by the
experience. An empty-headed young man became judicious, self-organized, and filled
with profound thoughts. A delightful lady ever-restless, nervous, and oversensitive,
became marvellously sweet and maternal, to the advantage of her own children and
husband. And so on, and so forth. There was no end to the variety of moral and
spiritual alchemies induced by a close encounter with the poor. For the latter were
prone to idleness, vice, and falsej?oc^but among them pearls of meekness, generosity
and patience could be found, that could teach volumes to the Visitors 66.
So the habit of visiting the poor should spread among the higher classes, and
gradually become the back-bone of a system where organized public charity would
not be abolished outright, but powerfully supplemented and completed. Poorhouses,
foundling homes, orphanages, and hospitals could not be suppressed, for sometimes
recourse to them was inevitable. But care at home of the young, the sick and the
elderly should be facilitated as much as possible. Strong family bonds were good for
morality and saved public money. Similarly, the state must ensure public relief by
means of extraordinary public works in the rare event of collective calamities, but
should not set up workhouses or workfare schemes, which would adversely interfere
with the market, and lead to overproduction and wage depression. Nor was labour
legislation needed - although the number of child labourers was high - for the
humanitarism of the entrepreneurs would mend all wrongs. Twenty years later De
Gerando admitted that child labour legislation was needed to set age and working hours
limits - he reckoned that children younger than eight or nine years should not be
employed in factories, and proposed a maximum of ten hours effective work for those
up to eleven years of age, and twelve hours for those up to eighteen. But he was still
opposed to any law protecting the workers' health:
Vouloir etablir sur I'influence hygienique de I'industrie des regies d'une absolue
generality, c'est violenter la nature des choses [...] Chaque branche d'industrie a
ses victimes; leur nombre varie suivant les conditions qui I'accompagnent.
L'influence exercee sur la sante des ouvriers par leur emploi dans les
maufactures, depend beaucoup du caractere personnel des manufacturiers et du
regime qu'ils instituent dans leurs etablissments. On est frappe de la vigeur des
ouvriers de certains ateliers diriges par des chefs pleins de bienveillance et
d'humanite. C'est done par des sages conseils aux ouvriers, par de bonnes
directions donnees a ceux qui les employent, qu'il convient surtout de recourir
pour ecarter du theatre du travail les consequences pernicieuses a la sante des
travailleurs.
The state must favour friendly societies and saving banks, but the task of teaching the
poor frugality and providence rested with the Visitor, who would guide his proteges
6 6 J. M. De G6rando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. I, pp. 56-141, 144-6, 161-2,
204-5, 221-2, vol. II, pp. 8-10, 26-7.
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through the arcana of tontines and savingsbonds. Private initiative was the password,
but De Gerando did not advocate spontaneity and irrationality. Quite the reverse.
Under the thick crust of sentimentalism and piousness, cold rationality was the rule.
It guided the grass-roots action of the single Visitors - careful to dole out relief with
great parsimony in accordance with the rule of less eligibility - as well as the entire
network, which should eventually be regulated by means of central registers set up
by the city authorities and the bureaux de bienfaisance. Private charity and
philanthropy were not synonymous with uncoordinated dispensation of relief. To the
contrary, they ensured its maximum rationalization 87. De Gerando constantly
appealed to the Christian charity of the individual, and insisted on the mutual
spiritual bonds between rich and poor. The latter still played the role of providers of
spiritual benefits to the rich, but the pious Baron's notion of charity was a far cry
from that of the medieval masters who provided the outer frame of his system. This
was devised to fit the need of the aristocracy to maintain its grip on society, but was
not oblivious of the interests of the bourgeoisie, and aimed at allying the old and the
new rich to keep the poor under control. Despite all appearances, the lessons of the
Reformation and Counter Reformation, as well a those of the Enlightenment, were not
lost. Indeed, they were at the heart of the system, digested and re-elaborated to fit
into the frameworks of Restoration Catholicism and rampant capitalism. There was
no return to the past.
This model was more fully expounded in De la bienfaisance publique. We already
noted that twenty years of economic development did not influence De Gerando's
standing on a crucial issue like industrial health hazards. Nor did he acknowledge
any structural link between industrialization and pauperism, although he recognized
occasional connections between the two phenomena. Like Minghetti, he believed that
modern industry was a powerful means to improve the conditions of all members of
society. Social unrest and discontent were the effect of the spreading of subversive
ideas, and the outcome of relative poverty, rather than a direct product of
industrialization 68. Nevertheless, indigence must be relieved, to abolish any strong
social conflict, keep peace, and preserve social order. De Gerando disagreed with
those who wanted to restrict the duty to assist to the elderly and invalids - like Eden
and Chalmers. In his opinion they over-reacted to the exaggerations of those who
advocated the absolute duty of the State to assist all those in distress, and failed to see
87 J. M. De Gerando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. II, pp. 3-133, 146-65, 178, 180-
212, 263-76; Id., De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 246-61, quotation pp.
250-1; tome III, pp. 1-484 (saving banks, friendly societies, assurances,etc.), pp.
485-606; tome IV, pp. 1-91 (workhouses and other methods of coercive work).
88 J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 169-269.
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that there was a third way, which excluded any legal right to assistance, but was fair
and flexible. The obligation to assist the needy befell the entire society, but rested
upon a purely moral obligation. Any attempt to transform this moral obligation into a
civil one would ipso facto kill the spontaneity of charity, and all the benefits ensuing
from it. The poor needed moral as well as material support, and legal charity could
only deliver the latter 69. Still, despite his aversion to legal charity, De Gerando
strongly criticized the main theorist of private charity, Naville, for two main
reasons. First, he had defined as legal charity any relief system regulated by law, or
somehow funded by fiscal revenue, making no distinction between a system like the
English one - based on a true poor tax - with other systems where portions of state-
lotteries and excise-duty revenue were used for relief purposes.
Si le systeme de la charite legale devait en effet comprendre toute charite exercee
en vertu de la loi, elle embrasserait, sans exception, toutes les branches des
secours publics, quelles qu'en soient la nature et la forme; car, quelle est celle qui
ne porte pas un caractere legal? Ne nous etonnons done pas si le laborieux auteur
[...] n'a pu epargner dans ses critiques aucune des branches de secours publics; s'il
s'est trouve conduit a n'accorder au gouvernement de la societe que I'exercice de la
charite preventive, comme seul exempt des inconveniens de la charite legale 70.
Second, Naville failed to propose a practicable alternative
et n'ait pu qu'invoquer I'essor de la charite privee, par un appel eloquent sans
doute, mais dont I'efficacite est trop uncertaine 7V
Far from retreating from his previous positions, De Gerando praised private
charity as the only one capable of paying attention to the smallest and essential
details, without offending the recipient, and as the only means of reconciling social
conflicts, and securing social order and peace, far better than any penal laws. But
freedom - the best virtue of private charity - was also its main flaw, for it made it
erratic, uneven, blind and unable to discriminate, likely to wane with the waning of
religious sentiments, incapable either to map out the overall situation, or to plan
over a long period 72. Hence bienfaisance publique, a flexible system of organized
private charity - supported by networks of visitors of the poor and public registers
of claimants, decentralized, and enjoying financial help from the local and central
authorities when private funding could not meet demand - whereby the shortcomings
of individual charity were corrected, and its virtues preserved:
69 J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 462-74, 498-513.
79 J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 486-90, quotation p.
489.
71 J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. xlix-l, quotation p. I.
72 J. M. De G6rando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 440-51, 493-7.
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La bienfaisance publique evite des sacrifices k la charite individuelle, en reduisant,
par des mesures protectrices, le nombre des indigens; elle remedie & ce qu'il y a
d'6ventuel et de variable dans les dons priv6s; elle guide les actes d'une
bienfaisance & laquelle peuvent manquer les lumieres, elle en repare les erreurs;
elle exerce un action regulatrice; elle opere par des dispensations g6n6rales; elles
dispose des moyens etendus; elle fonde des institutions durables; elle offre un
emploi utile et facile aux dons des particuliers; elle introduit I'harmonie dans le
regime des secours collectifs, I'unite, I'ordre, I'economie dans leur administration:
eminemment pr^voyante, elle travaille pour I'avenir 7^.
2.4. But was it truly excellent?
So, the formula 'private charity' ought not to evoke necessarily the image of a
wholly unregulated and spontaneous relief activity, where a variety of welfare
agencies and charitable individuals acted independently from one another, with
inevitably messy results. In theory a model was available to marry rationality to
variety and individualism. In practice it is doubtful whether it worked: recent
research suggests that the Baron's model did not help his native country to set up an
efficient system of poor relief 74. However, Italy offered an example of how a
privately-funded charity system should not be run, if one agreed on the less
eligibility principle. In The Visitor of the Poor, De Gerando found the Italian system
despicable, where the combination of abundant richly-endowed charities with the
lack of rules regulating the dispensation of relief, almost encouraged the poor to seek
relief rather than work. In De la bienfaisance publique he gave a very optimistic
account of how the Italians were improving their welfare systems and moving in the
right direction 75. In his first judgment he probably exaggerated the fortunes of the
Italian poor, for many stood no chance of relief. But his second assessment was
perhaps exceedingly charitable. In Florence the Congregation of S. Giovani Battista
applied selective criteria to out-door relief dispensation 76. But it would seem - at
the present stage of research - that this was not the universal rule. In 1853 the
doctor Carlo Alfieri argued that in Milan it was necessary to rationalize the
distribution of relief along the lines suggested by De Gerando, if one wanted to avoid
the pandemonium of 1847 and 1848 - when the distribution of bread vouchers and
7^ J. M. De Gerando, De la bienfaisance publique , cit., tome I, pp. 505-6. See also tome
IV, pp. 219-70, 562-612.
74 Roger Price, 'Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-Nineteenth Century France', European
Studies Review, vol. 13 (Oct. 1983), pp. 423-53.
75 J. M. De Gerando, II Visitatore del Povero , cit., vol. II, pp. 142-6; De la bienfaisance
publique , cit., tome IV, pp. 187-92.
76 S. Woolf, The poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
(Methuen, London & N.York, 1986), pp. 160-1, 163-4, 188-217.
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monetary relief exposed all the flaws of a system of uncoordinated relief agencies,
with no knowledge whatsoever of the number and predicament of claimants. He
proposed setting up quarter committees chaired by the parish priest. The members of
these committees must regularly visit the needy families and assess their
requirements case by case. Representatives of the quarter committees would form a
central committee which would report to a supreme welfare agency - called Consulta
generale di beneficenza - entrusted with the organization of relief in the event of
general calamities. The same sort of reform was proposed in the early 1870s in
Brescia by the prefect Luigi Tegas, who stressed the deleterious overlapping of such
welfare organizations as the Congregation of charity and the Congrega Apostolica 77.
During the thirty years after the unification, philanthropists passionately debated
how to make charities truly accountable to the public, coordinate their action, and
rationalize the distribution of relief in the meantime. Some partial results were
achieved. In Genoa a network of quarter committees and visitors was set up in 1876.
In Milan in the early 1880s the Congregation of charity used visitors to assess
claims. Quarter committees to assess claims existed also in Naples, but that
Congregation of charity ignored their advice, and dispensed relief as it pleased.
However, the debate among philanthropists and charities administrators in the last
two decades of the Nineteenth century suggests that coordination of the charities was
difficult to achieve, even where re-organization had been attempted on the tracks of
De Gerando's model 78.
At the turn of the century legal charity encountered little favour among Italian
philanthropists - on the grounds that the right to relief engendered a dangerous
attitude among the lower classes, demoralized them, and deterred them from seeking
77 Del Soccorso di famiglia. Riordinamento delta Pubblica e Privata Beneficenza in Miiano
proposto dal Dottor Carlo Alfieri gii medico presso I'Ospedale Maggiore (Guglielmini,
Milan, 1853), passim and especially pp. 12-20, 36-48; Luigi Tegas, Interesse generale
e interessi locali (Apollonio, Brescia, 1871), pp. 19-24. Tegas was a former member
of the Piedmontese Parliament. He was prefect of Lucca from 1864 to 1867 and prefect
of Brescia from 1867 to 1871. See Mario Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello Stato e
prefetti del Regno d'ltalia (M.I., Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Rome, 1973), pp.
311, 389. About the detrimental effects of ill-coordinated and indiscriminate almoner
relief see also: F. Sebregondi, 'Dell'unita d'intenti nella pubblica beneficenza', R.B.P.,
No.1, 1874, pp. 4-15; V. Tamburini, 'L'erogazione della beneficenza', R.B.P., No. 12,
1875, pp. 1009-24; G. Du Jardin, 'Di un nuovo modo di applicare la carita pubblica in
Genova per mezzo di Comitati di Sestiere', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, pp. 98-100; Dr. A.,
'Intorno al riordinamento delle opere pie in Crema', R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, pp. 513-526;
P. Locatelli, Miseria e beneficenza. Ricordi di un funzionario di Pubblica Sicurezza
(Dumolard, Milan, 1878), pp. 209-14.
78 G. Du Jardin, 'Di un nuovo modo di applicare la carita pubblica in Genova per mezzo di
Comitati di Sestiere', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, cit., pp. 97-109; M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp.
282-3 (28 April 1883). For the debate on the rationalization of relief dispensation see
below, 7.4., 7.6. and 9.5.
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work and self-improvement. Some even denied the usefulness of basic charity
legislation. Those who unequivocally advocated the duty of the State to fund poor
relief in full, applying the less eligibility principle, were rare. By and large, both
Right and Left agreed that public charity - i.e. a system of public relief privately
run - was the sole answer to all social evils 79. Carlo Ferraris and Pasquale Villari
acknowledged the need of a social safety net fully financed by the state, but reckoned
that Italy could not afford it as yet. Perhaps unknowingly, they repeated - thirty
years later - Cavour's argument about Piedmont's unreadiness for an English-style
welfare reform. So they too argued in favour of the system theorized by De Gerando.
Public relief should be dispensed by the charities - independently run, but
coordinated with one another at local and central levels 80. Yet, despite the buckets of
ink spilt about the necessity of such coordination, by and large, relief distribution
remained disorganized. As will became clear later, this was due to a variety of
interplaying factors. First of all, the Act of 3 August 1862 was highly respectful of
the autonomy of charities. Secondly there was the intricate interplay of vested
interests that underlay charity admnistration. Most philanthropists knew that no
modernization of the system could be achieved, unless the charities surrendered a
good slice of their autonomy. But this entailed shedding privileges, so many tried to
run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, which effectively paralyzed any chance
of success. Third, the state of the economy did not require as yet - in many parts of
the country - the strict enforcement of the less eligibility principle. In such a
context the Act of 17 July 1890 - or Crispi reform - appeared to be an attempt to
enforce - from above and in a very complicated manner - a rationalization which
refused to materialize 'spontaneously'. Details of this act and its implementation will
be examined later in this work, when we will also discuss more thoroughly the
various aspects of the Italian debate on welfare reform.
Here it seems worthwhile to jump ahead, and pay some attention to the present. For
the old charities - although fewer and less powerful than a century ago - have by no
79 Roberto Bonghi, 'Dell'indirizzo odiemo della beneficenza. Lettera al direttore', R.B.P.,
No. 1 (1873), pp. 1-17; Virgilio Bellachioma, 'L'ingerenza dello Stato nelle opere pie',
R.B.P., No. 4-5 (1896), pp. 279-92; Trajano Mozzoni, 'Beneficenza libera e beneficenza
legale', R.B.P., No. 1 (1896), pp. 25-36. For a full overview of the tenets of Right and
Left on social issues see Federico Chabod, Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870
al 1896 (Laterza, Bari, 1951), vol. 1, Le premesse , pp. 340-91. But see also R.
Price, 'Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-Nineteenth Century France', cit., pp. 424-8,
448-9.
80 Carlo Ferraris, 'Le istituzioni di beneficenza davanti al Parlamento', in Nuova Antotogia,
vol. 104 (16 April 1889), pp. 721-53, passim and partic. pp. 725-33; vol. 105 (1 May
1889), pp. 87-110, passim and partic. pp. 98-107; Pasquale Villari, 'La riforma della
beneficenza', in Id. Scritti vari (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1894), pp. 336-68 (originally in
Nuova Antologia, vol. 111 (1 May 1890), pp. 5-40).
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means left the Italian centre-stage of welfare debate. Their merits and demerits still
arouse some passion, and so does the Sphinx's riddle 'who should run the welfare
services?'. Without entering such debate, we will only note that - although the
traditional apology of private charity is no longer fashionable, at least not in the
sentimental terms used by Minghetti or De Gerando - as late as 1983 the sociologist
Luciano Gallino suggested recouping the old charities
... to try and build - from them, but reaching beyond their limits - new
organizational models capable at least of exploring a road to get us out of the
impasse represented on the one hand by private speculation in health and social
services, and on the other by bureaucratic centralism and political favouritism®1.
Which is probably not as unrealistic a suggestion as it might sound, if we consider
that the IPABs (Istituzioni pubbliche di assistenza e beneficenza, as the registered
charities were called from 1923) still play a considerable role in the provision of
welfare services, while the private sector appears strong, and the public sector
weak. Statistical monitoring of the welfare services is particularly inadequate -
today as a century ago - thus nobody really knows the full truth about them.
However, according to ISTAT, in 1972 40.4% of indoor relief institutions for the
elderly, the young, and the handicapped (istituti di ricovero per anziani, minori e
handicappati) were run by IPABs, 9.3% by the public sector (communes, provinces,
etc.), and 53.2% by the private sector. As for the bed capacity, the IPABs controlled
40.4%, the public sector 10.4%, and the private sector 49.2%. A census started by
the Regione Piemonte in 1977 and published in 1980 showed that in Piedmont the
IPABs were far more numerous than indicated by the official estimate, from which it
is reasonable to infer that the ISTAT figures were grossly underestimated 82. Many
81 Luciano Gallino, 'Presentazione', in Piercarlo Grimaldi, Renato Grimaldi, II potere delta
beneficenza. II patrimonio delle ex-opere pie (Angeli, Milan, 1983), p. 10. Among the
many works published on the wake of the act of 25 July 1975, No. 382, and the D. P. R.
No. 616 of 1977 we will note only a few: Mario Tortello, Francesco Santanera,
L'assistenza espropriata. I tentative di salvataggio delle IPAB e la riforma
dell'assistenza (Nuova Guaraldi, Quaderni di Prospettive assistenziali 12, Florence,
1982); Giovanna Rossi, Pierpaolo Donati, Welfare State: problemi e alternative (Angeli,
Milan, 1985, 3rd ed.); Carlo Curcio, 'Idee e discussioni intorno alia previdenza nel
Risorgimento e dopo', in Previdenza sociale, 1961, pp.1127-1173; Giusto Geremia,
'La previdenza sociale in Italia nell'ultimo secolo', in L'economia italiana dal 1861 al
1961 (Giuffre, Milan, 1961), pp. 614-655; Lorenzo Spinelli, 'L'assistenza privata con
particolare riguardo agli enti ecclesiastici (problemi e prospettive)', in Studi in
memoria di Carlo Esposito , vol.II (Padua, 1972), pp. 1025-1047; Giovanni Ancarani,
'L'evoluzione delle istituzioni assistenziali libere in Italia dall'unita ad oggi', in Quaderni
di Justitia , No. 29, ( Giuffre, Milan, 1978), pp. 58-75.
82 P. Grimaldi, R. Grimaldi, II potere delta beneficenza. II patrimonio delle ex-opere pie ,
cit., pp. 49-56. According to this census, in Piedmont the IPABs run 81.3% of the total
number of welfare institutions, the communes 4%, and the private sector 14.7%, see
ibidem, p. 51.
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IPABs exist in name only, and their economic power has undoubtedly been eroded by
inflation and the fall of revenues due to a long period of rent-freeze, yet it seems that
they still retain some of their former wealth. An enquiry funded by the Fondazione
Luigi Einaudi revealed that, as late as 1976, there were eighty-nine IPABs in Turin.
Of these, about thirty were on the verge of bankrupcy, but the rest were still active
and assisted - at 31 October 1977 - 7,306 people. The overall patrimony was
estimated between 135 and 200 billion lire, of which 15 billion were rural
properties, and the rest urban buildings - mostly flats rented out at lower than
market prices for 'humanitarian reasons' 83.
83 P. Grimaldi, R. Grimaldi, II potere delta beneficenza. II patrimonio delle ex-opere pie ,
cit., pp. 30-48, 58.
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3. Piedmont. The origins and development of the legislation on charities.
3.1. The importance of the Piedmontese model.
The administrative aspects of the Risorgimento particularly attracted the attention
of historians after the Second World War, when the need to explain the 'fascist
aberration' of the liberal regime pushed many to investigate fields usually neglected
by the liberal historiographic tradition. Since then, there has been a flourishing of
studies on the pre-unification administrations, the administrative unification, the
relationship between state and civil society in the newly united peninsula, the
judiciary, and so on. On the occasion of the centenary of the unification, a notable
quantity of such studies was published; and interest, almost thirty years after the
anniversary, has not abated. Such a durable interest is still fuelled by the need to
understand better a politico-administrative system which, according to some
interpretations, eased the fascist take over; but it has also acquired other
motivations, more strictly related to contemporary political debate, with the
emergence of 'new' political issues. The most debated of these issues is that of
administrative decentralization. The argument, central to the political debate in the
1860s, was re-discovered in the mid 1960s when the issue of regional autonomy,
until then dormant in the republican constitution, became the subject of public
discussion and was eventually dealt with in Parliament. At long last the regions were
granted a degree of politico-administrative autonomy, while the whole controversy
about the reasons why local autonomy had been ruled out a century before was
polemically and fruitfully revived 1.
1 Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa' civile (Einaudi, Turin, 1977^, Ist.ed. 1960);
Alberto Aquarone, L'unificazione legislativa ed i codici del 1865 (Giuffre, Milan, 1960);
Carlo Ghisalberti, Contributi alia storia delle amministrazioni preunitarie (Giuffre,
Milan, 1963); Isabella Zanni Rosiello, L'unificazione politica e amministrativa nelle
"Provincie deU'Emilia" (1859-60) (Giuffre, Milan, 1965); Guido Astuti, L'unificazione
amministrativa del regno d'ltalia (Morano, Naples, 1966); Ernesto Ragionieri, Politica
e amministrazione nella storia dell'ltalia unita (Laterza, Bari, 1967); Atti del
Congresso celebrativo delle leggi amministrative di unificazione , Feliciano Benvenuti
and Gianfranco Miglio (ed.), L'unificazione amministrativa ed i suoi protagonisti (Neri
Pozza, Vicenza, 1969); Alberto Aquarone, Alia ricerca dell'ltalia liberate (Guida,
Naples, 1972); Nicola Tranfaglia, Dallo Stato liberate al regime fascista (Feltrinelli,
Milan, 1973); Ettore Rotelli, 'Gli ordinamenti locali della Lombardia preunitaria (1755-
1859)', in Archivio storico lombardo , series IX, vol.11, 1974, pp. 171-234; I. Zanni
Rosiello (ed.), Gli apparati statali dail'Unita al fascismo (II Mulino, Bologna, 1976;
Nicola Tranfaglia (ed.), L'ltalia unita nella storiografia del secondo dopoguerra
(Feltrinelli, Milan, 1980); E. Rotelli, 'Gli ordinamenti locali preunitari', in A. Berselli
(ed,),Storia dell'Emilia-Romagna (University Press, Bologna, 1980), vol. 3, pp. 231-
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In the 1860s the main argument of the decentralists was that each of the seven
states forming the new Italian kingdom had different and often very efficient
administrative systems. To merge them was impossible, to write them off at once
was unfair to local civil traditions and politically detrimental to the new rulers,
since the annexed populations would inevitably resent losing their traditions.
Cavour, like most of the moderates, was theoretically favourable to some degree of
decentralization, but he never thoroughly studied the various administrative systems
in force before the annexations. Rattazzi held a different point of view. After
Villafranca he elaborated a package of administrative laws, mainly derived from the
Piedmontese legislation and seasoned with some elements of Lombard tradition. Their
enforcement in Lombardy in December 1859 aroused great discontent both among the
people and the Lombard moderates, since the promise to maintain most of the pre¬
existing administrative laws, a condition of annexation, had not been honoured. The
issue could not be easily eschewed, but a committee, chaired by Farini and Minghetti
and entrusted to find a compromise granting administrative unity in the context of a
moderate local autonomy, was to meet an unfortunate end. The committee produced a
series of bills, usually referred to as 'the Minghetti bills' which never reached
Parliament, since they were withdrawn at the committee stage. During their
preparation Italian politics had been modified and complicated by the acquisition of
the Southern regions which soon started to threaten the fragile unity of the new state.
To what degree the problems posed by the South were imputable to the very way in
which Cavour handled the whole matter is still a debated question which we need not
discuss. It is however widely accepted that the danger of a secession of the South
became the main argument used by those who favoured centralization. Indeed, it was
an undeniable risk and the champions of devolution found themselves short of
arguments and alternatives. Cavour himself, though still using the promise of local
autonomy to gain political consensus, did not take any effective steps in that
direction2.
256; Nicola Raponi (ed,),Dagli stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione (II
Mulino, Bologna, 1981); A useful synthesis of the debate on centralization in: I. Zanni
Rosiello, 'Unificazione italiana: le istituzioni', Storia d'ltalia , 3 (La Nuova Italia,
Florence, 1978), pp. 1333-1349. For the recent debate on administrative devolution
see Centro Studi della Fondazione Olivetti, Le regioni: politica o amministrazione?
(Comunita, Milan, 1973). For the implementation of regional autonomy in the 1970s see
M. Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1982 (Longman, London, 1984), pp. 390-93.
2 E. Ragionieri, 'Politica e amministrazione nello stato unitario', in Id., Politica e
amministrazione nella storia dell'ltalia unita (Laterza, Bari, 1967), pp. 72-6, 82-104,
Alberto Aquarone, L'unificazione legislativa ed i codici del 1865, cit., pp. 1-6, 79-80;
R. Ruffilli, 'Governo, parlamento e correnti politiche nella genesi della legge 20 marzo
1865', in L'unificazione amministrativa ed i suoi protagonisti , cit., pp. 221-67; A.
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Decentralization was hence shelved. Various pieces of Piedmontese legislation were
soon enforced in the Centre and in the South, and by 1865 administrative unification
was achieved by simply extending the Piemontese laws to the whole Peninsula.
However, the issue of administrative decentralization and local autonomy remained
central to the political debate. Various bills were produced between 1866 and 1872,
but none of them passed, due to the <?ppc.3« t"ic>K 0f t|-,e Right majority to relaxing
central controls on local administrations 3. Hence those choices made in 1865,
under the pressure of the civil war in the South, became definitive, bearing durable
consequences in all fields of civil administration - and therefore in that of public
welfare. For about thirty years the Italian charities were regulated by the act of 3
August 1862, No. 753, that was a modified version of the act of 20 November 1859
which was part of the package of laws elaborated by Rattazzi in the autumn of 1859.
In the first part of this work we intend to look at the issues, problems and
alternative solutions which arose during the unification process in the field of
welfare administration. We will discuss the legislative action on charities of the
provisional governments, the reasons for and effects of the abolition of the interim
legislation, the Parliamentary debate over the 1862 act, and its effects. But first, in
order to understand the contradictions involved in this particular aspect of
administrative unification, we need to take a close look at the origins and development
of the model of the 1862 act, i.e. that of 20 November 1859. This was the outcome of
a long process which went through several stages, all of them difficult and
controversial. By assessing the development of the Piedmontese legislation on
charities we will see that the Savoyard state had endured many battles and defeats
before imposing on the charities a system of administrative controls that respected
their autonomy but made them publicly accountable. This is a basic point to start
from. The myth that in Piedmont the charity system had worked wonderfully since
the 1717 reform must be dispelled; and it must be made clear that from that reform
to the 1859 act the way had been long and far from easy. Once the issue is put in this
perspective it will be evident that the root of all the problems and contradictions
facing the provisional and central governments on the matter of control of charities
lay in the fact that, whereas the Piedmontese state had bro ught its charities under
relative control over a long period of time, the new Italian state was supposed to do
the same in the span of a few years. It was the same sort of problem which confronted
the new rulers in many other branches of the public administration. Since most
Berselli, 'Marco Minghetti e le leggi di unificazione amministrativa', ibidem, pp. 319-
48; Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (Methuen, London, 1985), pp. 248-55, 263-65.
3 A. Berselli, La destra storica dopo I'Unita, vol. II, Italia legale e Italia reale (II Mulino,
Bologna, 1965), pp. 3-81.
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Italian charities were powerful and rebellious clerical strongholds, the imposition
on them of a legislation which had been tailored to relatively 'tamed' charities was to
prove disastrous.
3.2. The reform of Victor Amadeus II and Father Guevarre.
Various attempts to lock up beggars in hospices were made in Turin from the late
sixteenth century. But they encountered widespread popular hostility, while the
internal and external political instability of the mid-seventeenth century ruined the
economy, thereby making adequate funding impossible 4. The first wide-ranging
effort to tackle pauperism was made by Victor Amadeus II, who is remembered for
his reforms. These took place between 1717 and 1731 and put Piedmont ahead of the
other Italian States, where the administrative machinery's modernization occurred
at the end of the eighteenth century. Victor Amadeus strengthened the Savoyard state
structure by reorganizing central and local administrations, by setting up the land
register, and by reducing the clergy's immunities and privileges. The vacant
benefices were put under state management, the Inquisition was practically
abolished, the Church's monopoly on education was broken, and Turin university
reformed 5. Among these reforms there was also that of the charity system, whose
preliminaries took place in Savoy. In 1714 the bishop of Grenoble, Allemand de
Montmartin, sent to Chambery the Jesuit Andre' Guevarre with the task of
reorganizing the moribund hospice, first opened in 1650. Father Guevarre was at
that time an aged veteran of charity reform. With Fathers Chaurand and Dunod he had
founded or reorganized hospices and congregations of charity throughout France since
4 Jacopo Bernardi, II Ft. Ospizio di Carita in Torino e ordinamenti negli Stati Sardi per
prevenire e soccorrere la indigenza (Speirani e Tortone, Turin, 1857), pp. 31-64; S.
J. Woolf, 'Sviluppo economico e struttura sociale in Piemonte da Emanuele Filiberto a
Carlo Emanuele II, in Nuova Rivista Storica , XLVI, 1962, p. 16; Achille Erba, La chiesa
sabauda tra cinque e seicento. Ortodossia tridentina, gallicanesimo savoiardo e
assolutismo ducale (1580-1630) (Herder, Rome, 1979), pp. 248-258; Idem,
'Pauperismo e assistenza in Piemonte nel secolo XVII', in Giorgio Politi, Mario Rosa,
Franco della Peruta (eds.), Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna (Biblioteca e
libreria statale, Cremona, 1982), pp. 211-224. Chiara Vigliano, 'Miseria e carita a
Torino tra XVI e XVII secolo', Studi Piemontesi , XII, 1983, No. 2, pp. 371-375. See
also S. Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in western Europe', in Id., The Poor in
Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Methuen, London, 1986),
pp. 19, 38-39.
5 Geoffrey Symcox, Victor Amadeus II. Absolutism in the Savoyard State 1675-1730
(Thames and Hudson,1983); Stuart J. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'
Italia (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), vol. 3, pp. 50-2; 113; Giuliano Procacci, Storia degli
Italiani (Laterza, Bari, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 301-306.
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the 1680s. Their activity had been essential to the implementation of the ban on
mendicancy issued by Louis XIV in 1662. In the 1690s Chaurand and Guevarre had
travelled to Italy to help Pope Innocent XII set up the hospice of St. John in Lateran.
The two Jesuits also inspired reforms in Florence and Modena. Their main objective
was to convince the wealthy to give up almsgiving and instead contribute to the
official collectors. Their tenet was that poor and rich alike would benefit from the
establishment of an efficient network of hospices and congregations of charity. The
rich would be freed from continuous harrassment, being offered at the same time the
opportunity to contribute to the spiritual redemption of the poor. These, locked up in
the hospice or assisted at home, would learn a useful trade and save their corrupted
souls, thanks to the devout atmosphere in which they would be compelled to live.
The success of the reform carried out in Chambery so favourably impressed Victor
Amadeus li that, after giving it full support and official approval, he called Guevarre
to Turin. The implementation of an efficient system of poor relief seemed a proper
conclusion to the radical reforms by which he had sought to strengthen the structure
of the state. In 1716 Guevarre arrived in Turin, where he was to die in 1724, aged
seventy-eight and greatly respected at court. He left a detailed account of the
proceedings of the reform which were similar to those performed in France. The
first stage was to revise the regulations of the hospice. Aitough the administrative
board was formed, as before, by representatives of the clergy, the nobility, the town
council and the bourgeosie, Father Guevarre ensured that all administrative decisions
*56 taken°kalter careful consioW'ty setting up a quantity of minute rules. Other
regulations guaranteed a scrupulous keeping of the accounts and an orderly daily
management of the hospice. Then the dimensions of pauperism were assessed. After a
ban oh mendicancy, which provoked the departure of the foreign beggars, the poor of
Turin were called for a census. The information they offered was carefully checked
and two lists were formed- one for those who were to be locked up and the other for
those who needed outdoor relief. Adequate alms, to be distributed each Sunday after
the mass, were allocated to the latter. The attendance at mass was compulsory. Those
poor who did not attend would not get their weekly ration of bread. The same
assessment was made in the whole state by means of a general inquiry. Then the
resources available to the hospice were examined. Since they were inadequate,
Guevarre made an agreement with the Vicar General, Filippo Tarino. On Sunday 23
August 1716 six Jesuits preached in the main churches of Turin. The sermons,
intended to inculcate in the audience the correct concepts of charity, were followed by
a very successful public collection. It was an efficient if occasional method of fund
raising, since the sermons were a skilful mixture of heavenly promises and hellish
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threats. Other collections were subsequently organized in the same way to raise funds
for the weekly distributions of bread to those poor living at home, for furnishing the
hospice, for clothing the inmates, and for a grandiose banquet for the poor 6.
On the late morning of 7 April 1717 the populace of Turin enjoyed a spectacular
performance, that crowned Father Guevarre's hard work. An orderly crowd of about
800 poor people and beggars, all dressed up in new uniforms, was conducted from the
Hospice of Charity to the Cathedral, where the city's confraternities and a great
number of young boys and girls, respectively attired as angels and virgins, were
awaiting. Hence an impressive procession went back to the Hospice, through the
Castle square and the Via Po. The procession was headed by the poor women, each of
them accompanied by a virgin, followed by the men with their angels. Then came the
choristers dressed in red, the Hospice's priests and rectors, the invalids on carts and
assisted by angels, those poor who were eligible for out-door relief, the
confraternities, the religious congregations, and the Cathedral chapter. An altar
devoted to the Blessed Amadeus of Savoy had been erected near the door of the Hospice.
Here the Jesuit Father Andre Guevarre gave an impressive sermon inspired by the
biblical passage 'This is a terrible place: nothing less than the house of God and the
door to Heaven' (Genesis 28,17), explaining that the Hospice was a terrible place for
the avaricious but the entrance to Heaven for all charitable people. After the Te Deum
each angel and virgin embraced his companion. The poor entered the Hospice and
the rest of the procession went back to the Cathedral. Meanwhile the tables were set
in the Castle square for a grandiose banquet. The poor, after a third promenade from
the Hospice and the ritual blessing, at last sat down to enjoy their earthly reward,
6 La mendicita sbandita col sovvenimento de' power! tanto nelle Citta che ne' Borghi,
Luoghi, e Terre de' Stati di qua, e di la da' Monti, e Colli di Sua Maesta Vittorio Amedeo,
Re di Sicilia, di Gerusalemme e Cipro &c. Come altresi dello stabilimento degli Ospizij
Generali, e delle Congregazioni di Carita d'ordine delta Maesta Sua (Mairesse & Radix ,
Turin, 1717), passim and partic. pp.vi-vii, 8-56; J. Bernardi, II R. Ospizio..., cit., pp.
64-87; Charles Joret, 'Le P. Guevarre et les bureaux de charite' au XVIIe siecle', in
Annates du Midi, I, 1889, pp. 340-393, partic. pp. 376-381, 390-391, Geoffrey
Symcox, Victor Amadeus II. Absolutism in the Savoyard State 1675-1730, cit., pp.
199-201. About the reforms carried out in Rome, Florence and Modena cf.: Michele
Fatica, 'La reclusione dei poveri a Roma durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XII (1692-
1700)', in Ricerche per la storia religiosa di Roma, 3 (Storia a Letteratura, Rome,
1979), pp. 133-179; Idem, 'La regolarizzazione dei mendicanti attraverso il lavoro:
I'ospizio dei poveri di Modena nel Settecento', in Studi storici, No. 4, 1982, pp. 757-
782; L. Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nell'ltalia del Settecento', Transactions of the
Fifth international congress on the Enlightenment, in Studies on Voltaire and the
Eighteenth Century, vol. 191 (Oxford, 1980), pp. 914-20; Id., 'L'assistenza ai poveri
nella Toscana settecentesca', in Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 185-188.
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watched from the balconies of the palace by the royal family and surrounded by huge
crowds of the populace which a ring of 200 soldiers was just enough to contain 7.
During the following years the establishment in the major towns of Piedmont of
general hospices modelled on that of Turin was decreed. Wherever the funds were
insufficient for a hospice, a congregation of charity must be established. The
congregation was entrusted with the management of the legacies bequeathed to the
poor, the collection and distribution of alms, and the provision of medicines and
shelter for the sick. Control of the network was first committed to the general
congregation of Turin - established in 1719 - and later partially decentralized to
congregations established in the principal town of each province. The same
dispositions were extended to Savoy in 1722 8. In theory the foundations had been
laid down for a system of charity that, although still financed by private charity, was
run by administrative boards in which the lay prevailed over the clergy, and was
controlled by the state through the provincial and general congregations. In practice
the implementation of the system was not easy. An inquiry made in 1723 revealed
that 399 of the newly established congregations of charity had inadequate resources.
Of these, 337 were so destitute that could be regarded as non existent. Almost
everywhere the pre-existing funds available to the congregations were exiguous,
while the public collections, after the first enthusiastic response, became very
unpopular. The wealthy were reluctanct to abandon the traditional patterns of
almsgiving, and even objected to enfermement on the grounds that it was a cruel
means of helping the poor. It was an obstacle that the Jesuits had faced many times
before in France. In 1704 Father Guevarre had a very serious clash on this subject
with the administrative board of the hospice of Aix en Provence, which ended his
career there. On that occasion he elaborated answers to the most frequent objections
to his theories. This refutation, although re-published in La mendicita sbandita,
evidently failed to convince his critics. Also the clergy were hostile to the reform for
fear of losing Hleirtraditional control of charity. The problem of who should control
7 La mendicita sbandita..., cit., pp. 49-56.
8 Instruzioni e Regole Degli Ospizj Generaii per li Poveri da fondarsi in tutti gli Stati delta
S.R. Maesta del Re di Sicilia &c. di ordine della medesima Maesta (Mairesse & Radix,
Turin, 1717), pp.141; Instruzioni e Regole delle Congregazioni di Carita' da fondarsi
d'ordine della S. R. Maesta' del Re di Sicilia & C. nelle Citta', e ne' Luoghi degli suoi
Stati ove non possono farsi Ospizi Generaii per li Poveri (Mairesse & Radix, Turin,
1719), pp. 11-14; Stabilimento della Congregazione Primaria, e Generalissima Nella
Citta' di Torino Per gli Ospizj, e Congregazioni di Carita' (Mairesse & Radix, Turin,
1719); Stabilimenti delle Congregazioni di Carita Generaii, e Provinciali (Mairesse &
Radix, Turin,1720); Giuseppe Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo
XVIII (Bocca,Turin, 1908), pp. 332-333; Guido Quazza, Le riforme in Piemonte nella
prima meta del Settecento (Soc. Tip. Ed. Modenese, Modena, 1957), vol. I, p. 314.
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the congregations or hospices was aggravated by local rivalries between communities
and feudatories, whilst the poor preferred to go begging elsewhere rather than accept
official alms at home. Father Guevarre's system came under criticism in the mid
1730s, when some proposed abandoning any effort of forcing the independent
charities into the framework of hospices and congregations of charity, and investing
in textile manufactories to create jobs. But these suggestions came to nothing, and in
1739 it was decided to enhance the system set up by Guevarre. Data published by
Giuseppe Prato indicate that only in the province of Susa had the reform been
implemented with satisfactory results 9.
In 1750 the total number of congregations had risen to 616; but, as the following
table shows, they were still far from being the back-bone of the system .
Table 3.2.1. Charities in Piedmont (1750).
Kind of charity Number Revenue (lire) % of total revenue
Hospitals 141 592,131 50.8
Congreq. of Charity 616 109,314 9.4
Confraternities 1 ,395 204,958 1 7.6
Other charities 370 258,300 22.2
Totals 2,522 1 ,1 64,703 1 00
Source: G. Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo XVIII, cit., p. 335.
The congregations held less than 10% of the total revenue of the charitable
patrimonies, whilst almost 40% of it was still independently managed by
confraternities and other charities. The remaining half belonged to the hospitals,
which had not been touched by the reform and were numerous but inadequate and
often mismanaged to the detriment of their inmates 10. Since the merger in the
congregations of charity of all pious patrimonies was one of the principal targets of
the reform, we can infer that, thirty years after its implementation, this objective
had not been met. The network of congregations and hospices was a merely weak
subsidiary to the pre-existing private and mostly ecclesiastical charities.
9 G. Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo XVIII, cit., pp. 333-334; G.
Quazza, Le riforme in Piemonte nella prima meta del Settecento , cit., pp. 314-316; L.
Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nell'ltalia del Settecento', cit., pp. 916-7. About the
incident between Guevarre and the rectors of the hospice of Aix cf.: C. Joret, 'Le P.
Guevarre et les bureaux de charite' au XVIIe siecle', cit., pp. 369-371. For the thirty
seven answers to the objections to enfermement see La mendicita sbandita... , cit., pp.
103-175.
1 0 Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo XVIII , cit., pp. 335-336, 344-
351.
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A plan to build new hospices to cover the entire kingdom was elaborated in 1767.
But only few were actually built, for lack of funds 11. The attempt to tranform them
into profitable workhouses was quite unsuccessful and proved to be an inadequate
response to the silk industry crisis. The congregations were equally poor and could
barely afford the weekly distributions of bread, thus failing to provide medicines and
shelter to the sick. In many places they had been completely taken over by the parish
priests who diverted the scarce funds for religious purposes, while the civil
authorities did not care to stop such abuses. Complaints about partiality oj and abuses
committed by the officials entrusted with the distribution of relief were widespread
12. The hospice of Turin, although generously subsidized by the king, was in chronic
financial difficulty. Indeed, the situation in the capital confirmed the failure of the
new system in the rest of the kingdom. Between 1766 and 1774 the number of
inmates rose from 1,750 to 2,286; but, notwithstanding the renewed allowances of
salt, privileges and subsidies, the hospice could not afford their maintenance. Hence,
to avoid the overcrowding of the hospice, mendicancy was partially allowed in 1773,
and in 1792 was more fully accepted as an inevitable evil and regulated by begging
licences. Yet, despite several measures to reduce the number of inmates, the hospice
- with 2,000 inmates and 200 children entrusted to wet nurses - had a shortfall of
35,000 lire in 1799. On the verge of the French invasion the system was at
breaking point 13. In Turin mendicancy had been kept partially at bay for a period,
but the reform of Victor Amadeus had not been the definitive cure of pauperism. This
was bound to worsen dramatically during the recurrent crises of the silk industry,
and was aggravated by the process of proletarianization which, from the 1750s,
transformed the small land-owners into farm labourers and hence potential beggars.
As argued by Guido Quazza, no measures against pauperism could be effective, unless
accompanied by radical reforms of the economy 14. To this basic diagnosis we can add
some other comments.
It is clear from the evidence published by Prato that up to 1750 the network of
congregations of charity and hospices failed to take steady root in the provinces. Later
plans to enhance the existing hospices and build many more had very limited success.
Victor Amadeus had intended to relieve and prevent begging in the whole state; but,
1 1 Patrizia Clerici, Laura Palmucci, 'Gli ospizi di carita in Piemonte: appunti per una
lettura del fenomeno insediativo', in E. Sori (ed.), Citta e controllo sociale in Italia tra
XVIII e XIX secolo (Angeli, Milan, 1982), pp. 251-81.
1 2 Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo XVIII , cit., pp.336-343.
Bernardi, II R. Ospizio... , cit., pp. 97-108, 111-122; Daniela Maldini Chiarito, 'La
legislazione napoleonica e il pauperismo in Piemonte", in E. Sori (ed), Citta e controllo
sociale in Italia tra XVII e XIX secolo , cit, pp. 125-6.
1 4 Quazza, Le riforme in Piemonte nella prima meta del Settecento, cit., p. 316.
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once again, it was only in Turin that the project had been implemented. Even there it
would have not survived without the constant injection of subsidies by the kings.
Hence we can infer that the original plan of financing the system with regular
collections of public alms failed, and was effectively abandoned after the initial
enthusiastic response of the citizens. Donations and legacies proved an equally
insufficient source of finance, since no law obliged the pious benefactors to bequeath
in favour of the congregation of charity or hospice rather than in favour of a private
charity or confraternity. On the other hand, the generous subsidies granted by the
royal family to the hospice of Turin must not be interpreted in the sense that a state-
run welfare system was established in the Sardinian Kingdom 15. Effectively the
state tried to set up a charity system without paying for it. There was no direct and
regular state funding, the royal family's contributions were occasional, and basically
aimed at keeping the capital clear of beggars. When this became impossible, begging
licences were issued, although the ban on mendicancy was never officially lifted. As a
result, crowds of such mendicants as dispossessed farmers and unemployed artisans
continued to flow into Turin. The Savoyard state probably saved a lot of money by
avoiding a permanent financial committment towards welfare, but the ultimate result
was the complete overturning of the original project. The hospice of Turin, intended
as a model for the provinces, remained an isolated and overcrowded institution to
which the provinces discharged their beggars. In the long term Father Guevarre's
project not only failed, for lack of realistic sources of finance, but also fully showed
its real nature: that of a double-edged propaganda tool.
Double-edged because it was devised to serve two different purposes. From the point
of view of the imaginative Jesuit, the network of hospices and congregations of
charity would provide the basis for a new orderly society where rich and poor would
be linked together not by the medieval values of Christian charity and compassion but
by the modern values of reciprocal interest. The rich would help the poor in order to
receive the spiritual benefit of their prayers. The poor would be assisted providing
they were pious and docile. No alms could be given or accepted outside this orderly
system of exchange. The rich and the state would be free of mendicancy, the church
would become the powerful regulator of the new system, the capitalist-merchants
would be provided with trained and docile labourers. A rigid system of prizes and
penalties minimized any loopholes. From the point of view of Victor Amadeus the
reform would highlight his paternal concern for the poor, cleaning the capital in the
1 ^ On the erroneousness of the interpretation of the recurring waves of renfermement
from the sixteenth to the early ninenteenth centuries as steps towards the modern
welfare state see S. Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in western Europe', in
Id., The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries , cit., p. 21.
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meantime without costing too much to the state. The strict regime of duties, rewards
and punishments devised by Guevarre as a means of strengthening the Church's hold
on the masses was equally convenient for the absolute monarch, who needed to reign
over obedient and disciplined subjects. The rationalization of almsgiving was useful
in fact not only to the church but also to the state, since it would help to inculcate the
habit of civil obedience. Significantly, this proved to be the weak point of the project.
Not only were alms inadequate, but almsgiving proved difficult to rationalize. If the
poor could not easily escape being locked up, the rich openly disliked the compulsion
to give alms only to the congregation's collectors. When the effect of the
propagandistic sermons held on the occasion of the opening of the hospices vanished,
the citizens of Turin and the provincial capitals alike returned to their habit of
spontaneous and irrational almsgiving and refused to collaborate with the guards
entrusted with the arrest of the beggars. The stream of decrees imposing fines and
even corporal punishment on those who did not collaborate with the guards and kept
giving alms to the beggars prove how unpopular and hence unsuccessful was this
basic aspect of the Utopian project of Father Guevarre. The reform had failed because
based on ideological premises that the people, rich and poor alike, were unwilling to
endorse. Somehow, when observed J-ronja long term perspective, this was a minor evil.
Whoever volunteers to read La mendicita sbandita would probably agree that the
model of society which Father Guevarre had in mind is disturbingly reminiscent of a
totalitarian regime based on fear and delation, inflexibly 'just' and dutifully
unmerciful.
3.3. The confraternities.
There is still an aspect of the failure of the 1717 reform which requires attention.
It concerns the transformation for charitable purposes of the patrimonies of the lay
confraternities 16. Juridically placed in a no-man's land between Church and State,
they had eschewed state control since the Middle Ages, claiming at the same time their
independence from the ecclesiastical authorities. The resulting conflict between
Church and State for the control of this kind of charity, unwilling to submit either to
lay or ecclesiastic authority, is very important for this research. We will retrace it
cJ
as a central issue, from the period ^provisional rule in southern Italy, to Crispi's
reform of 1890, and we need therefore to pay attention to the policy of the Savoyard
state towards this particular category of pious foundation.
16 For general references on confraternities see above, 1.1, fn. 10.
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Like most confraternities those of Piedmont were supposed, by statute, to assist the
poor, but the revenues were usually spent only on devotional duties. Attempts to
restore the original charitable purposes had been made in 1587, and repeated
throughout the seventeenth century with little success. The struggle was resumed by
Victor Amadeus II. The 1716 edict prescribed, among the other reforms, that
hospices and congregations of charity incorporate the revenues of several
confraternities, notably those of the Holy Spirit, which were rich and numerous.
This order was generally ignored, hence a Regio biglietto of 25 June 1721. It
referred to abuses and corruption caused by the fact that often the priors of the
confraternities were also members of the congregations of charity, and openly
ignored the law. The gravity of the problem can be inferred by the power, granted to
governors and mayors, of imprisoning the defaulting priors. It does not seem,
however, that the confraternities were deterred by these threats. In 1728 the
bishops were forbidden to visit the lay foundations of royal protection, and in 1729
the alms collected by the religious orders were confiscated in favour of the
congregations of charity. A further step was made the following year, when a regular
service of surveillance of the charities was established, and criteria to define the
nature of the confraternities were issued. According to these criteria all autonomous
charities, even those managed by ecclesiastics, must be considered lay, and thus put
under state surveillance. Charles Emanuel III followed suit, although with less
energy.
Undoubtedly the Savoyard state was determined to gain control over a section of
charities that were very rich and notoriously inactive in the welfare field. Still,
according to Prato, around 1750 only ten confraternities had been transformed into
congregations of charity, while in thirteen provinces only forty three out of 1,050
confraternities spent part of their rich income on the poor. The impotence of the
state became evident again in 1766, when a general inquiry on the patrimonies of the
confraternities was made. The objective was to suppress them and devolve the
patrimonies to the congregations of charity, or use them to found hospitals; but the
bishops did not collaborate, and difficulties of all sorUprevented the implementation
of this plan. Hence, unable to implement any radical reform, the Savoyard kings
limited their action to reforms and transformations case by case. Some results were
achieved, but the bulk of the confraternities remained untouched. In 1790 another
committee was set up to collect data in view of a radical reform. But the financial
difficulties caused by the war provoked a change of direction. In 1795 the
government decided to sell off the confraternities' assets, converting their revenue
into 'luoghi di Monte '. The sale was started but suspended by an edict of 16 March
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1797. Under the French the patrimonies of the confraternities were merged with
those of the vestry-boards, but not suppressed, since the French Law of 18 August
1792, which abolished the confraternities, was not enforced in Piedmont. During the
Restoration an edict of 1814 returned to the confraternities their lost properties.
The long lasting conflict was settled only in 1831. The Church was granted control
over all matters concerning the confraternities, except the administrative ones,
which were put under civil jurisdiction 17.
It had been a very long struggle for the Piedmontese state to assert its right to
control the financial activities of the confraternities. Yet it must be noted that along
the way the state lost sight of the target set by Victor Amadeus II. The bulk of the
confraternities' patrimonies was never trasformed for charitable purposes and their
revenues continued to be spent on masses and other religious duties. Unlike
neighbouring Lombardy which, under the firm hand of Maria Teresa and Joseph II,
suppressed the confraternities and used their assets to finance schools and hospitals,
Piedmont failed to overcome the Church's obstructionism 18. As late as 1862 the
lack of effective controls on the confraternities was perceived by some Piedmontese
deputies as a worrying issue 19. In the light of the above evidence we disagree with a
recent interpretation according to which the successful confiscation of the
confraternities' assets was the basis of the success of Victor Amadeus's reform 20.
17 Prato, La vita economica in Piemonte a mezzo il secolo XVIII, cit., pp. 361-367;
Quazza, Le riforme in Piemonte nella seconda meta del Settecento , cit., pp. 317-318;
for the text of the Regio biglietto 25 June 1721 cf.: Salvatore D'Amelio, La
beneficenza net diritto italiano (Passerano, Naples, 1909), vol. I, pp. 107-109; for the
legislation in the nineteenth century cf.: Annibale Gilardoni, 'Scienza
dell'amministrazione delle Istituzioni di beneficenza', in Digesto Italiano (U.T.E.T.,
Turin, 1907), pp.250-251; Maura Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Confraternite romane e
beneficenza pubblica tra il 1870 e il 1890', in Ricerche per la Storia religiosa di Roma,
5 (Storia e Letteratura, Rome, 1984), p. 308. About the confraternities of the Holy
Spirit, see A. Erba, La chiesa sabauda tra cinque e seicento. Ortodossia tridentina,
gallicanesimo savoiardo e assolutismo ducale (1580-1630), cit., pp. 237-47; about the
role of confraternities and devotional foundations in the religious and political life of
ancien regime Piedmont see Amilcare Barbero, Franco Ramella, Angelo Torre,
Materiali sulla religiosita dei laid. Alba 1698- Asti 1742 (Regione Piemonte, 1981);
A. Torre, 'II consumo di devozioni: rituali e potere nelle campagne piemontesi nella
prima meta del settecento', in Quaderni storici, No. 58, 1985, pp. 181-223.
18 Riccardo Bottoni, 'Le confraternite milanesi nell'eta di Maria Teresa: aspetti e
problemi', in Aldo De Maddalena, Ettore Rotelli, Germano Barbarisi (eds.), Economia,
istituzioni, cultura in Lombardia nell'eta di Maria Teresa (II Mulino, Bologna, 1982),
vol. 3, pp. 595-607.
A.P., Camera, Discussioni, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2525-28.
20 L. Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nella Toscana settecentesca', cit., pp. 185-186.
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3.4. The glorious 'Piedmont of charity'.
No further reform of the charity system occurred in Piedmont during the late
eighteenth century, apart from these abortive attempts to use the assets of the
confraternities to fund hospitals and congregations of charity, and the previously
mentioned and unsuccessful plans to enhance the network of hospices. The gloomy
kingdom of Victor Amadeus III (1773-96) was impermeable to the wave of reforms
which were transforming Lombardy into a modern and rationally administered state.
Thus in Piedmont the merger and laicization of charities, which characterized the
French rule everywhere in Italy, represented a mere parenthesis unrelated to either
the past or the future. The reform of 1717 had for a long time been re-absorbed into
the pre-existing structures, and no further shake-up had disturbed a charity system
which was surely not the most advanced of those times. Besides merging the charities
and laicizing their administration, the French established depots de mendicite' in the
main towns, with the aim of setting the able-bodied poor to work 21. Such reforms
apparently adversely affected both the finance of the charities and the treatment of
their inmates, according to a committee set up in 1814. Hence the single
administrations were restored and the merged patrimonies returned to their former
owners. The novelties introduced by the French were partially maintained in
Lombardy, in the Bourbon kingdom and even in the Papal States, but were completely
swept away in Piedmont. The restored government was hostile to any form of state-
run welfare system and greatly praised and favoured private charity. Indeed, the
climate of religious fervour of the Restoration was the ideal soil for the flourishing
of charitable works, which were provided with an adequate ideological framework and
practical guidelines by Baron De G^rando 22. This 'charitable impulse' brought
together the most enlightened members of the aristocracy, the clergy and the
bourgeoisie in a generous but uncoordinated effort to ameliorate the living standards
of the working class, and hence to keep it quiet. Priests like don Cottolengo and don
Bosco, nobles like the Marquise Giulia di Barolo, the Marquis Cesare Tapparelli
d'Azeglio, the Marquis Roberto d'Azeglio, the young Count of Cavour, the Count Carlo
2^ J. Bernardi, II R. Ospizio... , cit., pp. 123-129; D. Maldini Chiarito, 'La legislazione
napoleonica e il pauperismo in Piemonte", in E. Sori (ed), Citta e controllo sociale in
Italia tra XVII e XIX secolo , cit., pp. 125-39; D. Maldini, 'II depot de mendicite' del
dipartimento di Po: analisi di una struttura assistenziale nel Piemonte napoleonico', in
Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 331-345.
22 J. Bernardi, II R. Ospizio... , cit., pp. 130-132; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'II "sistema della
beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 477-478;
S. Woolf, 'Introduction: the poor and society in western Europe', in Id., The Poor in
Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries , cit., pp. 21, 36. For De
G^rando see above, 2.3.
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Ilarione Petitti di Roreto, the Marquises Lorenzo and Giuseppe Valerio, Giovanetti,
Boncompagni, and many othersmade a lively contribution not only to the debate on
poverty, but also to its relief. It was, according to the definition formulated by
Niccold Rodolico, the biographer of Charles Albert, the glorious 'Piedmont of
charity', an emanation of the pious and caring personality of the king. Poorhouses,
kindergartens, day centres for the poor to keep warm during winter, Monti legna for
the poor to borrow fuel at low interest, schools for apprentices, etc. were founded in
Turin and the provinces by associations of private benefactors who strongly believed
in the cardinal virtue of charity 23. For instance, the new poorhouse of Turin,
founded between 1836 and 1840 by the Marquis Michele of Cavour and other
philanthropists, attracted as much as hundred and thirty thousand donations 24.
However one must not overestimate the effectivness of this charitable impulse.
According to Cavour's Etat de la Mendicite' et des Pauvres dans les Etats Sardes -
written in the Spring of 1834 and published in the foreign communications appendix
of the Report of the Commissioners on the poor laws - congregations of charity
existed only in a limited number of towns, and were in great administrative mess.
Almost all rural communities had none. Private charities assisted a very limited
number of poor - almost exclusively the sick and invalids. Cavour firmly re-ju^ed
to OLCtiipC
"that charities had
aucun effet facheux sur Industrie et les habitudes morales des classes les moins
fortunees de la societe. S'il existe malheureusement parmi elles une si deplorable
imprevoyance et si peu d'emulation, ce ne sont point les institutions de charite
qu'il faut accuser, mais bien plutot la profonde ignorance dans laquelle on les
laisse croupir.
He added that charities had no influence whatsoever on family relashionships
...I'homme pauvre regardera toujours ses parents comme son unique soutien
contre I'adversite.
and concluded that, as no regular relief was availbale for the able-bodied poor,
begging was their only resort, which ruled out any possibility of unemployment
being more attractive than work
23 For a biased account of the charity works in Restoration Piedmont see Niccolo Rodolico,
Carlo Alberto (Le Monnier, Florence, 1935), vol. 2 (1831-1843), pp. 346-362, 368-
380; a less biased picture in Narciso Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto alio Stato
costituzionale. Storia del Regno di Carlo Alberto dal 1831 al 1848 (Istituto per la
storia del Risorgimento italiano, Turin, 1980), pp. 72- 78. See also Rosario Romeo, Dal
Piemonte sabaudo all'ltalia liberate (Einaudi, Turin, 1964), pp. 75-76; Gian Mario
Bravo, Torino operaia. Mondo del lavoro e idee sociali nell'eta di Carlo Alberto
(Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin,1968), pp. 130-140, 142-146,149-156; M. Piccialuti
Caprioli, 'II "sistema della beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', cit., p. 481.
24 'La mendicity in Piemonte e il Regio Ricovero di Torino', R.B.P., No. 5 (1898), pp. 413-
1 5.
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...On ne peut pas comparer le prix du jounalier honnete et independant, avec les
gains des mendianfg: il y a une immense difference entre I'existence honorable de
1'un, et ('humiliation, I'avilissement, la degradation morale de I'autre, que,
quoiqu'il fut possible que certains individus, habiles & exploiter la pitie du public,
gagnassent beaucoup au dela de ce que rapporte un travail ordinaire, neammoins
luer sort ne serait pas comparable 25.
Other sources confirm Cavour's diagnosis. The census of 1848 categorized as
indigent nine per cent of the population. This included 33,000 regular beggars, but
not occasional and seasonal beggars. According to Massino-Turina, in the years
1845-1849 only 8,716 permanent beggars were locked up in poorhouses, the rest
were homeless. The average yearly out-door benefit enjoyed by 316,963 people
amounted to 4.92 lire per capita, equivalent to two and a half days pay of anurban
labourer 26.
The aristocracy's charitable impulse was the front of the medal. The reverse was
the growing criminalization of the marginal poor. From the 1750s to the 1850s the
proletarianization of the peasant masses, due to the introduction of the capitalistic
farming, was accompanied by the introduction of stricter controls on vagrants,
idlers, beggars, pedlars, porters, coachmen, servants, and innkeepers. The penal
laws re-ordered by Charles Felix in 1827 punished able-bodied beggars and
vagrants with one year in jail, whilst those unable to work were implicitly allowed
to beg. It seems however that these measures were not strictly enforced. In his Etat
de la Mendicite' et des Pauvres dans les Etats Sardes Cavour wrote that
La mendicite n'est point defendue par les lois: toute personne qui est censde etre
dans I'impossibilite de se procurer, par son travail, de quoi se mantenir lui et sa
famille, peut s'etablir dans les rues, et demander I'aumone aux passans. Le
Gouvernment et les autorites des differentes localites ont plusieurs fois
vainement tente de reprimer les abus sans nombre qui naissent de cette faculte
illimite. Les reglements qui ont ete fait dans ce but, n'ont jamais pu etre executes
d'une manidre efficace. lis sont tous restes sans effet. On applique toutefois assez
souvent la loi qui defend aux pauvres de mendier hors de leur communes. Lorsque,
dans une ville, les mendiants etrangers affluent en grande abondance, les
autorites municipales les en expulsent en masse, laissant le soin a la gendarmerie
de leur faire regagner leur pays natal, ou le lieu ou ils sont censes avoir un
domicile. Mais comme il n'y a aucune peine correctionelle pous sanctionner cette
25 Poor Laws, Appendix F, part II, in Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners,
vol. XXXIX (1834), Session 4 February- 15 August 1834, pp. 654, 656-7. For the
origins of Cavour's essay for the British Foreign Office see R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo
tempo, vol. I (1810-1842) (Laterza, Bari, 1969), pp. 408-9.
2 6 G. M. Bravo, Torino operaia. Mondo del lavoro e idee sociali nell'eta di Carlo Alberto ,
cit., pp. 131-2; P. G. Massino Turina, La beneficenza ordinata a sistema ossia ricerca
delle cause della miseria e dei modi pratici di fermarne il corso (Casale, Casuccio,
1850), p. 20.
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loi, ils ne lardent pas a la violer de nouveau, en s'eloignant de chez eux, s'ils
trouvent une trop grande difficulty a vivre 27.
Cavour also noted that no data were available as to the overall number of beggars,
which was however great all over the state, although it varied from place to place and
time to time. There is evidence that in 1832 the Governor of the Division of Cuneo
made an enquiry of his own initiative into the number of able bodied and invalid poor,
the means of the communities to support them, and the number of begging licenses
issued by twenty four of the 260 communes of the Division, which included the
provinces of Cuneo, Alba, Mondovi, and Saluzzo. The Interior Ministry expressed the
intention of extending such enquiries to the whole state each autumn, but we found no
further evidence in that respect 28. In 1835 the first secretary of State for the
Interior, Count La Scarena, bought 200 copies of Cavour's Extrait from the British
Commissioners' report on the Poor Law administration and sent them to the
provincial Intendants, high magistrates, and experts. From those few replies that we
have been able to trace, it was evident that no provisions existed either to monitor
mendicancy, or contain it 29 . La Scarena was unfavourable to poor taxes and any
form of state-funded relief, and sent Cavour's Extrait to the high administrative
ranks because he was persuaded that the shortcomings of the old English poor laws
would convince everybody that private charity was preferable. We cannot evaluate
the overall response, but from those few answers available it is clear that most
Intendants found the English new poor law very interesting in theory, but not
practicable in Piedmont. Nevertheless some Intendants recommended to set up
workhouses or poorhouses wherever possible. The need to reorder the charities'
27 Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners, Poor Laws, Appendix F, part II,
cit., p. 653.
28 A.S.T., Sez. I, Segreteria Interni, Opere Pie in genere, Statistiche e notizie, M. 15: the
Governor of the Division of Cuneo (Ufficio 3°, No. 677), 30 March 1832, to the First
Secretary of State for the Interior, accompanying four Stati dimostrativi dei poveri
tanto abili, quanto inabili riconosciuti esistere in ciascun Comune della Provincia e dei
mezzi che risultano per procurare ai medesimi il necessario sostentamento, regarding
the provinces of Cuneo, Alba, Mondovi and Saluzzo (for a synthesis of the information
contained in the four Stati see appendix 3).
29 A.S.T., Sez. I, Segreteria Interni, Opere Pie in genere, Statistiche e notizie, M. 15: the
Gen. Int.of the prov. of Cuneo, 24 Febr. 1835, No. 72 Gabinetto particolare; the Vice-
Int. of the prov. of Faucigny, Bonneville, 27 Febr. 1835; the Mayor of Vigevano, 27
Febr. 1835; the Vice-lnt. of the prov. of Tortona, 27 Febr. 1835; the Int. of Asti, 27
Febr. 1835; Marquis Gerolamo Serra, Genoa, 2 March 1835, to the First Secretary of
State for the Interior, Count Della Scarena, Turin. See also R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo
tempo, vol. I (1810-1842) , cit., p. 442.
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administration and put them under strict state control was emphasized by
authoritative persons , like Petitti di Roreto and Giovanetti 30.
The changes occurring in the Piedmontese welfare policy in the mid 1830s did not
follow the English example, but were probably influenced to some extent by it. The
recommendation to set up poorhouses without levying a tax to finance them was not
completely lost. New poorhouses were set up around 1835 in Nizza, Novara and
Vigevano 31, and specific guidelines for their foundation and financing were given
with the letters patent of 29 November 1836. This is a most interesting document,
since it clearly stated the official notion of 'public welfare' and anticipated some of
the administrative rules which were soon to be issued with the edict of 24 December
1836. The patent letters of 29 November 1836 welcomed privately-funded
poorhouses as a means of reducing and eventually eliminating mendicancy without
recourse to any poor-tax likely to damage the small land-owners, who were the
social group closest to poverty. But private initiative needed state supervision, hence
the stipulation that the foundation of any poorhouse was subject to royal consent. This
consent was granted only if the poorhouse was intended for all the beggars, able-
bodied and invalid, of any age, of an entire province or group of provinces (division).
The promoting committee must give evidence about the funds available for the first
five years, the number of poor the poorhouse was likely to shelter, and the nature of
the works in which the inmates would be employed. Once permission was granted the
committee must produce a statute, under the supervision of a royal commissioner.
The poorhouse could be established only after royal approval of the statute. The
poorhouses must be inspected every month by a royal commissioner who would
report to the Interior minister. The other charities, when their income excedeed
their expenditure, were bound to contribute to the poorhouses 32. No state
30 Only the Intendant of Asti suggested a poor tax of one per cent to be levied on incomes
from 500 lire and over, to finance strictly monitored out-relief, hospices for the
invalids, and workfare schemes for the able-bodied poor. The Intendant of Cuneo and the
Mayor of Vigevano were in favour of workhouses. That of Faucigny talked of setting up
registers of beggars and thightening up police controls, while Marquis Serra was
strongly critical of the English centralization of welfare administration, and reckoned
that the workhouse system would be unaffordale for the State's finances. See A.S.T.,
Sez. I, Segreteria Interni, Opere Pie in genere, Statistiche e notizie, M. 15: letters
quoted in fn. 29, and N. Rodolico, Carlo Alberto , vol. 2 (1831-1843), cit., pp. 362-3.
For La Scarena's opinions see R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I (1810-1842) ,
cit., p. 442-3.
31 M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione
piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit. , p. 978, fn. 33.
32 Patent letters of 29 Nov. 1836, arts. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11. The text can be found in Carlo
llarione Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri ( Bocca, Turin, 1837), vol. 1, pp. 443-448.
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contribution was provided. Articles 6 and 7 established a direct link between the
police and the poorhouses which were bound to shelter all the beggars whom the
police would send in, providing they were native of or resident for ten years in the
province. The police went also entrusted with the arrest and punishment of fugitive
inmates, but no provision was made for those beggars belonging to provinces without,
or with inadequate poorhouses 33. This was the weak point of the law: ultimately no
guarantee was given to shelter those beggars from those very provinces that, being
economically fragile, were most likely to have a great number of poor and few
charitable rich. These very limited provisions for the beggars were complemented
by the penal code of 1839, which further criminalized the paupers. Idlers,
vagrants, and beggars alike were labelled as 'suspects'. The mere fact of being
declared a vagrant made the homeless and unemployed liable to imprisonment from
three to six months. Thereafter a vagrant was subject to compulsory settlement.
Begging was forbidden to the able-bodied and punished in roughly the same way as
vagrancy. The police powers to pursue idlers, pedlars, and innkeepers, and to control
the civil population were subsequently widened in 1852 and 1854 34. Whether
practice and theory coincided is difficult to say, and would require specific research.
3.5. The edict of 1836 and the Act of 1850.
The letters patent of November 1836 had regulated the new poorhouses, but a lot
still needed to be done to put the Piedmontese charities in order. The general
congregations of charity established in each province in 1719 still existed, but they
were incapable of supervising both the sparse local congregations of charity, and the
many independent charities which were the back bone of the system. According to
regulations issued in 1766 the management of these charities was monitored by a
33 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicita, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri , vol. 1, cit., pp. 443-448. See also M. Piccialuti Caprioli,
'II "sistema della beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', cit., pp. 480-481.
34 E. Florian, G. Cavaglieri, / vagabondi. Studio sociologico-giuridico , vol. I (Bocca, Turin,
1897), pp. 279-83; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti
della legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', in
Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico , No. 3, 1980, pp. 1013-1016; Codice Penale per
gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna (Stamperia Reale, Turin, 1839), Tit. VIII, Capo III,
arts. 450-466, pp. 135-141; Ada Lonni, 'Controllo sociale e repressione di polizia delle
classi subalterne da Vittorio Amedeo II a Carlo Alberto', in Aldo Agosti, Gian Mario
Bravo (eds.), Storia del movimento operaio del socialismo e delle lotte sociali in
Piemonte (De Donato, Bari,1979), vol. I, pp. 158-174.
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special court, while the sale of their assets was controlled by the ordinary courts,
but these controls were inefficient, and the financial activities of the charities were
free from any restriction or inspection 35. A committee of inquiry was set up in
1831 to investigate the situation in the ex-Duchy of Genoa, and several others
followed. These inquiries proved that mismanagement, abuses and corruption were
more widespread than first thought. The gravity of the situation, and the
authoritative opinion expressed by Petitti di Roreto, Giovanetti and several
Intendants, convinced Charles Albert that it was time to intervene, setting aside his
anxiety not to offend the Church 36.
The edict of 24 December 1836 did not interfere with the internal management of
the charities: the founders' will was respected and the managers were not compelled
to spend in relief any fixed proportion of income. The new rules were exclusively
intended to ensure the liquidity of the foundations. Hence the charities must keep
detailed inventories of their assets; budgets and accounts must be compiled each year.
The former were inspected by the Interior Ministry, the latter by special
commissions set up in each province. Any administrative board which failed to
comply could be dissolved by the Interior Ministry. The treasurer, appointed by the
state, must deposit a substantial security. Purchases and sales were subject to royal
consent; and recourse could be made to the army to exact the revenues. The
introduction of this particular form of fiscal privilege, until then peculiar to the
communes alone, was the most successful aspect of the edict. In a few years the
charities recouped about three million lire of revenue, while their restored liquidity
attracted a growing flow of bequests. Notwithstanding the initial hostility of the
charities' managers and the clergy, the edict was welcomed as a great success. The
reform was nevertheless incomplete. Out of respect for ancient privileges, the edict
exempted from the above controls the charities managed by religious orders, those
put under royal protection, and those of Turin, Genoa and Chambery. Moreover, the
old provincial general congregations of charity which had been neither reformed nor
35 Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners, Poor Laws, Appendix F, part II,
cit., p. 654; Pralormo, Relazione a S. M. sulla situazione degli istituti di carita e
beneficenza dopo I'Editto 24 Dicembre 1836 (Turin, 1840), pp. 15-16; Statistica del
Regno d'ltalia, Le opere pie nel 1861, Piemonte (Le Monnier, Florence, 1868), p. X.
33 Pralormo, Relazione a S. M. sulla situazione degli istituti di carita e beneficenza dopo
I'Editto 24 Dicembre 1836 , cit., pp. 17-18. See also: N. Rodolico, Carlo Alberto , vol.
2, cit., pp. 365-366; N. Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto alio Stato costituzionale. Storia del
Regno di Carlo Alberto dal 1831 al 1848 , cit. p. 79; Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e
beneficenza pubblica aspetti della legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto
all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 967-970, 981, 1018-1019.
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abolished, still held powers of inspection that were ill-defined 37. Exemptions and
privileges were at last abolished by the act of 1 March 1850. All charities were put
under state supervision, the old general congregations of charity were abolished and
the system was mildly decentralized by entrusting the control of the budgets of those
charities whose income did not exceed 10,000 lire to the provincial intendants,
while the Ministry of the Interior maintained the control of the richer charities. The
whole system was extended to Sardinia 38.
There was a fundamental tenet behind all these cautious reforms. The state was
eager to take control and advantage of the welfare establishments privately funded,
it
but did not regard^as its duty to contribute to them, let alone to take the initiative
where private funding was not available. This attitude, not dissimilar to that of
Victor Amadeus II, was to continue into the Risorgimento and well beyond it. The
reform introduced by Crispi in 1890 was still based on the tenet that the state must
supervise the charities and ensure their efficiency, not provide welfare services.
Charities should merge, the statutes of confraternities and other devotional or
obsolete foundations should be modified and their funds used to grant relief rather
than be spent on masses. Yet, the fact that in many villages and regions the modest
assets of the existing charities and confraternities could not guarantee an adequate
level of assistance, was not taken into account 39. At the end of the nineteenth
century the mentality of Victor Amadeus II and Charles Albert still dominated, since
no alternative to the Piedmontese model had been allowed to develop.
3.6. The act of 20 November 1859 and the problem of Lombardv.
The flaws of the partial decentralization introduced in 1850 were discussed in the
Piedmontese Chamber on 4 April 1859. Among those who favoured the devolution of
administrative controls to the local authorities was Cavour. He reckoned that the
37 Pralormo, Relazione... , cit., pp. 20-39; N. Rodolico, Carlo Alberto , vol. 2, cit., pp.
367-368; S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano , cit., pp. 110-112; N. Nada,
Dallo Stato assoluto alio Stato costituzionale. Storia del Regno di Carlo Alberto dal 1831
al 1848 , cit., p. 79; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica aspetti
della legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp.
982-992; Id., 'II "sistema della beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', cit.,
pp. 478-479, 484-485.
38 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano , cit., pp. 113-117; M. Piccialuti
Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione piemontese da
Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 997-1006; Id., 'II "sistema
della beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', cit., p. 484.
39 See below, chapters 8 and 9.
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controls' centralization had been useful in 1836 to reorder the charities, but was
now a hampering device. The Interior Ministry was overwhelmed with bundles of
evidence of administrative abuses that were seldom tackled and eliminated. To speed
up procedures Cavour proposed entrusting the Intendants with the checking of
budgets and accounts of all charities with up to 30,000 lire of income. Although
these proposals were not passed, they formed the basis of the act of 20 November
1859. According to this act, which was part of the administrative laws elaborated by
Rattazzi, the powers of supervision and guardianship passed from the Interior
Ministry to the Provincial Deputations. The ministry maintained control on those
charities enjoying state contributions and kept the right to approve statutes and
regulations. For the rest all remained as prescribed by the 1836 edict and 1850 act,
except for the congregations of charity whose members' appointment was entrusted to
the town councils, while the government only retained the power to chccse the
chairman 40.
This act, whose liberal features Rattazzi strongly emphasized in his preface, was
passed during the suspension of the Parliament due to the war, and was hence
implemented in Lombardy, the 'new province' of the kingdom, without any debate.
Indeed, information about the system in force in Lombardy-Venetia had been gathered
by the Piedmontese; Cavour in August 1859 sent Pier Carlo Boggio to Milan with the
specific task of studying a possible amalgamation of that legislation on charities with
the rules in force in Piedmont 41. Apparently no report is preserved of Boggio's
mission, but clearly Rattazzi did not take into account his opinion, or Cavour's, when
drawing up his act on charities. The 'amalgamation' remained a pious intention.
Furthermore, when the Council of State discussed the regulations for the act in
1860, it dismissed the Lombard system as excessively concentrated in the hands of
the state. Such state interference was inadmissible in a great and free kingdom: the
Lombard charities would henceforth conform to the Piedmontese respect for the
founders' will 42. The solution chosen by Rattazzi and the Council of State was
undoubtedly the easiest and fastest, since it required neither deep preparatory
studies, laborious comparisons, or awkward compromises. But was it also the best?
To answer this question we must briefly examine the charities legislation of
Lombardy-Venetia.
4® M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione
piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 1017-18, 1021-
22, 1027-30; S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano , cit., pp. 119-22.
4^ M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione
piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 1022-1023.
42 Ibidem, pp. 1026-1027.
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Under Maria Theresa and Joseph II of Austria the charities of Lombardy underwent a
process of transformation which was, by and large, the most radical in Italy. The
reforms were aimed both at rationalizing a system of poor relief which had become
excessively complicated to run, and at trimming state expenditure by stripping the
charities of their fiscal privileges, and granting relief and free medical care only to
the really poor. In the process, poor relief was removed from the jurisdiction of the
local administrations, which had monitored it since the fourteenth century, and was
put under direct state control. The reform was implemented in stages and was
hampered by the passive resistance of the charities and the local elites, which used
bureaucratic delay to buy time and keep the reforms under their own control, in
order to dilute the radicalism of Vienna's instructions. However this manoeuvring
failed and in 1754 the charities, like all other public organizations, were stripped
of their fiscal privileges and made liable to pay land-taxes and excise duties. In 1767
a thorough investigation was launched into the charities' accounts, while their assets
were frozen. In 1772 dowry trusts were merged and alms distribution centralized
under the supervision of parish priests. There followed the reform of indoor-relief:
small hospitals, hospices for the aged and incurables, foundling homes, and
orphanages were merged and improved, in order to provide at least one large
institution of each kind in each district. Joseph II, who succeeded his mother in
1780, gave the final push to the reform, which was completed by 1790, when he
died. The single charities were suppressed and merged in five big establishments
centrally administered by state-appointed committees. Free health care was made
available in the hospitals only to those who exibited the poverty certificate issued by
the parish priest, who was now acting as a state official at the core of the system. All
other citizens were made to pay fees. Masters were bound to pay for the
hospitalization of their own servants. Further changes occurred during the Cisalpine
Republic and the Italian Kingdom with the establishment, in1807, in all towns and
villages of the congregations of charity formed by the prefect, or the mayor, the
bishop, or the parish priest, and a number of citizens. The congregations
administered the merged charities, while the whole system was controlled by the
state through a network of inspectors dependent on the Interior Ministry. In 1817
the restored Austrian government decreed the dismantling of the system set up by the
French, but the implementation of the new rules was extremely slow, and they
became fully operative only about 1826, and sometimes even later. Some of the
French novelties were however retained. The single administrations of the charities
were restored, but the offices of administrator and director of each institution were
kept separate and both offices were held by state-appointed officials who were
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accountable to the Provincial Delegation. The employees of the charities were paid
from the funds of the charities but enjoyed the same pensions as civil servants.
Although benefits and assistance to the poor were distributed by the single charities,
the system appeared quite advanced, as it granted shelter and assistance to foundlings,
free hospitalization to the poor, free health care and basic vaccination through
doctors employed by the local authorities (medici condottf), and free primary
education 43. It has been argued that in Venice the re-organization of the welfare
services was solely aimed at saving state funds, lacked any long-term vision, and it
was achieved without any consideration of the human suffering involved. And in 1869
the prefect of Cremona alleged that the charities had suffered from serious
mismanagement under the past administration 44. More research is probably
necessary before a thowough assessment of the system in force in Lombardy-Venetia
can be made.
However, it would seem that - at least in theory - the Austrian state perceived the
provision of a number of basic welfare services as its duty, and had modified and
shaped the charities legislation accordingly. Neither Piedmont, nor any of the other
Italian states offered such an enlightened vision of its social duty. Yet, Rattazzi
ignored it, and the Council of State concluded that it was inconvenient for the state to
43 Ada Annoni, 'Assistenza e beneficenza nell'eta delle riforme', in A. De Maddalena, E.
Rotelli, G.Barbarisi (eds.), Economia, istituzioni, cultura in Lombardia nell'eta di Maria
Teresa , vol. 3., cit., pp. 897-990; Edoardo Bressan, Poverta e assistenza in
Lombardia nell'eta napoleonica (Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-Roma-Bari, 1985), pp. 5-39;
R. John Rath, 'The Habsburgs and the great depression in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-18',
The Journal of Modern History, XIII, No. 3 (Sept. 1941), pp. 305-20; Bruno Bertoli,
'Assistenza pubblica e riformismo austriaco a Venezia durante la Restaurazione: i
"Luoghi pii"', in Ricerche di storia sociale e religiosa , No. 12, July-Dec. 1977, pp. 25-
27; F. Delia Peruta, Milano. Lavoro e fabbrica. 1815-1914 (Angeli, Milan, 1987), pp.
31-47. See also Statistica del Regno d'ltalia , Le opere pie nel 1861 , Lombardia (Le
Monnier, Florence, 1868), pp. V-XI; 'Una splendida pagina della storia della beneficenza
italiana. La Congregazione di Carita di Milano', R.B.P., No. 9, 1888, pp. 679-683; S.
D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano , cit., pp. 85-102; Storia di Milano
(Fondazione Treccani , Milan, 1959), vol. XII, pp. 360-372, 375-376; vol. XIV, pp.
801-831; L. Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nell'ltalia del Settecento', cit., pp. 918-9;
Id., 'L'assistenza ai poveri nella Toscana settecentesca', cit., pp. 203-204; M.
Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione
piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 1023- 1026; Id.,
'II "sistema della beneficenza pubblica" nel Piemonte preunitario', cit., p. 483.
44 B. Bertoli, 'Assistenza pubblica e riformismo austriaco a Venezia durante la
Restaurazione: i "Luoghi pii"', cit., pp. 25-69; A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 151:
copy of the part concerning welfare from a report by the prefect of Cremona, dated 11
Dec. 1869. The A.C.S. files concerning Lombardy and Venetia are very poor, as far as
the passage from the Austrian to the Piedmontese administration is concerned. Most of
the files 'Beneficenza pubblica' for the period 1859-60 preserved in the State Archives
of Milan were destroyed by bombardments in 1943. See M.I., Pubblicazioni degli
Archivi di Stato, XLV, Gli archivi dei governi provvisori e straordinari. 1859-1861. I,
Lombardia, provincie Parmensi, Provincie Modenesi (Rome, 1961), pp. 16-18.
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get too much involved in the management of the charities. As will become clear in the
following chapters, the principle of respecting the will of the founders was bound to
create an unmanageable situation in many parts of Italy and especially in the ex-
Papal States, where the clergy was almost exclusively in charge of the charities'
administrations. The introduction of some of the features of the Lombard system could
have been highly beneficial. Perhaps administrators and rectors appointed by the
state could achieve the elimination of abuses, and a proper management of the
'patrimony of the poor', which no external state control could ensure. Undoubtedly
the overturn of the traditional management of the charities would have caused
widespread and bitter protests everywhere, including Piedmont, but the ultimate
result might have been worth taking the risk. The Lombard system could suggest
some beneficial alterations to the Piedmontese model. Unfortunately it was hastily
written off, without serious consideration.
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4. Charities and poverty in central Italy during the unification.
4.1 .The legislation on charities in the Duchies of Modena and Parma, in Tuscany
and the Papal States.
The four states into which central Italy was divided had different customs and
traditions with regard to welfare. Broadly speaking the charities of the Duchies of
Modena and Parma and Tuscany were autonomously administered according to the will
of the founders and financially controlled by the state, like those of Piedmont. These
controls were more or less centralized. In the Duchy of Parma the right of
guardianship and surveillance pertained to the Interior Ministry, whereas in the
Duchy of Modena this right pertained to the Governor. In Tuscany the charities were
under direct state control when enjoying state contributions, otherwise they were
under municipal control. As it will be evident later, this substantial if not formal
legislative similarity greatly eased the implementation of the Piedmontese system in
these three areas. In all three states several major institutions, such as the Depot of
Borgo S. Donnino, the Ospizi Civili of Parma and Piacenza, and the Pia casa di lavoro
of Florence were awarded the proceeds of fines and taxes, notably those levied on state
lotteries. Such state contributions to welfare were however quite small. Between
1830 and 1858 they averaged around 3.1% of the total state expenditure in the
Duchy of Parma and around 2.4 % in that of Modena 1.
1 For the Duchy of Parma see Salvatore D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano
(Passerano, Naples, 1908), vol.I, pp. 80-83; Annibale Gilardoni, Scienza
dell'amministrazione delle Istituzioni di beneficenza, Extract from Digesto Italiano
(U.T.E.T., Turin, 1907), p.48; Statistica del Regno d'ltalia. Le Opere Pie net 1861.
Compartimento deU'Emilia (Succ. Le Monnier, Florence,1869), pp.VI; VIII-XI; Ettore
Falconi, Pier Luigi Spaggiari, 'Le spese effettive ed il bilancio degli Stati Parmensi dal
1830 al 1859', Archivio economico dell'unificazione italiana, 1957, vol. 7 (Sez.1), part
5, pp. 18-29.
For the Duchy of Modena see Statistica...Emilia, cit., p. XI-XIII; Augusto Setti, 'Ludovico
Ricci o la beneficenza pubblica nel secolo scorso', Nuova Antologia , vol. 53, 1880, pp.
428-467; 'Le opere pie di Reggio d'Emilia', R. B. P., No. 3, 1880, pp.234-235; Andrea
Balletti, L'Abbate Giuseppe Ferrari-Bonini e le riforme civili delta beneficenza nel
secolo XVIII (Calderini, Reggio Emilia, 1886), pp. 123-128; S. D'Amelio, La
beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol.I, cit., pp.76-78; Gilardoni, Scienza
dell'amministrazione..., cit. p.48; Giorgio Boccolari, Armosino Selmi, 'Le spese
effettive e il bilancio del Ducato di Modena dal 1830 al 1859', Archivio economico
dell'unificazione italiana, 1959, vol. 8, part 4, pp. 16-27; S. Woolf, 'La storia politica
e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia , 3, (Einaudi,Turin, 1973), pp.110, 143-5; Mario Rosa,
'Chiesa, idee sui poveri e assistenza in Italia dal Cinque al Settecento', Societa e storia,
No.10, 1980, pp. 804-805; Michele Fatica, 'La regolarizzazione dei mendicanti
attraverso il lavoro: I'ospizio dei poveri di Modena nel Settecento', Studi Storici, No.
4, Oct.-Dec.1982, pp. 757-782.
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The situation was completely different in the Papal States, whose welfare system
was notable for the absence of any systematic legislation. The charities were
generally administered by the clergy according to canon law. The Council of Trent had
put the charities of Rome under the Cardinal Vicario and those of the other dioceses
under the bishops; special privileges, granting autonomy, were awarded by the
pontiffs. When the aims of a charity failed to meet new social needs or, more often,
when the revenues were reckoned useful for devotional purposes, the original
purposes were modified by papal decree. Such malpractice was so widespread that the
Councils of Vienna and Trent attempted but failed to stop them. Therefore in the Papal
States very few charities were administered according to the original intentions of
the founders 2. As in the rest of central Italy, the charities received shares of the
proceeds of fines and state-lotteries and were usually granted special alms by each
pontiff. These benefits were in major part monopolized by the charities and the poor
For Tuscany see Luigi Passerini, Storia degli stabilimenti di beneficenza e d'istruzione
elementare gratuita della citta di Firenze (Le Monnier, Florence, 1853), pp. 580 ff.;
D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 69-74; A. Gilardoni,
Scienza dell'amministrazione delle Istituzioni di beneficenza, cit., p. 49, Daniela
Lombardi, 'Poveri a Firenze: programmi e realizzazioni della politica assistenziale
dei Medici tra cinque e seicento', Timore e carita. I poveri nell'ltalia moderna
(Biblioteca Statale e Libreria Civica, Cremona, 1982), pp. 165-184; Irene Polverini
Fosi, 'Pauperismo ed assistenza a Siena durante il principato mediceo', ivi, pp.157-
164; Idem, 'Lo stato e i poveri: I'esempio senese fra seicento e settecento', Ricerche
Storiche , X, 1980, pp.93-115; Lodovico Branca, 'Pauperismo, assistenza e controllo
sociale a Firenze (1621-1632): materiali e ricerche', Archivio storico toscano , No.
517, 3 of 1983, pp. 421-462; Saverio Russo, 'Potere pubblico e carita privata.
L'assistenza ai poveri a Lucca tra XVI e XVII secolo', Societa e storia , No. 23, 1984,
pp.45-80; Daniela Lombardi, 'L'Ospedale dei mendicanti nella Firenze del seicento. "Da
inutile serraglio dei mendici a conservatorio e casa di forza per le donne', ivi, No. 24,
1984, pp.289-311. Luigi Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nella Toscana settecentesca',
Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 185-210; Woolf S.J., 'The treatment of the poor in
Napoleonic Tuscany, 1808-1814', Annuario dell'lstituto storico Italiano per I'eta
moderna e contemporanea, vol.23-24,1971 -72, Rome 1975, pp.435-474, now also in
Woolf, The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Methuen,
London, 1986), pp. 76-117.
2 For the Council of Trent in general see Eric Cochrane, Italy 1530-1630 (Longman,
1988), pp. 106-64, passim, and partic. 145-53. For the dispositions of the Council of
Trent on charities see Caput VIII, Session XXV, 4 Dec. 1563, in Massimo Marciocchi, La
riforma cattolica. Documenti e testimonianze, (Morcelliana, Brescia, 1967), vol.1, p.
575. See also S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 35-38; A.
Gilardoni, Scienza dell'amministrazione delle Istituzioni di beneficenza, cit., p. 49;
Statistica del Regno d'ltalia, Le opere pie nel 1861, Compartimento dell'Emilia (Succ.
Le Monnier, Florence, 1869), p. V; Compartimenti dell'Umbria e delle Marche (Succ. Le
Monnier, Florence, 1870), pp. V-VII; Aristide Rav&, 'La beneficenza pubblica in Roma',
R. B. P., No. 9, 1874, p. 670; 'Le opere pie nella provincia di Roma '(from the report of
the Prefect Gadda on the first five administrative years of the province of Rome),
ibidem, No. 3, 1876, p. 233; Arnaldo Cherubini, Dottrine e metodi assistenziali dal
1789 aI 1848. Italia - Francia - Inghilterra (Giuffre, Milan, 1958), pp.15-19.
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of Rome, the provinces being less worthy of favour and privileges in the eyes of the
papal administration 3. Since the 1450s and throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the pontiffs Niccolo V, Alexander VI, Pius IV, Pius V, Gregory
XIII, Sixtus V and Innocent XII forbade mendicancy and tried to lock up the beggars of
Rome in large hospices. But these reforms failed to take root. Other welfare
institutions of the Papal States were the Congregazioni dell'Abbondanza, established
by Sixtus V to provide cheap food supplies to the populace of the main towns. These
boards looked after the storage of wheat at harvest time and distributed it to the
bakers in winter, fixing the price of bread. It was an artificial economic device
since, particularly during the periods of famine, the supply of cheap bread to the
towns could be achieved only at the expense of the countryside. Hence the
overcrowding of the towns by destitute peasants and the chronic pauperism which
plagued the Papal States. Public works and distributions of alms were the other
highly uneconomical devices to which the pontiffs resorted to keep poverty at bay 4.
The charitable patrimonies were confiscated in 1798 during the Franco-Roman
republic, they were restored by Pius VII (1799-1808), and then partly
confiscated, partly laicized, under Napoleon. Out-door relief was then entrusted to
Welfare Committees (Commissioni di beneficenza). The institutions were grouped in
four sections (hospitals; poorhouses and orphanages; conservatori and
reformatories; foundling homes) and laicized. The mendicants were expelled if
foreigners, locked up and employed in public works if Romans 5. As elsewhere the
Restoration brought back the former legislation: Pius VII re-established clerical
control over the charities. However he did not cancel all the French novelties. The
unified administration of the institutions was maintained, and in 1816 the Istituto
3 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 38-39; 'The Papal
States', The Westminster Review , XLIV, Sept.-Dec. 1845, p. 346; P. Simoncelli, 'Note
sul sistema assistenziale a Roma nel XVI secolo', Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 140, 142.
4 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 40-46; Cherubini,
Dottrine e metodi..., cit., pp. 15-16; Simoncelli, 'Note sul sistema...', cit., pp. 137-
155; Bronislaw Geremek, 'II pauperismo nell'eta preindustriale (secoli XIV-XVIII)',
Storia d'ltalia, V, / documenti (Einaudi, Turin,1973), pp. 685-691; Michele Fatica, 'La
reclusione dei poveri a Roma durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XII (1692-1700)',
Ricerche per la storia religiosa di Roma , 3, (Storia e Letteratura, Rome,1979), pp.
133-179; Rosa, 'Chiesa, idee sui poveri...', cit., pp. 775-799; Franco Venturi, '1764-
1767: Roma negli anni della fame', Rivista storica italiana , LXXXV, sept.1973, pp.
514-543, notably 514, 516-521, 531-543; Mario Tosti, 'Poveri, carestia e strutture
assistenziali nello Stato della Chiesa: il caso di Perugia (1764-67)', Rivista di storia
della chiesa in Italia , No. 1, 1983, pp. 143-172, notably pp. 165-169.
5 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 48-51; A. Cherubini,
Dottrine e metodi..., cit., pp. 151-152. For the debate on welfare during the French
period see Daniele Menozzi, 'Pauperismo e assistenza nel triennio giacobino. II caso di
Bologna', Timore e carita..., cit., pp. 297-315.
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generale di carita was created with a first endowment of 50,000 scudi. It was
intended to grant out-door relief to able and incapable poor and was to be subsidized
by public charity. The distribution of relief was entrusted to fourteen Congregazioni
parrocchiali. The communes were allowed to impose taxes for the maintenance of
hospitals, foundling homes and lunatic asylums. Pius VII also ordered a census of the
charities of the State, whose results, albeit available, do not seem yet to have been
investigated 6. In 1826 Leo XII replaced the Istituto generale di carita with the
Commissione dei sussidi. In this Commissione all almoner funds and revenues were
to merge: another proof that the founders' will was not sacred in the Papal States. The
Commissione was entrusted both with the distribution of alms and the administrative
control of the charities, but it seems that the second task was never efficiently
performed. The hospitals were also merged in a single administration, but this
reform did not last. In 1829 Pius VIII restored the single autonomous
administrations while later Pius IX chose a middle-way, establishing a general
committee for the administrative controls of the hospitals 7. For our ends it is
important to note that the charities of the Papal States were still owned, managed and
controlled by the clergy. Since the question of the temporal power of the Church was
among the main obstacles to the unification, the implementation of the Piedmontese
legislation in the Papal States was bound to be extremely awkward.
4.2. RicaSQli antf Farini. Twp different approach??.
No major modification to the existing welfare legislation was introduced in Tuscany
during the period of provisional rule. This was consistent with Ricasoli's persuasion
that the different administrative systems of the pre-unification states be
temporarily maintained and then comparatively studied in order to produce a
harmonious legislation. Ricasoli was to abandon this position once faced, as Prime
Minister, with the many problems that decentralization implied. We will later
return to this point. For the moment we will note that Ricasoli, as Interior Minister
and then Governor of Tuscany, barely touched the charities, suggesting to the prefects
6 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 50-52;
Statistica...Umbria e Marche, cit., pp. VII-VIII., the material of the mentioned census,
recently reordered, is in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Indice 1142, Luogi Pii di Roma,
and covers the period from the end of the eigtheenth century to the 1830s.
7 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp. 52-58; Cherubini,
Dottrine e metodi..., cit., pp. 223-226.
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a basic reordering within the existing legislative framework. His mention to^ the
charities in his first address to the prefects of May 1859 was vague:
...i will take care of the many establishments founded by the charity
and wisdom of our ancestors. They will be restored to their original purposes,
their patrimonies will be supervised, their action strengthened....
He made more specific recommendations in February 1860 when explaining the
basic criteria of the law concerning the District Councils to the prefects, the statutes
of the charities were to be inspected and, if necessary, reformed; new charities were
to be created and the prefects should ensure that true destitution was everywhere
relieved 8.
The approach of Carlo Farini in Emilia, that is the former Duchies of Modena-
Reggio and Parma-Piacenza, differed. Farini had been appointed Governor of the
Duchy of Modena in June 1859 after the departure of the Duke Francis V, following
the battle of Magenta. In August he had also assumed the Dictatorship of the Duchy of
Parma, offered to him by the 'Governor in the name of the people', Giuseppe
Manfredi, who had briefly ruled the ex-Duchy after the withdrawal of the
Piedmontese Governor Giuseppe Pallieri 9. Farini, in order to confront European
diplomacy with a 'fait accompli', both to show the inevitability of the formal
annexation to Piedmont, and to curb municipal rivalries, procetied with a quick
legislative 'Piedmontization'. This policy was consistent with the earlier program
drafted by Cavour and Minghetti when the latter was Secretary General of the
Piedmontese Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As in Lombardy, the abrupt break with the
local administrative tradition caused discontent when the political tension
surrounding the plebiscites decreased. Such discontent was particularly strong in
Modena and Parma, where the moderates, much less mature and politically organized
8 Mario Nobili and Sergio Camerani (eds.), Carteggi di Bettino Fticasoli (Istituto Storico
Italiano per I'eta moderna e contemporanea, Rome, 1956), vol. 8, p. 35 (Circular 12
May 1859), Vol. 12 (1960), p. 196 (Circular 29 February 1860). For the situation in
Tuscany in 1859-60 see S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3,
cit., pp. 488-96. About Ricasoli's approach to administrative unification see Giuseppe
Pansini, 'Bettino Ricasoli e I'unificazione amministrativa dello Stato Italiano', in
Feliciano Benvenuti and Gianfranco Miglio (eds.),Atti del Congresso celebrativo delle
leggi amministrative di unificazione, L'unificazione amministrativa ed i suoi
protagonisti, (Pozza.Vicenza, 1969), passim and partic. pp. 385-405.
9 G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1966), Vol.IV, pp. 347-
350, 368-370; S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp.
490-6.
90
than their collegues of the Legazioni, had made no theoretical or practical
contribution to the problem of administrative unification 10.
The welfare administration was thus reordered according to the Piedmontese model.
The Edict of 24 December 1836 and the act of 1 March 1850, with its related
regulations of 21 December 1850, were enforced in Modena with the Decree of 4
October and in Parma with the decree of 5 November 1859. The charities were
expected to conform to the new administrative system from 1 January 1860 11.
Evidence from the State Archive of Turin indicates that some problems of
organization occurred in the ex-Duchy of Parma. Article 3 of the above-mentioned
decree entrusted the Ministry of the Interior with the issue of regulations concerning
the transition from the old to the new administrative system. But neither these
regulations, nor the forms for the inventories and budgets of the charities were
produced, and the Intendants were thus uncertain whether to wait, or apply the law
according to their own interpretation. After having received repeated entreaties, the
Ministry announced in March 1860 that the forms were unlikely to be ready soon:
the printer was too busy. The regulations were even less likely to appear. The
Ministry would answer any specific problems case by case12. The obvious outcome of
this lack of direction was that the charities followed the former system using the old
forms, the only difference being that the accounts were now sent for control to the
Ministry of the Interior, whereas they were previously checked by the Accounts'
Chamber. On the other hand, since the welfare administration in the two Duchies was
already under governative guardianship, the change did not prove too troublesome:
1 0 I. Zanni Rosiello, L'unificazione politica e amministrativa nelle "Provincie dell'Emilia"
(1859-60) (Giuffre, Milan, 1965), pp. 30-32, 37-39, 42-45, 48-52, 62-67; Aldo
Berselli, 'Marco Minghetti e le leggi di unificazione amministrativa', Atti del Congresso
celebrativo delle leggi amministrative di unificazione, L'unificazione amministrativa ed i
suoi protagonisti , cit., pp. 328-332. About Farini's life and political activity: Gaspare
Finali, 'Ricordi della vita di Luigi Carlo Farini', Nuova Antologia , No. 9, 1878, pp. 5-
60; about the pre-unification administrative systems: Carlo Ghisalberti, Contributi alia
storia delle amministrazioni preunitarie (Giuffre, Milan, 1963); Ettore Rotelli, 'Gli
ordinamenti locali preunitari', Storia dell'Emilia-Romagna, Bologna, University Press,
1980, vol. 3, pp. 231-256.
1 1 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., pp.79, 84-85; A. Gilardoni,
Scienza dell' amministrazione..., cit., p. 48; M. Piccialuti Caprioli,' Opere pie e
beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto
all'unificazione amministrativa', Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 3, 1980, p.
1035.
12 A.S.T., Sez.l, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I. Div. II, M. 41, f. 8/10: the Intendant
of Borgo S. Donnino, 30 Nov. 1859, No. 7155; 5 Jan. 1860, No. 72, to M.I., Modena;
the Int. of Parma, 24 Jan. 1860, No. 778, to M.I., Modena; the latter, Modena, Div.II,
Sect. II, 7 March 1860, No. 1539, to the Int. of Parma (minute).
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several Congregations of Charity willingly collaborated sending reports, inventories,
etc 13.
In Modena the enforcement of two other Piedmontese acts was more controversial.
The Jewish charities did not welcome a decree of 3 October 1859 which prescribed
that they make the inventories and entrust their administration to the Congregations
of Charity, according to the Piedmontese act of 4 July 1857 14. This was a
comprehensible reaction from a minority group that felt its own religious and
economic autonomy threatened. The opposition provoked by the enforcement of the
Piedmontese act of 13 July 1857 (decree of 20 November 1859), was of a different
kind. This act enabled the leaseholders (emphyteuts) to redeem the land leased to
them on a perpetual or long-term lease. The Opere Pie Modenesi, that largely used
this kind of agrarian contract, and would thus lose great part of their landed
properties, immediately rebelled. Their protest, dismissed as 'inconsistent' by the
Minister of the Interior, was based on two tenets. The charities' assets were still
under Papal jurisdiction, since this had not been invalidated either by law or
international treaty; the Sardinian act, albeit applicable to future contracts, could
not have retroactive effects, thus could not apply to the existing contracts 15. This
controversy, involving the problem of the charities' landed properties - linked with
that of ecclesiastical property - was an early example of the basis on which the
future Charities-State struggle would develop. Administrative State control could be
tolerated and possibly eschewed. State interference in property rights was to be
1 3 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 40, f. 8/9: the Int. of
Piacenza, 19 Jan. 1860, No. 535, to M.I., Modena; M. 39, ff. 8/3, 8/4, 8/6; M. 41,
f. 8/10: the Int. of Parma, 12 March 1860, No. 2444, to M.I., Modena; M. 42, f.
8/16: report by the Mayor of Correggio, President of that Congr. of Charity,
forwarded to M.I., Modena, by the General Intendant of Reggio Emilia, 15 March 1860,
No. 1392; A.S.T., Sez. I, M.I., Div. VI, 1860, Carte dell'Emilia, Opere Pie: the Int. of
Piacenza, 20 June 1860, No. 5748, to M.I., Turin.
f 4 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 39, f. 8/8: all the file
and notably a letter from the President of the Universita ed Opere Religiose e Pie
Israelitiche, Modena, 7 Dec. 1859, to M.I., Modena. Cf. also: D'Amelio S., La
beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., p. 79.
15 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 39,f. 8/1: Capitoli
(Ricci) da osservarsi per le Concessioni livellarie de' Beni che appartengono alia
Serenissima Ducal Camera, alle Comunita ed alle Opere Pie di tutti gli Estensi Dominj =
mediati ed immediati, Modena, 14 Sept. 1788; the President of the Congregazione delle
Opere Pie di Modena, 12 Dec. 1859, to the legal office of the same Congregazione ; the
latter to the former, 15 Dec. 1859 and 17 Jan. 1860; M.I., Modena, 31 Dec. 1859, No.
597 to the Gen. Int. of Modena. The 13 July 1857 Act was later enforced in the whole
Emilia-Romagna with Decree 3 March 1860; in the Marches with Decree 12 Nov. 1860;
in Umbria with Decree 17 Dec. 1860 and in Tuscany with Decree 15 March 1860 (see
Forchielli Giuseppe, 'Enfiteusi ecclesiastica', Novissimo Digesto Italiano, Vol. VI,
(U.T.E.T., Turin,1960), p.556).
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fought thoroughly. It is probably significant that this early symptom of a conflict
that would become the leit-motiv accompanying all attempts of the State to put the
charities under effective and not merely formal control - from the bills of the
1870s to Crispi's reform of 1890 - showed up first in Modena, where the nature of
the pre-existing legislation allowed a relatively smooth implementation of the acts of
1836 and 1850.
4.3. The provisional legislation on charities in the ex-Papal States.
The theoretically most interesting novelties concerning the reordering of the
charities occurred in the Romagna (the so-called Legazioni pontificie, i.e. the
Provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Fori) and Ravenna). An account of the main political
events that occurred there between June and November 1859 will help to set the
framework within which the legislative action on welfare took place. After the
Austrians left Bologna, on the morning of 12 June 1859, a popular demonstration
decided the Papal Legate Cardinal Milesi to leave too. The City Council appointed a
Provisional Junta presided over by Marquis Pepoli who was later appointed
provisional commissioner of Umbria, and whose appointment in Bologna had been
recommended by both Cavour and Minghetti: he was a cousin of Napoleon III, thus
politically guaranteed. The Junta immediately offered the Dictatorship to Victor
Emanuel II who, unable to accept due to the delicate diplomatic situation of the
Legazioni, sent Massimo D'Azeglio as Royal Commissioner and guarantor of the King's
protection to Bologna. Diplomatic reasons had persuaded Cavour not to give D'Azeglio
the full powers of Governor, limiting his sphere of action to organising the Army and
controlling the Junta. Nevertheless D'Azeglio was effectively compelled to accept the
power the Junta offered him. Thus he set up a new Government, leaving immediately
after - on 16 July - for Turin: the news of the peace of Villafranca had already
arrived in Bologna. D'Azeglio left as Pro-Commissioner the Piedmontese Colonel
Enrico Falicon, whose rule was destined to be short: the Provisional Government of
The Romagna officially ceased on 28 July and a few days later Falicon too returned to
Turin, leaving power in the hands of the Gerenti (Ministers) previously appointed
by D'Azeglio. They were: Pepoli (finance), Antonio Montanari (Interior and P.S.),
Ippolito Gamba (Public Works), Cesare Albicini (Public Welfare, Instruction and
Fine Arts), Falicon (War), later replaced by Cipriani.
The reason for this complicated manoeuvring lay in the danger that the Papal army,
which had re-occupied Umbria and the Marches, would attempt the same in the
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Romagna. Napoleon III had offered Pepoli his protection, but the patriots' army was
weak, the diplomatic situation entangled and the greatest caution was required. It was
better that Turin should not be directly involved yet. But Turin's influence in the key
appointments was not diminished by its official withdrawal from the politics of the
ex-Legazioni. The new head of the Provisional Government appointed by the Gerenti
was Colonel Leonetto Cipriani. As a friend of Napoleon III he was - like Pepoli - a
guarantee of the safety of the four Provinces, as well as the target of the suspicions of
his colleagues in the Government. At the beginning of November 1859 the position of
Cipriani, who had energetically repressed the democrats' attempts to achieve a quick
and radical unification of Central Italy, was no longer sustainable. His resignation,
accepted by the General Assembly of Bologna on 9 November 1859, effectively
prevented a leftist military action against him, likely to be headed by Garibaldi. The
General Assembly elected Farini as the new Governor General: the ex-Legazioni were
thus unified with the Provinces of Modena and Parma in the 'Government of the Royal
Provinces of Emilia' which ceded to the Central Government immediately after the
plebiscites of March 1860 16.
The six Gerenti appointed by D'Azeglio thus enjoyed a three-month period of
relative independence in respect of the internal administrative reorganization in the
ex-Legazioni. The Welfare Section (or Ministry) entrusted to Count Cesare Albicini,
took its task quite seriously, attempting an experiment whose outcome could have
been interesting had it not been interrupted by the unification of the Romagne with
the Provinces of Modena and Parma when still in its infancy. The first concern of
Albicini was to abolish all ecclesiastical interference from the charities'
administrations. This was probably suggested to him by reports from the Provinces.
Only one of these, from the Royal Commissioner of Ferrara, is preserved in the State
Archive of Turin, but it seems likely that other similar accounts persuaded the
Gerente to take radical measures. The report from Ferrara stressed the need to put
the charities under Government control or - at least - to assess their economic
situation. Scandals like that concerning the rich Bonaccioli legacy, which the bishop
mismanaged using the revenues to sponsor anti-Government reaction, must be
^ G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna , vol. IV, cit., pp. 350-353, 370-373, 380-
381, 390-395; S. Woolf, 'La storia politioa e sociale', in Storia d'ltalia, 3, cit., pp.
482-96. The members of the Provisional Junta were: Marquis Gioaochino Napoleone
Pepoli, Count Giovanni Malvezzi, Count Luigi Tanari, Prof. Antonio Montanari, Aw.
Camillo Casarini ( ivi, p. 351). About the Section of Public Welfare, Instruction and Fine
Arts see also M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie...', cit., p. 1033, fn.160.
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stopped at once 17. As usual, the reordering was to be achieved by means of decrees.
The first, issued by Falicon and Albicini on 25 July 1859, declared that all charities
were henceforth under government guardianship. The Royal Commissioners (later
Provincial Intendants) were to obtain from the chairmen of the charities information
about their administrative situation, and supervise them. This was nothing but a
mere declaration of principles. An explanatory circular followed on 28 July, but it
failed both to define the new system, and provide the Intendants with the means to
implement it 18. A further decree was thus prepared by Albicini and issued by
Cipriani on 19 August. All charitable patrimonies would be freely administered in
each Commune by a congregation of charity (article 1). This was to be appointed by
the Municipal Commissions and approved by the Government. The number of the
members of the congregations was proportional to a town's size: ten for those with
more than 50,000 inhabitants; six for those with more than 30,000; four in the
others. Additional members were the bishop or parish priest; the Intendant or his
representative, and the Mayor (article 2). Specific regulations for the Congregations
were to be laid down by a Central Welfare Committe to be appointed by the Minister
(article 3). The charities, though administered by the congregations were to
maintain their own characteristics and purposes as well as their financial rights and
obligations (article 4). The Municipal Commissions were given eight days to appoint
the congregations of charity to whom the Administrative Boards of all charities would
cede (article 5). Albicini was responsible for enforcing the Decree (article 6).
The basic policy was to establish State control without merging the charities or
tranforming their purposes. The model, as Albicini clearly stated in his explanatory
report to Cipriani, was the system implemented by the French during the Italian
Kingdom. According to the Welfare Minister, the Provinces of the Romagna had
greatly benefitted from that reorganization. According to other sources it had not
been a success: by March 1814 the congregations were still at an experimental stage,
although established since 1807, and the full reform never took place 19. Nor would
17 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 1o3-: the Royal Commissioner
Migliorati, Ferrara, 24 July 1859, No. 1736, to Albicini, Bologna.
1 8 Renato Eugenio Righi, 'La trasformazione delle istituzioni di beneficienza alia caduta del
governo temporale del la Chiesa a Bologna', II 1859-60 a Bologna (Calderini,
Bologna, 1961), pp. 411, 416-418; see also: S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto
italiano, vol. I, cit., p. 59. A printed copy of the Circular 28 July 1859, No. 8 is in
A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f.9.
1 9 See the text of the Decree and Albicini's explanatory notes in A.S.T., Sez. Riun.,
ibidem:F?apporfo del Gerente la Sezione di Pubblica Beneficenzalstruzione e Belle Arti. A
Sua Eccellenza il Signor Cav. Colonnello Leonetto Cipriani Governatore Generate delle
Romagne. ... il 19 Agosto 1859. See also: R. E. Righi, 'La trasformazione delle
istituzioni di beneficienza alia caduta del governo temporale della Chiesa a Bologna',
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the new reform be fully implemented; and those parts of it that were, would not last
for long. We will devote the next paragraph to an analysis of the actual establishment
of the congregations and clerical opposition to it, focusing now on the activity of that
Central Welfare Committee mentioned in article 3 of the decree of 19 August. For the
minutes of the Committee's meetings and their voluminous enclosures are the clue to
understanding what could have happened and why it did not.
The Central Welfare Committee - established with the decrees of 16, 27 and 29
September 1859 - was formed by Count Giovanni Massei, Count Giovanni Malvezzi,
Dr. Angelo Marescotti (Councillors of State), Antonio Zanolini and Carlo Berti Pichat
(who soon resigned and was replaced by Pietro Bondi), plus the Minister Albicini,
and Carlo Ferrari as secretary 20. The key person was Count Massei, member of
several academies, who had published in 1836 an essay Sulla beneficenza e
I'lstruzione pubblica in Bologna , and in 1858 a major work in three tomes, La
scienza medica delta poverta ossia la beneficenza illuminata . Central to Massei's
philosophy was the need to define the various levels of poverty and their different
effects on society, and hence the necessity of distinguishing the true from the false
poor. His other tenets were that the equal distribution of wealth was the only means
to prevent poverty; that uncoordinated private charity was inadequate to relieve
indigence, and hence the government must supervise the charities' administration
and ensure a correct distribution of relief 21. The story of the Welfare Committee
will also tell us how Massei lost a unique chance to realise his long-conceived
theories.
The tasks of the Committee were set during the first meeting, held on 5 October
1859. The Commissioners would lay down a general bill on welfare and regulations
for the administration of the charities. The first decision of the Committee concerned
the model on which the new legislation should be based. To this effect, the
commissioners gathered information about the Piedmontese system, but decided not to
conform to it. They found it insufficiently organic and concluded that the rules in
force in Piedmont did not offer a sound basis for the reordering of the local charities.
Hence the decision to start afresh. The tenets on which all members of the Committee
cit., pp. 419, 422-426; S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano, vol. I, cit., p.
60; Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie e beneficenza pubblica...', cit., pp. 1033-1034.
20 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 1o2-: Cipriani Decree, 16 Sept.
1859; f.2: Cipriani Decrees, 27 and 29 Sept. 1859.
21 R. E. Righi, 'La trasformazione delle istituzioni di beneficienza alia caduta del governo
temporale della Chiesa a Bologna', cit., pp. 411-414; Dal Pane, Economia e societa a
Bologna nell'eta del Risorgimento (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1969), pp. 484-486, 530-531,
613.
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agreed were listed in the preface to the draft presented by Massei during the second
meeting, held on 8 October 1859. The solution of the poverty problem required
direct Government action. This must be directed both to ensure a uniform and proper
administration of the charitable patrimonies and a correct distribution of the relief.
Since both centralization and de-centralization were largely defective, the best
system was a middle way between the two, in order to harmonize the administration
with the local needs and situations. A better administration would surely increase the
incomes of the charities, but these would always be inferior to the needs in the
absence of a general statistic distinguishing between the true and false poor. Indeed,
the present increase of beggary was precisely due to the lack of such a distinction.
The imposition of a local poor-tax was regarded as dangerous because it was likely to
damage the poorer Communes. Finally, long-term leases were recommended as the
best system to ensure a maximum constant income from the charities' landed
properties, since it left the administrators free from duties other than the
distribution of relief 22.
The system devised by Massei was modelled on that introduced by the French in
1807. A comparison between his draft and the inventory-summary of the decrees
concerning the congregations of charity issued by Eugene Napoleon in 1807 clearly
shows substantial if only partial similarities 23. The part concerning the three
sections in which all charities would be divided (hospitals; orphanages,
conservatorii and hospices; almoner foundations) and their administrative rules was
directly taken from the Napoleonic model. That concerning the congregations of
charity was a re-elaboration, since in the Napoleonic decrees there was no mention
of different levels of congregations entailing different tasks. In Massei's project the
congregations of the main towns functioned as coordinators of those in the minor
centres, hence as filters between the basis and the welfare ministry. The Committee
for the Statistic of the Poor was a completely new feature, although the notion of
22 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f.2: Bologna, Governo delle Romagne,
Ministero di Pubblica Beneficenza, Istruzione e Belle Arti, Prot. No. 183, Minutes of the
Central Welfare Committee's meeting of 5 Oct. 1859 (present: Albicini, Prof. Giuseppe
Ceneri, Albicini's personal Secretary, Massei, Malvezzi, Marescotti, Ferrari); f. 10^.;
Bologna, Governo delle Romagne, Ministero..., cit., Prot. No. 335, minutes of the
meeting 8 Oct. 1859 and enclosures A, B, C, D, (Piedmontese legislation), E (Massei's
draft: Progetto di Legge o Decreto per la definitiva organizzazione della Pubblica
Beneficenza nelle Romagne). Present at the meeting: Albicini, Ceneri, Massei,
Marescotti, Ferrari. Absent: Malvezzi, for presiding the Town's Council, Zanolini and
Bondi for being out of Bologna.
23 Albicini requested the inventory from Bologna's intendant on 21 September 1859 and
returned it on 6 December.
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counting the poor was not peculiar to Massei alone 24. This last suggestion was
welcomed by the welfare commissioners, who appointed an experimental committee
for the statistics of the poor in Bologna. There would be three commissioners, each
entrusted with a district of the city. Unfortunately the minutes do not specify the
methodological criteria of the statistics, nor are any of the forms or other records
related to it preserved in the A.S.T. files, which leaves us with information of only
limited interest. For the rest the welfare commissioners were not totally favourable
to Massei's proposals. The hierarchical links between the congregations of charity
were reckoned to be inconsistent with the model outlined in the decree of 19 August,
and likely to delay their establishment 25. From this moment the Committee lost its
unity. Massei persisted in his ideas, producing other drafts which, although
interesting in retrospect, were not acceptable to his colleagues, who did not want to
depart from the criteria underlying the 19 August decree. Hence the drafts of Massei
were modified and watered down by two other members of the committee, Marescotti
and Bondi, who were more interested in copying the Napoleonic model 26.
The basic argument which divided the Commissioners concerned the amount of
autonomy to be granted to the lower levels of the welfare organization. The last of the
projects produced by Massei clearly shows his belief that even the inhabitants of the
smallest village were sufficiently mature to manage a parish-centred welfare system
that would actively involve a large number of citizens and would provide not only
almoner relief but also health care. The other commissioners were less optimistic,
perhaps correctly. The modifications to the drafts of Massei were all aimed at
reducing local autonomy and increasing the control of the welfare ministry, on the
basis of the French system. These arguments produced bitterness and resentment
within the committee. Massei resigned and Albicini had to put himself at pains to
24 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 1o3-: Vice-Royal Decrees issued by
Eugene Napoleon, Prefettura del Reno, 17 July 1807: Istituzione della Congregazione di
Carita per Bologna , and 5 Sept. 1807: Nuovo ordinamento dell'Amministrazione di
Pubblica Beneficenza per tutto il Regno . The letters of Albicini asking for and returning
the inventory are in A.S.T., Sez. Riun., cit., M. 45, f. 1o3-: Albicini, Bologna, 21 Sept.
1859, to the Intendant, Bologna, and f. 10^-: Albicini, Bologna, 6 Dec. 1859, to the
Intend., Bologna (minute). For proposals of statistics of the poor cf. for ex.: Oualche
cenno sulla mendicita' e sui mezzi di estirparla (Pomba, Turin,1834), pp. 21-29.
25 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow. cit., M. 45, f. 102-: Bologna, Gov. delle Romagne,
Ministero..., cit., Prot. No. 336, minutes of the meeting 21 Oct. 1859 and enclosure A.
Present at the meeting: Albicini, Massei, Zanolini, Bondi, Marescotti, Ferrari,
Brunetti, Mezzetti. Predieri sent his resignations from the Statistical Committee.
Mezzetti and Massei would try to persuade him to accept the office.
26 See the schemes of the various drafts produced by the welfare committee in appendix
4.
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persuade him to stay 27. But it was a battle destined for defeat, for Massei and his
opponents alike. On 29 October the last draft produced by Bondi was judged basically
acceptable, yet the committee decided to shelve it: the Piedmontese Government was
likely soon to issue new decrees on the matter, and it would probably be politically
advisable to enforce them in the Romagna 28. At the last meeting on 14 November the
Commissioners were told by Albicini that the Piedmontese legislation had already
been enforced in the provinces of Modena and Parma. He proposed to do the same in
the Romagna, since that was the intention of the new Governor General. Perhaps a
discussion followed that was thought better not recorded. The minutes only tell us
that the commissioners agreed, expressing the wish to learn more about that
legislation and the way in which it had been implemented in those provinces 29. What
fate met the statistical committeee we do not know, since no record of it seems to have
been preserved. Nor do we know whether the welfare committee met again. From the
absence of further minutes it would seem that its time had run out.
Internal theoretical dissent, lack of coordination and time had crippled the initiative
of the Welfare Commissioners. They produced nothing concretely, since they failed
both to devise and enforce a new legislation and to provide minimal rules for the
implementation of the decree of 19 August, effectively ignoring the requests of the
Intendants 30. As we will shortly see, this absence of regulations caused great
confusion in the newly formed Congregations of Charity, since the members did not
exactly know their duties and powers, nor did the Intendants dare to move further in
interpreting a decree that left so many questions unanswered. Yet the story of this
welfare committee set in Bologna at the very beginning of the provisional rule
demonstrates that in the Romagna the moderates were not outrightly favourable to the
Piedmontisation of the charity system. A more direct involvement of the state was
27 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow cit., M. 45, f. 10^.; Bologna, Governo..., cit, Prot.
No. 337, minutes of the meeting 26 Oct. 1859 and enclosure A (Bondi and Marescotti's
draft). M. 45, f.2: enclosure B (Massei's Project of Regulations). Present at the
meeting: Albicini, Bondi, Marescotti, Ferrari. Massei resigned on the grounds of his
new appointment as Municipal Councillor. See A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow...., cit.,
M. 45, f. 10l: Massei, Bologna, 4 Nov. 1859, to Albicini: the latter to the former,
Bologna 11 Nov. 1859 (minute).
28 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow cit., M. 45, f. 10^: Bologna, Gov cit., Prot. No.
338, minutes of the meeting 29 Oct. 1859; f. 2: enclosure A (Bondi's draft). Present at
the meeting: Albicini, Bondi, Malvezzi, Marescotti, Zanolini, Ferrari.
29 Ibidem: Prot. No. 339, minutes of the meeting 14 Nov. 1859. Present: Albicini, Bondi,
Malvezzi, Marescotti, Massei, Zanolini, Ferrari.
80 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow cit., M. 45, f. 103: the Int. of Ravenna, 11 Sept.
1859, Gen. Seer. No. 1502, to Albicini, Bologna; f. 101: the Int. of Forli, 16 Oct. 1859,
to Albicini, Bologna. A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 42,
f. 8/12: the Int. of Bologna, 21 Dec. 1859, Sect. I, No. 7112, to M.I., Modena.
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reckoned necessary, and in this respect the Napoleonic model was regarded as still
workable. Futhermore, it is no less interesting that the issue on which the
commissioners split was that of local autonomy. In this respect the majority of the
committee gave a sufficiently clear answer: the welfare system must be firmly held
iV\£
by the state, devolution of power was out of question.
Albicini had told the committee that Farini intended to enforce the Piedmontese
legislation in the Romagna as in the Provinces of Parma and Modena, but the new
Governor decided differently. The decrre of 19 August was left in force until 9
October 1861 when the act of 20 November 1859 and related Regulations of 18
August 1860 were enforced in the whole Emilia-Romagna and in the Marches, with
Royal decree No. 252 31. This might indicate that Farini, even though he was
concerned mainly with the political meaning of administrative unification, was not
unaware of the problems involved in that unification 32. It can, however, also be seen
as a merely 'practical' choice: the reordering of the charities in the ex-Legazioni was
difficult and perhaps Farini decided to avoid making it even more complicated.
Certainly he did not attribute importance to the decree of 19 August 1859, since he
did not bother to issue those regulations that had been the main reason for setting up
the Welfare Committee. The Intendant of Bologna who stressed their need was told, in
December 1859, to wait for the enforcement of the new law 33. In the Romagna the
congregations of charity were left in a sort of limbo, which probably did not matter
so much in Farini's view, since they were inspired by principles and models not
approved by Turin.
The criteria elaborated by Albicini served as a guideline for Gioacchino Pepoli in
Umbria and Lorenzo Valerio in the Marches 34. The provisional rule in these two
regions of the Papal States was short: both appointed in September 1860, Pepoli and
Valerio stayed in office respectively until 2 and 19 January 1861 when, according to
the response of the plebiscites held in November 1860, the Marches and Umbria
came under central rule 35. The two Royal Commissioners issued almost
contemporaneously two similar but not identical decrees. The Congregations of
31 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73: B. 16 (Prov. of Ancona) and 193 (Prov. of Forll).
32 I. Zanni Rosiello, L'unificazione amministrativa..., cit., p. 68.
33 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. ..., cit., M.I., Div. II, M. 42, f. 8/12: the Int. of Bologna, 21 Dec.
1859..., cit.(answer scribbled on the same document).
34 For Lorenzo Valerio (Turin, 1810 - Messina, 1865) and his activity of social reformer
in Piedmont see G. M. Bravo, Torino Operaia. Mondo del lavoro e idee sociali nell'eta di
Carlo Alberto (Fond. Einaudi, Turin, 1968), pp. 268-89.
35 About the expedition in the Marches and Umbria see G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia
moderna..., cit., vol. IV, pp. 492-498; vol.V, pp. 131,155.
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Charity were to be formed as those of the ex-Legazioni, but there was a basic
novelty, probably suggested by that experience. The Municipal Commissions were
ordered to take immediate possession of the charities' administration and to act on
behalf ot the Congregations until their establishment. Clearly this was to avoid any
delay in the laicization of the charities' management. The deadline for the
appointment of the Congregations by the Municipal Commissions was fixed at eight
days from the issue of the decree in the Marches, but left unspecified in Umbria. As
we will see, this lack of a deadline caused several problems in Umbria, where often
the Congregations were simply not appointed. The Valerio decree did not specify the
hierarchical procedure to be followed by the Municipal Commissions to get the
Government's approval of the Congregations' lists. Thus the Mayors addressed their
communications directly to Ancona, causing friction between the Royal General
Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioners who felt ignored. On the other hand,
Valerio gave precise instructions both in the decree and in a subsequent, very
detailed circular, about the duties of the Congregations and the administrative
procedures they must follow. He also set severe penalties for those who failed to
observe the law. This seems to have ensured better results than in Umbria, where
the decree only promised regulations that never came 36. Albeit similar in many
to .
respects;'and undoubtedly inspired by the French model, the two decrees indicated the
different intentions of Pepoli and Valerio. Article 4 of the Pepoli decree made it clear
that the following step would be the enforcement of the act of 20 November 1859,
and that the present arrangements were merely a temporary preparation for that
event. Nothing of that sort can be found in the text of the decree issued by Valerio,
who later expressed very clearly his opinion:
...I did not enforce the Sardinian Law of 1859 in the Marches because it
leaves in force the former administrative boards of the charities. This was
feasible in the ancient Provinces of the Kingdom and in Lombardy where the Civil
Authorities already presided over the Welfare services, but would have been a
mistake in the Marches, be_cause to keep or return power in this field to the
Clergy meant opening the road to the political interference of the Roman
Court...37.
36 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5, f. 21: Decree No. 81, Perugia, 29 October
1860. Ibidem, Gov. Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 7: Decree No. 142, Ancona, 24 October
1860; Regio Commissariato della Provincia di Ancona, No. 537 Prot. Gen., Circular No.
4, Ancona, 2 Nov. 1860, to the Municipal Commissions and Congregations of Charity of
the Province of Ancona, Object: Riforma deU'amministrazone delle opere pie.
37 Lorenzo Valerio, 'Le Marche dal 15 Settembre 1860 al 18 Gennajo 1861. Relazione al
Ministero dell'lnterno del R. Commissario Generale Straordinario Lorenzo Valerio',
extract from II Politecnico , Vol. IX, Milan, 1861, p. 40.
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It has been recently argued that, with regard to charities, Pepoii and Valerio were
not following their own initiative but conforming to Turin's instructions intended to
dismantle the clergy's power in that branch of the civil administration 38. The above
evidence, though insufficient to dismiss that argument fully, allows us to infer that
Pepoli's interpretation of the supposed instructions from Turin was quite different
from that of Valerio. Pepoii attempted a quick implementation of the 1859 act;
Valerio wanted to delay it in order to wipe away all clerical power from the charities'
administrative boards. Accordingly, Pepoii enforced the Piedmontese legislation on
26 December 1860, less than two months after the decree was issued, to the great
rejoicing of the clericals who correctly saw it as their salvation 39. One could guess
that the early enforcement of the 1859 act in Umbria was to serve as an experiment
to test its effects in the ex-Papal state. If so, the documentation we are going to
examine shows that the outcome of the experiment was conclusive: the 1859 act was
the best device the state could provide to perpetuate the power of the clergy over the
charities. It might also be guessed that the later date of the enforcement of the 1859
act in the Marches and the Romagne (9 October 1861) was a sign that the message
coming from Umbria had been perceived and understood. Yet the available
documentation will again show that the delay had not been long enough to allow the
congregations to settle down and work properly. However, this is not the central
issue. The congregations of charity ordered by the decrees of Cipriani, Pepoii and
Valerio were totally different institutions from those, bearing the same name,
ordered by the acts of 20 November 1859 and 3 August 1862. The former were
entrusted with the management of all the charities of the Commune, though with
respect for the peculiarities of each charity. The latter were intended merely to
manage those usually small patrimonies generally bequeathed to the poor. Their
reforming prerogatives were extremely limited as well as their power of relief . As
we saw, the congregations of Albicini, Cipriani etc. were inspired by those of the
Italian Kingdom, while those of the 1859 and 1862 acts directly stemmed from the
reforms of Victor Amadeus II and Charles Albert. The contradiction was there in the
roots, and could only bring contradictory results.
38 M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie,..', cit., p. 1035, fn. 163.
39 M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie...', cit., p. 1036.
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4.4. The establishment gt the congregating of charity in the ex-Papal State?
The assessment of the actual implementation of the decrees of Cipriani, Pepoli and
Valerio depends on the archival sources available. These are quite complete for the
Marches, since most of the correspondence related to the establishment of the
Congregations and their general register have been preserved. The documentation
concerning Umbria is less complete, consisting of a few partial registers and some
correspondence, and that of the Romagna even poorer, where we must rely on the
correspondence, since no registers seem to have been preserved. Despite the lack of
homogeneity of our sources, it is possible however to draw a general picture of the
situation. We will first devote our attention to the quantitative data and then focus on
the obstacles to the establishment of the congregations of charity. The following table
synthesizes the situation in the Marches, the region where the reforming initiative
of the Provisional Government was more successful 40.






















Ancona 41 34 82.9 3 4 _
Ascoli 46 33 71.7 1 _ 12
Camerino 19 15 79 4 _ _
Fermo 47 42 89.4 2 _ 3
Macerata 40 40 100 _ _ _
Pesaro-Urb. 94 83 88.3 6 1 4
Totals 287 247 86.1 16 5 19
The evidence available shows that most of the appointments for the Congregations
were made by 8 November in the province of Camerino, by 15 November in that of
Ancona, and by the beginning of December in those of Ascoli and Pesaro-Urbino. The
slowest province was that of Macerata where the appointments were only completed
40 A.S.T., Sez.l, Gov. Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 14: Regio Commissariato Generale
Straordinario delle Marche. Registro delle Congregazoni di Carita per I'amministrazione
delle Opere Pie istituite nelle Provincie delle Marche a senso del Decreto 24 Ottobre
I860.
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by the end of December 41. Although the congregations in the Marches were not
exempt from several problems, which we will examine later, this was not a bad
performance when compared with Umbria. Here by the beginning of December the
decree of 29 October 1860 remained largely unenforced. Only the provinces of Rieti
and Todi had sent the lists of the congregations' appointed members to Perugia, and no
provincial Commissioner had announced the taking of possession of the charities by
the Municipal Commissions. Pepoli harshly reproached his collaborators - and got
defensive replies in return. According to the Commissioner of Perugia-Orvieto,
Gualterio, the texts of the decree and 1859 act (plus related regulations, which in
Umbria already served as a contradictory basis for the reform) had been made
available late to the Communes because of the slow postal service. In addition the
Municipal Commissions had been charged with so many new tasks and performed so
well that they must not be blamed. The Commissioner of Spoleto stressed other
aspects of the situation: most Communes were tiny and poor, often without charities
or skilled and trustv/orrby people to appoint to the congregations 42. By the end of
December only ninety-five of the 176 Communes of Umbria had forwarded their
congregations' lists to Perugia, i.e. 55% 43. Notably, many of these lists arrived
when the 29 October decree had already been replaced by the newly enforced 1859
Piedmontese act, which would cause more controversies and complications. The
following table synthesizes the situation in Umbria at the end of December 1860.
41 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 8: correspondence from Ancona; f.9:
corr. from Ascoli; f. 10: corr. from Camerino; f. 11: corr. from Fermo; f. 12: corr.
from Macerata; f. 13: corr. from Pesaro-Urbino.
42 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5, f. 21: minute of Circular, Perugia, 3 Dec.
1860, No. 646, 3rd Dept., to the Provincial Commissioners of Perugia-Orvieto, Rieti,
Spoleto, Object: Rimostranze sull'inesecuzione del Decreto 29 Ottbre 1860 sulla nuova
amministrazione delle Opere Pie; the Prov. Comm., Perugia, 5 Dec. 1860, No. 3319, to
the Royal Gen. Comm., Perugia; the Prov. Comm., Spoleto, 5 Dec. 1860, to the Royal
Gen. Comm., Perugia.
43 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5, f. 21: minute of Circular to the Prov.
Commissioners, Perugia, 13 Dec. 1860, No. 809, 3rd Dept.; the Prov. Comm., Perugia,
15 Dec. 160. No. 3914, to the Royal Gen Comm., Perugia; reports by the Prov. Comm.
of Perugia-Orvieto, Rieti and Spoleto, Nov.-Dec. 1860, to the Royal Gen. Comm.,
Perugia.
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Peruqia-Orvieto 58 1 27 30 ?
Rieti 66 1 20 45 23
Spoleto 52 _ 46 6 1 2
Totals 1 76 2 93 81 35
The limited and fragmentary evidence concerning the provinces of the Romagna
cannot be used as a basis for any table. We must make do with partial assessments and
indications. The province that seemed to perform best was that of Forli where by the
beginning of October 1859 the congregations had been established in 37 of the 40
Communes. According to the Welfare Ministry, by the middle of November almost all
Communes of the provinces of Bologna and Ferrara had their congregations. The
slowest province was that of Ferrara, where the appointments were almost finished
by the beginning of December 44. Some evidence seems to indicate that, at least for
the province of Bologna, the Minister was a trifle optimistic 45.
Having broadly assessed the quantitative aspects of the establishment of the
congregations of charity, we can now analyse their problems. The Commissioner of
Spoleto had emphasized that often no suitable people could be found in the tiny
villages to form the congregation. This was also a recurrent leit-motif in the
correspondence from the Marches. The Municipal Commission of Serra de' Conti
specified that the appointed members (the Mayor, the postman, an ex-janitor of the
Commune and the tax-collector) were the only available non-clericals. Poggio
Marcello was so small that only the Municipal Councillors were available. Those of
Sammarcello reckoned that it was better not to form the congregation since the only
skilled people in the village were anti-Government and unlikely to accept the office,
while the councillors of Corinaldo announced that they had appointed two members
who were against the present political order but, on the other hand, honest and
44 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 1ol; the Int. of Forli, 6 Oct. 1859,
to Min. Welf., Bologna; the Int. of Ferrara, 6 Dec. 1859, to Min. Welf., Bologna; f. 2:
the Welf. Minister, Bologna, 18 Nov. 1859, No. 265, to the Int., Bologna (copy also in
A.S.T.,Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Gabinetto, M. 13, f. 42).
45 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 42, f. 8/12: the Int. of
Bologna, 13 and 26 Dec. 1859; 20 Jan. 1860, to M.I., Modena (establishment of
Congreg. in Budrio, Castelguelfo and Castel d'Ajano).
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skilled 46. Clearly, the difficulty of finding suitable members for the congregations
was closely linked to the clerical opposition. This became fairly organized in the
Romagna. Immediately after the issue of the Falicon decree of 25 July 1859, the
Archbishop of Bologna - Cardinal Viale-Prela - sent a circular to the administrative
boards of the Conservatorii e Luoghi Pii della Citta e dintorni, declaring the
invalidity of the decree and ordering the managers to refuse to consign the charities'
books and cash. A similar circular was issued by the Bishop of Faenza. The clergy's
refusal to collaborate was re-emphasized after the issue of the Cipriani decree of 19
August 47. No traces of official protests are preserved among the files of the Marches
and Umbria, but it seems likely that analogous instructions were dispatched also by
those bishops, since evidence of widespread obstructionism by the clergy is abundant.
In some cases the opposition was limited to a formal protest, read by the priest to
the officials of congregation at the moment of the confiscation of the charity's
archives 48. In other cases the administrative boards produced documents to prove
the noi!-viGlqbility of the founders' will, or the purely devotional nature of the
foundation, starting law suits. These were regularly dismissed as inconsistent by the
Ministries of the Interior or Justice; but they had at least the effect of slowing the
bureacratic procedures 49. Sometimes, perhaps more often than is recorded in the
48 A.S.T., Sez.l, Gov. Prow., Marche, M.3, f.8: Corinaldo, 2 Nov. 1860; Serra de'Conti,
3 Nov. 1860, No. 76; Sammarcello, 8 Nov. 1860, No. 291; Poggio Marcello, 15 Nov.
1860, No. 252 (all addressed to the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona).
47 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 8: minute of Circular by the
Cardinal Viale-Prela, Bologna, 3 Aug. 1859; printed Circular by the Bishop of Faenza,
29 July 1859, No. 333: A tutti i Presidenti ed Amm.ri de' Luoghi Pii della Diocesi di
Faenza\ the Bishop of Ravenna, 20 and 22 Aug. 1859 to the Intendant, Ravenna. A.S.T.,
Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deH'Emilia, M.I., Gabinetto, M. 13, f. 42: Card. Viale-Prela,
Bologna, 24 Aug. 1859, No. 107, to the Gov. Gen. Cipriani.
48 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. lO^-: the Int., Ravenna, 11 Sept.
1859, No. 1502 Gen. Seer., to the Welf. Min., Bologna; f. 12: the Int., Forli, 19 Nov.
1859, to the Welf. Min., Bologna; A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deU'Emilia, M.I.,
Div. II, M. 42, f.8/12: the Mayor of S. Giovanni in Persiceto, 15 Dec. 1859, No. 1580,
to the Int., Bologna; the latter, Bologna, 21 Dec. 1859, No. 7112, Sect.l, to M.I.,
Modena.
49 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deM'Emilia, M.I., Gabinetto, M. 13, f. 42: the
Administrators of the Orphanage Forni, Bagnacavallo, 28 Aug. 1859, answering the
Municipal Comm., Bagnacavallo, 26 Aug. 1859; the Archpriest Venturini, President of
the admin, board of the Orphanages of Massa Lombarda, 2 Sept. 1859. A.S.T., Sez. I,
M.I., Div. VI, 1860, Carte deli'Emilia, Opere Pie: various documents of Febr.-June
1860 concerning the attempt of the Bishop of Faenza to prove the purely devotional
nature of the Opera Pia Durazzo. Rejected by the Justice Ministry (Turin, 28 June
1860, to M.I., Turin). A.S.T., Gov. Prow., Marche, M.3, f. 7: the admin, board of the
Congregazione Sperelliana, Gubbio, 3 Nov. 1860; the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona, 13
Nov. 1860. No. 4890, to the Royal Comm. of Pesaro-Urbino (minute); Fatto informativo
della Commissone Municipale sulla Congregazione Sperella, ed altre unite, Gubbio, 28
Nov. 1860; the Royal Vice-Comm., Gubbio, 4 dec. 1860, No.566, to the Royal Comm.,
106
files, the obstruction was more effective. The congregation of charity of Brisighella
(prov. of Ravenna) took possession of an orphanage only to discover that its liquid
assets had been deposited in the Saving Bank of Lugo under the bishop's name, who
refused to give up the relevant certificates. The cashier of the Hospital for the
Infirm Poor 'S.Maria del Soccorso' of S. Benedetto (prov. of Ascoli) actually refused
toha«4 over the cash and books. The most active of the recorded obstructionist
performances was that of the Bishop of Comacchio, chairman of all local charities.
Formally ordered to consign their documents, he answered with a vehement written
protest. When the congregation went to the Monte di Pieta, the Orphaixige and the
Hospital to take possession, it found that the employees had fled with the cash and
account books. It was soon clear that these items were with the Bishop who fiercely
refused to give them up. Finally the Intendant sent the local magistrate, escorted by
the Carabinieri, to his palace and only then did the Bishop give up his prey, loudly
expressing his disagreement 50. Another way for the clergy to obstruct the
establishment of the Congregations of Charity was simply to refuse to take part in
them. It will be remembered that the parish priests and bishops were among the
fixed members, together with the Government and Municipality's representatives;
and, although a cooperative priest could sometimes be found to replace the rebellious
ones, disruptions and delays were widespread 51. If the hostility of the clergy was
the major obstacle, municipal pride and private lay interests also played their part.
Those Communes which already owned or controlled the charities could not see why
they should give up their ancient rights; nor were the families entrusted with the
Pesaro; Relazione e Parere, by the lawyer Domenico Fattori, Pesaro, 13 Dec. 1860;
the Royal Comm., Pesaro, 18 Dec. 1860, No. 4290, to the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona;
the latter to the former, Ancona, 30 Dec. 1860, No. 10134 (minute).
50 A.S.T., Sez. I, M.I., Div. VI, Carte deU'Emilia, 1860, Opere Pie: various documents
from Brisighella, May-June 1860; A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deU'Emilia, M.I.,
Gabinetto, M. 13, f. 44/1: the Int. of Comacchio, 22 Jan. 1860, No. 124 and 4 Febr.
1860, No. 340, to the Bishop; the latter, Comacchio, 2 and 4 Febr. 1860, to the
former; the Int., Comacchio, 7 Febr. 1860, to M.I., Modena. A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov.
Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 9: the Munic. Comm., S. Benedetto, 3 Nov. 1860, to the Royal
Gen. Comm., Ancona.
A.S.T., Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M/ 42, f. 8/12: the Int., Bologna,
19 and 21 Dec. 1859 and 4 March 1860, No. 2507, Sect. 3, to M.I., Modena; the latter,
Modena, 7 March 1860, to the former (minute).
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management of legacies and foundations eager to lose their power and privileges 52.
All this, plus the lack of regulations clearly defining the duties and powers of the
congregations, as well as the administrative procedures they must follow, caused
doubts and confusion often resulting in the resignations of the members of the
congregations. This was a phenomenon widespread both in the Marches and the
Romagna. Complete data are available only for the provinces of Macerata and Pesaro-
Urbino; but the following table shows how fragile the new congregations of charity
were 53.











Macerata 40 1 0 25 7 1 7.5 2 5 1 9 47.5
Pes.-Urb. 83 6 7.2 4 4.8 3 3.6 1 3 1 5.7
Totals 123 1 6 1 3 1 1 8.9 5 4.1 32 26
In the villages the charities were usually few and poor - consisting perhaps of a
Monte Frumentario, owned by a confraternity or the Commune, or a dowry
foundation, or a legacy, or occasionally a small hospital or poorhouse. Thus the
congregations were not, in general, overwhelmed with administrative work 54. But
in the big centres, where the charitable patrimonies were more TubxhxntTo-l , the
membership of the congregations was sometimes too small for the work involved, as
in Imola and Pesaro. This provoked criticism of the rules given in the decrees, which
linked the size of membership to the population, and not to the quantity and
52 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 2: the Munic. Comm., Budrio, 1st
Sept. 1859, to the Int., Bologna; the Int. of Ferrara, 30 Nov. 1859, No, 9257, Gen.
Seer., to Welf. Min., Bologna; f.8: the Int. of Ravenna, 8 Nov. 1859, to Welf. Min.,
Bologna; f. 10: idem to idem, 16 Oct. 1859; f. 10J-: the Munic. Comm., S. Giovanni in
Persiceto, 26 Aug. 1859, to the Int., Bologna. A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Marche, M.
3, f. 7: the Royal Comm., Camerino, 14 Nov. 1860, No. 951, to Remigio Benedetti,
administrator of the Opera Pia Ferretti; the R. Comm., Camerino, 16 Nov. 1860, No.
993 to the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona.
53 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 12 (Macerata) and 13 (Pesaro-Urbino).
Sparse evidence about the same problem in the Marches in the ff. 8 (Ancona); 9
(Ascoli); 10 (Camerino); 11 (Fermo). For Romagna: A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow.,
Romagne, M. 45, f. 10: the Int., Bologna, 2 Nov. 1859, to Welf. Min., Bologna; f. 1ol;
several letters by the Int. of Fori] and particularly, the Int., Forll 16 Oct. 1859 to Welf.
Min., Bologna; A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M.42, f.
8/12: the Int., Bologna 17 Febr. 1860, No. 1810, Sect.3; 4 March 1860, No. 2507,
Sect.3, to M.I., Modena; the Int., Forll, 16 Dec. 1859 and 26 Febr. 1860, to M.I.,
Modena.
54 Abundant evidence in all the quoted files and particularly: A.S.T., Sez.l, Gov. Prow.,
Marche, M. 3.
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importance of the charities. Other norms likewise provoked occasional criticism and
counterproposals. The congregation of Urbino remarked on the consequences of
article 4 of the decree of 24 October 1860: in the small centres the Mayor was
automatically appointed as a member of the congregation, while in the principal
provincial towns this place was taken by the Government representative. Thus the
communes had no say in the congregations in those very places where their
supervision was most necessary. The congregation of Pesaro pointed out the
incompatibility of the membri nati belonging to the judiciary. Even more radical
was the opinion of the Intendant of Ferrara, Zini. He reckoned that appointing the
Intendants as chairmen of the congregations in the administrative capitals of the
provinces had been a great mistake. In fact the Intendant, having both to administer
and supervise the charities, found himself in an ambiguous and contradictory
position. To care properly for the congregation, the Intendant should give up all his
other duties. Zini proposed either to allow the Intendants to appoint a deputy
President of the Congregation or to enforce the Piedmontese legislation, scrapping the
decree of 19 August, whose results he judged a disastrous mess. None of these
criticisms and proposals was accepted: as the Interior Ministry remarked to Zini, it
was not the time for introducing partial changes, since the administrative unification
would soon be accomplished 55. Yet this discontent among those entrusted with the
implementation of the decrees was a clear sign of their inadequacy as tools of a
reform that was largely unsuccessful, as the above evidence indicates.
So far we have mainly concentrated on the Marches and the Romagna, leaving aside
Umbria. The reason for this lies in the different circumstances in that region,
stemming from certain features of the Pepoli decree and the early enforcement of the
1859 act. Umbria presented a disastrous situation, compared to which that of the
Marches and the Romagna was almost a success. At the end of December 1860, when
the 1859 Act was enforced, the Prefects faced a dilemma: were the congregations
formed according to the Pepoli decree to be maintained, or were they to be replaced
by the newly conceived ones? The Interior Ministry answered that the 'old'
55 A.S.T., Sez.l, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div II, M. 42, f. 8/11: Magistratura
della Citta e Comune d'lmola, 17 Dec. 1859, No. 2156 to the Int. of Ravenna, by this
forwarded to M.I., Modena, on 19 Dec. 1859, No. 5078, Gen. Seer. A.S.T., Sez. I,
M.I., Div. VI, 1860, Carte deN'Emilia, Opere Pie: the Int. of Ferrara, 23 May 1860, No.
6311, to M.I., Turin; the latter, Turin 31 May 1860, No. 3203, Div. VI, to the former.
A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Marche, M. 3, f. 13: the Royal Comm. of Pesaro-Urbino,
Pesaro, 19 Nov. 1860, to the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona; the latter, Ancona, 20 Nov.
1860, No. 5837 (minute), to the former; the Municipal Commission, Urbino, 6 Dec.
1860, No. 2541, to the Royal Gen. Comm., Ancona; the latter, Ancona, 10 Dec. 1860,
No. 8128 (minute), to the former.
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congregations were to be considered null, and that new ones were to be formed,
according to articles 31 and 32 of the 1859 act 56. It soon became clear however,
that these newly formed congregations had very often nothing to manage, since in
most Communes the Municipal Commissions had failed to apply article 5 of the Pepoli
decree - the article that ordered the confiscation of all charities by the Communes on
behalf of the congregations. Pepoli had presumably given these large powers to the
Communes with the intention of preventing delays in the laicization of the charities
resulting from the slow process of appointing the congregations. Yet in practice the
stratagem had failed to work because many Communes had simply ignored the decree.
Opposing examples of the effect of the action or inaction of the Municipal
Commissions were presented by Foligno and Perugia. Perugia had twenty welfare
establishments with a total annual income of 356,500. 86 lire, but the congregation
of charity, formed during the Spring of 1861, had no patrimony to administer and
existed in name alone. Conversely the congregation of Foligno, whose Municipal
Commission had applied article 5 of the Pepoli decree, was endowed with six
charities with a total annual income of 28,302.88 lire. In September 1861 the
General Intendant Gualterio alerted the Interior Ministry to the dangers of a situation
where the clergy in practice still controlled most of the charities and were using
their revenues for other than the original purposes, notably '...to fight the present
political order in these regions...'. He then posed a crucial question: could the town
councils or the new congregations still apply article 5 of the Pepoli decree 57?
To understand fully the relevance of this question, it must be remembered that the
1859 act had been welcomed by the clerical managers of charities, because they saw
it as a legalized return to the statu quo antea. In order to invalidate such an
interpretation, the Council of State had handed down a ✓e.rdict' in March 1861
declaring the administrative changes created by the Pepoli decree irreversible 58.
Yet this was not enough. It was true that the legality of the changes occurring before
26 December 1860 could not be questioned after this verdict , but the managers of
the charities could still argue that the Pepoli decree was to be considered a dead
56 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: M.I., Div. Gen. d'Amm., Turin, 17 Nov. 1861,
Div.il, No. 86118/9840, to the Prefect, Perugia.
57 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: f. 26046/0-6°: the Gen. Int., Perugia, 3 Sept.
1861, to M.I., Turin.
58 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: the sentence of the Council of State (27 March
1861), notified to the Gen. Int. of Umbria on 25 April 1861, is mentioned both in
Gualterio's report to M.I. of 3 Sept. 1861, cit., and in his Circular No. 32, Div. V, Sec.
9, No. 18945, Perugia, 5 Oct. 1861, to the Mayors, Presidents of the Congregations of
Charity and Chairmen of the Charities, Object: Efficacia del Decreto Commissariale No.
81 del 29 Ottobre 1860.
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letter, since the 1859 act did not prescribe any concentration of charities under the
congregations, and that no more concentrations could therefore take place. This
argument was useful for the clergy, since little reform had resulted from the
implementation of the Pepoli decree; but it was also technically irrefutable, since it
stemmed from the actual contradiction between the two laws. The Interior Ministry's
reply to Gualterio simply ignored the contradiction and emphasised the illegality of
the old administrative boards. It insisted that the Pepoli decree was m }oi~o> and that
the congregations of charity were supposed to apply it immediately. Gualterio
reproduced long quotationsj^n)this ministerial statement in his circular of 5 October
1861 to the Mayors, the Presidents of the congregations of charity and the Chairmen
of the charities, to whom the conclusive part of the circular was addressed:
... the old Administrators will surely not find in these dispositions any
sign of hostitility or diffidence towards them. Such an hostility is not in the
Government's intentions and would be unjustified, given the gratitude of the
public and the Government for their zealous good work...5®.
Clearly Gualterio was well aware that a ministerial statement was a poor weapon to
fight interests and powers which were so deeply rooted in the administrative and
popular traditions of his home country. Yet, he had no other weapon, and was thus
eager not to enrage his enemies. Another circular provided further detailed
instructions for the transition from the old to the new administrations. The term for
the confiscation of the charities by the congregations of charity was fixed at the end of
October 1861 for those Communes where there was already a congregation, and at the
end of November for those which still had to form one. Interim cooperation between
the old managers and the congregation was allowed - probably as a means of
expediting the reform, as well as winning the sympathy of the clergy 60.
But, with the reordering of the charities, new problems arose. In Umbria there
were 470 charities with an annual income of more than a million lire, requiring
many more skilled employees than were available in the central and peripheral
offices of the Intendancy. To this must be added the hostility of the old managers,
whose opposition was 'not always purely passive'. Gualterio repeatedly asked for
reinforcements 61. It appears that Gualterio had been given only one employee. In
5® A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: Circ. No. 32..., cit. The M.I. reply, quoted in the
Circular, was of 13 Sept. 1861, No. 69776/8128.
60 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: Circ. No. 33, Perugia, 10 Oct. 1861, Div. V, Sect.
9, No. 18945, to the Presidents of the Congregations of Charity, Object: Istruzioni per
le Amministrazioni delle Opere Pie.
61 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: the Gen. Int., Perugia, 12 Oct. 1861, Div. V.,
Sect. 9, No. 18945, to M.I., Turin, Object: Impiegati per il servizio delle Opere Pie.
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1865 the new prefect Tanari tried to obtain more staff, and enclosed a circular of
his, where the wrongs which the charities constantly committed were analysed and
reprimanded. Tanari reminded the congregations that they must directly administer
the charities entrusted to them, without relying on external, unauthorized
administrators 62. He did not explain how this unlawful practice arose; but it
probably originated in the concession that Gualterio incautiously made in 1861 to
accelerate the reordering of the charities and to tame the clergy's hostility. The
concept of 'provisional cooperation' had been interpreted fairly liberally.
62 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345: f. 26046/0-9°: the Prefect, Perugia, 23 Nov.
1865, to M.I., Turin; Provincial Deputation of Umbria, Sect. 1, Circular No. 5188,
Perugia, 30 Oct. 1865, to the Sub-Prefects, Mayors, Presidents of the Congregations
of Charity and Special Administrative Boards of the Charities, Object: Opere Pie.
Norme per un piu regolare andamento nelle Amministrazioni ed assetto definitive delle
medesime, pp. 6-7.
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4.5. The failure of the decentralizing bills of Minahetti and the implementation of
the act of1859.
To all provisional Governors a proper management of the 'patrimony of the poor'
was synonymouswid,efficient poor relief. Hence they attached great importance to the
administrative reorganization of the charities, and paid little attention to the actual
relief of poverty. But within this framework their approaches differed greatly.
Ricasoli chose not to change the existing legislation, entrusting his Prefects with a
limited reordering. Farini immediately enforced the Piedmontese legislation in the
ex-Duchies. Some problems arosed, but the nature of the pre-existing legislation
secured a relatively ordered and peaceful transition. The approach of both Ricasoli
and Farini was consistent with their general administrative strategy in the newly
acquired regions. The situation in the ex-Papal States was more varied and
complicated, as the clergy's predominance in the welfare administration suggested
greater caution. Bologna took the lead, setting a model later followed by the Marches
and Umbria. The analysis of the decrees issued by Cipriani, Valerio and Pepoli, and
the evidence on their implementation indicated the basic contradictions which
prevented those decrees from becoming efficient tools of reform 63.
First, we have seen that Count Albicini drafted the decree of 19 August 1859 on the
basis of those issued in 1807 by EugeneBtswhwTiud. Thus bishops and parish priests
played an important role in the congregations of charity. This in itself clearly
indicates that little, if any, independent study had been devoted to the problem of the
membership of the congregations. Our evidence abundantly shows that bishops and
parish priests were opposed to the functions of the congregations. One of the most
effective weapons in the hands of the clergy was to refuse to take part in the
congregations or to withdraw, causing delays and serious trouble. So it would seem
that Albicini and Cipriani lacked the necessary imagination to devise an adequate
decree, notwithstanding their theoretical awareness that the essential precondition
for sanitizing the Papal states' charities was to eliminate the clergy from all
administrative boards. It was an open and major contradiction. Bishops and priests
were supposed to collaborate in the dispossession of their fellows and friends when
not of themselves, for often the bishop was the chairman of all the charities in the
principal cities. It is noteworthy that in the Valerio and Pepoli's decrees some
technicalities had been amended in order to avoid some of the problems posed in the
Romagna, whilst this principal and crippling contradiction had been maintained.
33 More evidence on the failure of the reforms promoted by the newly established
congregations of charity can be found in appendix 4, section 2.
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Significantly, none of the proposals for further reforms elaborated during the short
life of Bologna's Welfare Committee revised the membership of the congregations
tUisji '•
eliminating bishops and parish priests. Norwa,* vthe more organic of those projects
- that of Massei - put the parish at the very core of the system. The difficulty was
probably that no alternative seemed to be at hand, even after closer scrutiny. The
parish was the core of civil life and no substitute could easily be found. Hence
Albicini, Pepoli, Valerio, and Massei included the clergy among the members of the
congregations. They knew that their cooperation was essential, and just hoped that the
patriotic priests would outnumber the reactionary ones. Our evidence seems to
indicate that this was an illusion. The decrees and the projects of the Welfare
Commissioners presupposed an unrealistic level of civil committment among both the
laity and the clergy.
The second contradiction concerns the failure of the three provisional Governments
to produce adequate regulations for the congregations of charity. The Marches
presented a partial exception and, unsurprisingly, Valerio's decree was more
successfully implemented than the other two. Adequate regulations were repeatedly
requested by the Intendants, but never came for a variety of circumstances. Thus the
first intuition that something radical must be done with the charities was not
followed by an adequate legislation. The newly established congregations were left in
the dark about their duties and rights. This period of limbo was very short - three
months - in Umbria, longer in the Marches - about a year - still longer in the
Romagna - twenty six months. If it seems true that not enough time was allowed for
the congregations of charity to settle in Umbria, this does not apply to the Romagna.
This apparently illogical behaviour of the provisional Governors could be explained
by the third contradiction. The three decrees stemmed from the Napoleonic model
which contrasted with the basic tenets of the Piedmontese model. The concept that the
traditional administrative boards could be dismissed, and that all charities of a
centre could be managed by a unique board - although i-e,speetmj the
peculiarities of each foundation - entailed direct state interference. This was not
acceptable, since it was the first step towards legal charity. Albicini in his preface
to the decree of 19 August 1859 was adamant that the state had a duty and a right to
an active role in the welfare sphere. This notion was later developed by the Welfare
Commissioners, although their effort to adapt the Napoleonic model to the current
conditions was riddled with contradictions. All projects elaborated by the Welfare
Committee of Bologna were shelved when Farini arrived. He did not dare
implementing the Piedmontese legislation in the Romagna, but equally failed to issue
the necessary regulations for the congregations. One must conclude that in his view
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administrative disorder was preferable to an order conflicting with the one most
likely to become the general rule. The conflict which exploded in Bologna in 1862
between the congregation of charity appointed according to the Cipriani decree and the
Provincial Deputation is an example of what could have happened had that decree been
properly implemented in all provinces of the ex-Papal states.
We must now consider a further contradiction, open to the intelligence of both
politicians and Ministry bureaucrats. The early enforcement of the act of 20
November 1859 had disastrous consequences in Umbria. The clergy felt entitled to
claim the legality of their supremacy over the charities, and the Interior Ministry
was confronted with a problem that was difficult to overcome, even with the help of
the Council of State. Apparently all events occurring in Umbria, the Marches, and the
Romagna indicated that the 1859 act would only aggravate the situation. The reforms
based on the Napoleonic model were not acceptable to Turin in the long term, but the
failure to provide a temporary legislation for the ex-Papal states to secure lay
control of the charities - perhaps on different premises than those devised in the
three ill-fated decrees - seems to have been a major mistake. In the ex-Papal states
the 1859 act was no solution, rather a recipe for further disaster. The evidence was
available then, among the papers of the provisional Governments and the Interior
Ministry, as it is now. So why was that act enforced, on 9 October 1861? Why was
all experience and knowledge of local realities gathered by the Provisional
Governments lost ?
To understand the roots of this contradiction which stems from all the others
previously examined, we must step back a little, to the Spring of 1861. In that
period Minghetti presented his 'decentralizing' bills to Parliament. Their origins and
basic features are well known, and the debate about them is still alive, since they
were the only real alternative to the administrative centralization that followed their
defeat 64. One of these bills - hitherto little studied - concerned the charities. As
About the origins and failure of Minghetti's bills see C. Pavone, Amministrazione
centrale e amministrazione periferica. Da Rattazzi a Ricasoli (1859-1866) (Giuffre,
Milan, 1964), pp. 120-51; E. Ragionieri, 'Politica e amministrazione nello stato
unitario', in Id., Politica e amministrazione nella storia dell' Italia unita (Laterza, Bari,
1967), pp. 82-104, 71-129; A. Berselli, 'Marco Minghetti e le leggi.cit., Atti del
Congresso celebrativo..., cit., L'unificazione amministrativa..., cit., pp. 321-348 and
Roberto Ruffilli, 'Governo, Parlamento e correnti politiche nella genesi delta legge 20
Marzo 1865', ibidem, pp. 223-250. Among the abundant literature on the debate
centralization/decentralization see Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa' civile
(Einaudi,Turin, 1977, 3rd ed.), pp. 67-77; Carlo Ghisalberti, 'L'unificazione
amministrativa del Regno d'ltalia', in Contributi alia storia..., cit., pp. 219-237; Guido
Astuti, L'unificazione amministrativa del regno d'ltalia (Morano, Naples, 1966), pp. 7-
19; E. Ragionieri, 'Politica e amministrazione nello stato unitario', cit., pp. 71-129;
Alberto Aquarone, Alia ricerca dell'ltalia liberale (Guida, Naples, 1972), pp. 157-191,
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Minghetti explained in his preface to the bill, it was modelled on the Rattazzi act of
20 November 1859, but radical reforms were introduced, in the context of the
administrative re-organization based on the region 65. The first novelty concerned
the guardianship of the charities. In the act of 1859 this was the responsibility of
the Interior Ministry via the Provincial Deputations, whereas in Minghetti's bill it
was split on three levels and transferred to the local authorities. Whatever
concerned the current administration (budgets and accounts, rent contracts, etc.)
was controlled by the communes, if the charities' activity was limited to the
inhabitants of a single commune, and by the Provincial Deputation when several
communes or the entire province benefitted from the charities concerned. Whatever
concerned the conservation and modification of the charitable assets (purchase and
sale, donations, mortgages, etc.) was supervised by the prefect. The establishment,
statutes and regulations of new charities, were approved or rejected by the regional
governor. The Interior Ministry retained the general supervision of the charities,
inspecting them and amending their statutes and regulations, with prior consent of
the Council of State, but the power to dissolve irregular or defaulting administrative
boards belonged to the governors. These were also entrusted with the approval of the
administrative grouping of charities with similar purposes - without merging the
patrimonies, and the appointment of the vacant administrative boards 66. The second
novelty concerned the freedom of the communal councils to propose reform of the
purposes and administrative norms of the charities, when these no longer
corresponded to social needs. The final decision belonged to the Council of State 67.
The functions of the congregations of charity, whose chairman was the mayor, were
the same as in the act of 1859, plus the optional prerogative to promote the
collection and distribution of private donations 68.
As we saw above, Minghetti was convinced of the excellence of private charity.
Hence he did not remove either the principle of the administrative autonomy of the
charities, or the respect of their foundation deeds and ancient traditions, nor did he
establish the principle of direct state funding, or that of state interference with the
283-303. A useful synthesis of the debate in: Zanni Rosiello, 'Unificazione italiana: le
istituzioni', Storia d'ltalia, 3 (La Nuova Italia, Florence,1978), pp. 1333-1349.
65 A. P., Sessione 1861, Camera dei Deputati, Documenti, Vol.I, doc. No. 44: (No. 5)
Progetto di Legge presentato dal Ministro dell'lnterno (Minghetti) nella tornata del 27
Aprile 1861. Opere pie. See also M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie...', cit., pp. 1036-
1038.
66 Arts. 4, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 33.
67 Art. 26.
68 Arts. 27 to 31.
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prevision of welfare services. This bill contained no revolutionary features 69.
Wherever the clergy was still in charge, it would be maintained. But - at least in
principle - it would be closely monitored by a network of local controls that were
likely to be more efficient than those devised by the Rattazzi act. According to this,
the Provincial Deputation was entrusted with the guardianship of all the charities of
a province, whereas Minghetti proposed a wider network of controls. Abuses and
mismanagement would be immediately detected by the communal councils - providing
these had the political will to interfere - and dealt with by the prefects and
governors who had the power to take punitive and corrective measures without
having to wait for the consent of the Ministry. Hence the bureaucratic work-load of
the Ministry would be reduced, and its officials could devote more time and resources
to proper inspections of the charities that would secure a further form of control and
a guarantee against the risks of unlawful collusions at local level. The facility to
group charities with similar purposes and the opportunity for the communes to
promote reforms could be the first step towards a mild modernization of the system,
when applied. Minghetti's bill on charities was not a Jacobin one, yet it represented
an acceptable alternative, since it provided adequate crossed controls in the context of
a moderate decentralization. These are just speculations a posteriori, since the whole
legislative package proposed by Minghetti was withdrawn after rejection by the
Chamber committee.
Defeated and embittered Minghetti resigned, and the new Ricasoli Cabinet enforced
the Rattazzi act in Emilia and the Marches in October 1861. Ricasoli had maintained
the Tuscan administrative system and had himself drafted a decentralizing plan when
he was still governor of Tuscany, but abruptly changed his mind once he was at the
helm of the central government. Cavour was dead and the bulk of the moderates, faced
with turmoil in the South, feared that the limited local autonomy granted by the
Minghetti bills would degenerate. Ironically, the rejection of Minghetti's bill on
charities ensured that local enclaves of autonomous economic and political power
escaped all forms of control, let alone reforms - in the name of a strong central rule.
Arts. 4 and 5. For Minghetti'ideas on poor relief see above, 2.1.
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4.6.Provisional governments and problems of poverty in Emilia-Romaaria
and Tuscany
Despite their persuasion that a 'proper' management of the charities automatically
guaranteed an adequate level of assistance, the leaders of the Risorgimento could not
ignore the poor, when they threatened public order. The three following sections are
not an attempt to reconstruct at length the social problems of central Italy during the
unification process. Too many pieces of the mosaic are lost, probably for ever.
Moreover, any lengthy reconstruction would probably lead to the same conclusions
which can be reached through a selective approach. We will examine some samples
from different areas, and we will try to single out the general patterns with regard to
the nature of the situations, and the measures taken by the authorities.
In September 1859 the General Intendant of Ferrara visited his province, including
the most remote towns: Bagnacavallo, Fulignano, Cotignola, Argenta, S. Agata,
Conselice, and Massa Lombarda. His report was basically optimistic: public opinion
was favourable to the government, public order had improved, brigandage and crime
were decreasing. He did mention, incidentally, some economic difficulties which, he
felt, were caused by the obstacles still impeding free-trade, but did not attribute
much importance to them 70. This was a typical example of the kind of socio-political
approach that the state-officials displayed in their reports. Public order and
popularity of the Government were the main concern, yet their connection with the
material prosperity of the masses was often overlooked. This does not mean that the
prefects were blind or dumb. In reality they never failed to recognise that
connection, when the situation was worsening and public order was threatened by
excessive economic pressure on the populace. Only, they were often not prepared to
foresee the danger, and were thus unable to prevent the social situation from
deteriorating. Furthermore, sometimes they were aware of the socio-economic
problems of their province, but were often unsuccessful in taking prompt preventive
measures. The following cases show that the economic difficulties overlooked by the
prefect of Ferrara were quite serious and caused by a series of factors - bad
harvests, natural calamities, and economic effects of the intervening political
changes - which could not be easily solved by the magic formula of free-trade. The
popularity of the Government depended on its readiness to remove the causes of the
masses' material unhappiness, while the prefects, whether more or less able to
70 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., cit., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Gabinetto, M.12, f. 39/7: the
General Intendant of Ferrara, Lugo, 21 sept. 1859, to the Governor of the Romagna,
Bologna.
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foresee the danger of social unrest, were always constrained by the slowness of the
bureaucratic procedures, and the apparent insensitivity of their superiors.
Comacchio was one of the most destitute areas inherited by the new State. In
January 1860, when the river Reno broke the banks, the misery of the town reached
a peak. The Intendant openly admitted his impotence:
...I have visited those stinking hovels where the people are dying of hunger and
cold, where the revolting straw mattresses of those wretches float in water. I
could only offer them encouraging words and promises...''1.
The commune had no means to provide either for the most immediate needs, or for the
works necessary to prevent major damages. The Ministry of the Interior responded
relatively quickly, but inadequately. On 19 January 10,000 lire were appropriated
for the most urgent works, and a Committee was appointed to make a survey and
coordinate the help 72. But 10,000 lire were insufficient both to repair the huge
damages caused by the flood and to relieve minimally even the people's misery. The
Intendant spent most of the sum in benefits, food and clothes for the indigent. The
Ministry awarded another 10,000 lire on 19 February, but it was just a drop in the
ocean of Comacchio's problems. In March the Municipal Commission was still
pleading for help: the flood was not getting better, the town's bridges and streets were
in ruins, the poor needed assistance. The commune was asking for 50,000 lire, but
the Ministry decided that 12,000 would suffice. A neighbouring and similarly flooded
commune, Lagosanto, had to make do with 4,000 lire 73.
The Interior Ministry had answered relatively promptly to the emergency of
Comacchio, albeit inadequately. No prompt reply came when the requests for help
71 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., cit., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 43, f. 92: the
Intendant of Comacchio, 11 Jan. 1860, No. 90, to the Governor of the Provinces of
Emilia, Modena; see also: ibidem, the Municipal Committee of Comacchio, 10 Jan. 1860,
to the Governor: the Intendant of Comacchio, 14 Jan. 1860, No. 96, to the Gen.
Intendant of Ferrara; the Gen. Int. of Ferrara, 16 Jan. 1860, No. 565, to the Ministry
of Public Works, Modena; Dichiarazione di Possidenti e Medici Comacchiesi Relativa alia
Rotta del fiume Reno Avvenuto in Gennaro 1860 (Comacchio, 6 Febr. 1860) (printed
pamphlet).
72 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., cit., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 43, f. 92: Mayr
(Minister of the Interior), Modena, 19 Jan. 1860, to Farini; the Int. of Comacchio, 16
Febr. 1860, No. 391, to M.I., Modena.
73 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., cit., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 43, f. 92: Mayr,
Modena, 18 Febr.1860, to Farini; copy of Decree issued by Farini on 19 Febr. 1860;
M.I., Modena, 24 Febr. 1860, No. 4127 (minute) to the Int. of Comacchio; the latter,
Comacchio, 28 Febr. 1860, No. 490, to the former; the Municipal Committee of
Comacchio, 1st March 1860, No. 617, to M.I., Modena; Mayr, Modena, 3 March 1860,
No. 4545 (minute) to the Int. of Comacchio; The Munic.Comm. of Comacchio, 17 March
1860, to M.I., Modena; the Gen. Int. of Ferrara, 22 and 23 March 1860, to M.I.,
Modena; minute of Decree, M.I., Modena, 26 March 1860.
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were not justified by disastrous accidents, but were intended to prevent the
worsening of social malaises which could evolve in political disaster. In January
1860 the Intendant of Piacenza proposed to the Interior Ministry to refurbish the
area surrounding the church of St. Alexander. He only marginally mentioned the need
of creating jobs for the largely unemployed working class, stressing instead the
logistic advantages to the city. Perhaps he had chosen the wrong arguments. The
Ministry replied that it was not the moment to waste money in embellishing towns.
Only after this reply did the Intendant disclose the gravity of the situation. During
the preceding winter the Austrians had paid high wages to the numerous labourers
employed in fortification, to keep the loyalty of the masses. Now these workers were
unemployed and could see no advantage in their acquired independence from the
Austrians. Hostility towards the government was starting to spread, and it was
necessary to take urgent and appropriate measures 74. The preserved records do not
tell us the outcome of this story, but offer more complete evidence about Reggio
Emilia. Here the mayor had been negotiating since October 1859 to obtain a
government grant for public works. His objective was to provide jobs for the
unemployed, while improving the streets of Reggio Emilia. The cereal harvest had
been scarce and the vintage ruined by the phylloxera. The incumbent winter was to
be hard for the poor. The Intendant confirmed both the precariousness of public
order and the advantages that the suggested works would bring to the commercial
activities of Reggio. The Minister of Public Works was also favourable to the project,
but things were moving slowly. The final plans were sent for approval only at the
beginning of February, and in March the works had not yet begun 75. The unemployed
of Reggio had spent all winter with no job opportunities, apart from the very limited
ones provided by some minor works financed by the Commune. Tension was rising.
While the mayor pleaded with the Minister of the Interior for an advance of 20,000
lire 76, the paupers of Reggio made themselves heard.
74 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deil'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17: the Gen. Int. of
Piacenza, 10 and 30 Jan. 1860, to M.I., Modena; the latter, Div. II, No. 885, Modena,
20 Jan. 1860, to the former.
7 5 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deil'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17: the Mayor of
Reggio, 19 Oct. 1859, No. 4300, to the Gen. Int., Reggio; report of the Commune's
Technical Department, Reggio, 21 Oct. 1859, to the Gen. Int.; the latter, Reggio, 25
Oct.1859, No. 1272, to M.I., Modena; M.I., Modena, 30 Oct. 1859, to M. Public Works,
Modena (minute); the Gen. Int. of Reggio, 4 Febr. 1860, to M.I.; the latter to the
former, Modena, 3 March 1860.
76 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. deil'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17; the Mayor of
Reggio, 6 March 1860, No. 1273, to M.I., Modena.
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...Today a poor man, called Fornacciari, came to the town hall, taking one child by
the hand and two other in a basket. He was asking for bread. This aroused a popular
commotion and caused a concourse of people. We had to use the National Militia and
the P.S. Guards to disperse them. Nothing serious happened. Fornacciari was
arrested and almost immediately released. But - concluded the Intendant - since it
is impossible to calculate the measure of the popular feelings when it is a matter of
hunger, I must repeat the recommendations I made in my previous report of 27
February about the urgency to provide jobs for the proletarians, in order to avoid
disorders whose possibility is only too evident 77.
Nothing dramatic followed, since the unemployed of Reggio contented themselves with
a petition to the Minister of the Interior who then urged his colleague of Public
Works to move. Yet, as late as 24 March 1860 the approval of the project was still
pending and entreaties were to be made to Turin where the final decision was to be
taken 78. Other evidence confirms that in Emilia-Romagna the transition period to
unification was a difficult one regarding the social situation. Requests to start public
works to relieve poverty came in November and December 1859 from Massa
Carrara. Unsuccessful requests for funds to spend on benefits for the indigent were
made by the mayor of Pontremoli. In March 1860 the Intendant of Fori] sent a
worried report to his superiors in Modena: the price of cereals was rising, and the
populace was asking for measures against free-trade. The Intendant reckoned that
great caution was necessary in applying such measures, but thought that a balance
between public interest and public order must be found. Meanwhile, he had taken
precautions to prevent disorders. The files of the provisional governments contain -
besides this direct evidence - huge quantities of petitions for jobs, pensions,
benefits, places in orphanages, etc. 79. These massive records testify to the popular
habit of appealing to the personal mercy of the prince, but also indicate a widespread
need for relief measures. We can conclude that the Provisional Government of the
77 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17: the Gen. Int.,
Div. of P.S., Reggio, 13 March 1860, No. 279, to M.I., Modena.
78 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17: M.I., Modena,
15 March 1860, No. 5728 and 24 March 1860, No.5414, to M.Public Works, Modena.
A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. I, M. 32, Filza 9, f. 587, prot.
2005: the Gen. Int. of Reggio, 16 March 1860, No. 1406, to M.I., Modena.
79 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div.ll, M. 46, f. 17: M.I., Modena,
18 Nov. 1859, to M. Publ.Works; the Int. of Massa Carrara, 14 Dec. 1859, to M.I.,
Modena (minutes). A.S.T., ibidem, M.43, f. 9/2: the Mayor of Pontremoli, 8 March
1860, to M.I., Modena; the latter to the former, Modena, 14 March 1860; ibidem, M.I.,
Div. I, M. 32, filza 9, f. 602, prot. 2023: the Intend, of Forll, 22 March 1860, No.
2006, to M.I., Modena. For petitions: ibidem, M. 32, cit., Filza 9, ff. 620, 621, 622,
623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628; M.I., Div. II, M. 43, f. 9/2; M. 44, f. 16; M. 45;
M.I., Gabinetto, M. 14; A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Governi Prow., Romagne, M. 45, ff. 3, 4,
9. About the so called impiegomania see I. Zanni Rosiello , L'unificazione politica e
amministrativa..., cit., pp. 166-172.
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Provinces of Emilia was confronted with serious unemployment and poverty, and that
it failed both to approach them in a minimally systematic way, and provide an
adequate and timely response.
Unemployment and poverty caused concern also in Tuscany, where the approach of
Bettino Ricasoli seems to have been more systematic, if not very successful. From
various circulars to the prefects it is possible to infer that Ricasoli - who was
mainly preoccupied to maintain public order and to protect private property - was
equally prepared to prevent and repress social disorders. In August and September
1859 he instructed the prefects to urge the mayors to allocate some money for useful
public works in the communal budgets for 1860. Increases of food-prices, likely to
affect farm-labourers, were easily forese'able, for the harvest of cereals, silkworms
and grapes had been scarce. Social unrest had to be avoided at all costs, including
increases in local taxes. Ricasoli stressed that these were extraordinary measures,
not to be interpreted in any other sense but that of preventing disorder in especially
delicate circumstances. At the same time he recommended tougher police measures to
combat vagrancy, beggary, and rural thefts. Roads had to be patrolled, illegal begging
punished, and vagabonds returned to their villages. What to do with them was not
stipulated 80.
About a year later Ricasoli appointed a committee to study a report by Giovanni
Felice Berti on the charities of Northern Italy. The committee suggested the
establishment of more poor and workhouses as a means of fighting beggary, following
the example of Piedmont and Lombardy 81. Whether these new hospices were created
is unclear, but later evidence suggests that the existing poorhouses were unable to
cope, as they were in critical financial conditions. In 1862 and 1863 the Pia Casa di
Beneficenza of Lucca, the poorhouse of Arezzo and the Pia Casa di Lavoro of Florence
complained that they were close to bankruptcy. The situation was particularly
worrying in Florence. The city council refused to pay the debts of the workhouse on
the grounds that it was not liable for police expenses. The only alternative was to free
a quantity of dangerous vagabonds, with the result of crowding the prisons and
paralysing the police 82. During the Parliamentary debate on charities, in June
80 Mario Nobili and Sergio Camerani (eds.), Carteggi di Bettino Ricasoli (Istituto Storico
Italiano per I'eta moderna e contemporanea, Rome, 1957), vol. 9, pp. 136 (Circular 25
Aug. 1859), 238 (Circ. 11 Sept. 1859), 266 (Circ. 15 Sept.1859).
8^ Ottavio Andreucci, 'Delia Mendicita in relazione ai provvedimenti dell'associazione
fiorentina per I'estirpazione dell'accattonaggio', R. B. P., No. 9, 1875, p. 734.
82 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 178: the Prefects of Florence, 16 July 1862; of
Arezzo, 13 Oct. 1862; of Lucca, 22 Jan. 1863, to M.I., Turin. See also Giovanni
Gozzini, 'L'archivio della Pia Casa di Lavoro a Firenze', in Passato e Presente, No. 17
(May-August 1988), pp. 169-84, passim and particularly 169-72, 178-84.
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1862, those of Tuscany had been praised as models of sound administration and
efficiency 83. Perhaps that was relatively true, in comparison with the disastrous
situation in the ex-Papal states and the South, but this evidence seems to indicate
that Tuscany's welfare structure was inadequate to meet the growing needs of its
poor.
4.7. Bologna. The poorhouse and the houses for the poor.
Bologna was not better off than her sisters. The city had two establishments for
beggars: the Opera Pia Mendicanti, founded in 1560 by Pius IV, and the Spedale
Abbandonati for the incurable, founded in 1592. The two had been merged in 1821.
In 1859 these old structures were insufficient. The police reckoned that radical
repressive measures were necessary to bring the situation under control. How these
measures worked is not recorded, but it is clear that neither the local nor
government authorities took any preventive action. The initiative was taken by a
group of wealthy citizens who formed a 'committee for the suppression of begging' to
raise funds for a new poorhouse and workshop. The sum collected amounted to
42,238.24 lire. Farini approved the committee's plan, declaring the urgent need of a
poorhouse on 4 February 1860. On 10 March two other decrees followed, one
approving the poorhouse's regulations, the other authorizing the opening of the
workshop 84. Farini decided to accomodate both poorhouse and workshop in the
convent of St.Bernardino. But this decision was ignored by the War Ministry which
transformed the convent into barracks. Urged by the General Intendant of Bologna,
the Interior Ministry made several attempts - from the end of February 1861 - to
persuade the Ministry of the War to move the troops elsewhere, since they were
usurping a building previously destined for civil use. The result of these negotiations
83 M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere Pie...', cit., p. 1035, fn. 166.
84 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 32, f. 36: Report from Sezione di
Sicurezza Pubblica, Bologna, 5 Aug. 1859, to the Director of P.S., Bologna.A.S.T., Sez.
I, Gov. Prow., Prov. dell'Emilia, M.I., Div. II, M. 42, f. 8/12: Copy of Decree 4 Febr.
1860, signed by Farini and Mayr. A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-5°:
M.I., Div. V, No. 71716-8315, Turin, 21 Sept. 1861, Report to the Council of State,
Object: Cessione di un locale ad uso del nuovo ricovero di mendicita di Bologna. See
also: 'II Regio Istituto Vittorio Emanuele o Ricovero di Mendicita in Bologna', R.B.P., No.
8, 1875, pp. 671-672, 679-680. For the origins of the Opera Mendicanti and
subsequent developments of welfare policy in Bologna see Fabio Giusberti, 'Poveri
bolognesi, poveri forestieri e poveri inventati: un progetto di "rinchiudimento" nel XVIII
secolo', in E. Sori, Citta e controllo sociale in Italia tra XVIII e XIX secolo (Angeli,
Milan, 1982), pp. 341-64.
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was foreseeable. The War Ministry had spent a notable sum (130,000 lire) to
furnish the convent with a bakery and a supplies' store; none of the other convents of
Bologna were suitable for the troops, and there was no question of building new
barracks. At the end of March the 'committee for the suppression of begging' was told
to wait and find some other building 85. Meanwhile beggary had worsened and the
opening of the poorhouse was more a matter of public order than of public assistance,
according to both the local authorities and the Interior Ministry 86.
The lack of coordination between the civil and military authorities of Bologna
clearly indicates a general administrative disorder, but it forced the committee and
the local authorities to find a solution that was both logical and consistent with the
objectives set by the Falicon and Cipriani decrees of 1859. No one had infact
considered the possibility of using the old Casa di Ricovero e Spedale Abbandonati as a
basis for the new poorhouse. Their patrimony was provisionally administered since
March 1860 by the Central Administrative Board of the United Hospitals. In August
1861 this board agreed to hand over both the building and the patrimony of the old
Casa di Ricovero e Spedale Abbandonati to the new poorhouse. The United Hospitals did
not need the building (S. Gregorio). Moreover, the patrimony of the old institution
would be fully restored to its original purpose. The Council of State agreed. Thus the
poorhouse ' Vittorio Emanuele II' was opened at the end of October 1861 87. The
number of inmates were 489 by December 1861 and rose to an average of 800 in the
early 1870s. By then the crowding of the establishment and its financial difficulties
clearly indicated the need for urgent administrative reforms. This confirms that in
1861 only the merger with the old Casa di Ricovero/Spedale Abbandonati - devised as
a last-minute measure - had effectively saved the new poorhouse from immediate
bankruptcy. In 1873 the net patrimony of the Istituto Vittorio Emanuele, amounting
to 1,353,727.95 lire was so composed: net patrimony of the Spedale Abbandonati,
1,139,035.18; net patrimony of the old poorhouse, 125,748.93; net patrimony of
85 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-5°: M.I., Turin, 28 Febr. 1861, to
M.War, Turin; the Military Intendence, 4th Dept., Bologna, 8 March 1861, to M.War,
Turin; M.War, Turin, 15 March 1861, to M.I., Turin; M.I., Turin, March 1861, to the
General Intendant, Bologna.
86 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-5°: M.I., Div. V, No. 71716-8315...,
cit., and correspondence between the M.I., the General Intendant of Bologna and the
General Prisons' Board, January - February 1861.
87 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-5°: M.I., Div. V, No. 71716-8315...,
cit.; extract from the minutes of the meeting 27 Sept. 1861 of the Council of State,
Section of the Interior and Finance; the General Intendant of Bologna, Div. Ill, No.
15219, 18 Oct. 1861 to M.I., Turin. See also 'II Regio Istituto Vittorio Emanuele...',
cit., p. 672.
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the new poorhouse, 88,943.84 88. Undoubtedly the charitable impulses of Bologna's
affluent citizens - either concerned for the degradation caused to the city centre by
the beggars, or moved by humanitarism - were inadequate to endow sufficiently the
poorhouse. Yet, the basic features of this episode are the predominance of private
initiative and the passivity of the provisional government. Other evidence confirms
this pattern.
Among the novelties brought to Bologna by the Risorgimento was the demolition of
old buildings to renovate the city centre. No provision was made to re-house the
inhabitants of the demolished buildings - generally poor people - and this probably
contributed to the increase of mendicancy. In May 1860 a group of homeless
addressed a petition to the General Intendant, pleading for accomodation in what they
claimed to be the many empty convents and noble palaces 89. Unprepared, the
Intendant asked the police to enquire. According to the police, the only civil building
not inhabited by its owners was the Palazzo Aldrovandi, occupied by the Army. Of the
six convents of monks and three of nuns, five were already reserved for the Army,
and three were for educational use. The remaining one, S. Cristina, was too small to
be of any utility. However, even in the event that these buildings were available, it
was considered that to convert them into flats would be too expensive. The General
Intendant so concluded his report to the Interior Minister:
...Thus excluded, at least for the moment, the possibility of consenting to the
petitioners' request, worthy on the other hand of all consideration, I am however
comforted by the thought that perhaps the day when these righteous desires will be
fulfilled is not far...90.
The Intendant probably had in mind a project of the shareholders of Bologna's Saving
Bank according to which the slum clearance would be followed by the construction of
better homes for the poor and the working class 91.
Bologna was in a relatively privileged if delicate position compared with the
province, since its bourgeosie was willing to contribute to the solution of the city's
social problems. In February 1860, a few days after the decree about Bologna's
poorhouse, the Ministry of the Interior ordered the establishment of a poor-
workhouse in Vergato, to serve several communes. The funds were to be supplied by
88 See 'II Regio Istituto Vittorio Emanuele...', cit., pp. 671-671, 674.
89 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.65, f. 26011/0-7°: anonimous petition to the General
Intendant, Bologna, 24 May 1860.
90 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.65, f. 26011/0-7°: the General Intendant of Bologna,
24 July 1860, to M.I.
9^ A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.65, f. 26011/0-7°: communicate of the Bologna's
Saving Bank shareholders, 17 July 1860. About the Saving Bank, founded in Bologna in
1837 see L. Dal Pane, Economia e societa a Bologna..., cit., p. 321.
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the communes and the local rich. The District Intendant did his best to stimulate the
mayors, but the communes were soo poor that there was no hope of finding the
necessary funds, while the local rich were few and not in a 'liberal' mood. Thus the
Intendant suggested that the building be paid for by the government and the funds
necessary to keep the inmates be taken from the ecclesiastical patrimony, but the
Ministry prefered to shelve the project until
...the occasion will arise for a general initiative by all the Districts of Emilia 9^.
On the basis of this evidence it seems that in matter of welfare, both the local and
central authorities depended largely on private initiative. As in the Parliamentary
debates on charities of 1862, that dependence was not an accident, the mere result of
a general unpreparedness of the ruling classes, but the outcome of a deliberate policy
of non-interference in matters of social welfare. The lack of government action in the
provinces of Piacenza and Reggio, the administrative mess surrounding the
establisment of the poorhouse of Bologna, the inability to provide for the homeless,
and the lack of interest for the poorhouse of Vergato can be understood in this sense.
On other occasions and situations - notably in Umbria - the provisional governors
coped better with their poor and unemployed, but the general ideological pattern was
the same.
4.8.Umbria. Public works, benefits to the indigent, poorhouses. and kindergartens.
Poverty and economic underdevelopment were endemic in Umbria, where the
bourgeoisie welcomed the unification as the beginning of a new era of modernisation
and prosperity 93. Unemployment was widespread among the working class which
suffered from the combined effects of a poor harvest and the introduction of free
trade that had doubled the market price of food. The farm-labourers of Alta Sabina, in
the District of Rieti, were particularly affected. The economy of this area was based
on trade with Rome, hence the closure of the frontiers had deprived the peasants of
the only ready market for their products 94. Another area of great poverty was that
9^ A.S.T., Sez. I, M.I., Div. VI, 1860, Carte dell'Emilia, Opere Pie, file "Bologna": the
District Intendant of Vergato, 29 March 1860, to M.I., Modena (the quotation in the text
is from a note on this document).
93 See for example a printed manifesto addressed/4 Sua Eccellenza il Signor Marchese
Gioacchino Napoteone Pepoli Commissario Generate dell'Umbria, I Ternani, Terni, 30
Oct. 1860, in A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., 1859-61, Umbria, M. 5.
94 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-3°: the General Intendant of Perugia,
6 April, 17 Sept., 23 Oct. and 4 Dec. 1861, To M.I., Turin.
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of Assisi. According to the local authorities and the police, the majority of the
inhabitants of Assisi were beggars and poor of all ages. They depended on the generous
daily alms provided by the many monasteries, thus the Municipal Commission did not
dare to enforce the decree suppressing the religious orders and corporations. These
were unlikely to continue the distribution of alms, once they were aware of their
destiny; and they would certainly have reacted by inciting the poor against the new
government. The wealthy of Assisi were thus at great risk, since the commune had no
means of taking over the charitable activity of the monasteries. The request for help
made by the commune of Assisi remained unsuccessful 95, but the Royal
Commissioner for Umbria, Marquis Gioacchino Napoleone Pepoli, took a series of
limited and only partly successful measures to relieve the most urgent needs of the
indigent, and favour the economic development of the region. To this end he asked the
Council of Government to study how the financial difficulties of the communes could
be eased in order to provide them with means for public works, either required by
genuine need or
...suggested by a wise and humane policy, in order to enable the poor to earn a safe
and honest living during the coming winter...9®.
The councillors considered two possibilities: increasing taxes, or open special
credits for the communes. The first solution was unanimously dismissed as
politically unadvisable. The second posed several problems. Umbria's tiny financial
trade had always depended on the Banca Romana, so there were no local banks
available to help. In addition, the finances of the state were exhausted. After a long
discussion the council agreed on the solution proposed by Count Zeffirino Faina
Baldini, councillor for Perugia. The financial base for the loan was to be secured by
the input of the land-tax for the period March-June 1861, which was reckoned to be
about one million lire. The loan would be guaranteed by the Piedmontese government.
Probably Turin did not approve of this solution that could create a dangerous
precedent for local autonomy, for Pepoli chose a more modest solution. With a decree
95 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M.5, f. 22: the Municipal Commission, Assisi, 14
Dec.1860, No. 537, to the Royal Commissioner, Perugia (confirmed and countersigned
by the local Magistrate and the P.S. officier); for the Decree 11 Dec. 1860, No. 168,
suppressing the religious corporations, chapters, collegiate churches and chaplaincies,
cf., Ibidem, M. 5: Inventario delle leggi e dei decreti del Regio Commissario dell'Umbria
Marchese Gioacchino Napoleone Pepoli (Manuscript, 3 Dec. 1891).
96 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M.5, f. 17: proposals by the council of
government, Perugia, 2 Oct. 1860, on that date forwarded by Pepoli to M.I., Turin. The
members of the council were: Count Zeffirino Faina Baldini and the mayor Nicola
Danzetta for Perugia, Dr. Giuseppe Bonanni for Spoleto, and Carlo Viti for Orvieto.
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issued on 5 November 1860 (No. 98) he opened a credit of 200,000 lire for those
communes willing to start road works in 1861 97. The loan amounted to only a fifth
of the sum suggested by the council of government and was financed by the state as
extraordinary expenditure in the Public Works' budget of Umbria 98, rather than
being drawn from the land-tax revenue, belonging to the communal income. Yet,
Pepoli had shown his concern. In a circular to the Royal and Vice-Commissioners he
emphasized the need to provide Umbria with roads and railways in order to develop
its economy. The Commissioners were urged to define the needs and priorities of each
district and to investigate the proposals previously made by the Provincial Councils,
Communes and private citizens and rejected by the Papal Administration ". The
eighteen loans, varying from 1,000 to 35,000 Lire, were awarded between 12
November and 26 December 1860. They represented 1.96% of the total expenditure
for Public Works in Umbria in 1861, which amounted to 1,019,187.72 lire and
was equal to 19% of the total budget. If we consider that Public Instruction and
Agriculture, Industry and Trade, the two other headings of expenditure vital for the
economic development, represented respectively only 4 and 0.9% in the 1861
budget of Umbria 10°, we cannot conclude that Pepoli's short rule brought about any
dramatic change in the economic life of the region. But it must be ackwnoledged that -
within these limits and the expectations of his superiors in Turin - Pepoli did try to
plan some intervention, and diplayed a concern for the material welfare of his
subjects that was not shared by Farini in Emilia-Romagna, according to our evidence.
The Royal Commissioner also took some other measures intended to sponsor new
welfare establishments. Thirty thousand lire were appropriated to found two
poorhouses for men in Foligno and Rieti and one for women in Spoleto, which took a
97 Inventario delle leggi e dei decreti del Regio Commissario dell'Umbria Marchese
Gioacchino Napoleone Pepoli, cit.
98 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-3°: the General Intendant of Perugia,
6 April, 17 Sept., 23 Oct. and 4 Dec. 1861, to M.I., Turin; Regia Provincia dell'Umbria,
Bilanci Attivo e Passivo per I'esercizio 1861, Ristretto per Categorie (Stamperia
Reale, Florence,1861), pp. 19-20.
99 A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5: Royal Commissariat for the Provinces of
Umbria, Dept. of the Interior, No. 480, Circ. 12 Nov.1860, Ai Signori Commissari Regi
e Vice-Commissari dell'Umbria, Oggetto: Lavori Pubblici.
100A.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5: Inventario delle leggi e dei decreti..., cit.;
Regia Provincia dell'Umbria, Bilanci Attivo e Passivo..., cit., pp. 19-21, 23.
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long time to materialize 101. In the budget of Umbria for 1861 Pepoli also
appropriated for welfare one fifth of the 500,000 lire deriving from the 2% tax
imposed on the ecclesiastical properties. The sum was so divided: 50.000 lire for
kindergartens - an unknown commodity in the 176 communes of Umbria - to those
communes that would prove eager to found them; 25,000 to encourage the creation
of jobs and 25,000 in benefits for needy working-class families. These allocations
were classified as extraordinary expenditure. A subsidy of 10,000 lire to charities
was included among the ordinary expenses of the Interior 102. Pepoli had shown
concern for the institution of kindergartens since October 1860, when he devoted a
circular to the subject. The Papal government had always obstructed their
establishment, thus they were particularly necessary in Umbria
...where countless children wander and beg in the streets losing, since their
childhood, the sense of dignity, and becoming easy prey of idleness and vice....
Pepoli stressed that it was not the task of the government to open kindergartens, but
advised the local Commissioners to urge wealthy citizens and charitable ladies to
form committees and raise money to that end. He attached great political relevance to
such philanthropic initiatives, for they would demonstrate to the poor how much the
rich cared for them 103. Perhaps the committment of the affluent patriots of Umbria
was not so great, and Pepoli decided to give them an example with the subsidy of
50.000 lire. The sum was distributed to sixteen communes, but when this source
was exhausted no more kindergartens were founded in Umbria. As late as 1866 there
were 160 communes without them 104. The 25,000 lire appropriated for benefits to
the poor were spent in three instalments, in April, July and December 1861. The
General and District's Intendances were flooded with petitions for help by destitute
families. Filippo Gualterio, the prefect who replaced Pepoli in Perugia on the demise
101 An appropriation of 50,000 lire 'per gli urgenti ricoveri di mendicita neN'Umbria' was
proposed but not approved in the budget of the Interior for 1863, and the project for
their institution was fully approved by the Provincial Council only in September 1864.
The statutes were approved, by the same council, in September 1872. See A.C.S., M.I.,
O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-110; Bilancio Passivo del Ministero dell'lnterno
per I'esercizio 1863..., cit., pp. 72-73.
1 Q^Regia Provincia dell'Umbria, Bilanci Attivo e Passivo..., cit., pp. 7 and 18; Inventario
delle leggi e dei decreti..., cit. (Decrees 9 Nov. 1860, No. 117; 27 Nov. 1860, No. 145;
13 Dec. 1860, No. 186). See also A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-7°.
103a.S.T., Sez. I, Gov. Prow., Umbria, M. 5, f. 35: Circular No. 156, 3rd Dept., to the
Royal Commissioners for the Provinces of Rieti, Perugia-Orvieto and Spoleto, Perugia,
17 Oct. 1860, Object: Asili infantili.
104A.c.S„ M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-2°: sentence of the Council of State,
Section of the Interior, No. 3186/1165, 7 July 1866; Report to the Minister, M.I.,
Div.6, Sect.2, No. 54459/4345, Florence, 19 Aug. 1866.
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of the provisional government, used the last instalment of 11,000 lire to finance
public works in the district of Rieti 105.
The relative generosity towards the poor of Umbria was not going to last. In 1862
only 5,000 lire were granted for benefits to the poor and nothing in 1863, when the
new prefect of Perugia - Tanari - had a serious clash with the ministry on the
subject. The provisional budget of Umbria for 1863 included - like the final one for
1862 - an allocation of 5,000 lire for special benefits (Title 1, Chapter 34, Article
15). Tanari assumed that nothing was to change, and hence at the end of February he
asked the ministry for permission to spend the sum. He got a harsh reply from Turin.
The budget was to be discussed shortly, and Parliament was unlikely to approve an
appropriation based merely on a request from a prefect. The ministry could allow
only extremely urgent expenditure 106. But Tanari was under pressure so,
notwithstanding this warning, he went ahead. He anticipated funds for benefits and
authorized the sub-prefects to do the same, up to a total of 2,500 lire. This provoked
a severe rebuke from the ministry, which had backed the cancellation of the fund for
the poor from Umbria's budget. The prefect replied energetically. He asked for a
refund of the sum already spent, and emphasized the critical economic situation of the
area, reminding the minister that the distribution of alms was a custom under the
past government. The populace was so used to it that it was politically inadvisable to
break with the tradition. Moreover, the disproportion between the treatment of
Umbria in 1861 and 1863 was difficult to justify 107. But the Minister did not
change his mind, refusing even permission for 300 lire to be distributed around
105A.C.S„ M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-3°: the General Intendant, Perugia, 6
April, 6 July and 4 Dec. 1861, to M.I., Turin; M.I., Turin, 18 April, 17 July and 15
Dec. 1861 to the General Intendant, Perugia. About Filippo Antonio Gualterio, his
fundamental role in the upraising of Umbria, his career as 'political' prefect in Perugia,
Genoa, Palermo and Naples and as Minister of the Interior and than of the Royal House
see G. Degli Azzi, 'Gualterio Filippo Antonio', in Michele Rosi (ed.), Dizionario del
Risorgimento Nazionale (Vallardi, Milan, 1933), Vol. 3, pp. 268-270; Narciso Nada,
'Nel centenario della morte di Filippo Antonio Gualterio (1819-1874)', in Rassegna
Storica Toscana , XXI, No. 1, Jan.-June 1975, pp. 113-130; also, for specific
references to the relationship Gualterio- M.I. Peruzzi in 1862-63: Ernesto Ragionieri,
'Politica e amministrazione nell'ltalia unita', Politica e amministrazione nella storia
dell'ltalia unita , cit., pp. 111-114. The friendship Gualterio - Ricasoli is largely
witnessed in Carteggi di Bettino Ricasoli, cit., for ex.: Vol. IV (1947), p. 187, Vol. XI
(1960), pp. 80-81, 97, 299-300, Vol. XII (1960), pp. 117, 141, 218-219, 241-242,
259-260, 271, 309, 394.
106A.C.S, M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.345, f. 26046/0-4°: the Prefect, Perugia, 28 Febr.
1863, to M.I., Turin; the latter to the former, Turin, 14 March 1863.
107A.C.S, M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.345, f. 26046/0-4°: the Prefect, Perugia, 1st June and
20 July 1863, to M.I., Turin; the latter to the former, Turin, 9 June 1863. See also:
Bilancio Passivo del Ministero dell'lnterno per I'esercizio 1863..., cit., pp. 74-75.
130
Christmas. The refund of the 2,500 lire unlawfully spent by Tanari in 1863 was
only partially agreed by the Accounts' Court. Part of the benefits had been distributed
by the police, and those offices were unable to produce regular receipts: apparently
they had been lost in the post. As late as January 1864 the police and prefecture's
staff were still busily and unsuccessfully looking for them 108.
These events might suggest that in Umbria the presence of Gualterio, firstly as
prefect of Orvieto and later of Perugia, was a guarantee for the somehow special
treatment of Umbria's poor during the unification period. The central government
owed him a lot, and would not deny him a limited autonomy. His departure was
immediately followed by a harshening of the Interior Ministry's attitude. Tanari,
albeit brave, was unable to win the small but meaningful battle for minimal benefits
to the poor. On the other hand, the budget of the Ministry of the Interior for 1863
was full of such cuts. The provisional governments were reckoned to have been far
too expensive, and it was time to start saving, whatever effect the economies could
have on the popularity of the government among the masses 109.
4.9. Conclusions.
These cases offer limited but clear evidence of the level of unemployment and
poverty throughout central Italy during the period of political unification. They are
also informative of the unreadiness of the provisional rulers when faced with social
problems. In this sense the issue of poverty is complementary to that of charities'
policy. The new rulers were ideologically unequipped to tackle either properly. We
have analysed a variety of temporary and improvised solutions based on public works
and alms, which bore the same disorderly and casual features peculiar to the pre-
unification regimes' response to the problems of poverty. As for the approach to the
reordering of the charities, each provisional governor had his own view about the
relief of poverty. The case of Bologna demonstrates the propensity of Farini to rely
on private initiative; those of Tuscany and Umbria suggest that a relatively more
108A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-4°: telegrams from Perugia's Prefect
to M.I., 26 Dec. 1863; from M.I. to Perugia's Prefect, Turin, 26 and 28 Dec. 1863;
various letters of Autumn 1863- Jan. 1864.
1°9fi//anc/o Passivo del Ministero dell'lnterno per I'esercizio 1863..., cit., passim;
Riccardo Faucci, Finanza, amministrazione e pensiero economico. II caso della
contabilitd di Stato da Cavour at fascismo (Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin, 1975), pp.
12-13, 32-33, fn. 29; Antonio Pedone, 'Bilancio dello Stato', in Storia d'ltalia (La
Nuova Italia, Florence, 1978), Vol. 1, pp. 62-63.
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structured though temporary scheme of intervention was devised by Ricasoli and
Pepoli. In the context of these not irrelevant or casual differences we can however
note three common features. First, the general reluctance to concede public alms,
seen as a bad old custom to be allowed only exceptionally for reasons of public order.
Second, the importance of the social awareness of the prefects for the assessment of
the level of help needed, as well as that of their political ability in getting the
required financial allocations. Third, the strong determination of the central
Government to cut all such expenditure. In this respect the cases of Piacenza and
Reggio Emilia, and the clashes between the prefect of Umbria, Tanari, and his
superiors seem to us particularly interesting, since they witness to a basic
disagreement between the government and its representatives. The concern of Tanari
for the economic condition of his province and the precariousness of public order was
in sharp contrast with the rigid approach of the ministerial bureaucracy. Once again
it was the centre versus the periphery. We can recognise in this minor event all the
features and arguments involved in the debate on local autonomy. And it is worth
noting that there were times when the prefect, who represented the state, did not
agree with his minister. Whoever examines the administrative records, whether
they concern communal or provincial affairs or, as in this case, welfare, cannot fail
to recognise the flavour of the issue. Centralization meant not only bureaucratic
incompetence and delays, it basically meant that the people who knew local situations
and requirements had no power to take effective action. The prefect was supposed to
keep his province firmly under control, but his suggestions could not depart from the
central government's guidelines, even when a more flexible approach would be
beneficial to the general interest of the state.
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5. The southern welfare system and the provisional governments.
5.1. Legislation on charities in the Bourbon Kingdom.
The charities of central Italy had caused some headaches to those provisional
governors. The situation was even more entangled in the South, where any reordering
attempt was bound to sink into a mire of vested interests, local cliques, and ancient
traditions. In the Bourbon Kingdom a uniform charities' legislation had been
introduced only in 1741 with the Concordat between Charles of Bourbon and the Holy
See. From the Middle Ages until then the charities, joined to churches, chapels, and
convents, were dominated by the local clergy and were usually autonomous of the
bishops. Confraternities, pious bequests, and lay foundations proliferated in the
South during the seventeenth century. The Council of Trent advocated their control by
the bishops, but this and other aspects of the Catholic reform remained largely
unexecuted 1. According to the 1741 Concordat (head V, § 1 and 6) the pious
foundations with devotional aims remained under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, while a
Mixed Court was created to control those with charitable purposes, and the so called
mixed charities, concerned with both almsgiving and devotion: the ecclesiastical
control over these charities was limited to spiritual matters only. Charities of Royal
origins or patronage were directly run by the state and enjoyed less autonomy than
those put under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. There was widespread
plundering of assets and mismanagement, mainly by the clergy, as witnessed by
fourteen rescripts which attempted with little success to regulate the charities'
administration 2.
f Salvatore D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano (Passerano, Naples,1909),
vol.1, pp. 5-6; Mario Rosa, 'Geografia e storia religiosa per \'Atlante storico italiano ',
in Nuova rivista storica , vol. 1-2, 1969, pp. 10-15, 29-39; Id., 'La Chiesa meridionale
nell'eta della Controriforma', in Storia d'ltalia , Annali 9 (Einaudi, Turin, 1986), pp.
293-345; Silvana Musella, 'Dimensione sociale sociale e prassi associativa di una
confraternita napoletana nell'eta della controriforma', in G. Galasso, C. Russo, Per la
storia sociale e religiosa del mezzogiorno d'ltalia (Guida Naples, 1980), vol.1, pp. 351-
3; Antonio Cestaro, 'Strutture ecclesiastiche del Mezzogiorno nell'Eta moderna', in
Nicola Raponi (ed.), Dagli Stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione (II Mulino,
Bologna, 1981), pp. 354-361.
2 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano, vol.1.., cit. pp.7-9; Reale Commissione
d'lnchiesta per Napoli, Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli
(Bertero, Rome, 1903), vol. I, pp. 4-5. The Mixed Court was formed of three members
appointed by the King, one member appointed by the Pope, and a chairman appointed by
the King and the Pope.
1 33
Major changes occurred under the French who restructured and centralized the
system, putting it under state control. Hospitals, poorhouses and welfare
establishments were subordinated to the newly-instituted Interior Ministry which
was also entrusted with the general control of all other kinds of charities (decree of
13 September 1808). The Mixed Courts were abolished and general administrative
boards, called Councils of the Hospices, were created, firstly for Naples and later for
all the Provinces (decrees of 11 February and 16 October 1809). The Councils of
the Hospices were presided over by the provincial Intendant and formed by three
citizens plus the bishop: a structure similar to that of the congregations of charity
established by the French throughout Northern and Central Italy. The administrative
rules of the new system were fixed in 1812 with the Instructions issued by the
Interior Minister Zurlo. Special dispositions regulated the welfare institutions of
Naples: in 1809 they were merged under an administrative committee (commissione
amministrativa ) formed by three governors and put under the supervision of the
Council of the Hospices of Naples, which had fifteen members instead of the usual
three. The provincial Councils of the Hospices, and the administrative committee of
Naples' welfare establishments were bound to submit yearly budgets and detailed
reports on the internal situation of each institution to the Interior Ministry, and
could buy, sell, and accept legacies and donations only by royal consent. The major
problem faced by the French concerned the financial shortfalls of the charities. It is
commonly alleged that this was caused by the dismantling of the system of
arrendamenti. These were a kind of state bonds based on tax-revenue. The Bourbon
state used to sell its tax-revenue rights by portions. The bonds, known as partite
d'arrendamento, guaranteed their owners a secure income, hence they were a very
popular form of investment with the charities. A law of 2 July 1806 denied the
charities any right of refund, thus the dismantling of the system and the return of all
fiscal revenue to the state shattered the charities' finances. On the other hand, it
seems that the financial situation of charities was already weakened by
maladministratin, thereby the loss of revenue from the arrendamenti would be only
one factor contributing to their collapse. The French tried to help the charities
granting them state bonds, assets of suppressed monasteries, monthly subsidies, and
tax exemptions, nevertheless all major welfare establishments suffered severe
losses. In 1809 those of Naples were awarded a quota of the proceeds of the town's
excise duty (100,000 ducats), which was later maintained by the Bourbons. The
French also drastically reduced the privileges of the pious foundations. Their landed
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properties were confiscated and the proceeds of their sale went to the treasury. The
remaining revenues were administered as part of the state patrimony, according to a
decree 31st July 1806. Moreover in 1808 the lay pious foundations were put under
the Interior Ministry's jurisdiction. The bishops protested loudly, hence an attempt
to settle the controversy was made with the decree of 2 December 1813. This agreed
on the necessity of respecting those pious foundations that were of some public utility
or formed part of the communes' patrimonial rights, but put under the Interior
Ministry's supervision also those foundations still dependent on the mixed Courts,
and made them liable for stipends to the parish priests. No refunds were given for the
confiscated patrimonies 3.
Ferdinand IV of Bourbon returned to power on 15 June 1815. He immediately
repealed the French laws, suppressed the Councils of the Hospices, and dismantled the
French administrative organization, separating the merged patrimonies, and
restoring the individual administrators of the charities (decree 14 September
1815). But he soon changed his mind, and with a decree issued on 1st February
1816 he restored the network of Councils of the Hospices and administrative
commissions in the provinces. Thus the French system was basically maintained, but
with some important modifications. The decrees of 1st,14 and 29 February 1816
abolished the powers of the Councils over the ecclesiastical and pious foundations,
returning to the clergy all those charities and institutions which it used to run
before the French reforms 4. The complete administrative regulations came on 20
May 1820. The Councils' structure was basically the same as under the French: the
provincial Intendant presided; three lay councillors were appointed every three
years by the King from the lists proposed to him by the Intendant; the bishop was
3 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano, vol.1.., cit., pp. 9-11; Reale
Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli, Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza
di Napoli , cit., vol. I, pp. 5-6; Lucia Valenzi, 'La poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del
governo francese', in Aurelio Lepre (ed.), Studi sul regno di Napoli net decennio
francese (1806-1815) (Liguori, Naples, 1985), pp. 67-69, 71-79; Gabriella Botti,
'L'organizzazione sanitaria nel Decennio', ibidem, pp. 84-93; Maria Adele Teti,
'L'amministrazione della pubblica beneficenza in Calabria Ultra dal 1809 al 1830', in
Ercole Sori (ed.), Citta e controllo sociale in Italia tra XVIII e XIX secolo (Angeli, Milan,
1982), pp. 141-43.
4 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano , vol.1.., cit. pp. 11-13; L. Valenzi, 'La
poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del governo francese', cit., p. 74; M.A.Teti,
'L'amministrazione della pubblica beneficenza in Calabria Ultra dal 1809 al 1830', cit.,
pp. 143-44. In general on administrative aspects of the Restoration in the Bourbon
Kingdom and the 1818 Concordat, see Rosario Romeo, Mezzogiorno e Sicilia nel
Risorgimento (E.S.I., Naples, 1963), pp. 51-104.
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automatically part of the Council; a secretary was appointed by the King after
proposal by the Council (20 May 1820 Instructions, Section I). The Councils of the
Hospices controlled and supervised all welfare establishments except those which -
for their conspicuous patrimony and national utility - depended directly on the
Interior Ministry, like Aversa's lunatic asylum, the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples,
etc. The Councils must ensure that the charities' regulations were coherent with
their foundation deeds, and to eliminate abuses (articles 24, 25, 26, 87, 91, 93).
Hence the Councils were entrusted with the revision of the charities' foundation
deeds in order to separate the devotional duties legally founded from those established
by tradition, thus restoring the original purposes of the pious legacies (article 30).
Another task of the Councils was to compile statistics of the charities of each
province (article 37). Each Council had an office, headed by the secretary, and
formed by the chief accountant (Razionale del Consiglio ), and the accountants
liquidators (Razionali liquidatori ). Main task of the Councils was to control the
Communal Administrative Committees, also called Local Administrations. There was
one in each commune and they were the back-bone of the system. The Committee was
formed by the Mayor and two administrators chosen by the assembly of the local
notables (Decurionato ) among the wealthy citizens. They held office for three years
and could be confirmed for a second period. The treasurer of the Commune functioned
as treasurer of the Committee under the warranty of the Decurionato. The
Committees administered all those local charities lacking a legitimate administrative
board, and were entrusted with the care of foundlings (articles 87, 89). Both the
Local Administrations and the administrative boards of the single charities must
record their revenues and expenditure and submit their budget (Stato discusso ) at
the end of each year to the Council of the Hospices (articles 136, 140, 142). The
chief accountant of the Council was responsible for checking its exactitude (article
18, § I). Then the budgets were sent to the Ministry of the Interior where they were
discussed, approved or modified, and returned to be executed. The budgets of the
smaller charities (those with an annual revenue of not more than 3,000 ducats,
equal to 12,750 lire of 1860) had to be newly drawn up every three years; those of
the big charities, each year, to avoid the omission of important alterations to the
patrimonial situation (articles 25 to 35). The following diagrams show the
structure of the system.
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Single charities, managed according to foundation deeds, but controlled
by Councils of the Hospices
Local Welfare Administrations in each commune
Formed by Mayor + 2 administrators + treasurer
entrusted with care of foundlings and administration of
charities with no legitimate administrative board
Councils of the Hospices in each province
|
controlling and imposing taxes on Local Welfare Administrations and single charities, and
distributing subsidies to welfare establishments and single individuals
Devotional foundations under ecclesiastical administration and
independent of Councils of the Hospices
The 1820 Instructions recommended that great care be taken in according almoner
relief, ensuring that it was granted exclusively to the poor unable to work (articles
40 to 45). Later in this chapter we will see that this was one of most abused parts of
the law. Special rules regulated the internal management of conservatorii,
orphanages, hospitals, etc. An institution ruled by the 1820 Instructions was that of
taxes (ratizzi). Any charity controlled by the Councils of the Hospices was liable to
suffer taxes for the salaries of the staff of the Councils' offices, their upkeep, etc.;
the maintenance of the Lunatic asylums; the endowment of the Royal hospices
established by Royal decree 6 June 1818; the maintenance of foundlings in the
absence of communal and provincial funds; helping some national hospice or other
important establishment requiring the cooperation of the whole province. The taxes
for the second and third of the purposes listed above had to be imposed on the total
gross revenue shown in the budget of the charities and hud to be specified among the
headings of expenditure; all other taxes were put under the heading 'incidental
expenditure' (articles 77 and 78) 5. This imprecision was an open door to
mismanagement and bribery. The system of ratizzi imposed on the charities via the
Councils to subsidize the most important welfare establishments of the Kingdom was
5 S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano , vol.1.., cit., pp. 13-23.
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in theory close to the system of legal charity. Hence the Bourbon system, so neatly
regulated by the 1820 Instructions, could be considered - as it has been 6 - the most
organic and advanced in pre-unification Italy. In reality the law was generally and
openly ignored. The Councils became a kind of refugium peccatorum supposed to
grant a 'place' to anybody who was sufficiently distressed and sufficiently connected
with the right persons to claim a job, or better, a salary. The result was the inflation
of the number of staff, often proportional not to the real amount of work, but to the
degree of corruption endemic to the office. The Councils of the Hospices, while
perhaps theoretically well devised by the French, proved during the 1860s to be a
parasitic plant which was very difficult to extirpate.
It is known that, after the 1818 Concordat, and the revolution of 1820-21, the
Bourbons were increasingly more generous in their concessions to the clergy, and
that many parts of the Concordat were effectively abolished 7. This trend is evident
from a series of decrees concerning the charities. The first, issued on 7 December
1832, effectively abolished article 30 of the 1820 Instructions by ordering that the
budgets of the charities should include all devotional duties, regardless of their
legally founded or consuetudinary origins. The sums so fixed in the budgets were
made unconditionally available to the bishops. The same decree stressed that ratizzi
should never be reduced unless the bishop proved that they impeded the devotional
duties of a pious foundation (article 7). Which effectively meant that the bishops
could reduce the ratizzi, and hence obtain more revenue for themselves, providing
they exerted sufficient pressure on the Interior Ministry. Another decree of 12
February 1834 established that new ratizzi could not be imposed on the gross
annual revenue of the charities but only on the annual available residual revenue.
The increasing interference of the clergy in the management of the lay pious
foundations was later legitimized even more extensively by the decrees of 1st
February 1845, 6 September 1852, 4 March 1856 and 18 May 1857. The decrees
of 1845 and 1852 modified the structure of the Councils of the Hospices, increasing
the number and power of their ecclesiastical members. The decree of 1856 assigned
to the bishops part of the properties of the pious foundations to allow the
accomplishment of any devotional duty prescribed by the foundation's deeds. The
® S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano , vol.1.., cit., p. 25.
7 Giuliana D'Amelio, Stato e Chiesa. La legislazione ecclesiastica fino al 1867 (Giuffre,
Milan, 1961), pp. 8-10; Idem, 'La proclamazione dell'unita d'ltalia e i problemi di
politica ecclesiastica', in Pietro Agostino D'Avack (ed.), La legislazione ecclesiastica
(Pozza, Vicenza,1967), p.56.
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decree of 18 May 1857 restored the ecclesiastical administration of the lay
chaplancies and congregations of the Holy Body of Christ 8. More details on this issue
will follow later in this chapter, when we will discuss its general implications.
To conclude this summary on welfare legislation in the South we must see what
provisions were made for beggars and vagrants. As in Piedmont, streams of decrees
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century witnessed to recurrent and unsuccessful
attempts to free Naples from beggary. The process of locking up the mendicants
started later than in the rest of Italy. A first attempt was made in 1667 with the
foundation of San Gennaro Extra Moenia in Naples. In 1751 King Charles III started
the construction of the Albergo dei Poveri, with the Utopian purpose of segregating
all beggars of the Kingdom. With various interruptions the construction lasted until
1826 and its total cost was calculated in 1875 at thirty million ducats. Despite the
huge sums poured into the Hotel by Charles and his successor, beggary was not
eliminated from the streets of Naples, let alone the rest of the country. In 1813 the
French tried to establish depots de mendicite' in each province, but largely failed.
They were more successful in introducing various workshops in the Albergo dei
Poveri, which the Bourbons maintained. The Bourbons also maintained in the penal
laws of 1819 the notion of vagrancy and beggary as crimes, first introduced with the
French penal code of 1812. The penalties for vagrants and able-bodied beggars were
similar to those introduced in Piedmont in 1826 and 1839. As in Piedmont, the
disabled beggars were allowed to ply their trade when no hospice was available in the
vicinity 9.
8 S. D'Amelio , La beneficenza net diritto italiano , vol.1.., cit., pp. 24-26; Reale
Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli, Relazione suite istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza
di Napoli , vol. I, cit., pp. 6-7; Arnaldo Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza
pubblica in Italia', R.P.S. , No. 3-4, 1963, pp. 742, 747, fn. 43. On Arts. 30 and 37 of
the 20 May 1820 Instructions and the Decree 7 Dec.1832, see also: A.C.S., M.I., O.P.,
1861-73, B. 279; the Council of the Hospices, Campobasso, 28 May 1862, n.1370 to
M.I., Turin, Object: Ostacoli incontrati nella esecuzione del Decreto de' 21 Febb. 1861
intorno all'abolizione delle spese di culto di consuetudine finora cedute a carico de'
Luoghi Pii laicali , and Circular from the Council of Avellino to the Mayors, 14 May
1861, n.1783.
On the decrees of 1845 and 1852: A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Provincie Napoletane,
Beneficenza, Cart. 4a, f. 77; Cart. 5a, f. 101. On the 1856 decree: A.S.T, Sez.I,
Carte Sella..., cit., Cart. 1a, ff. 12, 17, 18; Cart. 5a, f. 99; Cart. 6a, f. 115.
9 L. Valenzi, 'La poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del governo francese', cit., pp. 59-62,
64-67; Teresa Filangieri Ravaschieri Fieschi, Storia della Carita Napoletana (Giannini,
Naples, 1875), vol. I, pp. 133-252.
1 39
5.2. Ratizzi and welfare structures.
The above summary on welfare legislation has given a general idea of the system as a
whole, but does not explain the complexity of the system. Therefore a closer analysis
will help to understand the problems faced first by the provisional governments, and
later by the central government, when they tried to reorder the southern charities.
In the following table are displayed the revenues for the years 1836, 1847, 1849,
and 1851 of all charities under the Councils' control in twelve of the fifteen
continental provinces of the Bourbon Kingdom 10. It must be remembered that these
figures did not include the revenue of those devotional foundations which were under
the jurisdiction of the bishops, and hence independent of the Councils, according to
the decree of 1 February 1816.
Table 5.2.1. Revenue in ducats for 1836, 1847, 1849, and 1851 of the charities





1836 1847 % 1849 % 1851 %
Teramo 24,872.54 29,666.86 + 19.3 30,139.77 + 1.6 31,570.67 + 4.7
L' Aquila 72,980.32 84,252.66 + 15.4 78,914.89 6.3 80,022.77 + 1.4
Chieti 30,091.11 34,244.37 + 13.8 33,294.13 - 2.8 33,480.92 + 0.6
Sub total 127,943.97 148,163.89 + 15.8 142,348.79 - 3.9 145,074.36 + 1.9
Rasilicata
|Potenza 45,215.18 70,602.66 + 56.1 48,043.83 - 32 53,685.63 + 11.7|
Molise
Campo
basso 41,500.81 1 6,742.45 -59.7 43,063.41 + 157 43,500.17 + 1
Camoania
|Caserta 261,545.48 289,736.84 + 10.8 263,1 13.07 - 9.2 285,820.39 + 8.6 |
Apulia
Foqqia 79,542.79 43,247.59 -45.6 94,988.56 +120 57,917.40 -39
Bari 141,738.39 179,089.68 +26.4 160,219.28 -10.5 172,860.42 + 7.9
Lecce 105,077.40 97,885.20 6.8 98,811.73 + 0.9 99,082.69 + 0.3
Sub total 326,358.58 320,222.47 1.9 354,019.57 + 10.5 329,860.51 - 6.8
Calabria
| Cosenza 42,791.29 57,823.23 + 35 52,124.90 - 9.9 54,525.57 + 4.6 |
10 Source of tables 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.: A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Provincie Napoletane,
Beneficenza, Cart. 3a, f. 58; Cart. 7a, f. 136.
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Region &
Province 1836 1847 % 1849 % 1851 %
Catanzaro 15,082.27 17,910.39 + 18.8 16,236.45 9.3 16,052.25 - 1.1
Reqgio 27,044.22 17,764.47 -34.3 24,152.24 +35.9 22,920.27 - 5.1
Sub total 84,917.78 93,498.09 + 10.1 92,513.59 1 93,498.09 + 1
Total 887,481.80 938,966.40 + 5.8 943,082.46 + 0.4 951,439.15 + 0.9
It is a limited series which unfortunately does not include any data for the period
after 1856. Thus we cannot measure the consequences of the 1856 and 1857 decrees.
Nevertheless it offers some useful general indications. The first concerns the notable
and apparently random variations of revenue by period and province. The
phenomenon applies to all provinces and does not appear to be confined to any
particular period, or to any particular province or region. For instance between
1836 and 1847, the charities of Abruzzo increased their revenues by an average of
16%, while those of Molise lost about 60%. Abruzzo and Molise are geographically
close to one another, hence a bad harvest should have hit them in a similar way. The
same incongruence can be seen in the other provinces for all the periods concerned,
hence it seems appropriate to interpret the variations of revenue not as a
consequence of meteorological conditions affecting the output of the farms belonging
to the charities, but rather as an indicator of inefficient management of the charities.
Great increases were often followed by great losses, and viceversa, which leads to the
inference that probably the charities' managers did not collect their rents regularly.
They probably allowed large credits to accumulate and then exacted them when short
of cash. The second and less controversial indication concerns the division of the
Kingdom into rich and poor areas. The charities of the province of Caserta alone
accounted for a third of the entire revenue of the twelve provinces, and another
abundant third was provided by Apulia, where the province of Bari alone produced
three times the revenue of Basilicata and Molise and twice that of Calabria. The
uneven territorial distribution of the charities' assets was a feature common to all
Italian charities, but it bore particular consequences in the Bourbon Kingdom, where
the charities' revenues were liable to a tax (ratizzo) for the maintenance of national
and provincial welfare establishments. Data available for the period 1849 -1851
show that this tax was not always proportional to the charities' revenue, and that
poor provinces often contributed proportionally more than rich provinces. In the
table below we have arranged the data by size of income, in order to show this trend.
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Table 5.2.2. Charities' revenues and ratizzi in eleven of the fifteen continental
provinces of the Bourbon Kingdom (1849-1851).
1849-1850 18 5 1
Province Revenue Ratizzo Ratizzo Revenue Ratizzo Ratizzo
as a % of as a % of as a % of as a % of as a % of as a % of
tot. rev. prov.rev. tot. rat. tot. rev. prov.rev. tot. rat.
Caserta 30.5 12.3 27.3 32.8 1 2 30.8
Bari 18.5 15.5 21 1 9.8 14.2 22.1
Lecce 1 1.4 1 0 8.3 11.4 1 0 8.8
Foqqia 1 1 8.4 6.7 6.7 6.9 3.6
Cosenza 6 15.6 7 6.3 13.8 6.8
Potenza 5.6 1 3 1 1 6.2 24 1 1 .7
Campob. 5 13.4 5 5 12.2 4.8
Chieti 4 12.2 3.4 3.8 12.4 3.7
Teramo 3.5 18.2 4.7 3.6 1 4 5
Reqqio 2.8 22.1 4.5 2.6 6.6 1.4
Catanzaro 1.9 9.8 1.3 1.8 9 1.4
In the provinces of Cosenza, Campobasso, Chieti, and Catanzaro the ratizzo was
roughly proportional to the corresponding contribution of those provinces' charities
to the total revenue of the eleven provinces considered, whereas in the other
provinces the disproportion between revenue and ratizzo was notable. The charities
of the provinces of Caserta, Lecce and Foggia were charged with a ratizzo which was
proportionally lower than their contribution to the total revenue, whereas the
charities of the provinces of Teramo and Potenza were over-taxed. The above sample
is too restricted to permit any general conclusion, and it is possible that even more
complete data would not clarify the criteria underlying the allocation of the ratizzi.
These were imposed by the General Councils of the Hospices not only on the basis of
the Interior Ministry's requirements, but also considering the needs of the
provinces' welfare institutions, and the increasing rights of the bishops. Thus it
might be that proportionally higher ratizzi were imposed on those poorer provinces
which, being short of orphanages, hospitals, and hospices, could not justify the claim
to a greater share of their charities' revenues. This interpretation is confirmed by
the data of 1850, which are more detailed and hence permit a deeper, albeit limited,
insight into the structure and mechanism of the ratizzi. The table below shows the
destination of the ratizzi under the three main headings of expenditure: maintenance
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of the Council's offices, national welfare establishments, and provincial welfare
establishments in the eleven provinces as above 11.
Table 5.2.3. Ratizzi and their destination, in ducats, in eleven of the fifteen










1 18,333.09 32,386.10 27.4 13,1 95.87 11.1 72,751.2 61.5
About 30% of the ratizzo served for the stipends of the Councils' staff, rent and
maintenance of offices, stationery, pensions to staff widows, etc. The rest was used to
subsidize national or local welfare establishments. These figures give a general idea
of the mechanisms of the system, but need further dissection if its peculiarities are
to be understood. We will look first at the Councils' upkeep. In the following tables
the data have been arranged according to the size of the ratizzo .
Table 5.2.4. Quota of total ratizzo, in ducats, spent for Councils' maintenance in
eleven of the fifteen continental provinces of the Bourbon Kingdom in
1 850.
Province total ratizzo Councils' maintenance %
Caserta 32,358 7,850.05 24.3
Bari 24,804.78 5,299.70 21.4
Potenza 1 2,993.38 3,303.48 25.4
Lecce 9,871.70 2,643 26.8
Cosenza 8,127.70 3,1 1 2.44 38.3
Fogqia 7,931.62 2,327.58 29.3
Campobasso 5,761.80 1 ,687.60 29.3
Teramo 5,498.91 1 ,612 29.3
Regqio 5,336.60 1 ,065.10 20
Chieti 4,065 2,31 7.65 57
Catanzaro 1,583.60 1 ,167.40 73.7
Total 118,333.09 32,386.10 27.4
1 1 Source of tables 5.2.3., 5.2.4., 5.2.5., 5.2.6.: A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Provincie
Napoletane, Beneficenza, Cart. 3a, f. 58.
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On average the upkeep of the Councils' offices required around 30% of the ratizzo.
But there were considerable variations. Reggio and Bari managed with about 20%.
Caserta, Potenza, Lecce.Foggia, Campobasso and Teramo were roughly in line with the
average. But Cosenza needed around 38%, Chieti 57% and Catanzaro almost three
quarters of their ratizzi, which were the lowest in real terms. It would seem that
often the Councils of those provinces less endowed with charitable assets spent
proportionally more on their own upkeep than those of the richer provinces.
Perhaps many offices were over-staffed 12. The general consequence was that very
little was left for welfare precisely in those provinces which were most in need, as
is evident from the data concerning the subsidies to local welfare.
1 2 On the poverty of the welfare institutions in the province of Catanzaro, where only four
institutes out of forty-four had more than 1,000 ducats of revenue, whilst sixteen had
a revenue below 100 ducats, see M.A.Teti, 'L'amministrazione della pubblica
beneficenza in Calabria Ultra dal 1809 al 1830', cit., p. 146.
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Local welfare absorbed on average 61.5% of the total ratizzo . Orphanages and other
hospices got more than half of the funds available, hospitals got one fifth, fixed
benefits one sixth, and occasional alms plus other subsidies to charities about one
ninetieth. However the figures varied greatly from one province to the other. Chieti
and Catanzaro spent very little in local welfare, both in relative and absolute terms.
It is self-evident that, after spending respectively 57% and almost 74% of the
ratizzo in administration, too little was left to help the local establishments.
Moreover Chieti paid a very high ratizzo for national establishments, hence the low
local expenditure. Conversely the Council of Reggio was the most cautious and devoted
more than two thirds of its meagre ratizzo in local welfare. The absolute figures
reflect the huge differences between the rich provinces, and the rest. Despite the
considerable differences between them, one feature was common to most provinces,
rich and poor alike. Both poor Chieti and rich Caserta spent notable sums in fixed
benefits, respectively around 15% and 11% of their ratizzo. Fixed benefits, which
were monthly benefits granted to 'deserving' poor by the Councils on their own
initiative, or on the Interior Ministry's order, accounted for almost 26% of the
ratizzo in the province of Cosenza, and varied from about 16% to 8% in those of
Teramo, Reggio, Bari, Potenza and Foggia. Only Lecce and Campobasso spent less than
2% of their ratizzo in fixed benefits. Later in this chapter abundant evidence will
show the true nature of these benefits, which were usually enjoyed by people who did
not really need relief. Hence for the moment it will suffice to note that in most
provinces fixed benefits absorbed a sizeable share of the scarce resources,
presumably at the expense of hospitals and orphanages.
The figures concerning the latter institutions are difficult to interpret, in the
absence of any general quantitative data. Some of the Councils' reports, from which
the above data have been extracted, explained the absence of subsidies to hospitals,
orphanages, and hospices by the non-existence of such establishments in their
province, but no details were given about the existing ones. Hence we must restrict
ourselves to a few comments. In general no apparent relation seems to exist between
contributions to hospitals and orphanages. In the provinces of Caserta, Bari and
Reggio the latter got a lot and the former nothing at all. In other provinces, like
Teramo, Potenza and Cosenza, hospitals got more subsidies than orphanages, whereas
Lecce and Foggia were more generous towards orphanages. One possible explanation
might be that the contributions by the Councils served to compensate any shortfalls
for the hospitals and orphanages, but were not their only source of income. The
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absence of any contribution probably indicated, in most cases, the absence of any
hospital or orphanage in the province, but a tiny contribution did not necessarily
indicate the presence of small institutions, since the Councils subsidized local
welfare not on the basis of the establishments' needs, but on the basis of their own
criteria. On what principles, if any, were these criteria based, we cannot speculate:
only complete series of data could offer an answer to the many questions that this
analysis leaves unresolved. One indication however seems to emerge. The ratizzi
were not the only nor the main source of income for the welfare establishments in
the provinces. The Councils probably met their shortfalls, when left-overs were
available, once the bills of the Councils, the fixed benefits, and the contributions to
the national welfare establishments had been paid. The subsidies from the Councils
to local hospitals, hospices, and orphanages varied greatly from one province to the
another, and seemed unrelated to the availability of resources. The same was true for
the subsidies to the national welfare establishments.
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On average the provinces contributed to the national welfare establishments by
about 11% of their ratizzo, but only Caserta was in line with the average. The
disproportion between provinces was great, and not always justified by the size of
their ratizzo . For Teramo and Chieti an explanation can be found in the location of the
poorhouse of Sulmona, to which they both heavily contributed. Sulmona is situated in
Abruzzo, and most probably served mainly to lock up the beggars of that area. Hence
the provinces which benefited most from it were also those that paid for its
maintenance. This could also explain the huge contribution made by Potenza to a
hospice in the province of Salerno, since it is possible that many inmates from
Potenza were sheltered in that hospice. For all provinces no relation can be found
between size of total ratizzo and size of contribution to the national establishments.
Although the richer provinces gave higher contributions, the poorer provinces were
not always charged less, especially with respect to the lunatic asylum of Aversa. One
hundred ducats seemed to be the minimum contribution imposed on all provinces for
that institution, irrespective of their resources. Hence these figures, like the
previous ones, seem to support the hypothesis that the ratizzi were a sort of random
tax, related neither to the availability of resources, nor to the needs of the
institutions supposed to benefit from them. We have no knowledge of the financial
situation of the poorhouse of Sulmona and the Convitto Madonna delle Grazie in San
Nicola La Strada, near Naples, but we know from a Rendiconto amministrativo of
Aversa's lunatic asylum for the period 1853- 1860, that the ratizzi accounted for
only about 13 to 15% of the total income of that institution. More than half of the
revenue of the Morotrofio - as it was called - was provided by a tax levied
previously on the communes and later on the provinces, and the rest by the sale of
the articles produced by the inmates in the workshops of Sant'Agostino and
Montevergine 13. Further research is needed before sound conclusions can be drawn
on the system of ratizzi. However so far, they do not appear to be such a powerful
generator of income for the welfare establishments, nor such a central element in the
southern welfare structure to justify the expensive and inefficient administrative
machinery set up to collect and distribute them.
1 3 Rendiconto amministrativo del Reale Morotrofio di Aversa dal 1853 a tutto il 1860
(Stamperia del Fibreno, Naples, 1861), passim.
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5.3.Thfi role of the charities in the Southern ecclesiastical structure. An
interpretative model.
So far we have assessed the mechanisms and characteristics of the welfare system
centred on the Councils of the Hospices. This is only half the picture. The other half
consists of a host of confraternities, pious legacies and foundations, which we
generically refer to as charities, and which played a role not only in the welfare
system, but also in the ecclesiastical structure. To understand fully the implications
of this issue, we must consider first the different ecclesiastical structures of
northern and southern Italy in the period of the Risorgimento. In northern Italy
there were relatively few and large dioceses, with numerous, small and well endowed
parishes. These were at the core of the ecclesiastical organization. The parish priest
and his vice lived in the parish house with the sole company of an aged female
servant, the Perpetua immortalized by Manzoni. Confraternities and pious
foundations, whose importance as worship centres and poles of political aggregation
was notable in the sixteenth and sevententh centuries, now played a secondary role in
the parish life, since their importance had been generally reduced during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most important, each parish had a vestry-
board, closely controlled by the parish priest, and entrusted with the furnishing,
maintenance, and restoration of the church, and consistently endowed for that
specific purpose. Hence the northern parish was an independent and self-sufficient
economic unit 14. The southern parishes were based on a different model. There were
many small dioceses, whereas the parishes were relatively few and large. The
ecclesiastical organization was based on a variety of religious institutions:
monasteries, confraternities, pious foundations, parish churches and Ricettizie
churches. Around 1850 about a third of all churches with care of souls were
ricettizie, but their distribution varied greatly. The higher concentration of
ricettizie was in Basilicata, Apulia, the two Principati, and Molise. On national
1 4 About the evolution of the ecclesiatical structure in northern Italy see Gabriele De
Rosa, 'Parrocchie e pieta nella Chiesa veneta dell'Ottocento', in Id., Vescovi, popolo e
magia nel Sud (Guida, Naples, 1971), pp. 337-57; Achille Erba, La chiesa sabauda tra
cinque e seicento. Ortodossia tridentina, gallicanesimo savoiardo e assolutismo ducale
(1580-1630) (Herder, Rome, 1979); about the role of confraternities and devotional
foundations in the religious and political life of ancien regime Piedmont see Amilcare
Barbero, Franco Ramella, Angelo Torre, Materiali sulla religiosity dei laid. Alba 1698-
Asti 1742 (Regione Piemonte, 1981); A. Torre, 'II consumo di devozioni: rituali e
potere nelle campagne piemontesi nella prima meta del settecento', in Ouaderni storici,
No. 58, 1985, pp. 181-223.
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average the ricettizie enjoyed over half of the ecclesiastical secular revenues, and
obviously much more in those provinces where they were more numerous. Hence
they had considerable economic power. The ricettizie were modelled on the medieval
pievi, a kind of church where a group of priests collectively managed the care of
souls and shared the revenues of a common patrimony. The pievi, once widespread all
over Italy, had gradually disappeared in the centre and north, where they had been
replaced by the parishes described above. In the south they persisted, due to the
geographical isolation of the communities and their economic immobility. Instead of
disappearing, the feudal structure of the ricettizie became the most common
ecclesiastical structure. The ricettizie were of lay patronage because they were
founded by laymen or by the community (Universita' ), and were regulated by
statutes legalized by the feudatories or the King. Consequently, the bishops had no say
in their administration and could interfere, with great caution, only with regard to
spiritual matters. The clergy of the ricettizie was notoriously jealous ot its own
autonomy, indisciplined, and rebellious. The original feudal model was evident in the
internal structure of the ricettizie : at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder were the
servants, or mansionari. These served without compensation for periods up to ten or
fourteen years. During that period they would climb the hierarchical ladder starting
from the humblest duties: cleaning the floor, opening and closing the church, ringing
the bells and attending to the sacristy, up to sacerdotal status. To reach that status
was therefore not a matter of theological preparation but a promotion by seniority.
Only when anointed priests, were the former mansionari finally admitted to share a
portion of the revenue of the common patrimony. As a consequence of this structure
the bishops had very little say in matter of ordinations whilst, on the other hand, in
the South seminaries were scarce, poor, and notoriously inefficient. The clergy of
the ricettizie was mainly interested in securing its material survival. Hence it was
quarrelsome and intriguing, mostly devoted to obtaining material privileges, and
oblivious of the spiritual needs of the parishioners. The revenues of the patrimony
with which the church was endowed were administered all together {in massa
comune) and were shared by the clergy according to the hierarchy described above.
Hence the titles and ecclesiastical dignities were purely nominal, not linked to
benefices and specific functions. The care of souls was collectively managed and
supervised by the senior member of the group, the archpriest, who usually enjoyed a
larger portion of revenues. Another important feature of the system was that the
clergy was recruited on an exclusively local basis. As a consequence the clergy of the
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ricettizie was overabundant, because it was ordained not in relation to the real needs
of a parish, but according to local interests and pressures, which the bishops were
usually unable to combat. Also, the local origins of this clergy meant that no parish
houses existed in the South, since after being ordained the priests continued to live at
home with their families, which had an obviously detrimental effect on the
impartiality and spiritual detachment that a priest should cultivate. The Council of
Trent had little effect on this structure. The clergy of ricettizie , jealous of its own
autonomy and fearful of any dismemberment of the parishes entailing a reduction of
patrimony, firmly resisted any attempt at reform by the bishops. In the south the
only novelty brought about by the counter-reformation was the spreading of
monasteries, confraternities and pious bequests, which responded well to the
superstitious devotionalism of the masses and offered them an alternative model of
worship. Neither the French reforms - that hit particularly hard the regular orders
- nor the Rosini plan in the 1820s radically changed the structures or reduced the
power of the ricettizie. They were effectively dismantled only by the act of 1867.
And yet - according to Bishop Nicola Monterisi - the mentality fostered by ricettizie
among the clergy and the masses was still alive as late as the early 1900s, more than
thirty years after the enforcement of the suppressive law of 1867, which shattered
the southern Church by physically eliminating the ricettizie , and left the parishes
weaker and poorer than before 15.
15 Gabriele De Rosa, Vescovi, popolo e magia net Sud, cit., pp. 9-10, 36-39, 43-47, 51-
56, 69-75, 100-102, 116-20, 124-37, 142-48, 216-36, 259-73, 393-94; Antonio
Cestaro, Le Diocesi di Conza e Campagna nell'eta delta Restaurazione (Storia e
Letteratura, Rome, 1972), pp. 9-21, 41, 67-70, 89-91, 101-110, 123-126; Id., 'La
ricerca storica-religiosa nel Sud con particolare riferimento alia tipologia
deH'organizzazione ecclesiastica', in A. Cestaro, M. Rosa, Territorio e societa nella
storia del Mezzogiorno (Guida, Naples, 1973), pp. 875-909; Pietro Ebner, Storia di un
feudo del Mezzogiorno (Storia e Letteratura, Rome, 1973), pp.165-74; A. Cestaro,
'Strutture ecclesiastiche del Mezzogiorno nell'Eta moderna', in Nicola Raponi (ed.), Dagli
Stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione , cit., pp. 343-63; Vincenzo De Vitiis,
'Chiese ricettizie e organizzazione ecclesiastica nel Regno delle Due Sicilie dal
Concordato del 1818 all'Llnita', in G. Galasso, C. Russo (eds.), Per la storia sociale e
religiosa del mezzogiorno d'ltalia (Guida, Naples, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 349-473; M. Rosa,
'La Chiesa meridionale nell'eta della Controriforma', in Storia d'ltalia , Annali 9
(Einaudi, Turin, 1986), pp. 313-26; Maria Rosaria Valensise, 'Diego Gatta e la chiesa
ricettizia', in Storia e Politica , No. 4, 1983, pp. 782-800. About the ecclesiastical
structures, and the popular religiosity in Sicily, similar albeit not identical to those of
the continental South see Angelo Gambasin, Religiosa magnificenza e plebi in Sicilia nel
XIX secolo (Storia e Letteratura, Rome, 1979), passim, and partic. pp. 117-221;
Angelo Sindoni, Dal riformismo assolutistico al cattolicesimo sociale (Studium, Rome,
1984), vol. 1, II tramonto dell'antico regime in un'area centrale della Sicilia, passim,
and partic. pp. 69-186.
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So far we have concentrated on the general structure of the southern Church. Now
we must see the role played by the charities in this structure. In our opinion, it was
a central role indeed, although it has been hitherto generally overlooked. A
fundamental feature of the patrimonial structure of the ricettizie was that no
regular funds were provided for the furnishing, maintenance and restoration of
churches. Since they were of lay patronage, it was the patrons' duty to care for the
physical survival of the sacred buildings. Over the centuries, in the south this
function was taken over by the various confraternities, pious foundations and
charities, which proliferated especially during the seventeenth century 16. Hence a
basic function, which in the centre-north was fulfilled by the vestry-boards
attached to the parishes, in the south was entrusted to lay organizations external to
the parishes and independent of the bishops' control. The structure of the ricettizie
therefore entailed the economic dependence of the parishes on a network of
institutions which openly competed with them as centres of devotion and worship.
According to ecclesiastical sources the welfare reforms introduced by the French and
partially maintained by the Bourbons greatly damaged the churches, which were
made dependent on the Councils of the Hospices and the Administrative Commissions
for the supply of oil, wax, and other furnishings. In the 1820s several bishops
complained about the state of disrepair of the churches, and the greediness of the
welfare administration, which denied the churches even their basic supplies of holy
furnishings 17. Whether or not the bishops artfully exaggerated the effects of the
administrative control of the welfare officials over the charities, we cannot say, but
it is undeniable that the Bourbons progressively restored the clergy's powers over
the charities. As we saw above, first came the decrees of 1,14 and 29 February
1816, which abolished the powers of the Councils on the ecclesiastical and pious
foundations, returning to the clergy all those charities and institutions which it used
to run before the French reforms. But most important were the changes occurred
between the 1830s and 1850s. With the above-mentioned decrees of 7 December
1832, 12 February 1834, 1 February 1845, 6 September 1852, 4 March 1856
and 18 May 1857, the bishops obtained greater portions of the charities' revenue,
1 6 A. Cestaro, Le Diocesi di Conza e Campagna nell'eta della Restaurazione , cit., pp. 7,
30; Id., 'La ricerca storica-religiosa nel Sud con particolare riferimento alia tipologia
dell'organizzazione ecclesiastica', in A. Cestaro, M. Rosa, Territorio e societa nella
storia del Mezzogiorno , cit., pp. 881-82, 890.
^ 7 A. Cestaro, Le Diocesi di Conza e Campagna nell'eta della Restaurazione , cit., pp. 33,
52-54, 63-66, 77, 110, 112-113, 132.
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and more power within the Councils of the Hospices. The origins of the 1856 decree
appear particularly interesting. In the mid 1850s the bishops bombarded the
interior ministry with massive protests, complaining that the Councils did not
ensure the execution of the devotional duties of the charities. The pressure exerted on
the King was such that he ordered that the bishops be assigned part of the properties
of the pious foundations to allow the accomplishment of any devotional duty
prescribed by the foundation's deeds. Some Councils expressed open disappointment,
pointing out that the bishops had already obtained supplementary sums from the
budgets, and stressing the damage which the decree would inflict to the works of
charity. Moreover, since the text of the decree left many questions unanswered
regarding its implementation, and the nature of the foundations subject to it, the
decree's interpretation became a pretext for further negotiations on the part of the
bishops to obtain more. They claimed their right to sufficient assets to cover not only
the devotional duties, but also the maintenance and restoration of churches, and the
administration costs. Furthermore, they wanted to recoup the church properties
confiscated by the French, and take over the lay pious foundations, that is the
confraternities, which had so far maintained their autonomy within the ecclesiastical
structure. They did not fully succeed. They were granted sufficient assets to cover the
maintenance and restoration of churches, and the same right of the Councils to have
recourse to the military to exact the rents. Finally, a decree of 18 May 1857
greatly reduced the traditional independence of the lay pious foundations by restoring
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the ecclesiastical administration of the lay chaplaincies and congregations of the Holy
Body of Christ 18.
Altogether the bishops regained during the last decades of the Bourbon rule a few of
the privileges they had lost under the French and, thanks to the King's bigotry, were
partially granted that control of the charities which they had failed to establish since
the Council of Trent. All at the expense - of course - of the so-called patrimony of
the poor. It is interesting to note that this trend has been ignored in recent works on
the southern ecclesiastical structures by Antonio Cestaro who - relying exclusively
on ecclesiastical sources - has taken for granted the picture resulting from the
bishops' reports, without investigating further. Hence the assumption that with the
establishment of the Councils of the Hospices and the Local welfare administrations
the charities had been completely laicized and stripped of any function within the
ecclesiastical structure. Yet the simple reading of the above mentioned decrees should
cast doubts on the soundness of such conclusions. On the other hand Cestaro confirms
18 S. D'Amelio , La beneficenza net diritto italiano , vol.1.., cit., pp. 24-26; A. Cherubini,
'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S. , No. 3-4, 1963, cit., pp. 742,
747, fn. 43. On Arts. 30 and 37 of the 20 May 1820 Instructions and the Decree 7
Dec.1832, see also: A.C.S.,.M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: the Council of the Hospices,
Campobasso, 28 May 1862, No.1370 to M.I., Turin, Object: Ostacoli incontrati nella
esecuzione del Decreto de' 21 Febb. 1861 intorno all'abolizione delle spese di culto di
consuetudine finora cedute a carico de' Luoghi Pii laicali, and Circular from the Council
of Avellino to the Mayors, 14 May 1861, No.1783.
On the decrees of 1845 and 1852: A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Provincie Napoletane,
Beneficenza, Cart. 4a, f. 77: M.I. Circular, No. 2744, Naples, 13 May 1857, to the
Intendants, Object: Interpretazione autentica dell'art. 3° del Real Decreto del 1°
Febbraio 1845 sulla discussione dei conti materiali dei Luoghi Pii. A.S.T., Sez.l, Carte
Sella..., cit., Cart. 5a, f. 101: text of the decree 6 September 1852.
On the 1856 decree: A.S.T, Sez.l, Carte Sella..., cit., Cart. 1a, ff. 12, 18 (bishops'
protests about the allegedly unexecuted devotional duties of the charities) ; Cart. 5a, f.
99: M.I. Circular No. 4769, Naples, 25 August 1855, to the Intendants, Object: Per
1'adempimento delle opere di Culto ; General Council of the Hospices, Circular No. 82,
Bari 26 April 1856, to the Local Welafare Committees, Object: Si comunica Real
Rescritto concemente il passaggio delle Opere, e spese di Culto agli Ordinari Diocesani ;
letters to M.I., concerning the interpretation of the 4 March 1856 decree, from the
General Councils of the Hospices of Cosenza (31st March 1856), Chieti (29 March
1856), Bari (10 May 1856), Naples (7 June 1856), the archbishop of Acerenza and
Matera, 25 May 1856, to M.I.; M.I. Circular, No. 4420, Naples, 6 August 1856, to the
Intendants, Object: Risoluzioni Sovrane su i dubbi intorno alia esecuzione del Rescritto
del 4 Marzo 1856 ; Cart. 1a, f. 17: M.I. Circular No. 4756, Naples, 19 August 1857,
Object: Se gli Ordinari Diocesani abbian dritto di far uso delle coazioni Amministrative
per la riscossione delle rendite cedute dalla Beneficenza pubblica in virtu del Sovrano
Rescritto dei 4 Marzo 1856 ; Cart. 6a, f. 115: Stato di Messe ed altre opere di culto e
di beneficenza che non sonosi compiute a contare da Gennaio 1844 a tutto il 1856
secondo i rapporti dei rispettivi Ordinari.
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that, due to the failure of both the regulations of the 1818 Concordat - intended to
improve the bishops' authority and reduce the traditional autonomy of the churches
in the South - and the reform plan devised by Pozzuoli's bishop Carlo Maria Rosini
and approved by the Concordat's executive committee, the ecclesiastical structure
remained basically the same. Cestaro implicitly admits the contradiction in saying
that
...the same structures of the past continued albeit deprived of the revenues and
economical means once available to the Church ^9.
As we shall shortly see, it would seem that the same religio-economic structures of
the past persisted since the economic determinants of those structures remained
despite the depredations of the French and because of their gradual restoration by the
Bourbons. Moreover, we have seen how the Councils functioned and how weakly they
controlled the pious foundations, it seems untenable to base on their mere existence
the conclusion that they had deeply modified the pre-existing ecclesiastical
structure. Our evidence rather suggests the reverse: they had been super-imposed on
that structure without substantially modifying it. All the Councils did was to extract,
via the ratizzi, what money they needed to maintain themseU-.ves, subsidize a few
national welfare establishments, and grant the fixed benefits. Moreover, the ratizzi
seemed unrelated to the revenues of the foundations. We may ignore the criteria
theoretically followed by the Councils' secretaries in imposing them, since the
evidence we have gathered about the moral standards of the Councils' staff allows us
to infer that the ratizzi were probably negotiated between the partksand were
inversely proportional to the economic and political power of a foundation.
The laicization of the charities by the French was an attempt to linK , the south of
Italy to the rest of the country, where confraternities and lay foundations had been,
by the end of the eighteenth century, either suppressed, or put under strict state
control. As we saw, the French also tried to modernize the parishes, but their
1 9 A. Cestaro, 'Strutture ecclesiastiche del Mezzogiorno nell'Eta moderna', in Nicola
Raponi (ed.), Dagli Stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione , cit., pp. 361-63
(quotation at p. 363). See also: A. Cestaro, 'La ricerca storica-religiosa nel Sud con
particolare riferimento alia tipologia dell'organizzazione ecclesiastica', in A. Cestaro,
M. Rosa, Territorio e societa nella storia del Mezzogiorno, cit., pp. 884-907 and Guido
Verucci, 'Chiesa e societa nell'ltalia della Restaurazione (1814-1830)', Rivista di
Storia della Chiesa in Italia, XXX, 1976, pp. 53-54. Sound criticism of those works
solely based on ecclesiastical sources can be found in V. De Vitiis, 'Chiese ricettizie e
organizzazione ecclesiastica nel Regno delle Due Sicilie dal Concordato del 1818
all'Unita', cit., pp.386-93.
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reforms were limited to the reduction of the number of parishes and parish-priests,
and did not affect the parishes' structure 20. Thus the changes introduced with
respect to the charities were bound to collapse, since they modified only one part of
the structure, without providing the means for either the reform or the support of
the other. Hence the restoration by the Bourbons to the charities of their former
function of support of the churches, can be seen both as the effect of the political
pressure exerted by the bishops on the government; and as an aspect of the resilience
of an ecclesiastical structure which was too deeply engrained into society to admit
reform by means of decrees. If neither the Councils of the Hospices nor the 1818
Concordat succeded in modifying the southern ecclesiastical structures, we can then
interpret the stream of decrees which, from 1816 to the late 1850s awarded the
bishops increasing power over the charities' administration, as the result of the only
possible compromise between the 'official' and the local Church. That is, as a means
by which the bishops, unable otherwise to establish their own authority, and reform
the system, tried to establish at least their control within the existing structure.
Which, for the bishops, was no meagre result, given that before the French period
they had no say at all in the charities, and considering the struggles they endured to
run their dioceses.
5.4. Some details of the southern charities.
This model of the charities' function in the ecclesiastical structure needs to be
tested. A quite complete sample worth analysing concerns the charities of the
province of Avellino (Principato Ulteriore). The statistical work from which we
have extracted the data below was the result of the zeal of Nicola De Luca, who was
appointed President of the Council of Avellino and Governor of the province of
Principato Ulteriore in March 1861. When he took office he immediately ordered a
statistical revision of the province's charities according to article 37 of the
Instructions of 20 May 1820. The forms he designed consisted of four tables covering
income, real expenses (taxes and administration), devotional expenses and welfare.
He recommended that the Mayors add an historical note about each foundation,
20 A. Cestaro, Le Diocesi di Conza e Campagna nell'eta delta Restaurazione , cit., pp. 43-
45; Id., 'La ricerca storica-religiosa nel Sud con particolare riferimento alia tipologia
dell'organizzazione ecclesiastica', in A. Cestaro, M. Rosa, Territorio e societa nella
storia del Mezzogiorno , cit., pp. 884-907.
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specifying whether it was administered by the Communal Committee or a special lay
or ecclesiastical board. De Luca also wanted, for each Commune, a list of non-endowed
confraternities and other foundations, with information about their purposes,
number of members and amount of donations 21. The Mayors proved less zealous than
the Governor. In July the Ministry of the Interior and Police requested from Naples a
summary of the most important welfare establishments of the province, to be
included in the 1861 edition of the Almanacco del Regno d'ltalia , the first and, with
regard to charities, largely unsuccessful attempt to produce a statistical account of
the new state 22. De Luca forwarded the request to the Mayors, pointing out that, had
all the administrative boards of the charities performed the statistical work
committed to them in May, the Ministry's request could be easily fulfilled. However,
since too much information was missing, the Mayors were urged both to complete the
statistics and to send summary information about the most relevant foundations of
their Communes. The results of this second inquiry ordered by De Luca were sent to
Naples in September 1861 and were praised by the Minister for their
meticulousness 23.
The total number of charities in the 132 Communes of the province of Avellino
amounted to 732 with an annual income of 372,631.28 lire 24. The figures,
originally furnished by De Luca in a descriptive way, have here been reorganized in
several tables to allow a systematic analysis. Firstly we must consider the basic
subdivision of the charities' expenditure.
21 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, cit., B. 279: Circular No. 1783 from Avellino, 14 May
1861, cit. Nicola De Luca was a lawyer, president of the revolutionary committee of
Molise, and was appointed Governor of that Province by Garibaldi. See Ernesto
Ragionieri, 'Politica e amministrazione nello Stato unitario', in Id., Politica e
amministrazione nella storia dell' Italia unita (Laterza, Bari, 1967), pp. 114-116,
where some details about his correspondence with the Interior Minister Peruzzi in
1862-63 can be found. He became senator in 1868, and served as a prefect - from
1864 to 1880 - in Reggio Emilia, Fori), Ancona, Como, and Messina (see Mario Missori,
Governi, alte cariche dello Stato e prefetti (M.I., Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato,
Rome, 1973), pp. 276, 291, 338, 402).
22 Saggio di Statistica delle Opere Pie dei Circondari e dei Comuni del Regno d'ltalia.
Appendice al Calendario Generate compilato per cura del Ministero dell'lnterno
(U.T.E.T., Turin, 1864).
23 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.279: Circ. n. 3758, Avellino, 20 July 1861. The
quoted Circular from M.I., Naples, was No. 2620, 5th Department, 2nd Section, 10 July
1861.
24 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 35: Per la compilazione dell'Annuario uffiziale del
Regno d'ltalia del 1861. Ossia Almanacco. Nozioni generali delta Beneficenza di
Principato Ultra. Another copy in A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., cit.,
Cart. 7a, f. 123.
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Table 5.4.1. Headings of expenditure of the charities of Principato Ulteriore
(1861).
TOTAL INCOME =L. 372,631.28 = TOTAL EXPENDITURE
RATIZZI % FIXED DUTIES % WELFARE %
44,452.92 1 1 .9 254,956.56 68.4 73,221 .80 19.7
It is immediately clear that the most important heading of expenditure for the
charities of Principato Ulteriore were the fixed duties, and that only a fifth of their
income was directly destined to welfare. The three following tables analyse the
internal composition of the headings of expenditure. It must be borne in mind that the
destination of the ratizzi was decided by the Council of the Hospices, whilst the other
two headings of expenditure were decided by the managers of the charities.































11,1 04.23 4,321.99 1,865.1 1 9,210.44 14,137.24 1,912.5 1,901.41
25% 9.7% 4.2% 20.7% 31.8% 4.3% 4.3%
QUOTA OF RATIZZI ALLOCATED FOR WELFARE FOR THE COUNCIL'S UPKEEP
Lire 26,501.77 = 59.6% Lire 17,951.15 = 40.4%
About 60% of the ratizzi were thus spent on welfare, while the rest served to keep
the Council's staff. This roughly confirms the trend described previously. The
composition of the fixed duties of the charities that required 68.42% of their
income/expenditure is particularly worthy of note.
Table 5.4.3. Composition of the fixed duties of the charites of Principato Ulteriore










161,384.4 30,182.26 31,836.79 31,553.95
63.3% 11.8% 12.5% 12.4%
The above table usefully explains the concept of fixed duties, whose bulk consisted of
devotional expenses. We can now observe how the charities, after having paid the
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ratizzi, their own employees and restored their churches, distributed their modest
left-overs for charity - through the Communal Committees.







Fixed benefits Dowries Alms in money and
kind.
21,300.57 22,073.44 4,248.51 1 2,51 0.85 13,088.43
29.1% 30.1% 5.8% 17.1% 17.9%
We can note the great fragmentation of this expenditure and the tiny share devoted to
the hospitals and the orphanage, probably the most deserving institutions. The shares
for alms and dowries, quite ineffective forms of relief, were comparatively high,
while the Conservatorii , often fee-paying and well endowed, seemed to enjoy a
privileged treatment.
The above analysis has clarified the nature and structure of the system with regard
to its elements. To get the precise dimension of the effects of this system on the actual
allocation of its financial resources, we must however re-elaborate the figures so as
to separate the welfare expenditure, whether derived from the Councils via the
ratizzi or directly from the charities through the Communal Committees, from the
administrative and devotional expenditure.
Table 5.4.5. Overall distribution of the welfare expenditure of the charities of
Principato Ulteriore in 1861, in lire.






a b b b a b
1 1,104.23 4,248.51 12,510.85 13,088.43 28,260.54 9,21 0.44 21,300.57
3% 1.1% 3.4% 3.5% 7.6% 2.5% 5.7%
15,352.74 = 4.1% 25,599.28 = 6.9%
total outdoor relief 40,952.02 = 11% Total indoor relief 58,771.55 = 15.8%
Total Welfare Expenditure 99,723.57 = 26.8%
a: from the Councils of the Hospices,
b: from the Local welfare administrations.
*: hospital of Avellino, 4,321.99 (1.2%), from the Council; hospitals of Ariano and
S.Angelo dei Lombardi, 1,865.11 (0.5%), from the Council; various local hospitals and
Loffredo orphanage, 22,073.44 (5.9%), from the Local welfare administrations.
1 60
Table 5.4.6. Overall distribution of the administrative and devotional expenditure
of the charities of Principato Ulteriore in 1861, in lire.







Devotion* Taxes Administr. Casual
expenses
14,137.24 1,912.5 1,901.41 161,384.4 30,182.26 31,836.79 31,553.95
3.8% 0.5% 0.5% 43.3% 8.1 % 8.5% 8.5%
17,951.15 = 4.8% 254,960.4 = 68.4%
Total Administrative and devotional expenditure 272,908.55 = 73.2%
* Including churches' upkeep.
The above figures show the great disproportion between welfare expenditure (about
27% of the total) and administrative and devotional expenditure (about 73%). The
administrative needs of the Council were quite modest (around 5%) when compared
with the devotional duties of the charities (about 43%). The dimensions of the
charities' administrative expenditure as well as those of the unexpected expenses
(both 8.5%), where a variety of abuses could be conveniently concealed, were also
notable. A closer look at the above table shows another important feature: the
disproportion between the contributions to welfare of the Council and the Communal
Committees. The former contributed to welfare, through the redistribution of the
ratizzi, in the proportion of about 7% , subdivided as follows:
Table 5.4.7. Welfare expenditure by the Council of the Hospices in the province of
Avellino in 1861.
Fixed benefits 3% outdoor relief tot.oudoor rel. 3%
Provincial hospitals 1.7 indoor relief
Nat. welf. establ. 2.5 indoor relief tot indoor rel. 4.2%
Effectively the bulk of the meagre welfare expenditure was directly administered by
the charities through the Communal Committees:
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Table 5.4.8.Welfare expenditure by the Local welfare administrations in the
province of Avellino in 1861.
Fixed benefits 1.1% outdoor relief
Dowries 3.4 outdoor relief
Alms 3.5 outdoor relief tot. outdoor rel. 8%
Prov. hospitals 5.9 indoor relief
Prov. conservatorii 5.7 indoor relief tot. indoor rel. 11.6%
This confirms that the Councils of the Hospices had a very limited function in the
distribution of welfare expenditure. Another feature was the predominance of indoor
relief (around 16%) over outdoor relief (around 11%). But it must also be noted
that a third of the indoor relief expenditure was accounted for by the contributions to
the thirty six Conservatorii of the province which could not, by any account, be
compared to hospices, hospitals and poorhouses with regard to their social function.
The archival evidence available does not prove whether the first statistical revision
ordered by De Luca in May 1861 was accomplished throughout the whole province
but those results concerning the City of Avellino have been preserved and are worthy
of a close examination 25. Not to overwhelm the reader with too many tables of data
we will display here only those immediately relevant, referring to the appendix for
the basic elaboration of the raw data.
The thirty-three charities of Avellino were a typical specimen of a variety of pious
foundations. There were twelve confraternities, eight sisterhoods (their female
equivalent), one legacy, five Monti, two Monti di Pieta' , two chapels, one church,
one hospital and one Conservatorio. An overall view at their expenditure shows for
welfare a promising 38.3%, higher than the provincial average.











30,187.72 4,483.08 1,280.78 1 1,485.64 1 1,560.46 1,377.76 30,187.72
1 00% 14.9% 4.2% 38% 38.3% 4.6% 1 00%
25 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279.
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We must however break down the total figure for welfare expenditure to get a more
precise picture (cf. Table No. 1, Appendix 5). Welfare accounted from zero to 3.4%
of the expenditure of the two chapels, the church and congregation of Costantinople,
the twelve confraternities and eight sisterhoods that, all together, represented more
than a third of the total income/expenditure. The bulk of these charities' expenditure
was absorbed by devotional duties (from 53 to 86.5%). The few charities whose
welfare expenditure was high (between 86 and 93%) were the five Monti and the
Barra Legacy, whose devotional expenditure was nil or very low, and whose income
represented less than a twentieth of the total. The other establishments whose
welfare expenditure was relatively high were one of the two Monti di Pieta' (57%),
the hospital (74%) and the Conservatorio (70%). We will regard these two last
establishments as both devoted to indoor relief, though there was a substantial
difference between their nature and function. The subdivision of the welfare
expenditure demonstrates that, as in the province, so in the city of Avellino the
larger share of it was devoted to indoor relief, where the Conservatorio prevailed
over the hospital. Outdoor relief counted for 32% of the total welfare expenditure.
Table 5.4.10. Distribution of the welfare expenditure in Avellino in 1861, in lire,








1 1 ,560.46 68.05 594.56 1,208.7 1,835.15 3,255.5 4,598.5





The contribution to the keeping of foundlings (wet nurses' fees) was tiny - 68.05
lire. From this it is reasonable to infer that concern for abandoned babies was low
among the pious of Avellino 26. Alms were also meagre, while the bulk of the outdoor
relief expenditure was represented by dowries and fixed benefits. Later in this
chapter we will extensively analyse the nature of the fixed benefits, that were
usually awarded not according to the foundation's deeds but rather on government
orders, and rarely relieved true destitution. Thus we will for the moment leave them
aside and concentrate on the dowries. Their importance is evident (cf. tables Nos. 2
and 3, Appendix 5): they represented the highest percentage of outdoor relief
2 6 For the treatment of foundlings in the Bourbon Kingdom see below, chapter 6.1., fn. 1.
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expenditure over the total (6.1%) versus wet nurses' fees (0.2%), alms (2%) and
fixed benefits (4%). They accounted for 83% of the welfare expenditure of the Monti
and 39% of that of the Monti di Pieta', the most generous charities of Avellino. Of the
twenty-two dowries awarded each year one amounted to 61.2 lire, nine averaged 98
lire and twelve were around 74 lire. No newly-wed poor were likely to go very far
with such sums: as most philanthropists lamented, dowries were a useless when not
dangerous form of relief.
Indoor relief expenditure requires a more detailed analysis. A close look at the
income and expenditure of the hospital and Conservatorio reveals that the
administrative expenditure of the two establishments had been split in two and partly
mixed with that of welfare. A sheet drawn by hand had been added to the printed
prospecti. It contained, above the concluding summary, the 'Expenditure of the
special welfare establishments' (i.e. hospital, Conservatorio and one of the two
Monti di Pieta' ). That sheet is reproduced in the table No.10, Appendix 5, under the
heading 'Special establishments'. An examination of the tables Nos. 8 (real expenses)
and 10 (welfare expenses) in the Appendix 5 shows that only part of the expenditure
of employees, teachers and servants' salaries was listed in the former, while the
remaining part was to be found in the latter. To the 183.35 lire (hospital) and
293.25 lire (Conservatorio ) of table No. 8 we must therefore add, respectively, the
255 and 327.25 lire of table No.10. It is quite clear that the separate sheet was
devised to create confusion and conceal part of the administrative expenditure, by
inflating in the meantime that for welfare. This was not the only ambiguity: in the
same table No. 10 another heading 'Total maintenance' (Mantenimento tutto
compreso) is worth noting. We have interpreted it as maintenance of the inmates, but
how much of that expenditure was for the keeping of destitute inmates was not
indicated and cannot be discovered. In this respect the income prospectus (table No.
7, Appendix 5) might help, though it cannot provide a definitive answer. Among the
sources of variable income the column 'Income of various kinds' (pensions,
donations, etc.) shows 688.5 lire for the Conservatorio and 3,293.75 for the
hospital (about 75% of its income). The maintenance column (table No. 10) shows
an expenditure of, respectively, 4,598.5 and 3,255.5 lire. This could mean that
only a seventh of the inmates of the Conservatorio were fee-paying (three or four
out of twenty six), whereas the hospital managed to maintain all its inmates thanks to
pensions and donations. But the impossibility of separating the income deriving from
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pensions or fees from that deriving from donations leaves a big question mark on how
many of the hospital's inmates were actually paying and how many were not.
The same remark applies to the Conservatorio, but here another consideration must
be added. Traditionally girls or women wishing to enter a Conservatorio were
supposed to pay a dowry rather than monthly or annual fees. Dowries were used to
augment the invested capital of the establishment: it may be noted that the
Conservatorio was - with the Monte Fratese - the only charity of Avellino that was
accustomed to lending capital and was, of all the charities, the largest investor in
state bonds (tables Nos. 4 and 7, Appendix 5). Moreover, the establishment was the
only one with a diversified variety of investments, where land-revenue accounted for
53%, and the rest came from liquid capital revenue. This might be interpreted as an
effect of the availability of a considerable amount of liquid capital, deriving from the
dowries, which allowed the Sisters to invest in a more varied way, while the other
charities - Monti di Pieta' excepted - were constrained in their investments by the
nature of the bequests made to them, generally in the form of landed-property. All
this leads to the conclusion that the column 'pensions and donations' did not
represent, in the case of the Conservatorio , all the income deriving from the paying
inmates. Those sheltered for nothing were probably less than six sevenths, perhaps
none at all. The ambiguity of the data does not permit further speculation, but it is
clear that something about the hospital, the Conservatorio and one of the Monti di
Pieta' (see below), had to be concealed. Indeed, the resulting confusion scattered
throughout the prospecti was quite effective. Finally, a look at the ratizzi suggest
they were not at all proportional either to the income or the low contribution to local
welfare (cf. tables Nos. 1 and 10, Appendix 5). The hospital and one of the Monti di
Pieta' were more heavily taxed than the chapels and confraternities, whose welfare
output was nil. The disproportion between the ratizzo imposed on the hospital and
that paid by the Conservatorio was big, though the former spent more in welfare
than the latter. No ratizzo was imposed on the wealthy Church and Congregation of
Constantinople whose only effort in favour of the poor was to award a meagre dowry
each year, while a 4% ratizzo was levied on one of the two Monti di Pieta' which
used to spend 57% of its income in dowries, alms and fixed benefits. The only ratizzo
that seemed to respond to some proportional criterion was that levied on the other
Monte di Pieta' that did not give a penny to the poor and had huge administrative
expenses.
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From the whole analysis of the welfare expenditure of Avellino's charities it is easy
to conclude that very few of them bothered with charity, that outdoor relief was tiny
and of questionable efficacy and that the information provided about indoor relief,
though reassuring at first sight, offers no grounds for positive conclusions. On the
contrary, the mystifying way in which the information was presented suggests that
the figures concerning welfare effectively included expenditure related to fee or
dowry-paying inmates. Having concluded that Avellino's poor were probably having
as thin a time in 1861 as they had long been accustomed, we must now consider the
devotional and real expenses of the charities, as well as their sources of income.
Table 5.4.11. Sources of income of the charities of Avellino in 1861, in lire,
(cf. tables Nos. 4 and 7, Appendix 5)
FIXED I NCOME VARIABLE INCOME TOTAL
19,294.87 = 63.9% 1 0,892.85 36.1% 30,187.72
QUIT-RENTS STATE BONDS RUR.LAND URB.LAND LOANS PENS.-GIFTS
14,318.12 4,076.75 440.73 3,495.65 1,261.17 5,695.3
47.4% 16.5% 1.5% 1 1 .6% 4.2% 18.8%
The most usual source of income were quit-rents, followed by pensions and
donations, revenue from state-bonds, urban landed property, loaned capital and
rural landed property. Table No. 4 (Appendix 5) shows that quit-rents provided
most of the income of the Barra Legacy (100%), the sisterhoods (80%), the
confraternities (75%), the chapels (78%), the Church and Congregation of
Constantinople (64%). The number of the article comprising the quit-rents revenue
indicates how small and fragmented were the properties (cf. table 7, Appendix 5).
Rural landed property, mostly woods, was of some importance only for the
Conservatory , while urban landed property represented a major investment only
for one of the two Monti di Pieta' (tables Nos. 4 and 7, Appendix 5). We have
already discussed "pensions and donations" and can conclude that most of Avellino's
charities displayed little dynamism in their investments.
Real expenditure was dominated by administrative expenses which averaged 43% of
the total. They were up to 100% in six cases: the Barra Legacy and the five Monti;
around 70% in the case of the Conservatorio and hospital: and around 50% in that of
the confraternities, sisterhoods, Church and Congregation of Constantinople (cf. table
No. 5, Appendix 5).
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Table 5.4.12. Real expenditure of the charities of Avellino in 1861, in lire.(cf.
tables Nos. 5 and 8, Appendix 5).







4,483.08 548.93 340.82 1,909.79 1,253.75 233.75 196.04
1 00 12.2% 7.6% 42.6% 28% 5.2% 4.4%
On the whole, real expenditure did not absorb huge shares of the charities' income,
with the exception of the Monti di Pieta' (22 and 60%, cf. tables Nos. 1 and 8,
Appendix 5). In particular, one of them was trying to conceal something: a heading
pertaining to real expenditure (upkeep of the Monte ) had been slipped into the
welfare expenditure on the last sheet of the statistical report as it was the case with
the hospital and Conservatorio (table No. 10, Appendix 5).
A peculiarity of these data is that the expenditure classified as administrative
excluded the salaries to chaplains, sacristans and other servants, since this
expenditure was listed among the devotional expenses (cf. tables Nos. 6, 8 and 9,
Appendix 5). This can mislead a casual reader of the prospecti; but it was not a trick
devised to conceal administrative disorder. On the contrary, it reflected the
particular structure of the southern Church. Phenomena like the high devotional and
low welfare expenditure can be properly understood and put in their correct context
only by taking into account the characteristics of that ecclesiastical structure.
Chapels, confraternities, sisterhoods were essential parts of the basic ecclesiastical
structure, since the physical existence of the churches depended on them. Thus
devotional expenditure was low only in those cases (Legacy, Monti, Conservatorio,
hospital and Monti di Pieta' ) where the foundations had no specific role in the
ecclesiastical structure as a whole. In the other cases the devotional committment
was heavy (from 53 to 87% of the total expenditure), including not only masses,
anniversaries and religious festivites, but also the whole range of expenditure
necessary to allow the religious services themselves to take place.
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Table 5.4.13. Devotional expenditure of the charities of Avellino in 1861, in lire
(cf. tables Nos. 1, 6 and 9, Appendix 5).
HEADING OF EXPENDITURE LIRE % SUBTOTAL
MASSES 3,924.73 34.2
ANNIVERSARIES 239.7 2.1
MISSIONS AND SERMONS 51 0.4
FESTIVITIES, TRIDUA, SEPTENARIES, PROCESSIONS 1,751 15.2 51.9%
OIL, WAX, HOSTS, ETC. 1,927.37 16.8
CHAPLAINS, SACRISTANS AND SERVANTS 3,201.74 27.9
MAINTENANCE OF CHURCHES 141.9 1.2
ECCLESIASTICAL FURNISHINGS 248.2 2.2 48.1
TOTAL OF DEVOTIONAL EXPENSES 1 1 ,485.64 1 00 1 00
The distribution of the devotional duties varied from one charity to another, but the
basic division of the devotional expenditure into the two broad groups mentioned
before was a constant which cannot be interpreted merely as a fault in the welfare
system. The fact that devotional duties weighed so heavily on the charities adversely
affected the assistance to the poor, but it would seem that the root of the problem lay
in the structure of the southern Church, rather than in its willingness or not to
share its own wealth with the poor. The above evidence suggests a relevant role of the
charities within the southern ecclesiastical structures. It is possible that our sample
is totally unrepresentative of the general situation. Therefore the conclusions drawn
from its analysis are far from definitive. Nevertheless it would appear that further
research on the interconnections between welfare foundations and ecclesiastical
structures could shed more light on the socio-religiuos history of Southern Italy.
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5.5. The provisional governments. Lack of social policies, and decrees on
charities.
Between the 7 September 1860 and the 7 November 1861 five provisional
governments followed each other in Naples 27. All were faced with growing
unemployment and pauperism, popular discontent and social unrest. Some measures
were drafted to tackle the causes of poverty, or at least diminish its immediate
effects, but none of the five governments had the courage, time, or the political will
to implement them. According to the idealistic vision of moderates and democrats
alike, the solution of all social problems would lie in political unification, hence
poverty was superficially, and dangerously, overlooked. In the continental South
poverty and unemployment were linked to two main questions: need for agrarian
reform, and crisis of textile manufactures. Peasant hunger for land accompanied the
Thousands enterprise from the outset. In Sicily the popular revolt against the
Bourbons soon developed into a peasant guerrilla against the landed classes.
Garibaldi's decree of 2 June 1860, granting the redistribution of the demesne,
further fuelled the peasants' revolts which were liquidated by means of bloody
repression by the Garibaldian army 28. On the continent the propertied classes
immediately seized the military initiative, to keep the peasants at bay. At first they
tried to win the collaboration of the masses, hence the decrees of 31 August 1860 by
Garibaldi, abolishing the tax on all cereals - except wheat - halving the salt price,
and granting the poor of Cosenza and Casali the right of pasture and sowing on the
demesne of Sila. But - as in Sicily - the peasants interpreted these limited measures
as a full endorsement of their expectations, and land occupations starded to spread.
The landed bourgeosie did not intended it that way. By mid September 1860 Donato
27 Garibaldi's dictatorship (7 Sept.-8 Nov. 1860), Luogotenenza Farini (9 Nov. 1860- 6
Jan. 1861), Luogotenenza Carignano (7 Jan. -20 May 1861), Luogotenenza Ponza di San
Martino (21 May -14 July 1861), Luogotenenza Cialdini (15 July- 8 Nov. 1861). On the
provisional governments in the Neapolitan provinces and Sicily see A. Scirocco,
Governo e paese net Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) (Giuffre, Milan,
1963); G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna, V, La costruzione dello Stato Unitario
(Milan, Feltrinelli, 1968), pp. 119-178; E. Passerin D'Entreves, L'ultima battaglia
politica di Cavour. I problemi dell' unificazione italiana , (ILTE, Turin, 19562), pp.137-
38; Idem, 'L'incontro fra le due Italie', in Nicola Raponi (ed.), Dagli Stati preunitari
d'antico regime all'unificazione (II Mulino, Bologna, 1981); on their legislative action:
G. Astuti, L'unificazione amministrativa del Regno d'ltalia (Morano, Naples, 1966), pp.
31-35.
28 Franco Molfese, 'Lo scioglimento dell'esercito meridionale garibaldino (1860-1861)',
Nuova Rivista Storica, Vol XLIV, 1960, pp. 2-4; S. Woolf, 'La storia politica e sociale',
in Storia d'ltalia, 3, (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp. 499-501.
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Morelli, governor of Cosenza, repealed the decree concerning the demesne of Sila,
while the provisional government of Lucania issued strong warnings against any
attempts to private property. From the very outset it was clear that there was no
room for the peasants' demands on the agenda of the southern patrioti, whose greedy
blindness would inevitably attribute the discontent of the masses to the Bourbon
reaction 29.
The rural masses were particularly keen to obtain a fair redistribution of the
communal demesne, which was long-overdue. In 1806 the abolition of feudality was
followed by a law decreeing the partition of the demesne between its ancient
beneficiaries - feudatories, clergy, and communes. The portions belonging to the
communes would be distributed to the peasants by lot. The aim of the French was to
favour the spreading of small holdings, but the result was different. Not only those
few peasants who obtained a parcel of land were soon compelled to sell it for want of
means to cultivate it, but the allotting of the communal demesne took a long time,
during which the land was usurped by the bourgeoisie. The Bourbons did very little to
speed up the procedures, and the communal demesne question was still pending when
Garibaldi arrived. The peasants' claim to the communal land had played a central role
during the 1848 upsurge and was equally central to the popular expectations and
riots in 1860 and 1861. Yet the provisional governments either ignored it, or did
too little to resolve it. Farini seemed aware of the importance of the issue. Pressed by
the reports of land riots from the provinces, on 1 January 1861 he issued a decree
for the settlement of the communal demesne question, appointing five commissioners
with large powers. Unfortunately, a few days later Farini was fired, on the pretext of
his illness and bereavement. Turin, solely interested in a speedy administrative
unification, disliked his conciliatory and gradual approach, and never fully supported
him. On the other hand, Farini devoted all his energies to drawing up a
comprehensive and ambitious plan of action, but in the attempt to solve all problems
in a organic and definitive manner, he failed to concentrate on the most urgent issues.
This gave credibility to the arguments mounted by his opponents - hence no credit
was given to his political strategy. Although the land riots were spreading, during the
first stage of the Luogotenenza Carignano the demesne decree was frozen and set aside
by Don Liborio Romano, who believed in repression and public works to keep the
29 Franco Molfese, 'Lo scioglimento dell'esercito meridionale garibaldino (1860-1861)',
cit., pp. 4-11,13-14; Alessandro D'Alessandro, 'II Governo provvisorio Lucano ed i
moti contadini', Nuova Rivista Storica, Vol. XLV, 1961, pp. 140-47. See also above,
2.2.
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populace quiet . Hence the demesne commissioners appointed by Farini started their
work only during the spring of 1861, thanks to the more realistic vision of Silvio
Spaventa, who had replaced Romano during the second phase of the Luogotenenza
Carignano. The solution of the demesne question was equally high on the agenda of the
two last Luogotenenti , Ponza di San Martino and Cialdini, but the commissioners'
work of retrieving documents was time consuming, hence the legal procedures could
not by any means be terminated by December 1861, as promised by Farini. At the
abolition of the Neapolitan Luogotenenza the demesne commissioners were dismissed,
and their job taken over by the prefects. The repartition procedures dragged on for at
least another fifty years: as late as 1909 they were incomplete. The failure to
resolve such an overdue question meant that, in 1861, while the demesne
commissioners were gathering documents, the land riots got out of hand. Now the
discontented peasants could be called brigands, and treated accordingly. Whatever
affection Garibaldi had won from the masses had vanished. With a remarkable lack of
realism, most politicians seemed unable to make the connection between brigandage
and the government's failure to respond to the poor peasants' hunger for land and
social justice 30.
The crisis of the textile mills also dated back to the Bourbon period. The Bourbon
kingdom was by no means an industrial country, yet some concentration and
modernization had occured in the cotton and woollen manufactories, largely owned by
foreign industrialists. After 1820 local production of wool, cotton and raw silk had
improved in quantity and quality. Foreign entrepreneurs set up factories and rural
industry expanded. The State heavily subsidized the mechanic sector, but little
stimulus came from the internal market, given the stagnation of agriculture. Textile
30 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) ,
cit., pp. 7-12, 39-41, 53-55, 100, 111-13, 119-40, 151-52, 163-64, 208-214,
230-33, 245, 255, 268-71, 276-78, 320-21; Aurelio Lepre, Storia del Mezzogiorno
nel Risorgimento (Riuniti, Rome, 1969), pp. 7-15, 186, 203-04, 209-12, 281-83; F.
Delia Peruta, 'Aspetti sociali del '48 nel Mezzogiorno', in Id., Democrazia e socialismo
nel Risorgimento (Riuniti, Rome, 1973, 2nd ed.), pp. 109-21; Paola Corti, 'Movimento
contadino: dall'unita alia resistenza', in Storia d'ltalia, 2 (La Nuova Italia, Florence,
1978), pp. 685-89; John A Davis, Conflict and Control. Law and Order in Nineteenth-
Century Italy (MacMillan, London, 1988), pp. 169-82. For a general overview of the
transformation of land ownership in the South between the seventeenth and twentieth
century see Rosario Villari, Mezzogiorno e contadini nell'eta moderna (Laterza, Bari,
1977), pp. 5-182. On the demesne ripartition after 1861 see Giustino Fortunato, 'La
questione demaniale nell'ltalia meridionale', in II Mezzogiorno e to Stato italiano.
Discorsi politici (1880-1910) (Bari, 1911), vol. I, pp. 88-95; Romualdo Trifone, Feudi
e demani. Eversione della feudalita nelle province napoletane (SEI, Milan, 1909), pp.
528-43.
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and mechanic industry developed separatly from one another, and were unable to
compete on the international market 31. Locally manufactured cotton fabrics were
dearer than imported ones, but until 1846 they were protected by import tariffs.
Hence the tariff reform of 1846, which reduced the import duties on cotton fabrics
but maintained those on raw cotton to protect local production, greatly damaged the
cloth mills, fully exposing the intrinsic weakness of the industrial structure of the
Kingdom. According to data produced in 1847 by the industrialists, seven mills had
been closed, many more had reduced production, and ten thousand jobs had been lost.
The crisis also hit the cottage industry, which played an important role in a pre-
industrial economy. Thirty thousand looms which provided bread for ninety thousand
people had been abandoned. In 1860 the industrialists requested a moderate
protection of their products, and the abolition of the protection of local raw cotton.
Otherwise they forecast the loss of at least sixty thousand jobs and the total
destruction of the cottage industry, which supported eight hundred thousand people.
No notice was taken of their requests. The new tariff, implemented on 10 October
1860, reduced but did not abolish the protection on raw local cotton, while
maintained a moderate protection of cotton fabrics. The last straw was the
implementation of the Piedmontese tariff, on 1 January 1861. At that point the
textile manufacturers had no defence against foreign competition, while their stock of
fabrics for the Bourbon army remained unsold, and no commissions were coming
from the Piedmontese army, nor subsidies or loans from the government. The
southern industrialists hoped for a revision of the tariffs, but during the
Parliamentary debate in May 1861 they failed to put their cause in a favourable
3^ Richard S. Eckaus, 'The North-South Differential In Italian Economic Develpment', The
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XX, No. 3, Sept. 1961, pp. 281-317; Alberto
Caracciolo, 'La storia economica', in Storia d'ltalia, 3 (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), pp. 572-
77; Giovanni Aliberti.'lndustria e societa meridionale nell'eta liberista (1861-1887)',
Ricerche di storia sociaie e religiosa, No.3, Jan.-June 1973, pp. 311-39; John A.
Davis, Societa e imprenditori nel Regno Borbonico 1815/1860 (Laterza, Bari, 1979)
[Original English version: John A. Davis, Merchants, monopolists and contractors. A
Study of Economic Activity and Society in Bourbon Naples (1815-1860) (Arno Press,
New York, 1981)]; Alain Dewerpe, 'Crescita e ristagno proto-industriali nell'ltalia
meridionale: la Valle del Liri", in Andreina De Clementi (ed.), La societk inafferrabile
(Ed. Lavoro, Rome, 1986), pp. 93-115 (original version: 'Croissance et stagnation
protoindustrielles en Italie meridionale: la Vallee du Liri au XIXe siecle', in Melanges de
TEcole Francaise de Rome, 1981, pp. 277-345).
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light, while the southern deputies proved once again to be out of touch with their
country's problems and priorities 32.
Since no long-term policies were implemented by the provisional governments on
the two fundamental issues of communal demesne and local industry, only temporary
measures could be taken to avoid the worsening of pauperism, but the provisional
rulers failed also on this front. On 31 August 1860 Garibaldi abolished the flour tax
and reduced the salt tax but both measures were repealed once the new regime was
fully in power - unlike in Sicily, where the abolition of the flour tax was
maintained. In the continental South the scarcity of cereal crops, and the high food
demand of the army caused an increase of bread prices, hence in September 1860
Garibaldi's government appointed a committee to study how to eliminate pauperism,
and planned some measures for Naples, which mostly remained on paper. A decree
issued on 11 September ordered the establishment of twelve kindergartens, one in
each district of the city. As late as November 1861 only four had been opened, whilst
in 1862 the commune was still looking for suitable buildings for the other eight.
Another decree of September 1860 set up an ambitious program of public works, to
demolish insalubrious buildings, build decent houses for the lower classes and public
buildings, and provide jobs to the unemployed. The parish priests would draw up
lists of the poor to be occupied in the works. The funds would be provided by the
abolished civil list, and other unspecified sources. The works never started, and the
indigent of Naples, far from getting work and decent homes, had to make do with
subsidies and bread vouchers, thanks to the old-fashioned approach of Liborio
Romano. From September 1860 to June 1861 the populace of the capital was kept
quiet with the daily distribution of firstly 25,000 and later 40,000 bread vouchers.
The poor of the provinces were not so lucky: throughout the provisional rule the
provision and distribution of cheap wheat, although requested by the provincial
governors, was rejected as a 'Bourbon' policy contrary to the healthy principles of
Ttalt 33. According to Farini and his Finance Minister, Scialoja, poverty and
32 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) ,
cit., pp. 64-66, 250-254, 318-319, A. Lepre, Storia del Mezzogiorno nel
Risorgimento, cit., pp. 158-59, 172-74, 176-77, Gino Luzzatto, L'economia italiana
dal 1861 al 1894 (Einaudi, Turin, 1968), pp. 21-28. On the economy of the Bourbon
state before the unification see also: R. Villari, Mezzogiorno e contadini nell'eta
moderna , cit., pp. 185-229.
33 For Naples' refurbishment see: M. R. M., Carte Agostino Bertani, Cart. 49, plico XIV, f.
3: list of decrees signed by Liborio Romano (11, 14, and 25 Sept. 1860); f. 30:
Garibaldi's decree, sept. 1860, in 12 arts., detailing the program of public works in
Naples. The planning of the refurbishments was entrusted to a committee formed by the
lawyers Emilio Civita and Giovanni Balsamo, the physicians Salvatore De Renzi and
1 73
unemployment should find relief in an organic program of public works, financed and
organized by the communes. The problem was that the communes had no money to
spare in such unprofitable enterprises: during the dictatorship even the existing
schemes had been abandoned for lack of funds. Notwithstanding repeated entreaties by
the various Luogotenenze, the communes showed no political will to comply, thus the
public works never started, and the unemployment'figures kept growing 34.
The gravity of the country's social problems should have triggered at least a public
debate, perhaps some initiative to reform the welfare system like that devised in
Bologna by Albicini and Massei. Yet it seems that only the democrat Giuseppe
Ricciardi 35 proposed a reform to Garibaldi and Bertani - and this was notable only
for its abstractness and ingenuity. The abolition of begging would be obtained by
employing all able bodied poor in public works financed by the communes, and by
granting a weekly benefit of fifteen carlini to each pauper unable to work. The funds
would be provided by the confiscation of all mort-main assets, while indirect taxes
would be abolished. As Alfonso Scirocco argued, this project demonstrated how little
Ricciardi was aware of the real aspirations of the poor, who wanted land and dignity,
not charity. Still, Ricciardi was not alone: the degree of insensitivity to the socio-
economical needs of the South displayed by the democrats, northerners and
southerners alike, and their inability to draw up long-term political strategies,
justify the opinion that Garibaldi's fellows were no better prepared to cope with the
South than Cavour's men. After all, democrats and moderates alike were men of the
bourgeoisie, respectful of private property, and ignorant of the lower classes'
aspirations and mentality. Gramsci's interpretation of the role of the democrats in
the unification seems confirmed by recent research, while the argument that the
democrats offered a real political alternative appears weak, abstract, and riddled
with internal contradictions 36.
Mario Turchi, the architects Luigi Giura, Nicola Montella, and Paolo De Lucia, the
economists Antonio Turchiarulo and Costantino Baer, plus the architect Francesco
Mastellano as secretary. For kindergartens and bread vouchers see: A. Scirocco,
Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61), cit., pp. 48,
51-52, 62-63, 109, 130. About the appalling housing situation in the poor districts of
Naples 20 years later see: P. Macry, 'Borghesie, citta e stato. Appunti e impressioni su
Napoli: 1860-1880', cit., pp. 149-58.
34 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) ,
cit., pp. 52, 100, 109-13, 131-35, 152-55, 159-61, 197-98, 237-38, 274-76.
33 About Ricciardi's role within the democratic movement see: Franco Delia Peruta, 'Per
la storia deU'emigrazione meridionale', Nuova Rivista Storica, vol. 1, 1966, pp.429-
52.
33 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61),
cit., pp. 39-41; Idem, Democrazia e socialismo a Napoli dopo I'Unita (1860-1878)
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However, it seems that Ricciardi's project for the abolition of begging was not taken
seriously by Garibaldi and his ministers who, conversely, paid some attention to the
charities. No reform of the welfare system was attempted, as in the ex-Papal States,
nor was the Piedmontese legislation implemented, as in the ex-Duchies of Modena and
Parma. But first the Dictator, and later the Luogotenenti, tried to eliminate the
clergy from the welfare administration, trim the charities' devotional expenditure as
much as possible, and put some order in the Councils. Even these limited objectives
were difficult for the new administrators. A first attempt to know the amount of the
charities' assets, investigate their maladministration, and ensure they were used
solely to relieve poverty was made in September 1860, when an inquiry was
entrusted to committees of notables, to be set up in each province 37. We do not know
whether these committees ever materialized, nor the results of their investigations.
However, another decree followed on 23 October 1860, issued by the Pro-Dictator
Pallavicino. It abolished the Bourbon decrees of 1 February 1845, 6 September
1852, 4 March 1856, and 18 May 1857. The ecclesiastics were thus expelled from
the Councils of the Hospices and the Local Administrations, and the bishops were
ordered to restore to the Councils the properties granted to them in 1856, as well as
the chapels and confraternities of the Holiest Body of Christ, whose control they had
obtained in 1857. The Interior Ministry calculated that this operation would see five
million lire of charities' assets returned to the Councils and Local Administrations.
The charities' devotional duties were not in question, but their performance was
entrusted to the Councils, as before 1856. It was a first blow to the privileged
position which the church had gained within the welfare system through years of
skillful negotiations; and the bishops resisted as best they could. No comprehensive
data are available, but there is evidence that most bishops obstructed the
implementation of the decree by refusing or delaying the restitution of the
properties, while the Councils often proved less than energetic in repossessing the
charities. Moreover the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs did not cooperate with
(Libreria Scientifica Ed., Naples, 1973), pp. 5-21. For a thorough analysis of the
political struggle between democrats and moderates during the dictatorship see ibidem,
pp. 25-43. Cf. also: A. Lepre, Storia del Mezzogiorno net Risorgimento , cit., pp. 263-
64, 281-283. For Gramsci's notes on moderates and democrats see: A. Gramsci, II
Risorgimento (Einaudi, Turin, 1949), pp. 70-75, 81, 83-87, 103-107. For an
unconvincing alternative interpretative model see R. Villari, Mezzogiorno e contadini
nell'eti moderna , cit., pp. 233-66 passim and partic. pp. 235-54, 259.
37 M. R. M., Carte Agostino Bertani, Cart. 49, plico XIV, f. 37: Garibaldi's decree, Sept.
1860, in 5 articles; f. 38: Osservazioni sulla proposta di decreto qui allegato.
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that of the Interior by putting appropriate pressure on the bishops 38. No further
action on charities was taken during the first Luogotenenza . Farini tried to win the
favours of the Church by implementing a conciliatory policy. Therefore he did not
bring in question the remaining privileges of the clergy, who were still in charge of
the administrative boards of the single charities and welfare establishments.
However Farini did not completely ignore the welfare problem, and ordered a
rigorous revision of the fixed benefits - to which we will pay full attention later 39.
The conciliatory line followed by Farini towards all components of the southern
society was abandoned by his successor at the head of the Luogotenenza, Prince
Eugenio Savoia Carignano. Turin had not appreciated Farini's cautious approach, and
wanted to speed up the implementation of the Piedmontese administrative laws. This
task was largely entrusted to Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, who had been appointed
Minister of Justice and Ecclesiatical affairs at the beginning of February 1861. He
rushed into effect the penal code, the code of penal procedure, the judiciary law, and
hurriedly prepared a package of ecclesiastical measures, which he published on 17
February 1861 in the form of seven decrees, known as 'the Mancini decrees'. With
them Mancini abolished the 1818 Concordat, suppressed the diocesan commissions,
reintroduced the Royal Economato for the vacant benefices and implemented the
Piedmontese Act of 29 May 1855 suppressing the greater part of the religious
orders 40. One of the seven decrees of 17 February 1861 was devoted to the
38 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 1a, f. 3: M.I. memo, No. 1023,
without date, outlining the content of the 23 Oct. 1860 decree and explaining its
necessity in order to retrieve five million lire of charities' assets; Council of the
Hospices of Cosenza, Circular 27 Nov. 1860, reproducing the text of the decree 23 Oct.
1860, and giving instructions on its implementation; Cart. 6a, f. 122: M.I. circulars to
the Councils, Nos. 9461, 9911 and 10400, Naples, 27 Oct., 29 Nov. and 27 Dec.1860;
Cart. 1a, f. 3: Council of the Hospices of Salerno, Circular No. 7085, 7 Nov. 1860, to
the Mayors; Letters to M.I. from the Councils of: Caserta, 21st Dec. 1860, 26 Febr.
1861; Avellino, 22 and 26 Dec. 1860, 5 June 1861; Teramo, 4 Jan. 1861; Potenza, 30
Jan. 1861; Salerno, 1st and 18 Dec. 1860; Lecce, 21 Dec. 1860; Bari, 30 Jan. 1861;
M.I., No. 10413, Naples 29 Dec. 1860; Nos. 52 and 610, 5 Jan. and 8 Febr. 1861, to
Min. Eccl. Aff.; the latter to the former, No. 536, Naples, 5 Jan. 1861.
39 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) ,
cit., pp. 100, 103, 120-23, 177-78; Lorenzo Frugiuele, La Sinistra e i cattolici.
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini giurisdizionalista anticlericale (Vita e Pensiero, Milan,
1985), pp. 30-31; A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 5a, f. 98:
M.I. circular No. 9920, Naples 29 Nov. 1860, object: Si dispone accurato scrutinio delle
condiizoni dei sussidiati fissi.
40 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61) ,
cit., pp. 175-88, 191-92; L. Frugiuele, La Sinistra e i cattolici. Pasquale Stanislao
Mancini giurisdizionalista anticlericale (Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1985), pp. 31-43; G.
D'Amelio, 'La proclamazione dell'unita d'ltalia e i problemi di politica ecclesiastica', in
Pietro Agostino D'Avack (ed.), La legislazione ecclesiastica (Pozza, Vicenza,1967),
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charities. The clergy was expelled from the administrative boards of all charities and
welfare establishments. Old managers and members of the clergy who had
administered charitable foundations were ordered to report on their past actions. The
devotional expenditure was reduced by abolishing all those religious functions which
were not enshrined in the charities' foundation deeds 41. This decree completed the
process of laicization of the welfare administration started during the Dictatorship,
but was difficult to implement, especially with regard to the reduction of the
devotional expenditure. Hence the late issue of a unsuccessful circular on 9 October
1861, the very day on which the suppression of the Provisional Government of the
Neapolitan Provinces was announced, with effect from 1 November 42.
5.6. The devotional expenditure.
The evidence from Avellino, previously analysed, indicates that the problem of the
charities' devotional expenditure was critical to the reordering of the welfare
administration in the South. Not surprisingly enforcement of those parts of the
decrees on charities, concerning the reduction of the devotional duties, proved
impossible. Theoretically the dispositions of the decree of 17 February 1861, and
the revision of the budgets ordered with the decree of 23 October 1860, should
temovedall abuses caused by clerical interference in the charities' administration. In
practice the formal expulsion of the clergy from the administrative boards could not
erase an ancient tradition. The Interior Ministry in Naples soon realised, from the
'revised budgets' and reports coming from the provinces, that a great part of the
cit., pp.55-60; Pietro Bellini, 'Le leggi ecclesiastiche separatiste e giurisdizionaliste
(1848-1867)', ibidem, pp. 168-170; Giuseppe Olivero, 'Gli enti ecclesiastici secolari e
regolari', ibidem, p. 398.
41 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 1a, f. 3: Council of the Hospices,
circular No. 412, Teramo, 8 march 1861, to the Myaors and chairmen of the charities,
reproducing the 17 Febr. 1861 decree, which abolished articles 4 and 7 of the decree of
1st February 1816, the decree 14 february 1816, articles 2, 4, 7 and 8 of the decree
29 February 1816, and the decree of 7 December 1832. See also: G. D'Amelio,
Stato e Chiesa. La legislazione ecclesiastica fino al 1867 (Giuffre, Milan, 1961),
pp.174-221, and part. 194.
42 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 2a, f. 35: M.I., circular No. 140,
Naples, 9 October 1861, to the governors, object: Per sopprimersi le spese assegnate
alle opere di culto di consuetudine, rispettandosi quelle di obbligo. On the mentioned
decrees cf. also: S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto iltaliano , cit. vol.1, pp.27-29;
E. Vecchione, E.Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza nella citta di Napoli (Naples,
1908), pp. 395-396.
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devotional duties were purely customary, and not legitimized by the foundation's
deeds. In the province of Salerno alone the customary devotional expenditure
amounted to at least 20,000 ducats a year, while the province badly needed an
hospital for women, an orphanage for girls, and improvements to the inadequate
orphanage for boys 43. Thus an attempt was made to know the real dimensions of the
problem and solve it. The revision of the budgets was temporarily suspended and the
Councils of the Hospices were ordered with Circular 9 October 1861 to provide
statistics to distinguish the consududinary devotional duties - to be abolished - from
those legally founded 44. The effective impossibility of enforcing the 17 February
decree had thus obliged the Interior Minister to follow the example of Nicola De Luca
in the province of Avellino five months earlier. That bright Governor had
immediately realized that, to stop the plundering of 'the patrimony of the poor', it
was first of all necessary to discover the extent of the fraud 45. To this end he had
set, in the forms which he designed and that we have previously described, two
columns: one for obligatory devotional duties, and one for the customary ones. But,
as the prospecti regarding the city of Avellino witness, the second column was -
without exception -left blank. All devotional duties appeared to be obligatory.
The fact was that, through the centuries and under the influence of the clergy, the
Communes had transferred the charities' revenues from the original charitable
purposes to devotional and ecclesiastical ones, in order to reduce their own share of
the parish and main churches upkeep. This practice was formalized by the bishops
who, during the pastoral visitations had established the Tabelle : inventories fixing
in each commune the amount and subdivision of the devotional expenditure according
to the available resources. As we saw above, during the French period most devotional
duties were suppressed but, with the Restoration, the clergy was restored to
the management of the pious foundations and the old practices were resumed. The 20
May 1820 Instructions contained one disposition, article 30, intended to abolish the
abuses and to restore the original purposes of the charities, but the combined
43 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 2a, f. 35: the Council of the
Hospices, Salerno, October 1861, No. 6507, to M.I., Naples.
44 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 2a, f. 35: M.I., circular No. 140,
Naples, 9 October 1861, to the governors, object: Per sopprimersi le spese assegnate
alle opere di culto di consuetudine, rispettandosi quelle di obbligo . A.C.S., M.I., O.P.,
1861-73, B. 54: Circ. No.1151 to the Mayors, Benevento, 25 October 1861; B. 279:
the Council of Potenza, 11 December 1861, to M.I.; the Council of Avellino, 1st
December 1861, to M.I., Turin.
45 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 2a, f. 35: the Council of
Avellino, October 1861, No. 6146, to M.I., Naples; A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.
279: Avellino, 1st December 1861, cit.
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pressure of the clergy and the communes succeded at last in obtaining the legal
restoration of the old sustem. The decree of the 7 December 1832, ordering that the
budgets include all devotional duties, irrespective of origin, and to make the sums
thus allocated unconditionally available to the bishops, meant the effective abolition
of art. 30 of the 1820 Instructions 46. Therefore the 17 February 1861 decree and
the circular of 9 October that - it must be noted - did not apply to the
confraternities, displeased both the clergy and the communes. The upkeep of main
churches and maintenance of clergy lacking other forms of income were now
seriously threatened. Many municipal authorities "...loudly claimed that customary
devotional expenditure must be maintained not only to respect the tradition, but also
to conform to the so-called Platee' 47. These were merely documents drawn up by
lawyers and describing the sources of income of the foundations and their destination.
Litathe Tabelle they had nothing to do with the original foundation deeds and their
legal value was nil 48. Yet, as the search for the foundation's deeds proved largely
unsuccessful and worries about the political effects of a rigid enforcement of the
reductionist dispositions increased, the Ministry surrendered. Despite the contrary
advice of some officials, the Minister agreed that Tabelle and Platee could be taken
in account instead of untraceable foundation deeds, and that customary devotional
expenses be allowed, only for 1862, in those cases of real necessity 49. Some
Councils, like that of Benevento, never produced the required statistics of the
devotional duties arguing that, with the imminence of the new Act on charities, the
revision of the budgets was unnecessary 50. Others proved eager to remove the
abuses, but were forced to accept compromises.
Again the documentation from Avellino is particularly rich and permits a deeper
insight into the matter 51. Besides ordering the statistical revision long before the
Interior Ministry assessed its need, De Luca forbade the pious foundations from using
any savings and left-overs for any but charitable purposes. When the 9 October
46 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: Campobasso , No. 1370, 28 May 1862, to M.I.;
Potenza, 11 December 1861, cit.
47 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: Campobasso, No. 1370, cit.
48 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: Campobasso, No. 1370, cit.
49 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: from Campobasso and Potenza, cit. and M.I.
answer, Turin, 13 June 1862.
50 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 54: Benevento, 15 May 1862, to M.I. and M.I. answer,
Turin 6 June 1862, where it was stressed that the Council must apply the current law
without speculating about the novelties to come.
51 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279: Avellino, 1st december 1861 and 5 April 1862 to
M.I.
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1861 Circular confirmed the correctness of his decisions, De Luca proposed to the
Ministry a series of radical measures concerning the execution of the circular. Any
devotional duty should be suspended until documented as legally founded. One month
would be allowed to produce the documentation. All devotional duties not documented
in the given time would be considered customary and therefore suppressed. The
expenses met by the local authorities to find and produce the documentation were to
be deducted from the provincial fund allocated for those devotional expenses liable to
be suppressed. Any restoration and refurbishing of churches would be forbidden and
suspended. If such were indispensable, the necessary money would be taken from the
funds allocated for ordinary devotional expenses, which would be therefore
suspended. Why - argued De Luca - should not churches be refurbished using
ecclesiastical money? It would be odd to ask a church to pay for the restoration of an
orphanage. So the reverse should be true. Finally De Luca recommended that the
koQ
confraternities ' Should be obliged to document and reduce their devotional
expenditure, since their patrimonies derived from pious legacies like those of the
other pious foundations. De Luca sent these proposals in October 1861 but, due to
bureaucratic delays, they were approved by the Ministry only after he sent a second
report on the matter, in January 1862. Immediately he ordered the Mayors to apply
the above mentioned measures. He was inundated with protests. Most Communal
Committees, though lay, claimed to be unable to produce the original deeds and
inquired whether equivalent deeds would be acceptable. One month was said to be too
short a term. It was unadvisable to suspend the devotional duties: Easter was
approaching and the populace would get very upset if the traditional solemnities were
abruptly abolished. The Council, aware of the political delicacy of the matter,
abandoned its rigid position almost entirely. 'Equivalent' deeds (i.e. Platee and
Tabelle ) were accepted; the term for producing the documentation was extended to
the end of 1862; no devotional expenses were suppressed for 1862, but it was
severely forbidden to insert them in the 1863 budgets without permission from the
Council.
The compromise, effectively a near-defeat, was reached in the province of Avellino
early in April 1862. Though this cannot be documented, it is probable that the
analogous directions given by the Ministry to the Councils of the other provinces in
June were largely founded on Avellino's case. If a perspicacious Governor like De
Luca had failed, others would fail. During the space of sixteen months an
administrative battle of the greatest importance had been started with enthusiasm,
fought without due preparation and irremediably lost. The Ministry's instructions to
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the Councils stressed for pages that devotional duties were allowed only for 1862 and
that the 17 February 1861 decree was not obsolete, for the sake of the poor. But
everyone knew that, in the matter of charities, novelties were imminent likely to
wipe away the dispositions issued by the provisional governments. The charities'
devotional duties were surely only one of the problems of the South, and it is
arguable whether a better prepared strategy was likely to disentangle so ancient a
knot. Yet it was a battle lost by the new state.
5.7. The reform of the Councils' staff.
The provisional governments not only tried to trim the charities' devotional duties,
and expel the clergy from the welfare administration, but they also attempted to
sanitize the offices of the Councils of the Hospices, that were very not only weak
filters of the sparse expenditure on welfare, but were also hotbeds of
maladministration and corruption. The great disorder endemic in the Councils' offices
became fully evident in October 1860, when the Interior Ministry ordered the
revision of the Councils' budgets. The new budgets were rarely prepared on time and
were often returned from Turin with caustic remarks on how expenditure should be
properly detailed and not mixed with income 52. Administrative disorder was an old
problem. According to a prospectus published in July 1852 by the Council of the
Hospices of L'Aquila (Abruzzo Ulteriore II), in 1849 that Council was in arrears
with the examination of 6,335 accounts. In 1852 this figure had grown to 7,153.
During that year 500 accounts had been dispatched and 2,391 were under
examination. The sums collected amounted to 171.06 Ducats whilst another
2,690.32 had still to be exacted. The revision of the budgets had been carried out for
127 charities, a mere seventh of the total. Yet such a situation was seen as a
satisfactory one by Don Niccolo' Dommarco, president of the General Council of the
Hospices of L'Aquila and signatory of the prospectus 53. We can infer that, before
1850, it was pure chaos. Maladministration was not only the result of the ignorance
of the Councils' employees of the 1820 Instructions, but was also the consequence of
deliberate falsification. This also was an old problem, which the Bourbon
52 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 23 (L'Aquila), 42 (Bari), 54 (Benevento).
33 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.23. Widespread maladministration also in province of
Catanzaro, see: M.A.Teti, 'L'amministrazione della pubblica beneficenza in Calabria
Ultra dal 1809 al 1830', cit., pp. 146, 150.
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bureaucrats had tried to solve by means of circulars. In 1847 the Interior Ministry
ordered the Councils to list all expenditure in the budgets , in an attempt to stop the
habit of allocating money outside the budgets. In 1852 another circular tried to stop
a widespread abuse which was creating serious financial difficulties to the welfare
establishments. The accountants of charities and Councils used to pocket part of the
charities' income. The remedies suggested by the circular were unlikely to work,
since they supposed a sudden moralization of a notoriously immoral staff, without
providing any effective deterrent 54.
In 1860 the reform of the Councils' staff was not ordered by any specific decree
concerning the charities, but was part of the cautious program of 'purification' of the
civil service started by Farini 55. Some samples will help understanding the criteria
followed to sanitize a particularly corrupted branch of the Bourbon administration.
By the end of November 1860 the Governor of the province of Potenza had
accomplished his inquiry of that Council's employees 56. The report he sent to Naples
was divided in nine sectors: name; age; native town; rank; public opinion of: honesty,
culture, political tendencies; Governor's opinion; and observations. The honesty of
the eleven employees (there were no comments about the janitor) was classified as:
censurable [two], fragile [two], blameless [five] and good [two]. The two 'good'
employees were also of 'excellent' political opinions. Of the five 'blameless', two
were politically 'good' and three 'indifferent'. Of the two employees endowed with
'fragile' honesty one was 'indifferent' and the other politically 'questionable'. The two
dishonest were, respectively, 'very bad' and 'censurable ' in their political attitudes.
These two, Vincenzo and Raffaele Spada, were brothers and held the key offices of
secretary and chief accountant of the Council. The other important positions were
also held by 'questionable' men. Vincenzo Janibelli, honorary secretary, was morally
fragile and Gaetano Chiantore, accountant, was 'morally fragile' and 'politically
questionable'. In other words: the secretary was corrupt and the honorary secretary
was prone to his will. Of the three accountants one was corrupt and executed the
orders of the secretary, his brother. The other accountant was easily manageable and
the third, 'blameless', was left in ignorance. The remaining employees, not holding
54 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., cit., Cart. 5a, f. 111: M.I. Circular,
Naples, 15 May 1847, to the Intendants; Cart. 7a, f. 124: General Council of the
Hospices, Circular No. 7, Teramo, 16 April 1852, to the Mayors, object: Nuove
disposizioni Ministeriali sul versamento delle reste di cassa e significatorie.
5 5 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61),
cit., pp. 100-103.
5® A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.382: Stato Censorio degl'impiegati del Consiglio degli
Ospizi di Basilicata , Potenza, 24 November 1860.
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key positions, ranged from 'good' to 'blameless honesty'. The cultural level ranged
from 'sufficient' to 'nil'. The sections 'Observations' and 'Governor's opinion' provide
the clue to interpreting the criteria followed to purge the staff of Potenza's Council.
Dismissal or transfer was suggested only for the two worst elements, but for only
three was it stressed that they must keep their place. For the other six the recurrent
formula was 'he can be tolerated'.
Clearly the Governor of Potenza was unwilling to upset the existing administrative
order except in extremely serious cases. The dismissal of too many employees could
create a critical administrative situation, for want of skilled and honest staff, as well
as contributing to the spread of discontent and alarm among the administrative ranks.
The observation 'He is poor', regarding Gaetano Chiantore, the accountant described
as 'morally fragile', 'politically questionable' and 'ignorant', highlights the decision
of the Governor not to break with the local tradition of considering the welfare
administration as a natural shelter for destitute galantuomini. The Governor limited
his staff reform to the replacement of Vittorio Spada with the educated, honest and
patriotic priest Emilio Maffei, who had suffered prison and exile under the Bourbons
57. Similar decisions were taken at Teramo (I Abruzzo Ultra) and Salerno
(Principato Citeriore). In Teramo only one out of ten employees was dismissed, and
for political reasons. The two sacked in Salerno were particularly corrupt: Federigo
Giannone, who had personally profited from rent contracts, etc., and Raffaele delta
Corte, who expected a fee from the charities' treasurers as a condition for the
execution of routine paper-work 58.
Elsewhere the worst elements remained, thanks both to their manoeuvring and the
lack of initiative of the political authorities. Such was the case of the secretary of the
Council of Catanzaro (Calabria Ulteriore II), Francesco Scanni. Since 1859 he had
been pleading to be promoted councillor of Intendance and transferred to Bari, where
he claimed to have eight orphaned nephews, four unmarried sisters and his eighty-
year old mother, in miserable conditions. The Bishop of Catanzaro, at that time vice-
president of the Council, supported him. Unaffected by the political changes of 1860,
Scanni retained his post in Catanzaro, despite a transfer to Cosenza in October 1861.
From January 1862 he again bombarded the Ministry with petitions to transfer him
to Bari and promote him councillor of Prefecture. His technique consisted in writing
at least a letter a week, without waiting for reply. To impress the Minister, he had
87 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.382: the governor, Potenza, 26 November 1860 to
M.I., Naples; the latter to the former, Naples, 12 January 1861.
58 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 446 and 414.
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written an administrative manual: Istruzioni pratiche pel miglior compito degli Stati
Discussi delle Amministrazioni di Pubblica Beneficenza. It was based on the 1820
Instructions, but adjusted to please Turin. In accordance with a Circular of 18
September 1861, Scanni shared the Government's opinion that charities should sell
their landed properties and invest in state bonds. Aware of the character of the
Piedmontese legislation on welfare, he favoured the autonomy of the charities.
Finally, when the new Act was issued, he offered to re-write his manual according to
the new rules. At long last Scanni's determination to get the Minister to print his
manual and promote him, awoke the Ministry's interest; but the manual was kindly
put on the waiting list. On Turin's request for information, the Prefect depicted
Scanni as a reactionary who, having greatly profited at the expense ot the poor, was
seeking a new place to escape local anger. Of a similar kind was Giuseppe Bufalo,
vice-secretary of Catanzaro's Council who, supported by the whole staff, coveted
Scanni's place. According to the Prefect he deserved dismissal to sanitize the welfare
administration of the province. But the references had been requested late, in May
1862, and none of them was sacked, although the two did not succeed in their plans
and Scanni was put under surveillance 59. Parliament was discussing the new Act and
it was clearly too late to try and sanitize the Council of the Hospices of Catanzaro.
The records of the Councils of the Hospices offer plenty of evidence that writing
petitions and denunciations was one of the favourite occupations of the Councils' staff.
Truths and lies were so tightly mixed together that it is often now difficult to decide
which if any of the litigants was to be believed. The technique of blaming others to
avoid being blamed continued during the early 1860s. It seems that the Risorgimento
brought no change of style in the management of the Council of the Hospices. On the
contrary, the fear of purges increased the defamatory habits of those who had
something to conceal or fear. The result was a confusion that contributed, together
with other factors, to the failure of the provisional government to impose order and
bring about reforms, and could have later influenced the Central Government's
decision to abandon any further reforming attempt. Petitions and denunciations also
show the mentality of the Councils' staff and how these were considered a kind of
refugium peccatorum for destitute bureaucrats. A typical example of the welfare's
employees attitude towards welfare comes from Messina. In 1862 the staff of that
Council, asking for a salary increase, stressed that it would not affect the state
59 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 128, f. 26018/0-1°. For the Circular 18 September
1861 cf. ibidem, B. 35: Avellino, 30 September 1861 to M.I., Naples.
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budget but that of local welfare 60. Any redundant Neapolitan functionary or indeed
anyone who felt entitled to assistance would ask for a place in the Councils of the
Hospices, even though it was known that these were due to be abolished in a few
years, as prescribed by the act of 3 August 1862 61. The phenomenon of
impiegomania which caused floods of petitions to the Ministries during the process
of unification in the Centre as in the South was a prominent feature of the
administrative aspects of the Risorgimento. Moreover, in the South the hunt for jobs
and privileges expressed the aspirations of the local middle classes which, far from
believing in the thaumaturgic powers of the unification, expected from the new
regime an immediate betterment of their living standards. The problem was rooted in
the poverty of the middle classes, mostly composed of small land owners who got a
low income from their holdings and could only find work in the civil service, since
the backward economy offered no alternative. Industrial development was the only
long-term solution, but in the short term it was impossible to find a place for
hundreds of galantuomini, seriously impoverished but desperately proud of their
'civil' status 62. Thus the hundreds of petitions concerning the Councils of the
Hospices are just a particular aspect of a wider problem. Yet, they exemplify the
notion of a 'Welfare State' peculiar to the Bourbon Kingdom. The Councils of the
Hospices were regarded by the public not so much as an administrative body
entrusted with welfare, but rather as a welfare institution itself. The Bourbons, in
their need to gain popularity, had favoured this attitude, and the Provisional and
later Central Governments often lacked the courage to dismiss such expectations.
Beset by more pressing problems, Turin would generally leave the decision to the
Governors and later to the Prefects and these would shape their decisions on the
political necessities of the moment rather than on strictly administrative criteria.
Nor was this a temporary problem, bound to be firmly swept away after the
completion of the unification process. As shown by recent research, the habit of
petitioning the authorities to obtain jobs, subsidies, studentships, favours of any
kind was to continue well after the years of unification. Aristocrats, ex-Bourbon
servicemen, professional people, and state employees alike would recur to the new
60 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.244, f. 26037/0-5O.
61 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.103, f. 26016/0-7o; B.279.
62 Alfonso Scirocco, Governo e paese nel Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione ..., cit.,
pp. 19-20,102-103; Guido Astuti, L'unificazione amministrativa del regno d'ltalia
(Morano, Naples, 1966), p. 57; Ettore Passerin D'Entreves, L'ultima battaglia politica
di Cavour. I problemi dell' unificazione italiana , (ILTE, Turin, 19562), pp.137-38;
Idem, 'L'incontro fra le due Italie', in Nicola Raponi (ed.), Dagli Stati preunitari d'antico
regime all'unificazione (II Mulino, Bologna, 1981), cit. pp. 518, 523.
1 85
State for protection and security as they did with the old one. Far from cutting the
paternalistic cobweb of favoritismo and clientelismo, the Italian state maintained it.
Circulars and official declarations stressed the necessity to stick to administrative
regulations and break the vicious circle, but they remained a dead letter 63.
5.8. The fixed benefits.
The provisional governments also attempted to revise the fixed benefits (sussidi
fissi ). These were usually awarded by the Interior Ministry, sometimes after Royal
order, and charged either to the budget of the Councils or to that of the Communal
Committees. The 1820 Instructions recommended granting these benefits, a
rudimentary form of social security, only to really destitute families, but practice
and theory parted company. A circular ordering the revision of the lists of those
enjoying these benefits, and the suppression of those awarded to people not really in
need, was issued in 1849. According to the Interior Ministry the reason for the
increase of the ratizzi levied on the charities, which caused the recurrent protests
of the bishops against the resulting cuts of devotional expenditure, lay in the
abnormal inflation of the fixed benefits. We do not know the results of the inquiry
ordered by this circular, nor whether the suggested cuts were effected; but later
evidence suggests that the misuse of the fixed benefits was a hard practice to
extirpate.
On 29 November 1860 the councillor of Luogotenenza , D'Afflitto, issued a circular
which raised issues that were all too familiar in the Bourbon lands:
The list of the fixed benefits charged to the budgets of the Councils of the Hospices
has grown so much that it has not only created a privileged caste of people,
supported at the expense of the truly indigent, but it also sucks in a great part of
the funds coming from the taxes or ratizzi...
Rigorous revisions of the lists and uncompromising cuts of all unjustified benefits
were ordered 64. Some of the reports of the Governors have been preserved. They
provide evidence of the criteria followed by the Bourbon administration in awarding
the benefits, their social function, and the criteria adopted under the Provisional
33 Paolo Macry, 'Borghesie, citta e stato. Appunti e impressioni su Napoli, 1860-1880',
Quaderni Storici, No. 56, Aug. 1984, pp. 365-75 (now also in A. De Clementi (ed.), La
societa' inafferrabiie (Lavoro, Rome, 1986).
34 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benef., Cart. 6, f. 121: Minute of circular No.
6668, Naples, 22 Dec. 1849; Cart. 5, f. 98: M.I., circular Naples, 29 Nov. 1860, No.
9920, to the Governors, Presidents of the Councils of the Hospices, object: Si dispone
accurato scrutinio delle condizioni dei sussidiati fissi. Also A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-
73, B.188: M.I., Naples, 29 November 1860, to Foggia's Council.
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Government for their reform. The three reports which we will analyse, from the
Councils of Chieti and Foggia and the Communal Committee of Cava (Salerno), were
compiled in different ways; thus any attempt to compare them would lead to spurious
conclusions. They will be analysed separately, together with such observations as
can be safely based on them.
Chieti.
This report was sent to Naples at the end of July 1861. The information was laid out
in eleven columns: name of the beneficiaries; native town; town of residence; age;
status; annual benefit; which authority awarded it; date of award; reason of award;
present condition of the beneficiary; opinion of the Council 65. The thirty-four
beneficiaries were divided in three categories: sixteen in the first, nine each in the
second and third. Most of those belonging to the first category seemed to be genuinely
in need of help. Ten were aged between seventy and eighty, all more or less unable to
work. Six were aged between twenty-one and fifty-two, and were similarly disabled.
A detailed analysis shows, however, a great disparity of treatment depending on their
status, hence the social function of these benefits.
A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 132: Stato di esame e di scrutinio dei sussidiati fissi a
carico dello Stato discusso del Consiglio degli Ospizi, Chieti, 27 July 1861. (A previous
report, not preserved in the A.C.S. files, had been sent in March but was rejected with
a request for more rigorous checks. The fear of further reproach was probably the
cause of the great detail of the second report).
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3 1 1 3 1 8 ★
46 28 1 8 *
42 24 9.4 ★
2 1 1 9 28.8 *
30 29 36 ★
74 55 36 *
70 64 1 2 ★
80 75 36 *
76 6 1 1 2 *
72 50 1 4 *
70 46 30 *
76 54 1 2 *
76 75 24 *
74 5 1 72 *
70 67 36 *
52 30 1 2 *
The highest benefit, seventy two ducats a year, was granted to the widow of a clerk
of the Council who had no legal right to a pension. It must be noted that she had
received the benefit since 1838, when she was fifty one, and she had been for a long
time supported by a 'painter' son, recently dead. Three smaller benefits, from twelve
to thirty six ducats a year were similarly granted in place of pensions to relatives of
dead employees of the Council, the Commune, or the Communal Committee. In one case
the beneficiary was the widow of a lawyer. In two cases the benefits (twelve and
thirty six ducats) were given as a kind of war pension and in another two (28.8 and
36 ducats) as an invalidity pension to blinded soldiers. In four cases the notation 'of
civil condition' allows us to place the beneficiaries in the category of the shamefaced
poor. Among the lowest benefits (two of 18 and one of 9.4 ducats) were those granted
to crippled and deformed foundlings, one of which, the least subsidized, used also to
be supported 'by the private charity of a family of peasants that give him shelter'.
The disparity of treatment between the various groups of the beneficiaries of the
first category is synthesized in the following table.
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Table 5.8.2. Chieti. First category of fixed benefits (1861).Percentages of the total
figures of benefits and beneficiaries.






Relatives of clerks 5 31.2 40.2 31.2
Shamefaced poor 4 25 23.7 23
Relatives of dead soldiers, sailors 2 12.5 12.4 24
Blinded soldiers 2 12.5 1 6.7 32.4
Crippled foundlings 3 1 8.8 7 15.13
Total 1 6 1 00 1 00 25.4
All these benefits - which totalled 406.2 ducats - were confirmed without alteration.
The second category included nine beneficiaries, all female, of which six were
inmates of the Conservatorio of S.Maria Maddalena in Chieti. Altogether they
received 194 ducats a year. Their age ranged from twenty-five to sixty-three. They
were all able bodied and, except one aged sixty and a peasant, they did not work.
Honest female orphans of genteel origins were not supposed to work. The
Conservatorii were expressly meant for them.














mother of dead soldier
36 1 4 40 36 * *
44 23 7 6 * *
47 26 7 6 * *
40 35 6 *
25 1 1 24 *
63 41 2 * *
28 6 1 8 * *
30 8 1 8 * *
60 59 72 36 * *
With the exception of the peasant widow - to whom the benefit had been granted as a
kind of war pension to compensate for the death of her son during a military exercise
- all the other beneficiaries can be classified as shamefaced poor, or of genteel
origin. It is remarkable that the reductions ordered by the Council were minimal,
except in the above mentioned case, where a fifty percent reduction was decided on
the grounds that the woman's economic situation had improved since she worked as a
farm-labourer.
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The cases included in the third category were more colourful, and the abuses
evident. Altogether these benefits amounted to 399.25 ducats a year. The highest
benefit (146.25 ducats) had been awarded in 1845 to Michele Mazzinghi, ex-
secretary of Chieti's Council, dismissed from his office for defrauding the poorhouse
of Sulmona of 128.4 ducats. Mazzinghi lost his benefit in April 1861, after having
enjoyed a very high 'pension' for sixteen years. Nevertheless he was described, aged
seventy-six, as absolutely destitute. In the case of Leonilda Tropea the benefit was
the outcome of a typical fraud. This wealthy lady enjoyed a yearly benefit of seventy-
two ducats because she was the niece of Archbishop De Palma who had himself
inherited the benefit, originally granted to his aunt Geltrude Tropea. The benefit
originally derived from two pious foundations of Chieti, one of which was founded by
the Archbishop De Palma, presumably as a kind of family trust. In 1826 a law-suit
stopped the income of the De Palma foundation but not the attended benefit that was
transferred to the budget of the Council of the Hospices. A private benefit had thus
been transformed in a fixed benefit granted by the state. The situation of the third
category is synthesized in the table below.
Table 5.8.4. Chieti. Fixed benefits. Third category (ducats, 1861).
Age in Age when Annual Reduced Undue Shame¬ Relative Reaction. Victim
1861 awarded benefit to privilege faced of welfare working of the
poor staff Bourbons
60 30 72 0 *
76 60 146.25 0 *
39 33 36 0 *
53 28 24 1 2 *
32 1 0 36 ★
1 2 1 1 18.5 *
1 0 9 18.5 *
32 26 12 0 *
70 70 36 * *
As shown in the table below, that summarizes the three categories, the bulk of the
beneficiaries (64.6%) were either relatives of employees of some administrative
office, notably of the welfare service, or people that could be generically defined as
shamefaced poor, or inmates of some Conservatorio. This group used to receive a half
of the total sum spent in fixed benefits by the Council of Chieti. The proportion of
unjustified benefits was high (27.2%), while the smallest share went to those in
most need.
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Undue privileges 4 11.8 27.2 66.6
Relatives of clerks 5 3 23.5 J_ 20.9 ) 25.6
Shamefaced poor 4 2 2 23.5 } 64.6 20.4 } 50.1 25
Conservat. inmates 6 1 7.6 J_ 8.8 } 14.3
Relat. of dead sold.s 2 1 8.8 } 12.3 ) 40
Blinded soldiers 2 5.9 } 14.7 6.6 } 18.9 32.4
Crippled foundlings 3 8.8 > 2.8 I 15.13
The total amount of the fixed benefits was reduced from 981.45 to 661.2 ducats a
year. This was obtained by cutting the more intolerable abuses of the third category
(278.25 ducats), while the cuts of some benefits of the second category were
minimal (42 ducats).
Fogqia-
This report, sent to Naples early in February 1861, was much less detailed 66.
There were only five columns: name, annual benefit, date of award, present
conditions of the beneficiary, and opinion of the Council. Only the cases of clearly
undue privilege were outlined in detail, according to the gravity of the abuse. When
the Council was favourable to the continuation of the benefit, according to the
information from the Mayor and Parish priest, no details were given about the status
of the beneficiary. For this reason it is possible to divide those said to be really in
need into three groups only: inmates of a Conservatorio, 'living on their own', and
'destitute blind'. This last group included only one person, awarded a modest benefit
in November 1860. All distinctions between relatives of dead employees, soldiers,
etc. are impossible; and a comparison with Chieti cannot be made. The data concerning
unjustifiable benefits are summarized in the following table.
66 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 188: Prospetto di tutti i sussidiati fissi a carico della
Cassa del Consiglio degli Ospizi di Capitanata, Foggia, 5 February 1861.
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Table 5.8.6. Foggia. Fixed benefits. Unjustified (ducats,1861).
Date of award No. of beneficiaries Annual benefit Reduced to living outside province
1827 6 204 0 *
1847 1 60 36 *
1855 1 36 0
1856 1 18 0 *
1 860 1 36 0
*
Total 10 354 36 9
The gravity of the abuses was stressed in the report by the Council's secretary,
Nereo Dominicucci 67 who said it was time to use the patrimony of the poor to relieve
real misery, which had recently dramatically increased in the province. His
description of the case of the Fiorelli family is worth reporting. This family
consisted of six sisters, daughters of Antonio Fiorelli, ex-secretary of Foggia's
Council. In 1827 he had been dismissed and his daughters had been granted 204
ducats a year: half of his salary. Dominicucci emphasized that the benefit was a useful
but not necessary supplement: the six sisters surely had other means of support, as
they could afford to live in Naples. Once awarded, a benefit was often
institutionalized, as in the cases of Giovanni Manieri and Teresa Pignataro. The first
was awarded eighteen ducats a year in 1856 when he was an inmate of an institute of
the Brothers of St. Anthony of Liguori; and he was still receiving that sum in 1861,
while working as a tailor in Naples. The second had been a destitute widow with four
children when she was granted thirty-six ducats a year in 1855; but she was less
poor in 1861. She had been awarded a further pension by the commune, and her
children were now economically independent. Of the five cases in which the benefit
was abolished or reduced this was the only one in which the beneficiary lived in the
province. All the others who had been illegally subsidized lived elsewhere - a
sufficient condition to exclude them from local charity.
The situation of the twenty needy people beneficiary by the Council of Foggia is
synthesised in the table below.
67 We will later find him among the collaborators of the Rivista della Beneficenza Pubblica
(1873-1918). In 1866 he was appointed with Davide Silvagni and Raffaele Manzi by the
Prefect of Naples Gualterio to the inquiry on the Royal Poor Hotel of Naples after a
revolt of the inmates in August 1866 (see E. Vecchione, E. Genovese, Le istituzioni...,
cit., p. 18, and below, chapter 6).
1 92
Table 5.8.7. Foggia. Fixed benefits. In genuine need (ducats, 1861).
















Total 283.2 7 1 2 1
The disparity of treatment between those in genuine need and those who had no right
to the benefit is evident from the following table.
Table 5.8.8. Foggia. Fixed benefits before reduction (1861).
% of the total number
of beneficiaries
% of the total benefit Average annual
benefit
Unjustifiable benefit 35.7 58.8 35.4
In genuine need
Conservatorio inmates 25 14.6 12.5
Living on their own 35.7 64.3 25.4 41.2 15.2 11.7
Destitute blind 3.6 1.2 7.2
The benefits to the needy were all maintained, while all those unjustifiably granted
were abolished except one which was reduced from sixty to thirty-six ducats a year.
This produced an economy of 318 ducats a year which were not, however, used to
support notable numbers of genuinely needy people. Only two new benefits of eighteen
ducats each were in fact awarded - to a couple of destitute orphans in December
1860. Dominicucci, in his comment about the Fiorelli case, had stressed the
deplorable situation of 'so many families of genteel condition'. This confirms other
contemporary sources that testify to the destitution of large middle class groups,
notably ex-military officers of the Bourbon army; and it likewise suggests the
propensity of Dominicucci to help those whom, for sake of convenience, we have
called 'shamefaced poor'. The evidence from Foggia seems to confirm Chieti's trend;
1 93
but the nature of the data does not allow us to conclude that Capitanata's fixed benefits
were largely expended on the poor of 'genteel birth' rather than on the plebeian
destitute.
Cava (Salerno).
The Communal Committee of Cava displayed particular enthusiasm in abolishing the
wrongs of the Bourbon administration. The report concerning revision of the
fixed benefits charged to two local pious foundations was sent to the provincial
Governor in March 1861, fully approved in May of that year and later confirmed by
the Interior Ministry 68. In the foreword, after noting the inviolability of the
patrimony of the poor and the respect due to the founders' will, the illegalities done
under the Bourbons were openly admitted:
...Until now (it is better to sincerely assert it) the entire patrimony has been
plundered because of tricks and obligations. Benefits have been granted to
people who either had no right according to the statutes, or were not really in
need. Under the past Government it was better to shut up because its policy was
always that of favouring its supporters against justice. It would be now
culpable indolence to continue such a grave injustice.
The total annual benefits were reduced from 210 to 52.20 ducats. The table below,
elaborated from the abundant information contained in the report, summarizes the
situation.
68 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, cit., B. 414.
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Table 5.8.9. Cava. Fixed benefits (ducats, 1861).
Date Annual Reduced Reason of reduction Local chari Additional information
of benefit to Against Subsid. Benefit ty paying
award statutes wealthy excess. benefit





sidence in local hamlets.
Benefit granted a as pen
sion at death of 1st hus¬
band. Beneficiary soon re
married. Benefit suppres
sed by M.I. in 1835 after
Loc. Adm. pressure, but
re-awarded in 1838.
1851 1 2 7.2 * Idem Supported bya son.
1851 1 8 0 * Idem
1852 1 8 0 * * Idem Benefit granted to sup¬
port education. Benefi¬
ciary now able to work,
lives in Salerno with rich
uncle.
1854 1 8 0 * * Idem Lives in Salerno.
1840 36 0 * Monte
Luciano
Quaranta
Dowry trust. Alms from
surplus and only to pari¬
shioners. Beneficiary li¬
ves in Naples.
1859 60 45 * Idem To keep beneficiary
in the local seminary.
The benefits had all been awarded by the Interior Ministry and imposed on the two
Monti della Monica and Quaranta, whose statutes excluded non resident natives from
any right to relief. In four cases out of seven these statutory rules had been ignored,
and in four cases the benefit had been given to wealthy people. Moreover, none of the
beneficiary was found to be really destitute. A notable example was Carmela
Sorrentino. She had received 1,532 ducats over thirty two years, which obviously
contributed to improve her initially good financial situation.
Summary data are also available for other provinces. In 1861 the Council of Potenza
reduced the number of fixed benefits from thirty-two to twenty-two. That of Bari
abolished twenty-two benefits for an annual amount of 656.4 lire and proposed
twenty-four new benefits for a total of 459.6 lire a year. Other provinces were less
efficient. As late as April 1863 the revision of the fixed benefits was still under way
in Cosenza 69. General conclusions cannot be drawn from these samples and even
69 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73: B. 42 (Bari); 382 (Potenza); 282, f. 26040/36-25o:
Prov. Dep., Cosenza, 21 Apr. 1863, to M.I., Turin.
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further research would be unlikely to provide conclusive evidence, since the
material is too fragmentary and disparate. Moreover the reductions decided by the
Councils of the Hospices and Communal Committees provoked floods of protests which
do not make clear whether the reductions were fair or not. The only feature common
to the three cases of Chieti, Foggia and Cava was the abolition of the most open abuses.
It is debatable whether the benefits maintained by the Councils of Chieti and Foggia
were all justified by real need. The data from Chieti suggest the reverse. Probably
the attitude of that Council was shared by the others: remove the most obvious abuses
and preserve the institutionalised situations to avoid spreading discontent. The
Communal Committee of Cava might be seen as a particular case where the patriots in
office took their chance to execute a long-overdue clean-up. However, some more
specific conclusions can be argued. Apart from the obvious cases in which the benefit
arose from corruption, it seems that the Bourbon policy was to favour the genteel
poor before their working class equivalent. Sometimes the fixed benefit also
compensated for the lack of preventive social security. Clearly, those most likely to
obtain such compensatory relief were somehow connected to the welfare
bureaucracy, but in a few other cases - soldiers and their relatives - the pensions,
instead of being charged to the budget of the Ministry of the War, were drawn from
the lay charities through the Councils. This suggests that the award of benefits also
served to save State money. Finally it is easy to see how the reduction of the fixed
benefits, as well as the general reordering of the charities and Councils, proved to be
a political matter. Decrees and circulars were produced by the new Government, but
their application depended on the people on power in the local administrations, from
the provinces to the smallest village. Here lay the greatest challenge to the
Risorgimento. The low degree of civic responsibility and experience was to prove a
crucial issue in all aspects of civil life, notably in the South 70.
5.9. Neapolitan charities.
If these reforms could not be considered even moderately successful, the greatest
failure concerned the effect of the decree of 23 October 1860 in the province of
Naples. The structure of that Council of the Hospices was different from the others.
70 Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa civile , (Einaudi, Turin, 1977), pp. 75-82; Alberto
Aquarone, Alia ricerca dell'ltalia liberale , (Guida, Naples, 1972), pp. 168-169, 173,
181-182, 292.
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The number of the Councillors had risen by the decree of 6 September 1852 to
twenty-four, half lay, half ecclesiastic. The aim of this measure was to improve the
management of the 561 charities of the province, whose total annual income
amounted to 410,320.05 ducats. But experience proved that such a large Council
could not perform well. The decree of 23 October went to the other extreme, reducing
the Councillors to five. If twenty-four Councillors were excessive, five were
insufficient, given the quantity of affairs they had to deal with. Moreover, the new
Councillors were lawyers whose paid professional duties often 'prevented' them from
attending the Council's meetings. The problem was temporarily solved with the help
of the staff of the local Interior Ministry, who still managed the ten big welfare
establishments of Naples 71. When, on 1 November 1861 the Provisional
Government of Naples ceased and its Ministries were therefore abolished, a new
burden fell on the Council's shoulders. The total annual income of the ten
establishments of Naples amounted to 763,856.19 ducats (3,246.388.8 lire) that,
added to the provincial charities' income, brought the total sum under the Council's
management to almost five million lire. Two sections of the fifth department of the
Interior Ministry had traditionally managed Naples' establishments: how could five
Councillors cope? The result was disastrous and the mismanagement evident.
Decisions made by the whole Council were modified by single Councillors. The tension
increased and two of them, Francesco Avellino and Girolamo Scalamandri resigned,
accusing the Council of illegal behaviour. These accusations were dismissed as
inconsistent by the Royal Special Commissioner for Naples, Eula - who proposed
easing the Council's tasks by adding two Councillors and a Vice-President, and also
increasing the staff by adding members of the welfare department of the former
Interior Ministry. After a delay caused by a loss of letters in Turin, these suggestions
were accepted 72.
71 Naples' welfare establisments were: the Royal Poor Hotel, the Hospice of St. Francis of
Sales, the Hospice of the Saints Joseph and Lucy, the Hospital of S.Maria dell'Arco, the
Hospital of S.Maria ai Cristallini, the Hospital of S.Maria della Vita, the Hospital of
S.Maria di Loreto, Hospital della Cesarea, the Hospital of the Incurables, the foundlings'
home and girls' orphanage of L'Annunziata (see E.Vecchione E.Genovese, Le Istituzioni di
beneficenza della citta di Napoli , cit. pp. 9-45; Scipione Staffa, Del riordinamento degli
stabilimenti di beneficenza nella citta di Napoli (Stab. Tip. dei classici italiani, Naples,
1867), pp. 50-52, 76-78, 86-96).
72 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279, f. 26040/0-3°: Eula, Naples, 30 December
1861, 13 and 18 February 1862, 26 April 1862, to M.I., Turin. Francesco Avellino,
Naples, 27 January 1862, to M.I..Turin; the latter, Turin, 31 January 1862, to Eula,
Naples.
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Such a solution was the only viable one at that point. Yet it was dangerous. Our
evidence has abundantly proved that most of the wrong-doing of the Bourbon welfare
administration stemmed from the old Ministry of the Interior. This used to encourage
corruption, and award unjustified benefits. The delicate political situation and the
need to maintain the existing administrative structure prevented the new rulers
from eliminating all the corrupt staff of the Ministries. Yet a careful assessment of
the situation could have suggested ways of gradually reducing dependence on such
staff. Clearly this was not the case with the charities of Naples. Since their
particular situation was ignored both in the making of the decree of 23 October 1860
and later, their control had ultimately to be entrusted to a group of employees who
were skilled both in the management and in the pillage of the 'patrimony of the poor'.
The reform of the Councils' staff might have been partially successful on the
periphery of the ex-Bourbon kingdom; but in its heartland, the decree which had
ordered reform ironically impeded it.
5.10. Conclusions.
This evidence shows that, at the cessation of the provisional governments, no
administrative reordering of the Southern charities had been achieved. Decrees and
circulars intended to amend the wrongs of the Bourbon administration proved to be
poor tools when faced with institutions strongly rooted in an obsolete but hardy
tradition, and in situations where local opposition could easily exploit the fears of
popular revolt. Governors and Ministers, aware of the risks, shaped their decisions
to the immediate political requirements of the situation. The confusion created in
Naples by the inadequacy of the measures taken, and the saga of the devotional duties
suggest that the provisional governments were blind to local realities. But it is also
debatable whether a more profound study could have produced better results, since
the whole system was too deeply rotten to admit reform. Moreover, the provincial
administrations were burdened with a quantity of more pressing issues, resulting
from the failure to tackle the social problems of the country, and at all events the
time conceded by Turin to the provisional governments was too short to expect better
results from the decrees on charities and the reform of Councils. As argued in the
summer of 1861 by Peruzzi and Minghetti on technical grounds, and on political
grounds by Vacca, De Monte, Villari, Rattazzi, Lanza, Dragonetti, and several others,
the administrative transition from the Bourbon system to the new one required
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caution and gradualism; thus it was better not to abolish the provisional government
in Naples as yet. Ricasoli, who knew very little about the South's problems and cared
even less, took no notice of such advice, and decided to carry on with centralization,
on the grounds that the provisional governments had acted without the Parliament's
formal consent, and it was time to put an end to such an abnormal situation. It was a
weak and debatable argument, since the Luogotenenti , all appointed from Turin,
enjoyed very little autonomy. Yet Ricasoli was in charge and firmly believed in the
thaumaturgical effects of a strong central rule, which would cure the southerners of
their tendency to laziness, disorder, and corruption. Those who did not agree with
him had no power to make him change his mind 73. Thus the abolition of the
Neapolitan Luogotenenza brought the moment of full Piedmontisation closer also for
the charities, with no further attempts to study or modify the existing legislative
system. Although the text of the 1862 Act emphasized the importance of the
Pallavicino and Mancini decrees, the new regime of liberty - which the southern
charities were impatient to see implemented - effectively meant that the issue of
illegal devotional expenditure would be forgotten.
Indeed, the future had in store pleasant novelties for the southern charities. The
dismantling of the Councils of the Hospices and local welfare committees, and their
replacement with the inefficient guardianship of the Provincial Deputations, meant
that they would be fully restored to liberty. Liberty to squander their revenues in
noisy and^agan religious festivities, with no budget/2fontrol and a purely formal
rendering of accounts. In 1861 Governor De Luca - who appeared the brightest and
moit honest of those local administrators involved in the clean-up - tried to
persuade the Turin1 to save the Councils of the Hospices. But his views were not
shared by the managers of charities, who awaited eagerly the enforcement of the
Piedmontese law 74. The French had hit the charities hard , but these had recovered
during the Bourbon restoration; and now the Italian state would preserve them even
more effectively, for at least another thirty years. Paradoxically, however, the other
part of the system - which first the French, and later the 1818 Concordat committee
failed to reform - was doomed. Not for the sake of reform but rather for money the
acts of 1866 and 1867 swept away not only monasteries, but also chapels,
73 A. Scirocco, Governo e paese net Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860-61),
cit., pp. 287-332; Claudio Pavone, Amministrazione centrale e amministrazione
periferica. Da Rattazzi a Ricasoli (1859-1866) (Giuffre, Milan, 1964), pp. 151 ff.,
493-4.
74 See De Luca's proposals, and the arguments of some charity administrators in appendix
5, section 2.
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Ricettizie, Comunie, collegiate churches, chapters, and benefices with no care of
souls - with devastating effects for the southern Church. Devotional bequests were
also listed for suppression, but many survived claiming their charitable status. The
confraternities for their part slipped through intact, and lived peacefully for another
thirty years, until Crispi decided to reform them - with little success 75. The
suppressive laws of 1866-67 were a big blow for the southern Church; yet,
according to some authors, although devastating, they had in the long term beneficial
spiritual effects in the South. Paradoxically the lay State had rendered the Vatican a
service, at last enabling it to assert a less controversial authority 76.
75 A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza sociale in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3-4, 1963,
cit., pp. 762-66; A. Cestaro, 'Strutture ecclesiastiche del Mezzogiorno nell'Eta
modema', in Nicola Raponi (ed.), Dagli Stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione ,
cit., pp. 343-344, 363; Francesco Margiotta Broglio, 'Legislazione italiana e vita del la
Chiesa (1861-1878)', Chiesa e religiosita in Italia dopo I'Unita (1861-1878), vol.1,
Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1973, p. 129, 143; Gabriele De Rosa, Vescovi, popolo e magia
net Sud , cit. pp. 257-273; Pietro Borzomati, 'Appunti per una storia delle riduzioni
delle Chiese e della soppressione dell'asse ecclesiastico in alcune diocesi del
Mezzogiorno d'ltalia (1866-1867)', Bollettino dell'Archivio per la Storia del Movimento
Sociale Cattolico in Italia , IX, 1974, 2, pp. 216-217. For Crispi's reform see below,
chapter 8.
7® F. Margiotta Broglio, 'Legislazione italiana e vita della Chiesa (1861-1878)', cit.,
pp.136, 143; G. Candeloro, II movimento cattolico in Italia (Riuniti, Rome, 1972^),
pp.107-108; P. Borzomati, "Appunti per una storia delle riduzioni delle Chiese e della
soppressione dell'asse ecclesiastico in alcune diocesi del Mezzogiorno d'ltalia (1866-
1867)', cit. pp. 218-219.
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6.The attitude of the new State towards poverty and assistance, and the act of 3
August 1862.
6.1 .An abortive project for foundlings, and an unsuccessful bill bv Giuseppe
Ricciardi.
Inadequate assistance to foundlings and abandoned children was only one among the
many social problems of the newly united State. Yet its effects were striking,
particularly in the South, where there were very few foundling homes and
maintenance subsidies were granted by the municipal authorities. These benefits
ceased at five to eight years for boys, and nine to twelve for girls. Thereafter
mendicancy was in most cases the only profession available to those foundlings to
survive their infancy 1. Elsewhere in the peninsula foundling homes provided a
marginally better assistance. But mortality levels were high, and provisions
generally inadequate 2. At first the central Government seemed determined to tackle
the problem with energy. During the summer of 1860 detailed information and
statistical data about the system of assistance to foundlings were requested from the
Intendants of Modena, Forli, Piacenza, Ferrara, Bologna, Ravenna, and the governors
of Milan and Tuscany. The same requests were made in January 1861 to the local
authorities of the Marches and Umbria, and in the summer to the Luogotenenza of the
Neapolitan Provinces. It was the government's intention 'to ponder deeply this
arduous social issue' in order to reform the whole system of child assistance. In
central Italy some Intendants were at pains to collect the few available data, and the
1 For the general legislation on foundlings in the Bourbon Kingdom: M.I., Naples, 8 June
1861, No. 1609, the chairman of the 2nd sect, of the 5th dept. to the chairman of the
4th dept., A.S.T., Carte Sella, Prov. Meridionali, OO.PP. e Sanita, 1860-61, f.40.For
the variety of treatment in the various provinces and the lack of homes: M.I. Circular,
Naples, 20 June 1846 to the Intendants and their replies, particularly that from the
Council of Intendance of Basilicata, Potenza, 7 July 1846, A.S.T., Ibidem, f. 40.
2 C. I. Petitti di Roreto, Saggio sul buon governo della mendicity, degli istituti di
beneficenza e delle carceri (Bocca, Turin, 1837), vol.II., pp. 294-304 (treatment of
foundlings in Piedmont); Dante Bolognesi, Carla Giovannini, "Gli esposti a Ravenna fra
'700 e '800', in E. Sori, Citta e controllo sociale in Italia tra XVIII e XIX secolo (Angeli,
Milan, 1982), pp. 307-28; Sandra Cavallo, 'Strategie politiche e familiari intorno al
baliatico. II monopolio dei bambini abbandonati nel Canavese tra Sei e Settecento',
Ouaderni storici , No. 53 (1983), pp. 391-420; Giovanna Cappelletto, 'Infanzia
abbandonata e ruoli di mediazione sociale nella Verona del Settecento', ibidem, pp. 421-
44; Franca Doriguzzi, 'I messaggi dell'abbandono. Bambini esposti a Torino nel
Settecento', ibidem, pp. 445-468; Michela Dall'Aglio Maramotti, L'assistenza ai poveri
nella Parma del Settecento (Tecnograf, Reggio Emilia, 1985), pp. 37-42; F. Delia
Peruta, Societa e classi popolari nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento (Ediprint, Siracusa, 1986),
pp. 91-110; Idem, Milano lavoro e fabbrica. 1815-1914 (Angeli, Milan, 1987), pp. 43-
5.
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governor of Tuscany sent statistical tables. Little information came from the South.
Data were difficult to obtain from the communes, and the Intendants had too many
other affairs to attend to 3. The scarce evidence available does not allow any further
reconstruction, but this reform came to nothing, since no law on child assistance was
passed in Italy either in the 1860s or later. Despite several bills proposed from
1877 to 1907, no uniform legislation regulated this branch of public assistance
until 1925. The only compulsory guideline on the matter was provided by article
237 of the communal and provincial act of 1865 and subsequently by article 299 of
the provincial and communal act of 1889. The care of foundlings was entrusted to
communes and provinces, but there were no specific rules on which system to adopt.
Hence a host of different traditions survived undisturbed all over Italy: the fees paid
to the wet nurses varied greatly, and so did the periods of direct care. In some regions
the children were sheltered in homes - called brefotrofi . As late as 1897 no
brefotrofi existed in the provinces of Sondrio, Belluno, Campobasso, Avellino,
Benevento, Foggia, Lecce, Potenza, Reggio Calabria, Agrigento, Trapani, Sassari
Cagliari. In these provinces the communes directly entrusted the foundlings to foster
families that kept them for a variable number of years. Direct entrustment of
foundlings to foster families was also quite common in the provinces of Modena,
Piacenza, Reggio Emilia, Macerata, Aquila, Chieti, Teramo, Caserta, Bari, Catanzaro,
Cosenza, Caltanissetta, Messina and Siracusa, although there were some foundling
3 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73: B. 450, f. 774, sf. 1739, M.I., Turin, 30 Dec. 1861 to the
Prefect, Perugia; B. 345, f. 26046/0-5°: the Prefect to the Provincial Council,
Macerata, 4 April 1862; B. 231, f. 26034/0-3°. A.S.T., Carte Sella, Prov.
Napoletane, Beneficenza, Cart. 3a, f. 47: Copy of a request for information on the
treatment of foundlings, without date, from M.I., Turin, 1st sect., to Luogotenenza
Generate of the Neap. Prov., by this forwarded to M.I., Naples, 1st sect., and by the
latter to the 2nd sect, of the 5th dept. on 7 Oct.1861; also: Gen. Council of the Hosp.,
Campobasso, 4 June 1861, No. 1228; Lecce, 1 and 22 Febr.1861, to M.I., Naples.
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homes in these provinces 4. If the foundling was lucky, he might end up in a family
of peasants, who would raise him or her with their own children and later employ
him or her in the fields. Otherwise the children, once dismissed from the care of the
fostering family, were simply left to their own fate, and went to swell the statistics
of juvenile criminality. In any case those foundling immediately handed over to
families had^ better chance oj survive^ for the mortality levels of infants in the
brefotrofi was terribly high. In 1897 853 of the 856 babies admitted at
L'Annunciata, in Naples, died. Jessie White Mario made an enquiry and found that
there were twenty-five doctors attached to the home, plus two midwives, yet no
doctor could be found at night, and the absenteism of each doctor averaged from 100
to 250 days a year. The wet-nurses were few and under-nou.rished, dirty biberons
and improper artificial milk often caused death by poisoning. Nappies were not
washed and disinfected properly, but simply rinsed; sick babies were mixed with
healthy ones; medicines were dispensed by nuns and assistants with no knowledge
whatsoever of chemistry. Death by sheer starvation coupled with syphilis and other
infections was the norm. Most of the budget of L'Annunciata was spent to maintain in
idleness about forty oblates and twenty young girls, and to pay rich salaries to a host
of staff and those doctors who rarely set foot in the babies wards 5. Not all brefotrofi
were in such scandalous disarray. Those of Milan, Verona and Genoa seemed better
4
run and had lower rates of mortality, while in the provinceJ Rovigo a courageous
reform was implemented in 1888. The foundling home was closed down and benefits
were paid directly to the mothers, who were thus encouraged to keep their child. The
4 Giorgio Berti, 'L'assistenza agli illegittimi e I'affidamento dei minori', in Antonio
Amorth (ed.), Atti del congresso celebrativo del centenario delle leggi amministrative
di unificazione, L'ordinamento comunale e provinciale , 2, Le Province , (Neri Pozza,
Vicenza, 1968), pp.171-205; Eugenio Florian, Guido Cavaglieri, / vagabondi. Studio
sociologico-giuridico , vol. I (Bocoa, Turin, 1897), pp. 524-27; Ministero dell'lntemo,
Direz. Gen. Amm. Civ., Rilevamento statistico-amministrativo circa le condizioni
dell'assistenza all'infanzia ed agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e della beneficenza
elemosiniera (Rome, 1905), pp. 3-5, 7-15; Mariagrazia Gorni-Laura Pellegrini, Un
problema di storia sociale. L'infanzia abbandonata in Italia nel secolo XIX (La Nuova
Italia, Florence, 1974), pp. 7-9, 11-37, 62-64. For a detailed account of child
assistance in Italy at the end of the twentieth century see: Jessie White Mario, Le
opere pie e I'infanticidio legale (Minelli, Rovigo, 1897), passim and partic. pp 95-96.
Criticism of the existing system and proposals for reform in: Augusto Setti, 'Ludovico
Ricci o la beneficenza pubblica nel secolo scorso', Nuova Antologia , 2nd series, vol. 23
(1 Sept. 1880), pp. 449, 456-457; Guido Capitani, Stato beneficenza e previdenza
pubblica (Derossi, Turin, 1888), pp. 63-89. A valuable local study with updated
bibliography is M. Elisabetta Bianchi Tonizzi, 'Esposti e balie in Liguria tra otto e
novecento: il caso di Chiavari', Movimento operaio e socialista , No.1(1983), pp. 7-31.
5 J. White Mario, Le opere pie e I'infanticidio legale , cit., pp. 7, 30-39; M. Gorni, L.
Pellegrini, Un problema di storia sociale. L'infanzia abbandonata in Italia nel secolo XIX ,
cit., pp. 95-107. For the origins and history of L'Annunciata see J. White Mario, Le
opere pie e I'infanticidio legale , cit., pp. 19-29.
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immediate results was a dramatic fall of mortality. Yet, various enquiries launched
after the scandal of L'Annunciata showed that in too many foundling homes hygienic
standards were frightfully low and mortality high: for instance, in the period 1892-
1896, the mortality of the infants sheltered in the foundling home of Vicenza
averaged 95.5%, while that of babies entrusted to families stood at 10.8% 6.
In 1861 the slow response from the periphery and the difficulty in obtaining
exhaustive data might have persuaded the Interior Minister to wait and launch a
proper enquiry later; but perhaps strong resistance within the cabinet prevented the
realization of the project. The last hypothesis seems the most likely, since no further
enquiries were ordered, nor was any bill on foundlings proposed to parliament until
1877 7. Probably the information gathered in 1861 was incomplete, but sufficient
to convince the cabinet that any reform of child assistance would be very expensive,
since proper care of foundlings required the foundation and funding of many homes.
Moreover, the establishment of a national network of state financed and monitored
foundling homes required legislative reform of the existing homes, usually private
charities. Both in principle and in practice any committment to social reform was
extremely dangerous, for it led to state interference with society or, in
contemporary terms, to 'legal charity'. It was a Pandora's box which nobody in the
cabinet really wanted to open. The lid, uncautiously removed by some unconsiderate
Ministry official, was tightly replaced. Any concern for foundlings was shelved.
The issue of 'legal charity' was however raised in the Chamber by the democrat
Giuseppe Ricciardi with a bill whose grandiose scope was matched by its intrinsic
inconsistency. The persuasion that confiscation of the mortmain could successfully
finance the abolition of mendicancy was not new to Ricciardi. The bill he proposed to
the Chamber on 23 March 1861 was based broadly on those principles underlying
the project he had elaborated the previous year during the Dictatorship 8. Any
concordat between the pre-unification states and the Catholic church was abolished,
the number of bishops and archbishops was reduced to one bishop for each district
and one archbishop for each province, all ecclesiastical property was confiscated and
all religious orders were abolished, except one for monks and one for nuns. The two
maintained orders were put under state surveillance, could not recruit novices and
8 J. White Mario, Le opere pie e I'infanticidio legale , cit., pp. 41-75; T. Minelli,
'Assistenza alia infanzia illegittima abbandonata', R.B.P., No. 2, 1899, pp. 86-105;
Idem, 'L'assistenza all'infanzia illegittima nella provincia di Rovigo', R.B.P. , No. 5,
1899, pp. 411-17; P. Donati, 'L'Ospizio degli infanti abbandonati di Vicenza', R.B.P. ,
No. 6, 1899, pp. 420-43; M. Gorni, L. Pellegrini, Un problema di storia sociale.
L'infanzia abbandonata in Italia nel secolo XIX , cit., pp. 113-238.
7 See below, chapter 7.4.
8 See above, chapter 5.5.
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could possess only state bonds. Also the properties of all welfare establishments,
hospitals and charities of any kind were confiscated; and the administration of the
establishments themselves was entrusted to the communes. The proceeds of the sale of
the assets of the charities would be converted to state bonds, whose income would
finance the charities. Half of the confiscated ecclesiastical properties were to be
leased to the poorest families in the communes, the other half were to be sold at
public auctions within three months. Half of the auctions' proceeds would go to the
Treasury and half to the communes to which the ecclesiastical lands belonged. With
such sums the communes would have been expected to provide for the maintenance of
churches and parish priests, the management of all local charities, primary
instruction (free and compulsory), the establisment of kindergartens and popular
libraries, and the abolition of mendicancy. The last target would be met by employing
the able-bodied poor in public works, and by supplying the disabled with food,
clothes and shelter 9. In twelve articles Ricciardi was confident of meeting the
threefold objective of enforcing total separation between Church and State, restoring
the exhausted finances of the state, and abolishing mendicancy.
Typically, welfare reform was married to church control. The men of the
Risorgimento, moderates and democrats alike, shared a great fascination, almost an
obsession for all issues concerning State-Church relations. Inevitably, since the
Roman question was at the very core of the Risorgimento. The hostility of the Vatican
and the clergy was perceived as the great enemy of national unity, and the assets of
the church were seen as property of the state, to be retrieved. As the charities were
almost exclusively the monopoly of the clergy, any project of welfare reform was
bound to be somehow or other linked to the greater theme of church property. It was
not by chance that thirty years later the same marriage of concepts was at the core of
Crispi's reform. Crispi, a Southerner and a Garibaldian like Ricciardi, devised a
mechanism which, although different from that proposed by Ricciardi, was equally
intended to make Church assets pay for welfare by charging a share of that
expenditure to the devotional charities. In 1890, as in 1861, the idea that the state
should directly pay for welfare was unacceptable, while the use of Church assets was
still perceived as the only viable solution to the betterment of the poor relief system.
Of the nine offices of the Chamber only two had agreed to the public reading of
Ricciardi's bill. The short debate which followed confirmed that the Chamber
disapproved of it. The main speeches against it were made by the Justice Minister
Cassinis and the Sicilian deputy Amari. Cassinis was not contrary in principle to the
9 A.P., Camera, Documenti, leg. VIII, sess. 1861-62, vol. Ill, pp. 1303-1304; A.P.,
Camera, Discussioni, leg. VIII, sess. 1861-62, vol.I, pp. 968-972.
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confiscation of ecclesiastical property, but considered Ricciardi's proposal untimely
and hardly practicable. The coming on the market of such a large quantity of land
would inevitably depress its price, whilst the methods of delayed payment proposed
would greatly reduce the profits of the Treasury. Confiscation of the charitable
patrimonies involved other and more fundamental issues. Cassinis expressed doubts
about the practical efficacy of the proposed measures, but his main concern was with
the consequences of the principles underlying Ricciardi's project. To accept his bill
meant to accept those principles and hence to agree to a total overturn of the economic
and social rules on which the whole political system was based. Amari, fiercely
opposed to any attack on ecclesiastical property, spelled out clearly the concepts at
which Cassinis had hinted in an elegant but oblique manner. To lease half of the
confiscated lands to the poor smelled dangerously of agrarian reform and was likely
to awake the appetite of the masses. The committment to abolish mendicancy opened
the door to the concept of legal charity, whose dangerous consequences could be seen
in the recent history of England. Finally, the committment to provide jobs for all the
able-bodied led to the admission of the lethal principle of the right to work. The bill
awakened too many hopes which were impossible to fulfill, and hence must not be
considered further. Nobody spoke in defence of the above principles. The rest of the
debate concerned the right of the state to interfere with the church and confiscate its
properties. Even Ricciardi devoted most of his reply to the necessity of abolishing the
concordats and the religious orders, weakly pleading, at the end of his speech, that
his plan would strenghten the welfare establishments. The bill was then rejected
from further consideration 10.
A Chamber more interested in social reform could find many flaws in the
mechanism devised by Ricciardi to relieve poverty. For instance, the fact that the
communes not endowed with rich charities or rich church properties would have
great difficulty in fulfilling all the tasks entrusted to them. Also, the plan to give the
administration of the charities to the communes, without any reform of the charities
themselves, was disputable. What difference could that make to the poor, if the
purpose of the charities was left untouched? As Cassinis remarked, Ricciardi's bill
was rather a solemn declaration of principles than a practicable proposal. Yet the
fact that such criticism was uttered by a member of the cabinet, opposed to the bill's
ideological implications, is highly significant. The democratic opposition was not
better prepared than the moderates when it came to the social problems of the
country. Hence it could produce only ill-devised and abstract proposals which it
seemed unable to defend and usefully re-elaborate.
10 A.P., Camera, Discussioni, leg. VIII, sess. 1861-62, vol.I, pp. 972-979.
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6.2. Cuts in State welfare expenditure, and social legislation.
The repugnance to legal charity, so clearly spelled out during the debate on
Ricciardi's bill, can be retraced in the budgets of the Interior Ministry. Until the
new communal and provincial act of 20 March 1865 was passed, the state mantained
the subsidies which the pre-unification administrations used to grant to their
charities, though substantial cuts were introduced 11. After 1865, state welfare
expenditure was reduced to a minimum. In exceptional years of natural calamities, as
in 1879 and 1882, special and temporary contributions were allocated among the
extraordinary expenses, and repealed as soon as the emergency was over. The trend is
evident in the table below 12.
Table 6.2.1. State welfare expenditure.
Years Overall expenditure Welfare expenditure %
1 862 950,398,845 2,712,125.65 0.28
1 863 940,692,668 2,735,41 0.40 0.29
1 867 990,813,800 719,102.45 0.07
1 873 1,286,654,184 220,342 0.02
1 874 1 ,225,156,577 160,640 0.01
1 875 1 ,259,250,005 142,400 0.01
1 876 1 ,321 ,242,202 129,740 0.01
1 877 1 ,315,855,565 131,694 0.01
1 878 1 ,31 8,926,1 24 140,386 0.01
1 879 1 ,31 7,131 ,41 5 2,341 ,104 0.18
1880 1 ,329,343,61 7 277,858 0.02
1881 1 ,401 ,299,640 400,858 0.03
1882 2,1 15,981 ,535 7,579,61 1 0.36
1883 1 ,468,950,268 665,310 0.05
Gradually from 1865 most of the welfare expenditure which the state had
temporarily met was charged to the provinces and communes, which progressively
had to increase their welfare allocations, as shown in the table below 13.
1 1 A.P., Camera, Documenti, leg. VIII. sess. 1861-62, Vol. V, Doc. 337 E, Bilancio passivo
per I'esercizio 1863. Ministero degli affari interni. Relazione delta Commissione
generate del Bilancio. Tornata 3 Marzo 1863 ; Ibidem, Doc. 337, Bilancio passivo del
Ministero dell'interno per I'esercizio 1863 , pp. 72-75. Ibidem, leg. IX, sess. 1867-
68, vol. I, Doc. 3 D, Relazione della Commissione generate del Bilancio, Ministero
dell'interno, esercizio 1867, Tornata del 31 Maggio 1867 , pp. 15-18.
12 Sources for table 6.2.1.: A.P., Camera, Documenti, leg. VIII. sess. 1861-62, Vol. V.,
Doc. 337 E, cit., pp.82-83; Ibidem, Doc. 337, cit., pp. 72-75; Ibidem, leg. IX, sess.
1867-68, vol. I, Doc. 3 D, cit., pp.49-52; M.A.I.C., Annuario Statistico Italiano 1887-
88 (Rome, 1888) pp. 1235, 1239, 1241.
13 Source of table 6.2.2.: M.A.I.C., Annuario...1887-88..., cit., pp. 1156-57, 1160-61.
The last volume of the Statistica delle Opere pie, vol. X (Bertero, Rome, 1897), p. LXI,
207
Table 6.2.2. Welfare expenditure of provinces and communes.
Years Tot. Comm. exp. Comm.Welf.exp. % Tot. Prov. exp. Prov.Welf.exp. %
1866 _ . _ 55,336,743 1 1,254,920 20.3
1867 _ _ 62,923,584 13,001,474 20.7
1868 _ _ _ 66,835,117 13,914,504 20.8
1869 319,613,385 4,168,333 1.3 72,514,827 14,374,896 19.8
1870 330,384,120 4,137,640 1 .3 79,109,567 1 4,945,021 18.9
1871 346,353,639 4,204,421 1.2 80,370,006 1 5,274,292 1 9
1872 388,337,495 4,154,017 1.1 87,933,639 1 5,589,230 17.7
1873 433,276,1 52 1 1,774,669 2.7 79,473,050 14,280,1 79 1 8
1874 397,837,291 1 1,978,065 3 82,191,606 1 5,093,631 18.4
1875 454,876,124 17,192,735 3.8 83,821,538 16,019,917 1 9
1876 489,585,701 1 6,862,063 3.4 86,028,263 16,11 3,200 18.7
1877 503,854,440 1 7,548,803 3.5 94,844,243 1 6,345,1 52 17.2
1878 502,31 2,090 17,882,746 3.6 87,871,463 1 6,891,776 19.2
1879 502,561,024 1 8,975,348 3.8 87,633,281 1 7,423,31 6 1 9.9
1880 513,420,028 19,864,361 3.9 94,793,781 17,81 7,636 18.8
1 881 505,966,761 19,993,455 3.9 99,857,118 18,281 ,799 18.3
1882 506,074,318 19,816,487 3.9 1 19,243,012 18,514,701 1 5.5
1883 528,422,003 20,060,702 3.8 1 1 3,699,209 18,684,209 16.4
1884 547,106,869 20,163,421 3.7 1 12,829,860 1 9,092,1 83 1 6.9
1885 561,798,719 20,41 9,083 3.6 1 20,501,720 1 9,656,467 16.3
This choice was inherent in the philosophy underlying the 20 March 1865 Act. This
was based on the criterion of de-centralized expenditure for all those headings which
did not pertain to the 'basic' duties of the state. But the fact that provinces and
communes met the shortfalls of hospitals, lunatic asylums, foundling homes and
other charities must not be interpreted as a sign of an early assertion of the concept
of the duty of the local authorities to assist their poor. The duty which the state
devolved to the local authorities was intended and perceived as a duty to contribute to
gives the figures of the welfare expenditure of communes and provinces from 1880 to
1887 included, and for 1889, 1891, and 1895, but does not compare them with the
overall expenditure. The provincial figures match exactly those of Annuario.,.1887-
88..., but those of the Communes are different. 1880: 34,731,016; 1881:
35,880,357; 1882: 36,282,196; 1883: 37,092,909; 1884: 37,754,065; 1885:
38,619,613; 1886: 40,135, 354; 1887: 40,837,395; 1889: 42,683,917; 1891:
41,601,353; 1895: 43,396,826.
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the expenses met by the charities. Provinces and communes had no autonomy within
the welfare system, though they were supposed to cover the financial shortfalls of the
charities as well as control their accounts. Significantly, the bills proposed by
Nicotera in 1877, as well as the act of the 17 July 1890, to which we will later pay
full attention, were aimed at reducing the local authorities' welfare expenditure, by
forcing the charities to trim their administrative and devotional expenses, and hence
deliver more efficient welfare services. The concept of 'duty to assist' was
undoubtedly embedded in that of 'duty to pay', but the evolution from the old
perception to the new one was not automatic and would take time. Only during the
fascist period did the provinces start to assume an autonomous and active role in
assistance to lunatics, foundlings, indigent mothers, etc. 14.
The evolution of health care legislation was equally slow. As with charities'
legislation, at the unification, the Piedmontese system was extended to the whole
peninsula, despite it was much less advanced than the Lombard equivalent. Later, in
1865 and 1874 the system was slightly modified, but did not work substantially
better. Local authorities were compelled to employ a doctor charged with public
health and sanitation care, but control bodies were given insufficient authority; town
councils had excessive power to interfere with the doctors' activity, and sanitation
regulations were in general widely defective. Politicians and public opinion were
slow to realize the gravity of the situation which was stressed only by medical
journals and the Italian Medical Association, founded in 1862. Two bills proposed by
Lanza in 1872 and Nicotera in 1876-77 were never passed by the Chamber. Nor did
they propose radical modifications to the existing legislation. It was only in 1880
that the radical Bertani, author of the first Italian inquiry on public health, was
entrusted by prime minister Depretis with the drafting of a bill. This became the
basis for another bill proposed to the Chamber in 1886 by Depretis. His death
prevented the discussion of the project; but two years later Crispi presented another
bill, also based on Bertani's draft, and this was finally passed. Crispi, like Depretis,
trimmed from Bertani's draft most of its democratic features, and centralized public
health administration as much as possible. However, the new legislation granted the
status of State officials to the doctors employed by the local authorities, thus
reducing the bureaucratic interference of mayors and town councils, which had been
one of the worst features of the old system. Altogether it took twelve years from
1 4 G. Berti, 'L'assistenza agli illegittimi e I'affidamento dei minori', in Atti del congresso
celebrativo ..., 2, Le Province , cit., pp.171-205; Roberto Gianolio, 'L'assistenza
psichiatrica ed agli infermi di mente', ibidem, pp. 145-150.
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1876 - when the 'reforming' Left came to power - to ameliorate the sanitation and
public health laws; but at least a basic though minimal health care was provided 15.
Social legislation, regulating industrial relations, came about even more slowly,
given the resistance of the industrialists - who would not surrender the slightest
slice of their power and profits to the cause of social peace - and that of the socialist
movement as well - which for a long time took a negative view of any compromise
with the capitalists. Consequently social security rested upon self help organizations
and friendly societies. Legislation providing workers with compulsory accident
insurance and setting up a non-compulsory old age pension-fund was passed only in
1898. In 1902 the working day of women was limited to eleven hours, and the
employment of children under the age of twelve was forbidden. In 1907 one resting-
day per week was made compulsory, and in 1908 night work in bakeries was
forbidden. A compulsory Maternity Fund for female industrial workers was set up in
1910 16.
Provisions for those unable to work or the unemployed could be found only in the
penal code and in the public security laws. We must refer again to the Piedmontese
codes, since also in this respect they provided the model for the legislation of united
Italy. The penal laws reshuffled by Charles Felix in 1827 punished able-bodied
beggars and vagrants with one year in jail. Beggars unable to work were implicitly
allowed to beg. The Patent Letters issued by Charles Albert in November 1836 put
the poorhouses under strict State supervision, and ordered close collaboration
between the poorhouses' managers and the police, but the State made no financial
committment towards the poorhouses' expenditure nor made any provision for those
provinces without poorhouses 17. The subsequent legislation modified the penalties
1 5 Franco delta Peruta, 'Sanita pubblica e legislazione sanitaria in Italia dall'Llnita a Crispi',
in Studi storici , No. 4 (1980), pp. 713-759, now in Idem, Societa e classi popolari
nell'ltalia dell'Ottocento, cit., pp. 197-244. See also G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia
moderna , vol. 5 (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1968), p. 217.
1 6 Stefano Merli, Proletariate) di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. II caso italiano: 1880-
1900 (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1972), vol. I, pp., 335-56; Arnaldo Cherubini, Storia
della previdenza sociale in Italia (1860-1960) (Riuniti, Rome, 1977); Raffaele
Romanelli, L'ltalia liberale (1861-1900) (II Mulino, Bologna, 1979), pp. 285-305, 348-
51; Dora Marucco, Mutualismo e sistema politico. II caso italiano (1862-1904)
(Angeli, Milan, 1981); Gian Carlo Jocteau, ' Le origini della legislazione sociale in Italia.
Problemi e prospettive di ricerca', in Movimento Operaio e Socialista, No.2 (May-
August 1982), pp. 289-303; Martin Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1982 (Longman, London
& N. York, 1984), pp. 137-8; Romilda Scaldaferri, 'Tecniche di governo e cultura
liberale in Italia. Le origini della legislazione sociale (1879-1885), in Ricerche di storia
politica, No. 1 (Bologna, 1986), pp. 45-82.
1 7 E. Florian, G. Cavaglieri, / vagabondi. Studio sociologico-giuridico , vol. I (Bocca, Turin,
1897), cit., p. 279; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti
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for vagrants and able-bodied beggars, and prescribed further repression, but did not
depart from a purely monitoring function of the state on those charities entrusted
with the locking up of mendicants and vagabonds. The penal code of 1839 labelled as
'suspects' idlers, vagrants and beggars alike. The mere fact of being 'legally' declared
a vagrant made the homeless and unemployed liable to imprisonment from three to
six months. Thereafter a vagrant was subject to compulsory settlement, though how
he should earn a living without begging was not said. Begging was forbidden to the
able-bodied - and punished in roughly the same way as vagrancy. Subsequent laws of
1852 and 1854 widened police powers to pursue idlers, pedlars, and innkeepers,
and to control the civil population. In the Duchies of Modena and Parma, and in the
Bourbon kingdom vagrancy, idleness and beggary were similarly prosecuted and
punished, whereas no specific sanctions in this respect were contained in the penal
codes of Lombardy-Venetia, Tuscany, and the Papal States 18.
Upon unification, the Piedmontese penal code and public security act of 1859
(which basically reproduced the previous legislation), were enforced in the whole
peninsula, with the exception of Tuscany which kept its own legislation until 1865.
The new public security act was also published in that year, and later modified in
1871. The major novelty introduced with the legislation of 1859 and 1865 was a
stricter imposition of compulsory settlement on idlers and vagrants by means of
admonishment (ammonizione ) by the magistrate (pretore ). The ammonizione was
often abused for political ends, particularly as a means to persecute socialists and
anarchists. The jurisprudence on the matter was very controversial and
inconclusive; and the whole matter became the object of criticism and polemics. The
public security acts of 1859 and 1865 prescribed (articles 86 and 72) that
appropriate workhouses be established by the government to shelter and re-educate
vagrants, idlers and beggars under the age of sixteen; but these institutions never
materialized, and the 'rehabilitation' of young delinquents remained largely and
inadequately entrusted to the charities. This particular aspect of the problem of
vagrancy was dealt with by the prison reform of 1889, aimed at the separate
reclusion of the different kinds of young criminals. The reform ameliorated the
della legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', in
Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico , No. 3 (1980), pp. 978-80; see also above, 2.5.
1 8 Codice Penale per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna (Stamperia Reale, Turin, 1839),
Tit. VIII, Capo III, arts. 450-466, pp. 135-141; E. Florian, G. Cavaglieri, I vagabondi.
Studio sociologico-giuridico , vol. I (Bocca, Turin, 1897), cit., pp. 280-83; Ada Lonni,
'Controllo sociale e repressione di polizia delle classi subalterne da Vittorio Amedeo II a
Carlo Alberto', in Aldo Agosti, Gian Mario Bravo (eds.), Storia del movimento operaio
del socialismo e delle lotte sociali in Piemonte (De Donato, Bari,1979), vol. I, pp. 158-
164; M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della legislazione
piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', cit., pp. 1013-1016.
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situation, although as late as 1894 charity-run reformatories still outnumbered
state reformatories. The 1889 public security act slightly modified the rules
concerning the admonishment, but did not substantially change the penalties for those
who did not comply 19.
The legislation of 1859 and 1865 allowed the disabled to beg in those areas where
poorhouses were inadequate or did not exist. A royal decree 24 June 1860, No. 4152
prescribed that beggars be repatriated at the expenses of the state,but only when
dangerous to public order. This principle of repatriation of beggars was enlarged by
the 1889 act on public security. This prescribed that all beggars unable to work be
sent to the nearer poorhouse, or to their family if any. The transport and
maintainance expenses were anticipated by the police and later charged to the
congregation of charity of the commune of residence of the beggar, the local charities
and confraternities, and the commune, according to their resources. Only when none
of these agencies could meet the bill was the state compelled to pay. This system
proved very complicated and hardly practicable. The accountability between the
police and the agencies with legal responsability was in a constant mess. Nobody knew
exactly how many poorhouses were available and what was their capacity.
Innumerable controversies arose concerning financial liability, while the
poorhouses were unable to cope; and the sums which the state had to pay constantly
increased. For Rome alone the annual bill averaged two million lire. A decree of
November 1889 extended the compulsion to shelter the beggars to all charitable
establishments that were not devoted to the care of the sick or to the education of
children. However, this did not solve the problem. Hence a stream of circulars
instructing the police to 'repatriate' the paupers unable to work with the greatest
parsimony. The police was not a charitable institution; and its officials must not
squander State money to fulfill their own humanitarian impulses. The beggars must
be sent to the poorhouses only when likely to threaten public order. Moreover it was
always preferable to send the beggars home (rather than to the poorhouse), and to
try and arrange for them some form of out-door relief. But beggars, when not safely
locked up, tended to return to the cities whence they had been expelled. Soon the
major cities, and especially Rome, were filled again with beggars 20. More than ever
the old dream of abolishing mendicancy remained just a dream.
1 9 E. Florian, G. Cavaglieri, / vagabondi. Studio sociologico-giuridico , vol. I (Bocca, Turin,
1897), cit., pp. 283-96, 321-31; Mario Galizia, 'La liberta di circolazione e
soggiorno', in Paolo Barile (ed.), La Pubblica Sicurezza , Atti del congresso celebrativo
del centenario delle leggi amministrative di unificazione , Sect. 3, vol. 2 (Neri Pozza,
Vicenza, 1967), pp. 500-506.
20 E. Florian, G. Cavaglieri, / vagabondi. Studio sociologico-giuridico , vol. I, cit., pp. 530-
546; M. Galizia, 'La liberta di circolazione e soggiorno', in Paolo Barile (ed.), La
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6.3.The Act of 3 August 1862. Origins and basic features.
In Autumn 1861 the defeat of Minghetti's de-centralizing bills was followed by the
hasty enforcement of the administrative Piedmontese legislation in the new
provinces21. Administrative unification was perceived as an irrevocable and urgent
means to cement and make effective political unification, and was consequently
rushed in hurriedly, ignoring the variety of the pre-existing administrative
traditions and the long-term effects which such a variety was bound to produce. In
this sense the parliamentary itinerary of the act of 8 August 1862 on charities
provides an interesting sample of the political dynamics underlying administrative
unification; and it highlights the abstractness of the government's approach to the
problem of charities control. It also shows that the disastrous performance of the act
had been exactly forecast by many of its opponents. The act of 20 November 1859
had been enforced in Piedmont and Lombardy in the autumn of 1859, in Umbria on
26 December 1860, and in Emilia-Romagna and the Marches on 9 October 1861.
Tuscany and the South still retained the former legislation. In the South the clergy's
interference in the lay charities was theoretically eliminated by the decrees of 23
October 1860 and 17 February 1861, but the welfare structure - based on the
Councils of the Hospices and the Local Welfare Committees, and financed through the
mechanism of ratizzi - had not been modified during the various Luogotenenze . The
previous chapters offer abundant evidence on the disruptive effects of the act of 20
November 1859 in the ex-Papal States, and the complicated nature of the southern
welfare structures, entangled with a peculiar ecclesiastical structure. We concluded
that the Piedmontese system could work, with some initial difficulties, in Lombardy,
in the ex-Duchies, and in Tuscany, where the pre-existing legislation was not too
dissimilar. Conversely, in the ex-Papal States and the South, the Piedmontese
legislation, based on the respect of the founders' will and the autonomy of the
charities, appeared more a recipe for disaster than a law conducive to order and
administrative regularity.
Pubblica Sicurezza , Atti del congresso celebrativo del centenario delle leggl
amministrative di unificazione , Sect. 3, vol. 2, cit., pp. 495-499.
21 G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna , vol. V (Feltrinelli, Milan, 19681), pp. 170-
75; A. Berselli, 'Marco Minghetti e le leggi di unificazione amministrativa', in F.
Benvenuti, G. Miglio (eds.), L'unificazione amministrativa ed i suoi protagonisti ( Neri
Pozza, Vicenza, 1967), Atti del Congresso celebrativo del centenario delle leggi
amministrative di unificazione , pp. 321-348 and Roberto Ruffilli, 'Governo,
Parlamento e correnti politiche nella genesi della legge 20 Marzo 1865', ibidem,
pp.223-250.
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On 22 December 1861 Ricasoli, then Prime Minister and Interior Minister,
proposed to the Chamber to apply the act of 20 November 1859 to the whole
Kingdom, on the grounds that administrative unification of the charity system must
be in harmony with the criteria of autonomy underlying the communal and provincial
laws 22. All the Chamber's offices except one judged this proposal inadequate, since
the mere extension of the 1859 Act seemed to conflict both with the concept of the
general reordering of the kingdom, and with the need for tact in handling people's
feelings. Hence a Commission was set up, formed by Minghetti, Allievi, Speroni,
Gigliucci, Panattoni, Tenca, Cavour, Capriolo and Gallozzi, entrusted with the re-
elaboration of the bill. The Commission did not overturn the principles on which the
1859 act was based; and in this sense the theoretical origins of the two laws were the
same. Both were solely concerned with the administration of the charities' assets, and
with their guardianship and surveillance. The law was not concerned with the
amounts of revenue allocated for welfare, with how and to whom the charities
distributed alms and benefits, nor with the treatment of the inmates in poorhouses,
homes, and hospitals. These were matters to be defined by the charities' statutes and
internal regulations. Their approval was entrusted to the guardian authorities, but
no general guidelines were provided for such regulations. Thus a poorhouse could give
its inmates meat and wine every day, or once a week, or twice a year. It could offer
them outdoor exercise, or keep them locked indoors all the year round. Neither the
Commission, nor Parliament took such issues into consideration, showing a complete
and unfounded trust in the sense of humanity and responsability of the charities'
managers.
Both the 1859 and 1862 acts defined as charities (opere pie ) subject to the law
all those foundations and institutions exclusively or partly intended to relieve,
educate, and assist the poorer classes. The 1862 act contained a further article
stipulating that also the mixed charities (those with devotional and charitable
purposes) were subject to the law for the charitable part of their administration,
which must be kept distinct from the devotional one 23. Family trusts and relief
committees privately funded were not subject to the law, apart from a general
surveillance by the government 24. According to both acts the charities were
administered by boards, committees, or single individuals according to the foundation
deeds, or by special regulations or ancient traditions. When a charity had no
22 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156.
23 This addition was drawn from arts. 2, 3, and 4 of the Regulations 18-8-1860 to the
1859 act (see A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp. 2, 5).
24 Art. 2 of the 1859 Act and 3 of the Commission's bill (cf.: A.P., Documenti, Camera,
Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, p. 5).
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administrative board - and when the foundation deeds or special regulations did not
provide adequate guidelines - the Government would set up an administrative board
after consultation with the Provincial Deputation. The administrators were
appointed according to the specific rules of each charity's regulations, and were not
eligible when in litigation with the charity itself or when they had failed to render
their previous accounts. They could not decide on matters involving their own
interests, or those of relatives, nor could they undertake contract work on behalf of
the charity they themselves administered. But no ineligibility clause was provided
with regard to ex-criminals, individuals convicted for fraud and bankruptcy, and
people involved in the local government. In other words: almost anybody could manage
a charity, and there was to be no revision or updating whatsoever of statutes and
internal regulations. This was one of the major shortcomings of the 1862 act. All
administrative boards must keep and regularly update an inventory of all
patrimonial documents in their archive. A copy of these inventories must be sent
both to the prefect and the Interior Ministry. Budgets and accounts must be drawn up
each year. A compulsory deposit was required from the treasurers at the moment of
their taking office. Contracts for sale, rent, etc. must be put to tender. The charities
could use military compulsion to exact their revenues, like the communes. The
Commission suppressed in its draft three articles from the 1859 act, according to
which the treasurers were personally liable for unexacted revenues and unjustified
expenditure; the accounts of treasurers and accountants were subject to
government's approval; and the charities must contribute, proportionally to their
income, to the salary of one employee in the District office and to that of a secretary
in the government's office charged with the charities' surveillance 25.
The government's direct interference with the charities was reduced by
transferring to the Provincial Deputations some of the functions previously
performed by the Interior Ministry, while the control exerted by the Provincial
Deputations was relaxed. In the new bill, as in the old, each charity was under the
guardianship of the respective Provincial Deputation, but the article defining the
powers of the Deputations was substantially modified. According to the 1859 act the
Provincial Deputation must approve budgets and accounts, contracts for purchase
and sale, legacies and donations, and all transactions concerning the patrimony of the
charities. The charities were subject to the 5 June 1850 act on the mortmain.
According to the Commission's bill the Provincial Deputation must approve all the
activities listed above, except the budgets. The majority of the Commission reckoned
that the control of budgets was too exacting to be imposed on the charities. As a
25 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp. 2-3, 6-7.
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consequence the annual statistical report by the Provincial Deputations to the
Interior Ministry on the general situation of the charities would be based only on the
accounts. Such reports must be printed. In the Commission's intentions publication
gave a further guarantee of public control and compensated for the abolition of
budgets control. As it happened, no such healthy publicity materialized. According to
the new bill the Provincial Deputation also approved the organic and internal
regulations of the charities - a power which, in the 1859 act, belonged to the
government. This transfer of power was intended as a decentralizing measure. The
approval of all transactions concerning patrimony was restricted to those
transactions involving its increase or decrease, in order to leave more liberty to the
charities. Also the subjection to the act of 5 June 1850 was restricted to landed
assets: thus the charities had to seek the Provincial Deputation's approval for
monetary donations and legacies, whereas the acceptance of landed donations and
legacies was regulated by the 1850 act. The Commission justified this with the
argument that the control of mortmain was basically intended to prevent the
accumulation of excessive landed patrimonies, so as to favour the free land market.
Direct government interference was thus notably reduced. The approval of organic
and internal regulations was transferred to the Provincial Deputations, and the
Interior Ministry only checked budgets and accounts of those welfare establisments
whose ordinary expenditure was partly met by the state. The right of the state to
abolish or reduce expenditure of the charities (article 25 of the 1859 act), was
suppressed in the Commission's bill. The Interior Ministry maintained general
powers of surveillance, either through its inspectors or the prefects. Finally, any
administrative board not complying with its own regulations or the law could be
dissolved by royal decree, on the advice of the Council of State and the opinion of the
Provincial Deputation. The dissolving decree would provide for the provisional
administration and the reconstitution of a regular administrative board. The
charities were granted the right to appeal to the King, via the prefect, against any
decision taken by the Provincial Deputation. The final decision belonged to the King on
the advice of the Council of State 26. Hence the only weapon provided by the 1862 act
against mismanagement and unlawful behaviour of the charities' managers was the
dissolution of the administrative boards. A poor deterrent indeed, especially in the
small centres, where the availability of skilled alternative administrators was often
scarce, or non-existant.
Other 'decentralizing' measures were introduced in the section concerning the
congregations of charity. As in the 1859 act, these must be set up in each commune to
26 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp. 3-4, 8-9.
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administer those legacies made generally on behalf of the poor. They were formed by
a chairman and four members in those communes not exceeding 10,000 inhabitants,
a chairman and eight members in the others. But, whereas under the 1859 act the
appointment of the chairman was made by the King at the suggestion of the Interior
Ministry, in the new draft the chairman was appointed by the communal council, like
the other members. As Rattazzi admitted during the debate, such a decentralizing
measure was dictated more by practical than theoretical reasons. The Interior
Ministry was unable to cope with the work load involved in the choice and
appointment of all chairmen of the congregations. In the end the Ministry's control of
the prefects' decisions was nil and its function was reduced to a rubber-stamp 27.
Various other rules from the Regulations of 18 August 1860 to the 1859 act were
inserted into the legislative text, and the Interior Ministry was advised to lay down
simpler Regulations for the new act, in order to leave room for the specific
administrative rules of the single charities 28.
The great novelty of the new bill was that it provided guidelines for reforming the
charities. When the purpose of a charity ceased to exist, or did not correspond
anymore to its statutes, these could be modified, but in such a way as to respect the
founders' intentions as far as possible. The requests for reform must be initiated by
the communal or provincial councils, depending on the pertinance of the charity, and
must be repeated twice during the ordinary meetings of the councils. The prefect
collected all appeals against such changes, and the final decision belonged to the
Interior Ministry, with the consent of the Council of State. The Commission stressed
that this was a great step towards modernization, but in reality it was a very
cautious approach to reform; it was surrounded by so many precautional devices that
the the actual reforms were rendered difficult if not impossible 29. The Commission
presented its bill as a reform of the 1859 Act, but this was not really the case. The
changes did not substantially modify the general criteria governing the charities,
whilst they seriously weakened the powers of the local and central authorities. This
reduction of guardianship and surveillance was presented as decentralization; but, as
emerged several times during the debate, it was a pseudo decentralization, primarily
intended to reduce the work loads of the Ministry and Provincial Deputations, and not
to devolve power from the centre to the periphery 30.
27 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp.4, 10; A.P., Camera,
Discussioni, Sess. 1861-62, Vol. V., pp.2608-09.
28 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp. 1-2.
29 A.P., Documenti, Camera, Sess. 1861, Vol. Ill, Doc. 156-A, pp. 4, 9.
30 See the analysis of the debates in the Chamber and the Senate in appendix 6.
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As became clear a decade later, this act was the best deal that the Catholic Church and
the private lobbies could get. Yet these groups regarded the very mild system of
controls imposed over the charities with great worry and suspicion. Catholic dissent,
heralded outside Parliament by La Civilta Cattolica , was expressed in the Chamber
by the deputies Santocanale and Catucci who proposed to exclude any form of
government interference when the founders had stated in their will that such
interference would nullify the entire will. These attempts of the Catholic right to
extract even more guarantees than those already granted to them were bound to fail.
Nevertheless they demonstrated the Catholics' fear of this act, since they did not
realize immediately how many loopholes it contained nor how difficult, and hence lax,
its implementation would be 31 . A major loophole concerned the confraternities. The
act did not list them among the foundations to be considered charities. The Regulations
of the act (27 November 1862, No.1007) were more precise, since they bestowed
the title of charities, upon confraternities, congregations, hermitages and lay
chaplancies with no ecclesiastical title. Nevertheless a subsequent judgement of the
Council of State created a considerable interpretative mess, which various circulars
from the Interior Ministry were unable to dissipate. So, many confraternities were
sheltered from state control by the judgements of the Council of State and the
ambiguity of the legislative text, and they managed to avoid those controls to which
they were theoretically subject. Twice during the late 1860s they risked being
suppressed, together with the religious orders; but they were saved. The first time
was in 1865, when Vacca withdrew his bill after its heavy amendment by the
Chamber Commission. The second time was in 1867. The Ferrara bill on the
liquidation of ecclesiastical property included the confraternities; but during the
Chamber debate Pisanelli defended them as institutions that offered moral and
material shelter to the people, against those who stressed that the confraternities
were superfluous to popular religious needs, and were often devoted only to create
trouble during religious festivals. Pisanelli proposed drafting a specific bill to
regulate and supervise the confraternities. Parliament agreed, and eliminated any
mention of confraternities from the Ferrara act. But no specific act on
confraternities was ever proposed; and the abortion of Nicotera's bill on welfare in
1877 saved them once again from suppression 32.
3^ A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2628-31. For the reactions of the
Civilta Cattolica see Fernando Manzotti.'L'istituto ospitaliero nel Risorgimento italiano',
Atti del primo congresso Italiano di storia ospitaliera, Reggio Emilia, 14-17 Giugno
1956 (Arcispedale di S. Maria Nuova, Reggio Emilia, 1957), pp. 447-448.
32 A. P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, cit., p. 2528; E. Vecchione, E.
Genovese, Le Istituzioni di Beneficenza nella Cittk di Napoli (Tip. Sordomuti,
Naples,1908), pp.392-93; Annibale Gilardoni, 'Scienza deH'amministrazione delle
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6.4.Comments and criticism.
The assessment of the act of 3 August 1862 by Francesco Saverio Nitti is worth
quoting, for it synthesized thirty years of criticism :
When, in 1860, the political unification of Italy was in great measure
completed, the necessity was felt of introducing radical internal reforms. The
charitable institutions were a dark and tangled forest which no one dared to meddle
with [..] Put under the guardianship of the clergy and of old noble families,
connected with ancient customs and often also with local prejudices, their
provisions dependent on old testamentary deeds, they were ill adapted, not only to
a radical reform, but even to an inquiry on the part of the Government. Many
charitable institutions, founded by religious persons for philanthropic reasons, had
disappeared, and their property had, in many cases, been taken possession of by
old noble families. But the Government was afraid to have recourse to too
energetic legislation, which would undoubtedly have exasperated the religious
conflict and disturbed not a few private interests.
Thus, from 1860 to 1862, the Piedmontese law of 1859, which kept Government
interference within narrow limits, was applied to the whole of Italy. Nevertheless
the Government did not use even the powers which the law gave it, and only
concerned itself with collecting information, letting things as they were. In the
meantime, even without making any radical innovation, even allowing charitable
institutions to subsist, which had no longer an object and which spent large sums in
objects of very little use, it was still necessary, at least, to introduce a uniform
system of law. The law of 1862, which was an outcome of the general recognition
of this need, had two aims in view: 1) to unify the law about charities throughout
the whole of Italy, and 2) to free charitable institutions from Government
management and leave them to themselves, with confidence in the 'system of
liberty'. Nevertheless, the 'system of liberty' never proved a greater failure, and
the abuses were such and so great that publicists and writers of note occupied
themselves with them repeatedly, and gradually prepared the country for that
radical reform which was brought about in 1890 by the efforts of Signor Crispi^.
The 'publicists and writers of note', mentioned by Nitti, started voice their
concern from the mid 1870s, when the dreadful state of disarray of the charities was
painstakingly denounced first by Giovanni Gemelli, chairman of the Interior
Ministry's department entrusted with the surveillance of the charities, and later by
Istituzioni di beneficenza' , Extract from Digesto Italiano (U.T.E.T., Turin, 1907),
p.251; Maura Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Confraternite romane e beneficenza pubblica tra il
1870 e il 1890', in Ricerche per la Storia religiosa di Roma , 5 (Storia e Letteratura,
Rome,1984), pp. 309-11; Ministero dell'lnterno, Div.6, Sez.1, Circular 4 November
1863, n.112866-7185, Object: Applicazione delta Legge 3 Agosto 1862 alle Istituzioni
laicali esistenti nelle Provincie Meridionali ed aventi lo scopo di adempiere ad opere del
divin culto, od esclusivamente o cumulativamente ad opere di beneficenza. For
Nicotera's bill see chapter 7.
33 F. S. Nitti, 'Poor relief in Italy', Economic Review , vol. 2, No. 1(1892), pp. 1-24, quot.
pp. 8-9 (English translation by D. G. Ritchie, M.A., Jesus College, Oxford), now in A.
Saitta (ed.), Francesco Saverio Nitti. Scritti sulla questione meridionale (Laterza, Bari,
1958), vol. 1, pp. 225-49, quot. pp. 231-2. The original Italian version was published
in Rassegna Pugliese , No. 9-10 (1892).
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his successor Evandro Caravaggio. We will later devote full attention to these reports
and the heated debate which they provoked 34. For the moment we will focus on
another assessment, made by Caravaggio in 1911, on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary celebrations of the Kingdom, for it synthesizes the main points stressed
by all those who perceived the need for a new law. Article 4 was the major culprit:
...it was intended to introduce a highly liberal and modern principle. On the contrary it
abolished whatever useful innovation had been introduced throughout the centuries,
according to the evolution of the time and its needs and, by restoring the foundation
deeds (often already modified and abolished), plunged us once again in the depth of the
Middle Ages...35
Nitti attributed this choice to the Government's fear of upsetting Church relations,
and many private interests - Caravaggio offered another explanation. In his opinion
the 'fetishistic' respect for the founders' will was mainly caused by a desire to
ensure the continued flow of legacies and donations on which the entire system
depended. Indeed, this was the argument of the Deputies who defended the
Government's point of view. However, in retrospective, both explanations were
probably true. Valeria Fargion recently argued that the moderates preferred to leave
the charities under the clergy's control for two main reasons. They had no interest in
worsening the high level of internal and international tension created by the Church-
State conflict, whilst the values of resignation and submission conveyed to the masses
by paternalistic philanthropy were functional to the economic interests of the ruling
classes, which were not compelled to change their social policy, given the absence of
a large industrial proletariat. The contradiction between the choice of advocating
public instruction to the state, and that of leaving welfare to the church was only
34 'Le Opere pie nel 1873', R.B. P., No. 7 (1874), pp. 530-36. The charities' reform was
much debated in the above mentioned journal from 1874 onwards. Other contributions
to the debate: Paolo Locatelli, Miseria e beneficenza. Ricordi di un funzionario di
pubblica sicurezza (Dumolard, Milan, 1878); A. Setti, 'Ludovico Ricci o la beneficenza
pubblica nel secolo scorso", in Nuova Antologia , 2nd series, vol. 23, 1st Sept. 1880,
cit; Stefano di Rorai, Abbasso le opere pie! (Manzoni, Rome, 1880); Luigi Bodio, 'Le
Opere pie in Italia', Annali di statistica , 2nd series, vol. 21(1881); Pietro Celli, Del
riordinamento della pubblica beneficenza (Hoepli, Milan, 1883); Giuseppe Pagni, La legge
sulla riforma delle opere pie (Florence, 1883); Nicola Saglioni, Le Opere Pie (Conti,
Faenza, 1884); Gaetano Ferroglio, La questione sociale e le opere pie (Paravia, Turin,
1885); Giuseppe Gallarati, Pensieri sopra i consigli e la tutela delle opere pie (Civelli,
Milan, 1885); Guido Capitani, Stato beneficenza e previdenza pubblica (Derossi, Turin,
1888), cit.; Matteo Maggetti, La genesi e I'evoluzione della beneficenza (Ravenna,
1890), cit.; Pasquale Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza', in Scritti vari (Zanichelli,
Bologna, 1894), pp. 310-381.
35 E. Caravaggio, 'Beneficenza pubblica, di Stato o legale, e privata', in Cinquanta anni di
Storia Ifaliana (Hoepli, Milan, 1911), vol. II, p. 6.
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apparent 36. To our mind this interpretation is only partly acceptable. One can agree
that the low level of industrial development and the tension surrounding Church-
State relations made the choice of leaving the clergy in charge of welfare
substantially convenient. But one should not overlook the ideological aspects of the
issue. Minghetti and his fellows were genuinely persuaded that economic freedom was
the key to social progress. To forget the tenets on which the Italian state was founded,
and to interpret all policy-making in purely functional terms might be reductive.
Moreover, the contradiction between leaving welfare in private hands and advocating
instruction to the state was not only apparent. The Catholics in general, and their
political organization - the Opera dei congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici in Italia - in
particular, were well aware of the importance of the welfare sector, and determined
to make the most of it. The charities' section of the Opera was the kernel from which
the modern social Catholic organizations developped. Rural unions, rural banks and
cooperatives, mutual help associations, eventually labour unions stemmed from that
core. These organizations were the kernel of the early 1900s' Christian Democracy,
the P.P.I., and - after World War II - today's Christian Democratic Party. If we look
at the various stages of the development of the Italian Catholic Movement, we can
retrace the welfare organizations as a sort of 'red thread' which runs all along it 37.
Welfare organizations were the back-bone of a political project of reconquest of
power at all levels, to overturn the political balance established in the early 1860s.
This is no place to expand the discussion on the ultimate outcome of such a project.
The point here is that in 1862 the liberal State, by not advocating to itself the
control of the welfare sector, made a choice which might have been convenient in the
36 V. Fargion, 'L'assistenza pubblica in Italia dall'Llnita al fascismo: primi elementi per
un'analisi strutturale', in Rivista Trimestrale di scienza della Amministrazione , No. 2
(1983), pp. 33-38.
37 For the Opera dei Congressi e Comitati Cattolici in Italia see G. Candeloro, II movimento
cattolico in Italia (Riuniti, Rome, 1972), passim, and partic. pp. 129-304;
S.Tramontin, 'Opera dei Congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici in Italia', in F.Traniello, G.
Campanini (eds.), Dizionario del movimento cattolico in Italia , (Marietti, Casale
Monferrato, 1982), vol. I/2, pp. 336-47; G. De Rosa, II movimento cattolico in Italia
dalla Restaurazioone all'eta giolittiana (Laterza, Bari, 1988), passim, and partic. pp.
45-223. A most useful synthesis of the Catholics' social committment is: Sergio
Zaninelli, 'L'azione sociale dei cattolici', in F.Traniello, G.Campanini (eds.), Dizionario
storico del movimento cattolico in Italia , cit., vol. 1/1, pp. 320-58. For the debate on
welfare within the Opera dei Congressi: A. Gambasin, 'L'utopia sociale nei congressi
cattolici in Italia prima della "Rerum Novarum" (1874-1890), in Bollettino
dell'Archivio per la storia del Movimento Sociale Cattolico in Italia , No. 1(1974), pp.
7-51; Fabrizia Berera, 'Note sul dibattito all'interno del movimento cattolico
organizzato intorno ai problemi dell'azione assistenziale in Italia nell'ultimo quarto
dell'Ottocento', ibidem, No. 1 (1978), pp. 61-99; Casimira Grandi, 'Le attivita
assistenziali sanitarie nell'ambito dell'Opera dei Congressi', ibidem No. 2 (1978), pp.
200-35.
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short run under some respects, but left open a gap which - in the long run - would
prove of crucial importance.
Returning to Caravaggio's analysis, the other flaws of the 1862 act were contained
in the articles concerning the guardianship and surveillance of the charities.
Caravaggio not only criticized the lack of controls on budgets, which reduced the
checks of the accounts to 'a hasty acknowledgement of arbitrary acts already occured',
but also pointed out the inadequacy of the Provincial Deputations as guardians of the
charities. Their components, elected by limited suffrage, were not subject to any
restraint on the grounds of incompatibility. Hence they often combined their public
role of charities guardians with that of charities managers - with detrimental effects
on the impartiality of their judgements and decisions. Article 20, which entrusted
the Interior Ministry with the surveillance of the charities by means of inspectors,
was dismissed by Caravaggio as 'a poor article', on the basis of his experience in the
higher ranks of the Interior Ministry. Finally he criticized the narrow opportunities
for reform offered by the law. The reforms, which were already obstructed by the
wording of article 23, were further hampered by the fact that the initiative could be
taken only by the Communal or Provincial councils - and also by their dependence on
the Council of State '...that most authoritative assembly, given the powers of a
tribunal, admitted reforms with the greatest parsimony...' 38.
This malfunctioning of the act was a further contradiction, which should not be
underestimated. The choice to grant large autonomy to the charities might have
stemmed from the speculation that welfare provisions would cost nothing to the state,
while keeping the poor quiet and contented with a few alms. Reality turned out to be
much more complicated. Maladministration, diversion of welfare resources for other
purposes - notably devotion and local political patronage - and their general
dispersion in a myriad of inefficient forms of relief, plus inadequate financial
controls, made welfare expenditure by the local authorities soar. Legal charity had
been ruled out in principle, but in practice it was creeping in. It was not by chance
that the purpose underlying both Nicotera's and Crispi's bills was to force the
charities to deliver a better service in order to trim public welfare expenditure.
The act of 1862, which aroused a very lively debate in the 1870s and 1880s, has
not attracted equal interest in more recent times. With a few exceptions, the act is
generally mentioned very briefly by those who have recently contributed to the
reconstruction of the historical process through which the modern Italian welfare
state took shape. This apparent lack of interest does not however entail the
disappearence of the ideological divide which in the last century opposed the
38 E. Caravaggio, 'Beneficenza pubblica, di Stato o legale, e privata', cit., p. 8.
222
detractors of the act to its supporters. Today those who claim the legitimity of
voluntary agencies within the present welfare system, and campaign to widen their
scope of activity, interpret the act of 3 August 1862 as the first step towards a
State-managed system of public assistance. Conversely, those to whom public welfare
is a matter for the State alone, tend to emphasize the negative effects produced by the
act of 1862, and interpret it as a major obstacle on the road to the welfare state 39.
39 The interpretation of the 1862 Act as a first step towards the statalization of the
welfare system can be found in: G. Cattaui De Menasce, L'assistenza ieri e oggi
(Studium, Rome, 1963), p. 93; Giovanni Ancarani, 'L'evoluzione delle istituzioni
assistenziali libere in Italia dall'unita ad oggi', in Quaderni di Justitia , No. 29, 1978
(Giuffre, Milan), pp. 58-62; Silvio Restelli, 'Chiesa e mondo cattolico italiano di fronte
alia legge Crispi del 1890 sulla riforma della beneficenza', in Bollettino dell'Archivio
per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia , No. 1 (1978), pp. 101,111; Ivo
Colozzi, 'L'evoluzione del sistema italiano di Welfare State ', in Giovanna Rossi,
Pierpaolo Donati (eds.), Welfare State: problemi e alternative (Angeli, Milan, 19853),
p. 306. The opposite point of view in A. Cherubini, Storia della previdenza sociale in
Italia (1860-1960) (Riuniti, Rome, 19771), pp. 38-39. A very optimistic as well as
unfounded opinion on the efficiency of the act in: F. Manzotti, 'L'istituto ospitaliero nel
Risorgimento italiano', Atti del primo congresso italiano di storia ospitaliera, Reggio
Emilia, 14-17 Giugno 1956 (Arcispedale di S. Maria Nuova, Reggio Emilia, 1957), cit.,
pp. 449-450; Idem, Esperienze risorgimentali (Bonanno, Catania, 1970), p. 157.
Balanced the evaluation made by Lorenzo Spinelli, 'L'assistenza privata con particolare
riguardo agli enti ecclesiastici (problemi e prospettive)', in Studi in memoria di Carlo
Esposito, vol.II (Padua,1972), p. 1025; and Stefano Sepe, 'Stato e opere pie: la
beneficenza pubblica da Minghetti a Depretis (1873-1878)', in Quaderni Sardi di storia ,
No. 4 (July 1983-June 1984). The best account, and a balanced assessment of the act
and its making is: M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'Opere pie e beneficenza pubblica: aspetti della
legislazione piemontese da Carlo Alberto all'unificazione amministrativa', in Rivista
trimestrale di diritto pubblico , No. 3 (1980), cit., pp. 1036-51. The implications of the
interpretation proposed by V. Fargion,'L'assistenza pubblica in Italia dall'Unita al
fascismo: primi elementi per un'analisi strutturale', cit., are discussed above.
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7.The implementation of the act of 1862 and the debate on poor relief (1860s-
1 880s).
7.1. The Reale Atberao dei Poveri of Naples. An extreme case of inaovernabilitv.
or a test-case for the 1862 Act?
A fine example of the inadequacy of the 1862 act to force sound administration upon
the charities was offered by the Reale Albergo dei Poveri 1 of Naples. This was a
typical welfare establishment of the ancien regime. It had been founded in 1751 by
Charles III of Bourbon as a shelter for all beggars of the kingdom. Its construction
took seventy-five years, including interruptions due to famine, war, and lack of
funds. The total cost of the building, estimated at thirty million ducats, was met by a
variety of means, since Charles III failed to ensure adequate funding. Apart from the
12,000 ducats allocated in 1751 from the treasury, funds came from private
donations, royal alms, taxes on banks, and assets of those monasteries suppressed by
Benedict XIV to help the Albergo 2. During the Napolenic period the Albergo, like all
other Neapolitan charities, suffered a reduction of income from the abolition of
arrendamenti, but it also benefited from the introduction of workshops, aimed at
educating the inmates, and providing new sources of income to the establishment 3.
The workshops were maintained by the restored Bourbons who amalgamated eight
other establishments with the Albergo dei Poveri between 1816 and 1836, merging
their patrimonies and administration 4. From the outset the internal life of the
Albergo was marred by financial difficulties, maladministration, and the ill-
1 Literally: Royal Hotel for the Poor.
2 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-25o: Soprintendenza Gen. del Reale
Albergo de' Poveri e degli ospizj e stabilimenti riuniti, Segr. Gen., No. 3343, Naples, 20
August 1866, to Prefect, Naples; Teresa Filangieri Ravaschieri Fieschi, Storia della
Carita Napoletana (Giannini, Naples, 1878), vol. Ill, pp.133-234, 251-52; E. Vecchione,
E. Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza della citta di Napoli (Naples, Tip. Sordomuti,
1908), pp. 9-14; Romeo De Maio, Societa e vita religiosa a Napoli nell'eta moderna
(1656-1799) (E.S.I., Naples, 1971), pp. 369-73.
3 L. Valenzi, 'La poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del governo francese', in A. Lepre (ed.),
Studi sul regno di Napoli nel decennio francese (1806-1815) (Liguori, Naples, 1985),
pp. 62-8, 74-7. For arrendamenti see above, 5.1.
4 The establishments annexed to the Albergo were the home for the deaf and dumb, the
hospices of S. Francesco di Sales (for women), SS. Giuseppe e Lucia (for blind men), S.
Maria dell'Arco (for old and disabled beggars), S.Maria Maddalena ai Cristallini (for
women), and the hospitals of S.Maria di Loreto, S.Maria della Vita, and S.Maria della
Cesarea (Cf.: A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Report of the committee of inquiry
into the Albergo to the Prefect, Naples, 30 October 1866; Statistica del Regno d'ltalia,
Opere Pie, Campania, 1861 (Tip. Reale, Milan, 1871), pp. 61-63; T. Filangieri
Ravaschieri Fieschi, Storia della Carita Napoletana , vol. Ill, cit., pp.240-43, 247-50;
E. Vecchione, E. Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza della citta di Napoli , cit., pp.
22-37).
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treatment of the inmates, whose number swelled beyond the capacity of the buildings:
the record was reached in the 1830s, when 7,000 individuals of all ages and kinds
were crammed into a space suitable for 3-4,000 people. The Albergo could not
accommodate the huge quantities of beggars from the provinces. Hence in September
1843 the provinces were told to set up their own poorhouses, for the Albergo dei
Poveri would cater only for the province of Naples. New internal regulations, issued
in December 1843, restricted the admission of inmates to disabled beggars, destitute
children, and foundlings between seven and twelve years of age. These were to be
educated and discharged at the age of eighteen if male, and at twenty- one if female.
The internal workshops and schools were intended to provide them with sufficient
skills to earn a honest living. None of these well-intentioned rules was implemented.
The provinces did not set up their own poorhouses, and kept sending their beggars to
Naples as late as the 1870s. The internal schools and workshops fell into total neglect
from the early 1850s. As a consequence, the young inmates never learned any useful
trade, and spent their lives in idleness and appalling conditions. According to the
Prefect of Naples, 2,442 (i.e. about 61%) of the four thousand or so inmates of the
Albergo dei Poveri and aggregated establishments in 1864 were able-bodied 5.
As far as welfare establishments were concerned, Naples' Albergo dei Poveri -
known to the populace as "il Serraglio' 6 - was undoubtedly the most unsavoury
legacy of the Bourbons to the Italian state. Farini was aware of the problem. He
appointed a new body of Governors and entrusted the study of the necessary reforms
to the Regia Consulta. This conducted an inquiry and found all sorts of wrongs. The
administrative staff was overabundant and overpaid, and enjoyed undue privileges,
such as free lodging in the best parts of the building, whilst about a hundred elderly
inmates languished in the cellars. The 5,300 or so inmates were undernourished
and inadequately clothed. The internal schools and workshops were neglected, since
the only preoccupation of the governors was to train soldiers. Corruption was
rampant. The assets were mismanaged and consequently the revenue was much less
than it should be. The Consulta recommended selling estates and buying state bonds,
pruning the staff, improving the food, separating the educable inmates from the
5 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-25o, particularly: the Prefect,
Naples, 20 April 1864, to the Superintendent of the Albergo ; f. 26040/36-30o; B.
283, f. 26040/12: the Prefect, Naples, 19 April 1864, to M.I., Turin; T. Filangieri
Ravaschieri Fieschi, Storia delta Carita Napoletana , vol. Ill, cit., pp. 253-65; E.
Vecchione, E. Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza della cittci di Napoli, cit., pp. 16-
7, 38-9, 592-93; R. De Maio, Societa e vita religiosa a Napoli nelieta moderna (1656-
1799) , cit., pp. 371-73.
6 Literally: menagerie. See: Paolo Macry.'Borghesie, citta e stato. Appunti e impressioni
su Napoli: 1860-1880', Quaderni storici , No. 56, 1984, p. 349.
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irrecuperable beggars, and restructuring the workshops. None of these wise
recommendations was implemented 1.
The gravity of the situation was first brought to the attention of the central
authorities in May 1862 when, during the second visit by Victor Emmanuel II to
Naples, some inmates and lower-rank employees of the Albergo managed to escape
surveillance and tell the sovereign about their appalling conditions and the
administrators' abuses. This small demonstration, promptly repressed and punished
by the police and the administration of the Albergo, was followed by numerous
petitions and manifestos 8. These documents were written by those lower-rank
employees who had been sacked for organizing the demostration - hence they were
largely inspired by personal hatred. Yet the general state of affairs which they
denounced was genuine, as later evidence confirmed. The inmates of the Albergo
were said to be so miserable that
they sleep on old and filthy straw where they find torment rather than rest.
Their clothes are rags patched up many times; the new ones only serve for
good appearence before those who must be deceived. No socks or shoes,
because those worn in the presence of His Majesty are always stored away
in the wardrobes. The food is a little pasta, brown and acid and overcooked,
with no seasoning [...]. About the nightdresses and sheets, inhabited by
tormenting insects, it is better not to talk. Also we prefer not to describe the
revolting condition of the old, who sleep in a foul catacomb. What about
morality? There is none. Philo-bourbon confessors come twice a week to
trouble the conscience of the male inmates [...]. What about the women? [...]
More than 300 girls were expelled and ended up in brothels; many go out to
entertain some governor. About the teaching, it is better not to talk [...] 9.
The Interior Ministry seemed to take the matter seriously. A new superintendant of
the Albergo was appointed, a copy of the internal regulations was requested, to see
how it could be modified, and a committee was entrusted with the investigation of the
above allegations. The prefect 10 was urged to inquire into the administrative
7 T. Filangieri Ravaschieri Fieschi, Storia della Carita Napoletana , vol. Ill, cit., pp. 265-
67; E. Vecchione, E. Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza della citta di Napoli, cit.,
pp. 17-8; Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche
di beneficenza di Napoli (Bertero, Rome, 1903), vol. V, pp. 22-26.
8 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-1 o: Fatti avvenuti net Real Albergo
de' Poveri (printed manifesto without date, but referring to the events of 11 May
1862); A S.M. il Re d'ltalia Vittorio Emanuele II. Supplica degli Alunni del Real Albergo
de' Poveri (printed manifesto, without date, but June-July 1862); Pasquale Niscia,
Naples, 30 Sept. and 17 Oct. 1862, to M.I., Turin.
9 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-1 o: A S. M. il Re d'ltalia Vittorio
Emanuele II. Supplica degli Alunni del Real Albergo de' Poveri, cit.
1 0 During the period of these events the prefects of Naples were: the general Alfonso
Ferrero La Marmora (16 Oct. 1861- 11 Jan. 1863, when he asked to be dismissed), the
marquis Rodolfo D'Afflitto, previously prefect of Genoa (11 Jan. 1863- 16 Oct. 1864,
when he resigned for health reasons), the senator Paolo Onorato Vigliani, previously
procuratore generale at Turin's appeal court (16 Oct. 1864-17 Dec. 1865, when he was
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situation, and propose reforms 11. More wrongs began to emerge, but virtually
nothing was done to put them right. As late as February 1864, the Albergo had no
inventories, no budget for the current year, no accounts rendered for 1862. No rent
contracts were put out for tender. The inmates had been reduced from five to four
thousand, enabling a slight improvement in their treatment. The new superintendant
De Blasio had concentrated his energies on the creation of a separate section for 130
young girls, who received better treatment and education. But he had failed to
improve the other internal schools and workshops which remained obsolete and
neglected: out of 2,400 able-bodied inmates only 800 worked, with minimal profit
for the Albergo and no advantage for themselves. Virtually no inmate was able to earn
a living, and thereby leave the institution. As a consequence the Albergo could give
no shelter to young orphans, foundlings, and disabled beggars, as prescribed by the
statutes. Only 900 inmates were beggars, whilst the estimated 13,000 beggars
elsewhere in the city were summarily assisted by the Opera della mendicita. This was
a private organization founded at the end of 1861 by Leopoldo Rodino. The city council
spent huge sums for the upkeep of the theatre S. Carlo and the refurbishment of the
rich quarters of Naples, but all it did for the beggars was to make sure they did not
invade those areas inhabited by aristocrats and bourgeois. The internal life of the
Albergo was dominated by philo-Bourbon priests and Sisters of charity. They
appointed first president of the corte di cassazione of Florence), the marquis Benedetto
Reggio (deputy councillor, 17 Dec. 1865-9 Apr. 1866), Filippo Gualterio, previously
prefect of Palermo ( 9 Apr. 1866-28 July 1867, when he resigned for health reasons),
Giacomo Durando, chief commander of Naples' military department (28 July 1867-31
Oct. 1867, when he resigned), the senator marquis Massimo Cordero di Montezemolo
(31 Oct. 1867-13 Febr. 1868, when he was apointed prefect of Florence), the marquis
Antonio Starrabba di Rudinl, previously prefect of Palermo (13 Febr. 1868-22 Oct.
1869, when he was appointed Interior Minister), Rodolfo D'Afflitto (31 Oct. 1869- 26
July 1872, when he died) (cf.: Mario Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello Stato e
prefetti del Regno d'ltalia (M.I., Pubblicazioni degli archivi di stato, Rome, 1973), p.
412).
11 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-1o: Royal Decree 20 May 1862
(appointing Filippo De Blasio as new superintendant); M.I., Div.5, Sect.2, No. 2308,
Turin, 7 July 1862, to prefect, Naples (minute), and Turin, 14 Nov. 1862, to prefect,
Naples; the latter, Naples, 17 May, 8 Oct., 23 Oct., and 18 Nov. 1862, to the former,
Turin; Soprintendenza Gen. del Reale Albergo de' Poveri , etc., Naples, 17 Sept. 1862,
to M.I., Turin.
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indulged in anti-government propaganda, and seemed impossible to get rid of 12. The
enormous power enjoyed by Sister Vittoria Mantelli, who had run the female section
for twenty-two years, became evident in May 1864, when a joint attempt by De
Blasio and the Mother Superior of the order to replace her with a lay direttrice
provoked the revolt of the female section. For three days 1,700 women went on the
rampage, destroying furniture, demolishing a wall, and stealing clothing. The women
were protesting against their miserable living conditions, but the protest was
Sister's Mantelli reply to De Blasio's attempt to breach her power 13. This incident
eased the replacement of De Blasio - whose relationship with the prefect was
awkward - by Francesco Ciccone 14. But the new superintendant was as powerless as
his predecessor to breach the network of interests and complicity created by the
Sisters of Charity, since he was unwilling to risk further and possibly more violent
revolts. On the other hand the Sisters' replacement with lay staff required more
resources, since the eighteen Sisters costed only 612 lire per month, and asked
nothing for the extra help they hired. The prefect reckoned that, to raise the funds
necessary for a more expensive management, the productivity of the workshops must
be improved. But the sisters had full control of the inmates' work, since they
provided the contact with clients, and this would surely go with them, leaving the
workshops without orders. The ministry's entreaties to eliminate the Sisters were
purely academic, since the government was not prepared to meet the bill of a radical
overhaul. Thus in 1865, with four plans of reform under study, nobody had the guts
12 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-1o: Police report, Naples, 30 Aug.
1862; Superint. De Blasio, Naples, 30 Aug., 11 and 29 Nov. 1862, to M.I., Turin;
Council of the Hosp., Naples, 3 Sept., 6 and 8 Oct. 1862, to M.I., Turin; the latter,
Turin, 22 Oct. 1862, to prefect, Naples; 10 Sept. and 22 Oct. 1862, to De Blasio,
Naples; f. 26040/36-21 o: gen. Admin, of the Albergo, Naples, 2nd March 1863,
Object: Reclamo al Re contro I'avviso della Deputazione Provinciate di Napoli del 31
Gennaio 1863 ; B. 283, f. 26040/12: the prefect, Naples, 14 Febr. and 19 April
1864, to M.I., Turin. See also: Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Reiazione suite
istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli , cit., vol. V, p. 26. For the Opera della
Mendicita see: Jessie White Mario, La miseria in Napoli (Quarto Potere, Naples, 1978),
pp. 221-26 (1st ed. 1877), and also A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 279, f. 26040/0-
11 o: the prefect, Div. O.P., Sect.1, No. 5670, Naples, 29 Sept. 1864, to M.I., Turin.
About Leopoldo Rodino (Palermo 6 Febr. 1810 - Naples, 17 Jan. 1882) cf.: Luigi Vitali,
'Leopoldo Rodind', R.B.P., No. 1, 1882, pp. 3-8. About the expenses to embellish the
noble parts of Naples, and the measures against beggars see: P. Macry, 'Borghesie,
citta e stato. Appunti e impressioni su Napoli: 1860-1880', cit., pp. 350-1.
13 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283, f. 26040/12: Petition to the King by the female
section of the Albergo, Naples, 16 May 1864; Police report, Section of S. Carlo all'
Arena, Naples, 18 May 1864, to the prefect, Naples; the latter, Gabinetto, No.
1820/440, Naples, 18 May 1864, to M.I., Turin.
14 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283, f. 26040/12: Petition to M.I., of employees of the
Albergo against De Blasio's resignations, Naples, 7 May 1864; the prefect, Naples, 15
May 1864, to M.I., Turin (telegram); Royal Decree 19 May 1864.
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to take the first step, although everybody agreed on the detrimental influence of the
Sisters on the inmates, and on the need for their expulsion 15.
More evidence of the degeneration of the Albergo dei Poveri was to emerge in 1866.
In February a group of citizens of the borough of S. Anastasia alleged ill-treatment of
the inmates of S. Maria dell'Arco, an annexe of the Albergo that sheltered elderly
beggars. The provincial councillor Giacomo Mazza, sent by the prefect to investigate,
fully confirmed those allegations. He found filth, lice, and other insects everywhere,
in the wardrobes, beds, and the inmates' clothing. In the kitchen he found that the
copper pans were without tin, and were thus likely to cause verdigris poisoning. The
daily ration of meat was inferior in weight to the quantity prescribed by the
regulations, and of the lowest quality. Since it consisted mostly of bone, cartilage and
skin, it contained few nutrients. Also the flour for the pasta weighted less than
prescribed, and the broth in which it should have been cooked revealed no trace of the
prescribed tomato conserva , but only some swedes and celery. The oil and lard used
for seasoning were rancid. In the dirty infirmary he found that the medicines did not
correspond to the doctors' prescriptions, but were cheap mixtures of water and
honey, kept in filthy containers. The inmates, mostly old and in poor health,
complained of being brutally treated 16. The commotion and polemics caused by
Mazza's report had just abated 17, when a riot exploded in the male section of the
Hotel's central building. The philo-Bourbon priests, who circulated freely in the
establishment, had diffused the rumour that the Piedmontese would lose the war with
Austria, and the return of the Bourbons was imminent. This caused opened
manifestations of hostility towards the government, which the Comandante (rector)
failed to punish. From that moment he lost control of the situation, living the field
15 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Ciccone, Naples, 21 July 1865, to prefect,
Naples; the latter, Naples, 27 July and 27 Sept. 1865, to M.I., Turin; the latter, Turin,
14 Aug. 1865, to the former. The mentioned plans of reform were by a committee of
distinguished Neapolitans, the superintendant Ciccone, the provincial deputation, and the
provincial council.
16 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: M.I., Turin, 28 Febr. 1866, to prefect, Naples;
copy of report by Giacomo Mazza, Naples, 13 March 1866, to the prefect, Naples; the
latter, Div. 2, No. 3983, Naples, 10 Oct. 1866, to M.I., Florence.
1 7 The governors of the Albergo greatly resented the interference of the provincial
authorities. They challenged the evidence produced by Mazza - though they were unable
to prove it was false - , and resigned. The prudent manoeuvring of the prefect
persuaded them to withdraw their resignations, and the incident was closed with solemn
promises to improve the standards of S. Maria dell'Arco. (Cf.: A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-
73, B. 283: Governors of the Albergo, Naples, 18 March 1866, to prefect, Naples; the
latter, Naples, 29 March 1866, to M.I., Florence; Superint. of the Albergo, Gen.
Secret., No. 946, Naples, 31 March 1866, to prefect, Naples; the latter, Div. 2, No.
1714, Naples 16 April 1866, to M.I., Florence; the latter, Florence, 26 April 1866, to
prefect, Naples (minute).
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open to the plotting of the Prefetti (assistants), who hated him for having cracked
down on some of their illegal activities, such as stealing property, marketing food in
the dormitories, and sexually abusing the younger inmates. The revolt started at
lunch time on 21 August. The inmates smashed crockery, windows, lamps, marble
tables, and tried to pull down a wall. Calm was restored by intervention of the
carabinieri, the police, and the guardia nazionale. Twenty-two were arrested.
The prefect appointed a committee of inquiry, whilst a police investigation revealed
that the pharmacy of the Albergo was the headquarter of a Bourbon clique formed by
the chemist, the doctor, the printer, and the Sisters of Charity. The three
commissioners, whose report was ready by the end of October, worked hard,
investigating all aspects of the internal life of the Albergo and annexed hospices, and
its administrative situation. In the central building the male section was found to be
relatively clean, but in need of structural repairs: the staircase was unsound and
part of the roof was collapsing; the toilets needed overhauling, and the water supply
was insufficient. The female section was in even greater disrepair, and very dirty. In
both sections the commissioners found that the first source of trouble lay in the
custom of chosing the assistants (prefetti and oblates) from among the inmates. These
people, who had been brought up in the Albergo, were ignorant, avid, ruthless, and
presided over ail sorts of swindles. The oblates in particular, used to lend money
usuriously, sell food, coffee, sweets, spirits, clothes; and rent tools and kitchen
utensils to the inmates. The governors were fully aware of such illegal activities, but
lacked the courage to stop them, because they knew that they provided a temporary
relief to the misery of the inmates, who would never collaborate wiht a clean-up. The
committee concluded that all such people must be replaced by trained and well paid
external staff. In the male section the Comandante, a retired army officer, did his
best to keep discipline, and could not be blamed. However his efforts were useless.
Some of the internal schools, like the primary school, the Istituto magistrale, and the
schools of music and design were relatively well run and efficient; but the
workshops, which ought to have provided income for the Albergo and technical
training for the inmates, were totally neglected. Those few inmates who attended
them, learned nothing. Most inmates, especially the aged, spent their days in
idleness, wandering along the corridors. No leisure activities were provided, nor
physical exercise for the young.
In the female section the picture was bleaker. The only inmates who received decent
treatment and education were those selected young girls for whom De Blasio had
created a separate sub-section run by a lay direttrice. The others, old, young, adults,
deaf, dumb, ex-prostitutes, widows, all mixed together, lived in idleness, filth, and
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degradation, gossiping and fighting in an inferno where the callous prevailed and the
meek succumbed. A very small number worked, making gloves or embroidering
ecclesiastical paraments. No primary instruction was provided, nor were useful
skills, such us tailoring, taught. Sister Vittoria Mantelli, and her accolytes - whom
we have already met - presided over this bedlam, making personal profit from the
inmates' work, and from the household administration, which they managed without
any control by the governors. The commissioners described Mantelli's private
apartment as luxurious, like that of an abbess. She had powerful friends among the
high ecclesiastics, and took active part in the meetings of the Bourbon clique in the
pharmacy of the Albergo. She used to grant exit permits to her favoured inmates, and
persecute those who expressed sympathy for the present political order. Dubious
confessors had free access to both sections, and great influence on the women. The
committee suggested eliminating them and appointing fewer priests loyal to the
government. Both in the male and female sections the standard food provided by the
administration to those inmates who did not work consisted of a bowl of pasta seasoned
with some lard, and a loaf of bread. Those who worked got nineteen cents a day, and
prepared their own meals, buying the food in the internal market. This practice,
concluded the commissioners, must stop; and better food must be provided for all
inmates. Of the seven hospices and hospitals annexed to the Albergo three - the
hospice of S. Maria Maddalena ai Cristallini, and the hospitals della Vita and della
Cesarea, were well run. One, the hospital of S. Maria di Loreto, could not be
inspected, because temporarily filled with cholera victims. The other three - the
hospices of S. Francesco di Sales, S. Maria dell'Arco, and SS. Giuseppe e Lucia,
suffered from the same problems as the central building. The administrative part of
the inquiry revealed the absence of any archive, which meant that the exact
boundaries of many properties, as well as usurpations, rent-contracts terms, etc.,
were often unknown to the administration. Moreover, the maintenance of the urban
properties appeared too expensive: the committee advised their gradual sale and
investment in state-bonds. The account books were in great disorder and the book¬
keeping added to the confusion. The administrative staff, fifty six employees and nine
porters, could well be reduced, while pensions and stipends needed pruning 18.
18 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: report from the police section of S. Carlo
all'Arena, Naples, 6 Sept. 1866, to the chief constable, Naples; the prefect, Div. 2, No.
3983, Naples, 10 Oct. 1866, to M.I., Florence; All'onorevole Sig. Prefetto della
Provincia di Napoli. Relazione della Commissione d'inchiesta per I'Albergo dei Poveri,
Naples, 30 Oct. 1866; see also: Reale Commissione d'inchiesta per Napoli. Relazione
sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli , cit., vol. V, pp. 27-29. The
commissioners were Davide Silvagni, chief secretary of Naples' prefecture, Nereo
Dominicucci, secretary of the charities' section, Raffaele Manzi, police inspector.
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The prefect, who was now Gualterio, decided not to print the thirty-seven pages
long report, so as to minimize public polemic. It took a while for the prefecture staff
to copy it by hand, to provide the Provincial Deputation with an adequate number of
copies 19. Thus the matter remained unresolved until the end of December when,
with a vote of six out of ten, the Deputation decided to appoint a Royal commissioner
to run the Albergo and introduce the most urgent reforms. This was the only solution
likely to produce effective results, yet it must be noted that the deputies were not all
in favour of the Royal commissioner. One faction wanted to keep the present
administration, which should patch up some of the reforms recommended by the
committee of inquiry 20. This was the faction of those who effectively opposed any
substantial change in the Hotel's state of affairs. Albeit temporarily defeated, they
enjoyed enough power to impede any such changes from taking root, as was to become
clear fairly soon.
With some difficulty, by the middle of February 1867 a Royal commissioner was
found, in the person of Antonio Winspeare 21. As soon as he took office, he became
the target of a deffamatory campaign by the local press, but he was no man to be
easily deterred. By April Winspeare had achieved some remarkable results, and was
planning much more. Since the first problem was the lack of discipline, he divided
the male inmates by age, sent all the old to S. Maria dell'Arco, and ensured that the
various groups did not mix. The Comandante was now helped by another retired
19 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: report to the minister by Del Carretto, head of
M.I., Div., 6, Sect. 2, Florence, 19 Dec. 1866; the prefect, Naples, 27 Dec. 1866, and
13 Jan. 1867, to M.I., Florence.
20 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Provincial Deputation's deliberations, Naples, 30
Dec. 1866; the prefect, Naples, 13 Jan. 1867, to M.I., Florence, cit.
21 The prefect first persuaded Giuseppe Figlioli, governor of the Santa Casa degli
Incurabili, to take the awkward job but he soon resigned. Antonio Winspeare, who at the
time happened to be in Florence, was persuaded personally by the Interior minister
(A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Royal Decrees 27 Jan. and 13 Feb. 1867; the
prefect, Naples 21 and 22 Jan. (telegrams); 14 Feb. 1867, to M.I., Florence; the latter,
15 Feb. 1867, to pref., Naples). Winspeare, Duke of Selve, was born in Potenza in
1840. Former ambassador to Constantinople under the Bourbons, he was sent in July
1860 to Turin by the Neapolitan constitutional government, with the finance minister
Giovanni Manna, to negotiate an agreement with the Piedmontese. Soon after the end of
his office as Royal Commissioner at the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples he started a long
career as prefect. He was prefect of Lecce (1868-70), Massa Carrara (1870-72),
Forli (1881-84), Caserta (1884-85), Modena (1885-87), Alessandria (1887-90),
Palermo (1890-91), Turin (1891-93), Milan (1893-May 1898), Venice (1898-1900),
Florence (1900-1904, when he retired). When he was prefect of Milan he had problems
with Crispi from 1894, for he appeared weak towards radicals and socialists. His
handling of the crisis of 1898 provoked his transfer to the quieter prefecture of Venice
(see: G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna (Feltrinelli, Milan, 19662), vol. IV, pp.
470-71; M. Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello Stato e prefetti del Regno d'ltalia , cit.,
pp. 273, 325, 356, 363, 383, 398, 406, 409, 423, 491, 510; Fausto Fonzi, Crispi e
lo "Stato di Milano" (Giuffre, Milan, 1972), pp. 37-64).
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officer, who set up a gymnasium within the Albergo. The internal schools and
workshops were reorganized, many idle and ignorant teachers sacked. All inmates
now studied or worked. The system of paying the working inmates nineteen cents a
day was abolished. The diet, now equal for all, included meat four times a week, wine
on Sundays, and decent basic food. By the first of May all inmates would receive new
clothes and working overalls. All this was going to cost much, but most of the
necessary funds would come from the savings made by sacking idle staff. Besides the
teachers, Winspeare sacked the thirty-five doctors of the Albergo, who cost a fortune
and did very little, and hired three new doctors instead. Things went less smoothly in
the female section. Inmates and Sisters of Charity resisted and rebelled at the
introduction of the first novelties, but Winspeare, instead of giving up for fear of
confrontation, used the riots as a pretext for gradually separating the inmates and
getting rid of the Sisters. Now the old were all at S. Francesco di Sales, the young and
adults were in the central buildings of the Albergo, but on different floors, with
different entrances and separate management. The various passages between the male
and female section were being bricked up, and nobody could enter into the Albergo
when Winspeare was not there. Also the administrative offices were undergoing a
shake-up. The archive was being set up with the help of the superintendant of the
state archives; the book-keeping system was being overhauled; the corrupt vice-
secretary had been sacked, and several others were to follow. Overdue rents were
being collected, and law-suits settled, while the planned sale of several urban plots,
and the letting as shops of some empty premises of the Albergo were going to provide
some much-needed extra cash 22.
At long last the camorra of the Albergo was being breached, and many did not like the
shape which things were taking. On 1 May a fugitive inmate tried to kill Winspeare,
seriously wounding him on the head and face. The local press, which had been waging
war to the Royal commissioner for months, was now turning in his favour - with the
exception of 'II Pungolo' and 'La Roma' - but the provincial deputation was displaying
an increasingly open hostility. First, it ignored the above-mentioned plans to sell
and rent some properties, which needed the deputation's consent to go ahead; then it
issued a declaration asking the government to remove Winspeare and appoint a
normal administration. This demand was unlawful, since it originated in the
informally uttered wishes of some provincial councillors. Both the prefect and the
ministry dismissed it as irrelevant, reckoning that Winspeare must continue his
22 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: M.I., Florence, 6 April 1867, to prefect, Naples;
Winspeare, Naples, 14 April 1867, to pref., Naples. See also: Reale Commissione
d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli , cit.,
vol. V, pp. 30-33.
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work; but they failed to recognise the meaning of the deputation's illegal move.
Rather than stand up to the provincial deputies' arrogance, the ministry asked the
deputation to be specific, if allegations were to be made against Winspeare. On his
part, the prefect made a further mistake, sending the mayor and the judiciary to
investigate the Albergo. This investigation confirmed that Winspeare was doing his
job properly; but it undermined his authority over the inmates and enhanced the
self-confidence of the provincial deputation. The uncautious request by the ministry
for specific allegations against Winspeare brought the appointment of three
provincial councillors to inspect the Albergo. Again, this was illegal, since a Royal
commissioner was not accountable to the local authorities, but only to the central
government which he represented. Again, this request by the provincial deputation,
instead of being rejected on the grounds of its unlawfulness, was accepted by both the
prefect and Winspeare himself. The former feared that a refusal would incense the
deputation, while the latter was confident that no investigation could find any wrong¬
doing in his management 23.
From that moment the central government and its representatives lost control,
leaving the field open to the manoeuvring of the provincial deputies. Winspeare
wasted a week of his precious time waiting for the committee to materialize. He did
not want any inspection to take place in his absence, knowing what effect such visits
had on the inmates' morale. At long last the committee arrived unannounced, and was
refused entry by the janitors, according to Winspeare's ruling that nobody be granted
access to the Albergo in his absence. The deputation took this as a personal offence
and claimed to have full evidence of Winspeare's mismanagement, without need of
inspection. It insisted on Winspeare's dismissal. The truth was that the provincial
authorities wanted to avoid an inspection which was bound to prove them wrong; and
hence they fabricated the whole incident, probably with the help of their informants
within the Albergo. Winspeare reacted with great dignity, continuing his work, and
refusing to apologize for an error which he had not committed. The prefect and
ministry fully backed him, having sound proof of his integrity. Nevertheless they
seemed unable to stand up against the sly manoeuvring of the deputation. Our evidence
does not permit a more detailed reconstruction, but by mid July 1867 Winspeare
was dismissed, and his collaborators resigned. Soon after Gualterio also resigned, for
health reasons. The Royal commissioner's place was taken first by the councillor of
the prefecture, Marquis Reggio, and then by the provincial councillor, Giacomo
23 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: the prefect, Naples, 3 and 24 May, 11 July 1867,
to M.I., Florence; the latter, 15, 26, and 31 May 1867, to the former; Winspeare,
Naples, 11, 24 and 27 May, to the prefect, Naples; Prov. Dep. deliberations, Naples,
1st May and 12 June 1867.
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Mazza. The deputation, now firmly in control, ensured that all "injustices"
perpetrated by Winspeare be repaired. The oblates, whom Winspeare had disposed of,
finding them places in Naples' numerous conservatorii, returned triumphantly to the
Albergo. So did a collection of dismissed employees, inmates, and parasites of all
sorts 24.
By October 1867 the deputation reckoned that all was 'back to normal', and an
ordinary administrative board could be appointed. This was another troubled
business because the deputation unlawfully tried to override the prefect, and have its
own men appointed. This time the deputation was forced to comply with the law, but
the new administrators proved inept and gutless. By December 1868, when faced
with an administrative problem which could be easily solved by negotiation, they
resigned. The prefect, who was now Di Rudinl, wanted a new Royal commissioner. He
reckoned that after Winspeare's departure no reforms had been implemented, and he
knew that only a single-minded and independent man could introduce changes into the
Albergo. The ministry officials were of a different, embittered opinion. The saga of
the Albergo dei Poveri had abundantly proved that no brave Royal commissioner could
enforce long-lasting reforms without the consent of the local authorities. Communal
and provincial councils should either learn to collaborate with one another within the
limits set by the law, or be let alone to disentangle the messes they had created. This
was a conspicuous admission of failure by officials who had pressed for years for the
reform of the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples, and had monitored with great attention
the development of the situation. Yet they had failed to bring to heel the provincial
deputation at the first signs of insubordination; and now things had gone too far to be
put right with an intervention from above. However, since nobody willing to take the
unpleasant job could be found, the Albergo was run for yet another year by a special
commissioner, appointed by the prefect, until a 'normal' administrative board was
formed in January 1870. Meanwhile the ministry kept receiving anonimous
denounciations of abuses, robberies, maladministration, and ill-treatment of the
inmates. But the time was past when these documents were taken seriously and their
allegations investigated: now denunciations and petitions were put 'agli atti'. Reform
by Royal commissioner had proved unworkable in the long term; reform by local
authorities was impossible because nobody in the local government wanted it 25.
24 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Winspeare, Naples 5,11 and 18 July 1867, to
the prefect; the latter, Naples, 11 and 22 July, 3 Sept., 18 Oct. 1867, to M.I.,
Florence; the latter, Florence, 6 Sept. 1867, to the former, Naples; Prov. Dep.
deliberation, Naples,10 July 1867.
25 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 283: Prov. Dep. delib., Naples, 16 Oct. 1867; G. Mazza,
Naples, 28 Oct. 1867, to pref., Naples; M.I., Florence, 25 Nov. 1867, 29 July and 28
Dec. 1868,to pref., Naples; the latter, Naples, 28 Dec. 1867, 3 Jan., 14 an 16 Dec.
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Over the years many more inquiries and reform plans would be produced, only to
end up gathering dust in the archives; as late as 1908 the Albergo was still run
according to the regulations of 1843. Jessie White Mario, who visited the
establishment in the late 1870s to collect material for La miseria in Napoli, found a
lot of filth and deprivation in the male section. Apart from the school of design, no
workshop was fully operative. Very few inmates worked, and there was very little
education. The female section was cleaner, and the inmates worked, but none learned a
proper trade. The food was not too bad, but still insufficient, although the inmates had
been reduced to 2,700 by the early 1870s. The whole building was damp and
insalubrious, the beds were appalling, and so on 26. The report of 1903 by the Royal
Commission of Inquiry for Naples depicted the same mismanagment, degradation,
filfth, abuses, corruption, lack of discipline and education found by the Regia
Consulta in 1861 and the inspections of 1866 27.
It has been recently argued that the case of the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples offers a
typical example of persistent opposition by an ancien regime institution to modern
forms of control 28. Broadly speaking that is undeniable; but it seems to us that this
interpretation tends to forget that the institution was not sealed off from the
surrounding socio-administrative reality. The above evidence shows that not only did
this particular institution oppose change and reform, but that such opposition was
shared by those very authorities to whom the initiative for proposing change
belonged. Any overhauling was bound to hurt too many vested interests, and cost too
much in terms of local political balances. In this sense the Albergo's saga can be seen
as a tough test for both the central government and the act of 1862, as well as an
extreme case of ingovernability. The act offered some devices for reforming charities
and welfare establishments, but all depended on the local authorities. The legislator
had presupposed a high level of civil committment by provincial councils and
deputations; the case of Naples demonstrated that this presumption was sometimes
Utopian. The law offered no ground for direct government intervention in the absence
1868, 13 Jan. 1869, 16 Jan. 1870, to the former, Florence; M.I. report to Council of
State, Florence, 4 Febr. 1868; Council of State, Interior section, Sentence 26 May
1868; M.I. report to the King, 16 July 1868; anonimous denounciations, Naples, 27
May and 13 June 1869, 11 Dec. 1870, to M.I., Florence.
2 6 E. Vecchione, E. Genovese, Le istituzioni di beneficenza della citta di Napoli, cit, pp. 19-
22, 38, J. White Mario, La miseria in Napoli , cit., pp. 85-107; Reale Commissione
d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli, cit.,
vol. V, pp. 33-42.
2 7 Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di
beneficenza di Napoli , cit., vol. V, pp. 46-575.
28 L. Valenzi, 'La poverta a Napoli e I'intervento del governo francese', in A. Lepre (ed.),
Studi sul regno di Napoli net decennio francese (1806-1815) , cit., p. 79.
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of local initiative. In this sense the early confidence of the ministry officials that
reform could be imposed from above can be interpreted as a sign that the ministry's
initial interpretation of the act was over-optimistic. Winspeare's defeat revealed the
limits of government interference into local authorities' territory. But it might also
have taught another lesson to ministry officials and government representatives -
that any unlawful act by local authorities must be nipped in the bud, without leaving
room for further manoeuvring. We cannot say whether a stricter approach by the
ministry and the prefect would have deterred the provincial deputation from ousting
Winspeare. But it seems undeniable that the central authorities behaved naively,
fearing direct confrontation, and believing that the provincial deputies would change
their minds, when there was early evidence to the contrary. The Italian government
had no hesitation in sending south tens of thousands of troops to fight the brigands.
Yet, when the battle was fought at local administration level, fear of confrontation
seemed to prevail over single-mindedness. One could argue that the situation in the
South, and particularly in Naples, was notoriously extreme, and should not be taken
as exemplifying the performance of the 1862 act. Conversely we reckon that
significant tests of the effectivness of a law are best provided not by those situations
offering optimal pre-conditions, but by those offering the highest degree of
resistance.
7.2. Congregations of Charity, statutes, inventories, and accounts.
In 1892 Nitti wrote that under the act of 1862
...the charitable institutions had become a mere prey to the spoiler [...] much
capital was trafficked away without any benefit to the poor. The charitable
institutions of the country districts, far from the great centres, when deprived
of all superintendence, became the arena of all local struggles, and frequently
served for mere personal ends or the purpose of party. Priests, who were left
poor by the alienation of so much Church property, and monks, whom the
suppression of their orders had often induced to become priests, found nothing
else to live upon except the charitable institutions. These foundations, which
ought to have served to help the sick, the poor, the widowed, served, on the
contrary, in the majority of cases, to support young seminarists of the middle
class who were preparing for priesthood, to aid in defraying the expenses of
religious worship, to restore churches, to pension old priests, etc. Nor did the
middle-class managers prove more careful of the public good, or more tender to
the sufferings of the poor. They took advantage of them [...] to help themselseves
in administrative contests, to obtain the means of electoral corruption, or even
to support their own sons.j...] At Milan the 'Congregation of Charity' supported
the son of the rich Radical deputy Marcora.j...] At Naples it used to be said, and is
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said still, that, in administrative elections, the party wins which is at the head of
the charitable institutions... ^9
Perhaps not everything was so black as depicted by Nitti. Not all welfare
establishments were as chaotic as the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples. The poorhouses of
Borgo S. Donnino and Reggio Emilia seemed well run, and their inmates' treatment
appeared more humane. In 1861 the administration of the Albergo dei Poveri of
Genoa was taken over and reformed by the congregation of charity, which
successfully overcame the same sort of opposition that, in Naples, had ousted
Winspeare. In the late 1870s - it was alleged - those inmates learned useful trades
in the new workshops, could read and write, and were able to find jobs when they left
the institution 30. However, there was evidence that in many regions the
implementation of the 1862 act was slow and far from satisfactory. For instance, as
late as 1865, the new act was still a dead letter in Umbria. Both congregations and
independent charities had no inventories; budgets and accounts were inaccurate or in
arrears; administrative and devotional expenditure was too high and the land was
unprofitably managed; too many treasurers had given no deposit; too many
congregations did not administer directly the foundations entrusted to them, but
relied on external and unlawful administrative boards; too many congregations had
their archives mixed with those of the commune; and most communes did not bother
to propose reform of those independent charities whose purposes were obsolete 31.
2 9 F. S. Nitti, 'Poor relief in Italy', Economic Review , vol. 2, No. 1(1892), pp. 1-24, quot.
pp. 8-9 (English translation by D. G. Ritchie, M.A., Jesus College, Oxford), now in A.
Saitta (ed.), Francesco Saverio Nitti. Scritti sulla questione meridionale (Laterza, Bari,
1958), vol. 1, pp. 225-49, quot. p. 232-3. The original Italian version was published in
Rassegna Pugliese , No. 9-10 (1892). Another list of assorted abuses can be found in
Pasquale Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza', in Id., Scritti vari (Zanichelli, Bologna,
1894), pp. 317-22 (originally in Nuova Antologia, vol. 111 (1 May 1890), pp. 5-40).
30 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 332, f. 26044/0-13o; B. 333: Provincia di Parma.
Capitolato da osservarsi per I'appalto degli alimenti ed indumenti e di tutto quanto
riflette il servizio del Deposito dei Mendicanti in Borgo S. Donnino (approved by M.I. on
11 Aug. 1863); 'Osservazioni sopra un opuscolo del dottore B.C. risguardante
I'amministrazione del deposito di mendicita di Borgo S. Donnino', in Supplemento alia
Gazzetta di Parma, No. 85, April 1863; B. 402: Regolamenti organico ed interno della
casa di ricovero di mendicita di Reggio nellEmilia, amministrata dalla Congregazione di
Carita (Tip. Torreggiani & Co., Reggio Em., 1867); B. 198, f. 26028/0-2o; B. 203, f.
26028/ 85-2o: Rapporto sull'ordinamento dell'Albergo dei Poveri in Genova adottato
dalla Deputazione Provinciale con deliberazione del 7 Marzo 1861 e trasmesso al
Ministero dell'lnterno (Tip. Ferrando, Genoa, 1861); two memos by the old
administrative board of the Hotel, Genoa, March 1861 and 17 July 1861, to M.I.,
Turin; 1863 budget of the Hotel, in Supplemento al No. 57 della Gazzetta di Genova, 7
March 1863; Giovanni Du Jardin, 'Di un nuovo modo di applicare la carita pubblica in
Genova per mezzo dei comitati di sestiere', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, p. 101.
31 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 345, f. 26046/0-9o: Deput. Prov. dell'Umbria, Sect.1,
Circ. No. 5188, Perugia, 30 Oct. 1865, to sub-prefects, mayors, chairmen of the
congregations of charity and other special welfare administrations, Object: Opere Pie.
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A number of cases of neglected institutions - in need of reforms which nobody cared
to propose - was brought to the attention of the Interior ministry by the Ministry
for Public Instruction in the late 1860s. The school inspectors investigated several
educational charities in the provinces of Venice, Mantua, and Caltanissetta. In Venice
there were too many educational charities whose assets should be merged and used
more profitably to the benefit of larger numbers of inmates. Two establishments in
particular, the Istituto Manin and the Istituto dei Catecumeni, were found to be
obsolete, with rich revenues, but too few inmates - who received no primary
instruction 32. In the foundling home of Mantua, and the orphanages of Mantua,
Viadana, and Sabbioneta education was completely inadequate. The orphanage of
Sabbioneta, run from 1866 by the Congregation of Charity, not only lacked all
educational material, but competed in filth with the Albergo dei Poveri of Naples.
When the inspector asked the teacher why no night supervision was provided in the
dormitories, she replied that neither her or her assistant had the courage to sleep
there.
...The inmates must spend the night walking about to rid themselves of the
revolting insects which fill beds and dormitory... 33.
Federico Polizzi, school inspector of Caltanissetta, defined the eight educational
charities for girls of that province
...prisons often dangerous to innocence and decency, rather than salubrious
shelters for destitute orphan girls... 34.
The orphanages of Aidone and S. Caterina were run by private boards, all the others
by the local congregations of charity. In none of them did the inmates receive the
minimal elementary education prescribed by law. In Caltanissetta the inspector found
that the teacher of the Moncada orphanage was totally illiterate; and that some
Norme per un piu regolare andamento nelle amministrazioni ed assetto definitivo delle
medesime.
32 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 505, f. 26067/55-28o: M.P.I., Florence, 23 Dec.
1869, to M.I., Florence.
33 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 236, f. 26035/ 0-3o: M.P.I., Florence, 14 Sept. 1869,
to M.I., Florence; see also B. 239, f. 26035/54-5o: Regolamento organico della
Congregazione di Carita di Sabbioneta, redatto il 4 luglio 1865 ed approvato dal
Ministero dell'lnterno il 18 gennaio 1866\ f. 26035/ 54-6o: evidence about the messy
administrative situation of the orphanage from 1863.
34 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 99, f. 26014/0-1o: Report No. 253, from the Royal
Scholastic Inspectorate, Caltanissetta, 31 Dec. 1869, to M.P.I., Provveditorato
Centrale per I'lstruzione Primaria e Popolare, Florence, by this forwarded to M.I. on 21
May 1870. The institutes inspected by Polizzi were: the orphanage Moncada
(Caltanissetta), the Educandato Castelnuovo (S. Caterina), the orphanage and retreat of
St. John the Baptist from Rhodes (Piazza Armerina), the orphanage Torres (Aidone),
the orphanages of Castrogiovanni, Terranuova, and Butera.
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inmates who could read were used to teach the others. The other orphanages had no
teachers at all, and most inmates were innumerate and illiterate. However, that
seemed a secondary problem. Most buildings were in disrepair and insalubrious,
when not on the verge of collapse. Money was so tight that the inmates had to work
hard sewing and embroidering to earn a meagre living. In the orphanage of
Castrogiovanni the congregation of charity and the local church were so in arrears
with their payments that the inmates had to pawn their own clothes not to die of
hunger. The tax imposed on the charities' assets by Garibaldi in favour of the
'danneggiati dalle truppe borboniche in Palermo' certainly did not help, but often the
lack of funds was simply due to the administrators' abuses 35. In Aidone the five
trustees of the rich Torres orphanage pocketed the entire income of the orphanage's
estates - concealing their abuses with the impenetrable disorder of their account
books - and letting the twelve inmates starve. They were permanently locked in, had
no fuel, no shoes, no clothes apart from rags and, of course, no teachers of any kind.
Inspector Polizzi put himself at pains to arrange agreements with the municipal
councils and the local maestre comunali, who proved eager to collaborate and teach
the inmates in their spare time. He also pushed the congregations to promote
reforms, refurbish the buildings, or move the institutes into deserted convents. But
everywhere, with the exception of Castrogiovanni, he came up against a wall of
diffidence and hostility. Neither the private boards nor the congregations really
wanted to change anything. Most of the courses set up with the help of the maestre
comunali either never started, or were aborted for lack of collaboration from the
orphanage administrations.
Polizzi concluded his report by making a number of sensible suggestions. The
government must impose primary instruction on the educational charities with an
iron fist, it was the only way to obtain any result. Then the orphanages needed a
radical administrative overhaul to stop mismanagement and abuses, and they
required statutes and internal regulations to ensure equal and fair treatment to all
inmates. To become profitable and useful it was convenient to convert them into
workhouses, where primary instruction could be coupled with sound technical
training. But, stressed Polizzi, the government should first of all pay attention to the
congregations of charity, on which the implementation of the above measures
depended. The chairmen of too many congregations did not care about the charities
3 5 With the decree of 9 June 1860, No. 24, all charities and trusts whose funds did not
serve for hospitals or religious duties were ordered to surrender their assets and
revenues to the azienda danneggiati dalle truppe borboniche. This was the only measure
concerning charities during the provisional rule in Sicily. See: G. D'Amelio, Stato e
Chiesa. La legislazione ecclesiastica fino at 1867 (Giuffre, Milan, 1961), pp. 164-65.
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they administered, and behaved like petty tyrants, bitterly resenting any
interference into their personal fiefs. Indeed, these reports by the school inspectors
seemed to contain sufficient evidence to persuade the Interior Ministry to send
inspectors, in accordance with article 20 of the 1862 act, or to order the prefects to
proceed to enquiries, in accordance with article 23. No evidence suggests that either
course of action was effected. The prefect of Caltanissetta declared that, since he first
took office, he was well aware of the awful conditions of all charities in the province.
He was doing his best, but it was a long job, as nothing had seemingly been done from
1860 to 1869. He was struggling to dispatch 12,336 accounts in arrears, and needed
a good accountant, whom the ministry was not sending. He had appointed a committee
to study Polizzi's report. However, given the charities' bankruptcy, caused by the
compulsory contributions to the 'azienda dei danneggiati dalle truppe borboniche',
most of the suggestions made by the school inspector were simply not affordable 36.
Not all congregations of charity performed as badly as those of Sabbioneta,
Caltanissetta, Piazza Armerina, Butera, and Terranova. Yet, there is evidence that,
by and large, the formally orderly establishment of the congregations did not
guarantee by itself their efficiency as guardians of the patrimony of the poor. In
many parts of Italy the congregations had little or no assets, hence they were unable
to help the poor, while the independent charities, shielded by articles 4 and 15 of the
1862 act, kept squandering their assets as they pleased. As late as 1880 there was a
congregation of charity in almost all 8,259 communes of the Kingdom , but only
1,890 congregations (i.e. around 23%), managed assets of their own. All the others
had either no means at all, and distributed occasional donations, or acted as
administrative boards of independent charities 37. Inevitably, the congregations were
bound to perform better in those regions where the eighteenth-century reforms had
paved the way, merging myriads of charities into a few administrations run or
controlled by the state. In Lombardy there was initial resistance to the replacement
of the old Luoghi Pii Elemosinieri with the congregations; but, once these difficulties
were over, the congregations seemed to function quite well. Since most charities were
36 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 99, f. 26014/0-1o: the prefect, Div. 2, Sect. 3, No.
819/6387, Caltanissetta, 2 Aug. 1870, to M.I., Florence; f. 26014/0-3o: the pref.,
Caltanissetta, 29 July 1869, to M.I., Florence.
37 Direzione generale della Statistica, Commissione Reale d'lnchiesta sulle Opere Pie
istituita con Regio Decreto 3 Giugno 1880, Statistica delle Opere Pie, vol. X, Abruzzi e
Molise, Puglie, Basilicata e Calabrie, e Riassunto generale per il Regno (Bertero, Rome,
1897), p. VII. Giuseppe Bodio gave slightly different figures in his final report: 2,022
congregations of charity with assets of their own out of 8,256 communes (cf.: M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 8, p. 6).
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not privately run, but administered by the Luoghi Pii, the congregations inherited
large patrimonies and became the major providers of indoor and out-door relief 38.
A typical example was offered by Cremona. That congregation of charity
administered the hospital, the lunatic asylum, the foundling home, two orphanages,
the poorhouse and workhouse, the almoner foundations, and the Monte di Pieta.
Budgets, accounts, and internal statistics were published each year; all institutions
appeared well run and financially sound, with the only exception of the workhouse,
which was obsolete and unprofitable 39. In Genoa a network of Comitati di Sestiere
was being set up in the late 1870, entrusted with the coordination of the dispensation
of extraordinary relief, in accordance with De Gerando's model of Visitors of the
poor40. In other regions, like the ex-duchy of Modena, where the charities'
individual administrations had been restored in 1815, the congregations did not
enjoy complete control of the distribution of relief; but there was evidence among
those local authorities of a will to implement sound reforms. In Reggio Emilia the
congregation administered the poorhouse and other nine foundations, while fourteen
major establishments were managed by seven administrative boards, appointed by
the prefect and the municipal council. Plans to merge the educational charities were
elaborated by the municipal council in 1869. In the late 1870s, in accord with the
chairmen of the seven independent administrative boards, the reform plans were
expanded to the rest of the charities. These would be grouped into three categories:
hospitals and hospices; educational charities and orphanages; and almoner
foundations. Each group would be run by a common administrative board; several
colleges and conservatory would be merged; and the congregation of charity would
take over all almoner foundations and dowry trusts, whose assets would be devolved
to more useful purposes, such as public instruction, care of the aged, etc. The
elaboration of these plans took about a decade, since differences inevitably arose as
to the technical aspects of the reforms, and the pace of their implementation. Yet it
must be noted that the municipal authorities and the independent administrative
boards of the charities worked in substantial harmony. In Reggio Emilia those
encharged with the welfare services were persuaded that administrative
modernization and rationalization of relief distribution were paramount to the
38 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 57: the governor, Bergamo, 6 Aug. 1861, to M.I.,
Turin; the prefect, Bergamo, 12 Nov. 1861 and 21 Aug. 1863, to M.I., Turin; B. 151, f.
26022/0-1 o: prefect's report, Cremona, 11 Dec. 1869, to M.I., Florence.
39 L. De Benedetti, 'Le principali opere pie di Cremona', R.B.P., No. 8, 1875, pp. 661-8.
40 G. Du Jardin, 'Di un nuovo modo di applicare la carita pubblica in Genova per mezzo di
Comitati di Sestiere', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, pp. 97-109.
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welfare of the entire city. It showed that those local authorities who wanted to, could
move forward, even under the domain of the 1862 act 41.
No such examples could be found in the ex-Papal states. Here, where the 1862 act
remained by and large a dead letter, with rare islands of relative administrative
order 42, the congregations had to fight a tough war with the clergy, if they wanted to
get hold of the fattest charitable assets, and take control of relief distribution. In the
early 1870s the assets of Bologna's charities amounted to about thirty million lire.
The congregation of charity administered only 2,452,446.65 lire of that patrimony,
while assets worth 2,657,064.02 lire were held by 335 charities still controlled
by the clergy. The reforms devised by the congregation of charity appointed during
the period of provisional rule had been obstructed in 1862 by the provincial
deputation. Hence, fifteen years after unification, the municipal council of Bologna
tried again - headed by the same Count Albicini who had masterminded the first, ill-
fated attempt to oust the clergy from the charities. The assets of the 335 charities
would go partly to the congregation, which was planning to use them to fund a health
care service, and partly to schools and kindergartens. Dowry trusts would be
amalgamated with the dowry foundation of the Monte di Pieta, but would not be
diverted to other purposes, as in Reggio Emilia. During the heated debate which took
place at the town hall in May 1874, the representative of the clerical party was only
partially defeated. The health and relief services which the congregation was planning
to set up would operate through a network of parish committees (comitati
parrocchiali), chaired by the parish priests. As to the implementation of these
reforms, it took 'only' another five years for the completion of bureaucratic
procedures 43.
Sadly, if predictably, the largest amount of evidence about the poor performance of
the 1862 Act, and the total inertia of the congregations of charity, came from the
41 'Le opere pie di Reggio d'Emilia. Proposte per il loro riordinamento', R.B.P., No. 3,
1880, pp. 213-249; 'II riordinamento delle opere pie di Reggio nell'Emilia', ibidem, No.
5, 1880, pp. 418-27; No. 11, 1880, pp. 1193-1224.
42 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 176, f. 26024/0-4o: the prefect, Ferrara, 26 April
1864, to M.I., Turin; the latter, Turin, 3 May 1864, to the former; B. 193: the pref.,
Fori), 22 Aug. 1871, to M.I., Florence; Statuto organico della Congregazione di Carita
del Comune di Borghi (Rimini, 1873); B. 387: M.I., Div.3, Sect. 2, Florence, 2 March
1869, to M.I., Div. 5; the latter, Florence, 5 March 1869, to the prefect, Ravenna; the
latter, Ravenna, 22 April and 9 May 1869 to the former, Florence; A.C.S., M.I., O.P.,
1861-73, B. 363, f. 26047/0-4o: the prefect, Pesaro, 16 April 1864 and 7 June
1866; B. 231: the prefect, Macerata, 26 April 1869, to M.I., Florence
43 Aristide Rava, 'Sulle opere pie bolognesi', R.B.P., No. 3, 1874, pp. 193-203; Idem, 'Sul
concentramento di varie opere pie a Bologna', R.B.P., No. 6, 1874, pp. 459-66; 'La
riforma delle opere pie e la Camera dei deputati', R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, pp. 555-56,
575. For the battle between the congregation of charity and the provincial deputation in
1861-62 in Bologna see appendix 4, section 2.
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South. The prefects' reports depicted very much the same situation everywhere. The
administrators of the congregations of charity committed all sorts of abuses,
plundering the assets entrusted to them. In Bojano (province of Campobasso), the
congregation's chairman never called the meetings. He made the members sign his
decisions in private, and without prior notice, hence his will was never discussed,
still less opposed. The treasurer had given no deposit, and kept at home 8,629 lire
belonging to the congregation, instead of using it to relieve the poor and pay off
several debts with the commune and other foundations. The wheat of the Monte
Frumentario, administered by the congregation, was left to rot, and the poor of
Bojano were getting no benefits at all. During the cholera epidemic of 1866 the
congregation did not fork out a penny. By the late 1860s many congregations had been
dissolved, but their replacements did not guarantee honest management, since the
new members were often worse than the former ones 44. As for the other charities,
their revenues were either swallowed up by devotional duties, or they served for the
exclusive benefit of their managers, as happened with most Monti Frumentari.
Francesco Saverio Nitti examined the accounts of a charity of a village in the
province of Salerno. The revenue - 8,660.76 lire - was spent as follows: about 36%
went in taxes, dues, local rates, and subsidies to two priests. The salaries of the
secretary and treasurer took around 25%. Two seminarists of well off families
enjoyed a subsidy equal to 4%. Another 3% went to support a school attended
exclusively by children of wealthy people. Dowries for destitute girls took around
4%. The needy could rely on 28% of the revenue. Those 2,389.98 lire, noted Nitti,
were spent with a view to the elections rather than with a view to charity; and
were distributed without any discretion. Ifwas nothing but a school of degradation
and beggary 45.
The charities had no inventories, no statutes, no internal regulations. Often the
prefects did not even have full lists of the provinces' charities and confraternities,
and the pile of accounts in arrears mounted every year. By 1867 in the province of
Caserta the accounts in arrears since 1859 were 2,000. But the charities were not
solely to blame, because much responsability lay with the prefecture staff entrusted
with their affairs. In September 1867 in Caserta's prefecture lay 676 accounts sent
in by charities. Only seventy-six had been dispatched. Eigthy-four were about to be
44 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 101, f. 26015/7-2o: the prefect, Campobasso, 24 July
1869, to M.I., Florence; f. 26015/12-1 o; B. 282, f. 26040/ 36-25o: the prefect,
Cosenza, 2 May 1864, to M.I., Turin; B. 54, f. 26009/0-1o; f. 26009/0-4o: M.I., Gen.
Seer., Div.3, Sect. 2, No. 5686, Florence, 12 Dec. 1869, to M.I., Div.5, Florence.
45 F. S. Nitti, 'Poor relief in Italy', Economic Review , vol. 2, No. 1(1892), cit., p. 11,
now in A. Saitta (ed.), Francesco Saverio Nitti. Scritti sulla questione meridionale , vol.
1, cit., p. 235.
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cleared, thirty-one were under examination, and 485 still remained untouched. The
employees supposed to check these accounts were the lazy, negligent and corrupt
individuals whom the prefectures and provincial deputations had inherited from the
Councils of the hospices. As far as their careers were concerned, they were left in a
limbo. Their attempt to get the top jobs in the prefectures' offices had been rejected,
hence they knew they had no career prospects, and responded in kind 46. In Caserta
much responsability also lay with the complacency of the provincial deputation,
which used to approve without discussion all decisions taken by the shrewd but
dishonest secretary of the charities' section, Onofrio Foglia. His power became
evident when the prefect discovered that data gathered through official channels for
the so-called 1861 statistics had been used by Foglia for a work of his own, which
was then printed with a generous grant from the province 47. It is no exaggeration to
say that in the South the 1862 act was a dead letter, even where prefects, local
authorities, and philanthropists devoted time and energy to elaborate plans of
reform. Between 1863 and 1875 six different committees were set up in Naples by
the prefecture and the city and provincial councils to study administrative and
internal reforms of the charities. Major reforms were also proposed by
philanthropists and scholars like Pasquale Turiello, Giulio Petroni, Nereo
Dominicucci, Achille Lazzaro, Giuseppe De Simone, and the Duchess Teresa Filangieri
Ravaschieri Fieschi. They all came to nothing 48.
The administrative mess of the charities had dramatic practical consequences, that
went beyond its political implications. In 1863 the Interior ministry and the prefect
of Naples decided that the Albergo dei Poveri could not cope any longer with the
bunches of beggars sent in from the provinces. These were consequently requested to
collect their own beggars, and set up poorhouses. The invariable answer from all
provinces was that neither the congregations nor the charities had the means to
48 The final settlement was approved by Parliament on 13 Dec. 1879. The ex-employees
of the Councils of the hospices - then 115 - were put on the State payroll and granted
retirement pensions. See A.P., Camera, XIII legislatura, Sessione 1878-79, Documenti,
No. 176 A; A.P., Camera, XIII legislatura, Sessione 1878-79, Discussioni, vol. X,
tornata 13 Die. 1879, pp. 9103-6.
47 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 54, f. 26009/0-4o: M.I., Gen. Seer., Div.3, Sect. 2,
No. 5686, Florence, 12 Dec. 1869, cit.; B. 103, f. 26016/0-6o: Prov. Dep. delib.,
Caserta, 5 Aug. 1867; the prefect, Gabinetto, No. 224, Caserta, 29 Jan. 1868, to M.I.,
Florence. For the pressure exerted by the councils' staff to be levelled to the
prefecture's secretaries see A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 42; 128, f. 26018/0-1o;
B. 145, f. 26021/ 0-2o; B. 279, f. 26040/0-3o; B. 394, f. 26053/ 0-5o: petitions
from Bari, Catanzaro, Cosenza, Naples, and Reggio Calabria. For the charities'
statistics of 1861 see below, chapter 8. 1.
4 8 Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli. Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di
beneficenza di Napoli , cit., vol. I, pp. 7-8, 15-21.
245
maintain their own beggars, let alone build and fund poorhouses. The controversy
went on for years. As late as 1870 only the province of Caserta had opened two
hospices, one for men in Caserta, and one for women in Capua. Another hospice was
opened in 1871 in Benevento but, from the beginning, it was inadequate for the
province's needs 49. Inevitably the beggars kept flowing from the provinces into
Naples, where a minimal number found shelter in the Albergo dei Poveri, whilst the
greater part filled the streets, and were occasionally catered for by the Opera della
Mendicita. But, as with the Albergo dei Poveri, so with the problem of beggary, the
central government seemed to have given up any hope of imposing its own solutions.
From the ministry to the mayors, via the prefects, the watch-word was now "impede
by all means the indigent to go begging outside their own province" 50. Experience
had taught that it was safer to stick to minimal targets.
7.3.Reform bv circulars. Cantelli's failure.
By the late 1860s the ministry's bureaucrats began to realize that something was
wrong. The much praised regime of liberty was not delivering those results forecast
by Minghetti during the parliamentary debate, and by Peruzzi in the introductory
circular to the act 51. A first attempt to know the real dimensions of the charities'
administrative situation was made in 1869, when the prefects were requested to send
tables of the accounts rendered by the charities 52. In 1871 they were ordered to
draw up annual reports, structured in eighteen points, ranging from the situation of
budgets and accounts to the administrative expenditure and the state of the
49 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-25o: M.I., Turin, 19 Febr. 1863 and
5 Aug. 1865, to the prefect, Naples; M.I. Circular, Turin, 24 March 1863, to all
southern prefects; the prefects, Potenza, 30 Nov. 1863, 6 April 1864, 6 Jan. 1872;
Campobasso, 30 Nov. 1863 and 27 July 1864; Reggio Calabria, 8 April 1864; Cosenza,
21 April 1863, 2 May 1864; Catanzaro, 1 April 1863; Caserta, 12 May 1864, 7 Oct.
1868, 22 Dec. 1871, 6 Jan. 1872; Salerno, 27 May 1864, 13 Dec. 1871; Benevento, 4
Nov. 1863, 17 July 1871; Foggia, 13 April 1863; Lecce, 24 Nov. 1863; Bari, 13 May
1864; Chieti, 11 Dec. 1871, to M.I.
50 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 282, f. 26040/36-25o: M.I., Turin, 5 June 1865, to
pref., Naples (minute); f. 26040/ 36-30o: the pref., Naples, 13 Nov. 1871, to M.I.,
Rome; the latter, 23 Dec. 1871, to pref., Salerno; the pref., Potenza, 12 Jan. 1872, to
M.I., Rome.
51 M.I. circular No. 9300, 23 Dec. 1862, in S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano
(Passerano, Naples, 1909), vol. I, pp.145-150.
52 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 5, Sect. 2, No. 2936,
Florence, 3 Nov. 1869, Object: Si chiede un prospetto dei conti delle opere pie
presentati net 1868 ; Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25201, Florence, 13 July
1870, Object: Prospetto dei conti delle opere pie presentati nel 1868 .
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instruction provided by the educational charities 53. The response was incomplete
and far from satisfactory 54. However, by the early 1870s some rough quantitative
data were gathered, and synthesized in a report by Giovanni Gemelli, chairman of the
charities' department, to the Interior Minister. The picture was indeed worrying. In
1873, out of an estimated total of 19,441 charities, only one fourth had drawn up
their budgets, while almost 40% had not rendered their accounts. The accounts in
arrears (i.e. not submitted from previous years) amounted to 25,448, while
15,211 accounts were gathering dust in the provincial deputations' offices, while
waiting to be dispatched. About one tenth of the charities had no treasurer, and
almost one third of the treasurers had given no deposit. Almost one fourth of the
charities had no inventories, and 7% kept no register of their operations, nor had
any archive. Information was missing about several provinces, and Gemelli did not
publish detailed statistics. But from the evidence he produced, it seemed indisputable
that maladministration was widespread. The south was the most problematic area,
with maximums of disorder in the provinces of Teramo, Caserta, Messina, and
Cosenza. With some exceptions, notably the provinces of Cuneo and Piacenza, the
north behaved relatively better, while the central provinces offered a mixed
performance, with the provinces of Arezzo and Grosseto in perfect order, and those of
Perugia, Ascoli, Ancona, Macerata and Rome largely mismanaged 55.
53 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288,
Florence, 15 March 1871, circ. No. 14, Object: Rapporto annuale circa I'andamento
delle opere pie ; No. 25288, Rome, 8 June 1872, Object: Nuove avvertenze circa il
rapporto annuaie sull'andamento delle opere pie .
54 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288, Rome,
24 June 1873, Object: Nuove norme circa al servizio delle opere pie e alia compilazione
del rapporto normale sull'andamento loro. For the endless stream of entreaties to the
prefects cf.: ibidem, No. 25700, Florence, 25 Aug. 1871, Object: Bilancio pel ramo
opere pie per I'anno 1872 ; No. 25288, Florence, 5 Sept. 1871, Object: Rapporto
annuale circa I'andamento delle opere pie ; No. 25288, Rome, 13 Nov. 1871, Object: as
above; No. 25288, Rome, 10 Jan. 1872, Object: as above; No. 25288, Rome, 28
March 1872, Object: Ancora sul rapporto sull'andamento delle opere pie ; No. 28500-
10, Rome, 5 June 1872, to the southern prefects, Object: Nuove avvertenze per la
compilazione dei bilanci provinciali, ramo opere pie ; No. 25288, Rome, 10 Oct. 1872,
Object: Rapporto sull'andamento delle opere pie per I'anno 1872 ; No. 28500-10, Rome,
14 Oct. 1872, Object: Bilancio provinciate, ramo opere pie pel 1873 ; No. 25288,
Rome, 20 Nov. 1872, Object: Rapporto sull'andamento delle opere pie per il 1872 ; No.
25288, Rome, 16 Febr. 1873, Object: as above; No. 25288-8, Rome 15 Dec. 1873,
Object: Rapporto circa I'andamento delle opere pie nel 1873 ; No. 25288-8, Rome,
March, 1874, Object: as above; No. 25271, Rome, 18 June 1874, Object: Opere pie -
spese eccedenti di amministrazione, stipendi, onorari: rimedi.
5 5 'Le opere pie nel 1873', R.B.P., No. 7, 1874, pp. 530-36; S. Sepe, 'Stato e opere pie: la
beneficenza pubblica da Minghetti a Depretis (1873-1878)', Quaderni Sardi di Storia,
No. 4 (July 1983-June 1984), pp. 184-85. Gemelli's report was first published on
Gazzetta Ufficiale of 15 July 1874. The information contained in the report is
reproduced in the appendix to this chapter, tables 1-9.
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When Gemelli published the above-mentioned report, the charities' managers were
already on the alert. In November 1873 Minghetti, then finance minister, proposed a
bill to reduce the paper currency, which in the last two years had reached a
dangerous peak. In the long term, the objective was the return to the golden standard,
which Italy had abandoned in May 1866. The Chamber committee, headed by the
deputy Mezzanotte, proposed to raise the necessary sinking-funds through the
compulsory sale of the charities' landed assets, to be replaced by state bonds. The so-
called 1861 statistics of the charities, whose publication had just been completed,
showed that estate maintenance and administration absorbed from forty to over
seventy per cent of the revenues. Hence the replacement of estates with bonds would
greatly reduce this excessive administrative expenditure, simplifying the charities'
management, and freeing revenue for charitable purposes. Neither Minghetti nor the
Chamber majority were in favour of this proposal. Therefore, after much bickering
and inconclusive promises by Minghetti to study the issue, the committee's proposal
was dropped 56. Nevertheless, the agitation provoked by this project among the
charities and the Catholic press was enormous, and assumed the features of a crusade
against the State which, after having suppressed the religious congregations and
swallowed up their assets, was now determined to destroy the last bastion of the
church's independence, undermininig in the mean time the right to private
property57. Now charities and congregations of charity could rely not only on the
Catholic press to make their voice heard, but also on the monthly Rivista della
Beneficenza Pubblica , founded in 1873 by Giuseppe Scotti, chairman of Milan's
congregation of charity, and member of that municipal statistical committee 58.
5 6 Cf.: Aldo Berselli, La destra storica dopo I'Unita (II Mulino, Bologna, 1965), vol. II, pp.
220-82; Luigi Trezzi, ' II dibattito suscitato in Lombardia dal progetto di conversione
coattiva dei beni immobili delle opere pie e la stampa cattolica (1874-1875)', in
Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, No. 2,
1975, pp. 292-305; G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna, vol. VI (Feltrinelli,
Milan,1978), pp. 19-23
57 Luigi Trezzi, ' II dibattito suscitato in Lombardia dal progetto di conversione coattiva
dei beni immobili delle opere pie e la stampa cattolica (1874-1875)', cit., pp. 305-330.
58 The Rivista della Beneficenza Pubblica , whose first number was issued in April 1873,
lasted in 1918. It was edited by Scotti until his death, in February 1899. In 1893 G.
Sormani, professor of sanitation at Pavia's university, joined Scotti as co-editor for
the social health part. In 1896 a new member joined the editorial board, in the person of
Count Carlo Biancoli, general secretary of Bologna's poorhouse "Vittorio Emanuele II".
He shared with Scotti the responsability for the welfare part. After Scotti's death the
magazine was edited by Biancoli and the member of parliament, Enrico Pini, who had
been on the editorial board since January 1899. In 1902 Biancoli and Pini were joined
by N. Tabanelli, who assumed most of the editorial work in 1903. The Rivista was
published in Milan by Civelli until 1887, when the head office moved to Rome. Here it
was published firstly by the Stabilimento Tipografico Italiano and then, from 1891, by
the Tipografia dell'Llnione Cooperativa. In 1903 the head office moved to Bologna,
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Although in its second issue the magazine published an article advocating that the
state had the right to reform inefficient and obsolete charities 59, the Rivista by and
large, defended the charities' freedom, on this occasion as well as later. On the issue
of the sale of the charities' estates Scotti's line was clear-cut: in 1862 the Italian
state had showed its concern for the poor by issuing an act that offered the best
guarantees of the charities' liquidity and efficiency. Now, concerned only for its own
finances, that same state was ready to destroy the patrimony of the poor. The Tuscan
Ottavio Andreucci cautiously admitted that there was some evidence of the failure of
the 1862 act, and that a reorganization of the entire relief system was due, so as to
exploit the full potential of the charities' assets. However, he reckoned that the
responsability for not applying the law lay exclusively with the authorities, while
any reform must respect the charities' autonomy. On all counts the 1862 act was a
great law, whose principles of liberty and decentralization must be defended 60.
Thus Gemelli's report was like lightning in an already stormy sky. But any defence
of the1862 act required the support of hard evidence, and this was difficult to find.
Gemelli himself concluded with an expression of little confidence in the entreaties
Tabanelli's town. The heading changed several times. Born as Rivista della Beneficenza
Pubblica, in 1875 it became Rivista della Beneficenza Pubblica e degli Istituti di
Previdenza. More and more attention was devoted to cooperatives and friendly
societies, especially from the early 1880s, when the part devoted to the charities
declined. The original heading was resumed in 1891-92; in 1893 the magazine became
Rivista della Beneficenza Pubblica e di Igiene Sociale, and in 1896 it changed to Rivista
della Beneficenza Pubblica, delle Istituzioni di Previdenza e di Igiene Sociale, which
remained until 1918. The aim was to provide space and stimulus for studies and debates
on social welfare. A section was devoted to the sentences by the Council of State
concerning the charities. The Rivista, which reflected the debate on charities for about
fifty years, was open to the various opinions but, during the long period of Scotti's
leadership, basically defended the charities' autonomy. Such defences were usually
low-profile. Whenever a position risked becoming untenable, the magazine would keep
silent till the turmoil was over. Then it would re-start from a critical but supple
position, showing willingness to accept the novelties without fully dismissing the old
opinions. From 1880, when Scotti was appointed member of the Royal Commission of
Inquiry into the charities, the Rivista took a more flexible position, but only after
Scotti's death did the editorial board start to follow a radically different line, openly
acknowledging the inadequacy of the old-style charities.
5 9 Bassano Gabba, 'Delia ingerenza dello Stato nelle Istituzioni di Beneficenza', R.B.P., No.
2, 1873, pp. 81-93.
60 G. Scotti, 'La conversione dei beni immobili delle opere pie', R.B.P., No. 2, 1874, pp.
81-111, partic. p. 89; O. Andreucci, 'Delia vendita e conversione dei beni immobili delle
opere pie', ibidem, Nos. 4, 5 , and 6, 1874, pp. 281-97, 361-82, 441-58, partic. pp.
289-90, 456-58. On the same topic: V. Lanfranchi, 'L'Ospitale di S. Matteo di Pavia e la
proposta di conversione degli immobili delle opere pie', R.B.P., No. 7, 1874, pp. 513-
29; O. Nesi, Della proprieta immobiliare delle opere pie in Toscana, ibidem, pp. 536-41;
E. Salvagnini, 'Di alcune operazioni che le opere pie potrebbero fare coi loro beni',
ibidem, No. 9, 1874, pp. 684-89; Carlo Ughi, L'avvenire degli istituti di beneficenza in
Italia secondo il progetto del deputato Mezzanotte (Grazioli, Parma, 1875).
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made to prefects and provincial deputations, and he hinted at the need for new
legislation. Scotti replied with a sharp attack. He stressed the data's incompleteness,
hinting that most irregularities probably occurred in the small centres, while the
more important charities complied with the law. Moreover, any failure to enforce
the law was entirely the government's responsibility; thus Gemelli's suggestion of
new legislation was dismissed as a further proof of the ministry's ineptitude 61.
However, after this defensive reaction on the part of the charities, things started to
move, if slowly. On 30 January 1875 the much-needed reform of the 1862 act was
discussed in Parliament. Villari and Luzzatti stressed the waste of money caused by
the charites' mismanagement and the inefficiency of relief distribution; but no bill
was proposed. According to Evandro Caravaggio, who had replaced Gemelli at the head
of the charities' department, the Interior Minister Cantelli agreed on the need for an
energetic intervention, but reckoned that his party could not afford the political
risks entailed by a radical bill on such a sensitive issue. Hence Caravaggio was given
the go-ahead for a number of memorable but ill-fated circulars 62. The aim of this
reordering operation, launched on 12 December 1875, was to cut public spending on
welfare and health care. The charities' assets were huge: in millions of lire the
almoner foundations had three hundred and fifty; the poorhouses over one hundred;
the hospitals four hundred; the orphanages one hundred; the foundling homes forty;
the conservatorii one hundred; the Monti di Pieta sixty; the Monti frumentari
eight; yet provinces and communes spent about forty million a year for foundlings,
lunatics, and health care for the poor at home and in hospitals.
...as a result of the administrative unification some welfare expenditure was
included among the communes' and provinces' obligations, according to the local
administration act, but undoubtedly such expenditure should belong to the
charities. I suspect that there are foundations for the relief of foundlings and
lunatics which do not fulfill their obligations, and I intend to find them out.
Communal and provincial budgets might greatly benefit...®3.
The first step was a statistical inquiry of the almoner foundations, including the
congregations of charity and the charitable burdens attached to churches,
confraternities, and any other foundations. For the patrimonial part the method was
the same as that followed for the inquiry launched in 1862. More detailed forms
61 'Le opere pie nel 1873', R.B.P., No. 7, 1874, cit., pp. 530-36.
62 Cf.: G. Scotti, 'Delia beneficenza elemosiniera in Italia', R.B.P., No. 2, 1875, pp. 97,
101-102; E. Caravaggio, 'Beneficenza pubblica, di stato o legale, e privata', in
Cinquanta anni di storia italiana (Hoepli, Milan, 1911), vol. II, p. 8.
63 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288-7,
Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 1, Object: Riordinamento delle opere pie. Inchiesta. See
also: ibidem, No. 25288-7, Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 3, Object: Riordinamento
delle opere pie. Tutela ; and No. 25288-7, Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 4, Object:
Riordinamento delle opere pie. Vigilanza.
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were supplied for welfare expenditure. The ministry also wanted an account of poor,
indigent, and beggars in each commune, in order to have a basis for comparing the
welfare expenditure data; but the criteria given for this purpose were highly
questionable. The poor were defined as all those who paid no tax of any kind; beggars
were those who could exhibit begging licences. The permanent and temporary
unemployed, as well as vagrants and beggars without a licence, were not taken into
account. The deadline was January 1876, later postponed to February, but the
inquiry was never completed. The charities perceived this operation as a preparation
for the forced sale of their landed assets, and did their level best not to collaborate,
while the chronic shortage of staff in the prefectures added to the difficulty of the
task. As late as 1878, when yet another mini-statistical inquest was launched, the
ministry insisted that the work ordered on 12 December 1875 had not been called
off, and must be accomplished 64.
The second step of the operation launched by Cantelli was to impose stricter
administrative controls. To this end, on the basis of a large interpretation of the
ministry's right to supervision, accorded by article 20 of the 1862 Act, the
charities were ordered to publish their budgets and hand them over to the mayors.
These - whom article 49 of the regulations to the 1862 act granted a generic right of
supervision - should check the budgets, note any irregularity, and send them to the
prefects, who would notify the ministry of those charities which ought to be
inspected. In addition the charities - which until then|iad been left free to administer
themselves according to their customs - were now ordered to implement a quantity
of meticulous rules, ranging from the daily register of financial operations to
monthly reports. Detailed and complicated rules regulated the treasurers'
operations. Those who did not submit accounts, would refund the expenses incurred
by the employee sent to settle them 65. The third step was to remind the provincial
deputations of the limits and nature of their tasks. Too many interfered in matters
that did not concern them - such as the appointment of the charities' employees and
the undertaking of law-suits - while neglecting to check the charities' accounts.
64 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288-7,
Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 1, Object: Riordinamento delle opere pie. Inchiesta ; No.
25288-4, Rome, 1st Jan. 1876; No. 25288-7, Rome, 15 Jan. 1876, Object:
Riordinamento delle opere pie ; No. 25288-7, Rome., 5 May 1876, Object: Inchiesta
sulle opere pie. Chiarimenti ; No. 252887, Rome, 27 July 1876, Object: Inchiesta sulle
istituzioni limosiniere ; No. 252887, Rome, 28 July 1877, Object: Inchiesta sulle
istituzioni limosiniere ; No. 26000-12, Rome, 4 Febr. 1878, Object: Indicazioni
sommarie sullo stato delle opere pie net Regno .
65 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288-7,
Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 2, Object: Riordinamento delle opere pie.
Amministrazione.
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From 1873 to 1875 the situation had worsened: the accounts to be dispatched by the
deputations were 17,319; those in arrears from the charities were 27,923. Such
delays made a nonsense of guardianship: what use could there be in commenting on
irregularities that had occurred fifteen or twenty years before 66? The last step was
to remind the prefects of their duties. There was abundant evidence that they were
not keen to monitor and investigate. The office of each prefecture and sub-prefecture
must keep and regularly update a number of registers: one for the various kinds of
charities, modelled on the forms sent for the inquiry; one for the charities' staff,
congregations included; one for the treasurers; one for statutes, internal
regulations, and inventories. The prefects must use their authority to ensure that all
charities draw up their budgets, and render their accounts, and that all
administrations have a treasurer with adequate bond. Those administrative boards
which did not comply must be dissolved, according to article 22 of the law. All
charities must be inspected at least once a year 67.
It looked all very neat, but unfortunately it did not work. Giuseppe Scotti ironically
welcomed the ministry's initiative after a decade of inaction, but forecast that the
collection of data would be difficult and of little value - which meant that, whatever
information the bureaucrats managed to gather, they could be sure it would be
largely false. As for the other aspects of the planned shake-up
...the said circulars will make no difference, since they will meet a passive
resistance undeterred by fines. In many cases it will not be unwillingness to
comply, but impotence, for want of staff, for want of pre-set rules, for inability
of the prefecture's offices to undertake the huge work committed to them...®8.
Moreover in many regions - notably Lombardy, Venetia, and the Romagne - the
charities had by tradition no treasurers, but only cashiers. Although article 11 of
the 1862 act prescribed that all charities with a regular income should have a
treasurer, so far the principle had prevailed that the administrative traditions of
the charities should not be tampered with. Now, all of a sudden, that principle was
abandoned, and restraints were imposed which had no ground in either the letter or
66 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288-7,
Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 3, Object: Riordinamento delle opere pie. Tutela.
67 A.C.S., M.I., Gabinetto, Circolari: Gen. Secretariat, Div. 4, Sect. 1, No. 25288-7,
Rome, 12 Dec. 1875, Circ. No. 4, Object: Riordinamento delle opere pie. Vigilanza.
68 G. Scotti, 'II riordinamento delle opere pie in Italia', R.B.P., No. 2, 1876, p. 141.
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the spirit of the law 69. Indeed the whole operation was questionable from a legal
point of view, despite Caravaggio's claim of its perfect legality 70.
But whether legally sound or not, the circulars made no difference - as Scotti had
predicted - and they aroused considerable opposition. The Academy of the Accountants
of Bologna held a special meeting, where the legality of the circulars was challenged,
and a declaration was solemnly made inviting the Government not to overstep its
legal prerogatives. The administrators of Milan's charities made passive
obstruction, and rallied to find legal means of defending the independence of the
charities 71. The principal electors of Codronchi, General Secretary of the Interior
Ministry, threatened to withdraw their support if he persisted in implementing the
new measures. According to Caravaggio, 'the illustrious personage' was not deterred,
but the ministry's officials knew in advance that any effort was bound to fail, and
that the impossibility of implementing the circulars would provide conclusive
evidence to those who wanted the law radically changed 72. Indeed, two years after
the issue of the circulars, the situation surrounding the budgets was even worse than
before. The charities which failed to provide one rose from 5,038 in 1875 to 7,400
in 1876. A small improvement occurred with the accounts. Those in arrears from
the charities had fallen from 21,630 in 1874 to 15,006 in 1875; for the same
years those to be dispatched by the provincial deputations also fell from 17,319 to
10,042, but such improvements were clearly no victory. Moreover, the above
figures were, at best, only indicative, since nobody really knew the truth. Often a
new prefect disclosed huge irregularities, where the previous one had found no
serious wrong 73.
69 G. Scotti, 'II riordinamento delle opere pie in Italia', cit., pp. 138-141; 'II servizio di
tesoreria presso le opere pie' (memo to M.I. from the administrative boards of Milan's
hospital, orphanages, and congregation of charity), R.B.P., No. 8, 1876, pp. 722-26.
7 0 E. Caravaggio, 'Beneficenza pubblica, di stato o legale, e privata', in Cinquanta anni di
storia italiana , cit., vol. II, p. 9.
7^ 'Cronaca della Beneficenza. Un importante voto sulle note Circolari Ministerial 12 die.
1875', R.B.P., No. 3, 1876, pp. 288-9. Timid approval of the reordering attempted by
the Ministry came only from Paolo del Colle, in the province of Bari, see Vito Chieco,
'Sull'impianto d'un servizio d'ispezione sulle Amministrazioni Pie', R.B.P., No. 6, 1876,
pp. 507-13.
72 E. Caravaggio, 'Beneficenza pubblica, di stato o legale, e privata', in Cinquanta anni di
storia italiana , cit., vol. II, p. 9; 'Le opere pie dal 1o aprile 1876 al 31 ottobre 1877'
(from the report to the Chamber on the M.I. services' situation), R.B.P., No.12, 1877,
p. 1132. Giovanni Codronchi-Argeli was general secretary of the Interior from the 1st
November 1875 to the 31st March 1876 (cf.: M. Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello
Stato e prefetti del Regno d'ltalia , cit., p. 184).
73 'Le opere pie dal 1o aprile 1876 al 31 ottobre 1877', cit., pp. 1133-34; S. Sepe, 'Stato
e opere pie: la beneficenza pubblica da Minghetti a Depretis (1873-1878)', cit., p. 187.
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In any case, arrears of budgets and accounts, absence of inventories, etc., were only
the tip of the iceberg. They were the more visible result of administrative
practices which were both obsolete and deeply intertwined with political and
economic interests that had little to do with charity and philanthropy. In his lengthy
work L'ordinamento delta beneficenza ed assistenza pubblica in Italia , Evandro
Caravaggio pointed out the excessive expenditure on administrative and devotional
matters. Confraternities and similar foundations spent virtually all their income on
devotional duties, while administration, taxes, and patrimonial burdens absorbed
from forty to eighty per cent of the revenues of the other charities. Comparing the
hospitals and hospices of Paris with those of Lombardy-Venetia and Tuscany,
Caravaggio concluded that the Parisian establishments spent 17.48% of their
revenue on administration, whilst their Italian counterparts needed 58%. Perhaps,
as Scotti immediately retorted, Caravaggio was unfair, since he did not make the
necessary distinctions between administration of the patrimony and taxes, and
administration of the establishments. A few years later Luigi Bodio admitted that
such distinctions must be made; but in doing so he highlighted the real nature of the
problem. According to the results of a mini-inquiry launched by Crispi in 1878, the
charities' gross revenue amounted to ninety-one million. Patrimonial
administration and maintenance cost fifteen million; patrimonial burdens fourteen
million; taxes fourteen and a half million. Hence the net revenue available for
welfare amounted to about forty-seven million, but from this must be deducted the
expenses for the management of the establishments: doctors, nurses, servants,
accountants, etc. This varied from one to two thirds of the net revenue. Bodio pointed
out that the interest paid on patrimonial burdens (i.e. masses, pensions obligatory
by bequest, and old mortgages) averaged five per cent, while the patrimonies yielded
about three per cent. It was a net loss which could be cut by remitting the burdens.
The charities might have to sell some land, but the consequent decrease of patrimony
would be fully compensated by the abolition of passive interests which were slowly
eroding the entire assets. So, why did the charities persist in keeping burdens whose
origins were lost in the darkness of time? For the very simple reason that the
accountancy involved inflated the importance of many employees, and provided
secure sources of income to armies of lawyers, secretaries, and the like. The
remittance of these burdens would result in dramatic cuts of staff; hence nobody
wanted it 74. In the end it was the poor who paid for the upkeep of a parasitic growth
74 E. Caravaggio, L'ordinamento della beneficenza ed assistenza pubblica in Italia (Rome,
1877); G. Scotti, 'Le opere pie e la miseria', R.B.P., No. 2, 1878, pp. 129-38; E.
Caravaggio - G. Scotti, 'Opere pie', R.B.P., No. 3, 1878, pp. 253-59; Luigi Bodio, 'Le
opere pie in Italia', R.B.P., No. 2, 1881, pp. 97-116; (another version, slightly
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of pre-capitalistic origin, but still thriving in a country on its way to the industrial
age. Another aspect of this administrative parasitism was highlighted by Lanza
during the Chamber debate on the Interior Ministry budget for 1880. The 1862 act
did not declare incompatibility between the office of charities' administrator and
local political functions. Hence, many charities were administered by municipal and
provincial councillors, and provincial deputies, with the odd result that the
charities' administrators acted as guardians of themselves: no wonder so many
irregularities passed undetected. Moreover, this system had transformed the
charities into political battlefields and hotbeds of corruption. The allocation of both
places in their administrative offices, and benefits, had become political tokens, to
be redeemed at election time, when the charities' employees returned the favour by
sponsoring their patrons 75. Lanza talked from the opposition benches, implicitly
accusing the Left of this degeneration, but it is unlikely that things were different
before 1876. After all it was the Right, when drafting the act, that had 'forgotten' to
prevent the local authorities from taking office in the charities' administration. Both
the parliamentary debates and the philanthropic literature were usually silent on
this peculiarity of the system. That silence, as well as the general hilarity provoked
in the Chamber by Lanza's remarks, sounded as a confirmation of a network of
interests and complicity deeply engrained into the Italian administrative mechanism.
7.4. Reform bv law? Nicotera's bill.
The only positive outcome of the above-mentioned reports and circulars was to
trigger a public debate among philanthropists. After the first incensed reactions,
Scotti started to talk of the need of studying partial reforms, for bienfaisance
required continuous adjustments, not abrupt change 76. Some proposals were
uniquely concerned with the technicalities of the reform to the 1862 act. But some
went deeper, analysing the social consequences of the existing structure of relief,
different, in Annali di statistica, 2nd series, vol. 21, 1881, and a synthesis in 'Atti
ufficiali del Congresso Internazionale di Beneficenza tenutosi in Milano dal giorno 29
Agosto al 5 Settembre 1880', R.B.P., No. 9-10, 1880, pp. 954-55). For a typical
sample of the Italian charities' over-complicated administration see: Virginio
Tamburini, 'Note statistiche sulle opere pie nella provincia di Brescia', R.B.P., No. 1,
1880, pp. 18-24.
75 'La riforma delle opere pie e la Camera dei deputati', R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, pp. 570-71
(session of 15 June 1880). Similar allegations in Pasquale Turiello, Governo e
governati in Italia (Einaudi, Turin, 1980), pp. 146-67, partic. 164-67.
7 6 G. Scotti, 'Le Opere Pie. Riforme o inchiesta?', R.B.P., No. 3, 1877, pp. 193-6.
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and making suggestions which, although only draft proposals, showed that the
country's most enlightened men were becoming aware of the link between
administrative and social issues. According to the 1861 statistics the charities spent
about twenty-five million a year on welfare, to which must be added about forty
million from provinces and communes 77. To whom and how was all this money
allocated? How were hospitals, orphanages, foundling homes, and poorhouses run? In
the current 'system of liberty' in most centres each charity acted independently,
without any notion of the activity of fellow institutions. The results of this lack of
coordination were described on the Rivista della Beneficenza Pubblica by
Sebregondi, a Milanese philanthropist:
...if the poor goes for help to a friendly society, he believes that, to get a
benefit, he must scream "Viva Garibaldi" at the top of his voice. But if he
knocks at the door of a college run by Ursulines, or by the Sisters del Buon
Pastore, to have his daughter accepted, he mutters a Jesus-Mary... If he asks
a dowry from a noble family, he implores the trustee of that family. That poor
becomes an itinerant petitioner and, having got used to it out of cowardice and
lack of confidence, he will ask for bread in the name of God, in the name of
Garibaldi, in the name of the trustee of the Duke x and y. Providing one can live
at someone else's expense, the "long live whoever is the king" becomes the
motto of the indigent mass...78.
On the other hand, if many of the indigent were skilled in getting benefits from
different charities, many others, less astute and in desperate need, often got lost in
the charities jungle, and failed to get any help at all. The congregation of charity
would deny them relief on the grounds that there were so many charities available,
whilst the charities would send them back to the congregation of charity. Meanwhile
the poor could well die for want of treatment 79.
Sebregondi reckoned that all relief organizations, including friendly societies and
cooperatives, must be centralized and their action coordinated, in order to make it
impossible for the 'itinerant poor' to collect benefits from different sources, and to
teach the virtues of saving and domestic economy to the notoriously improvident
working classes 80. This opinion was shared by Virginio Tamburini from Brescia,
who proposed grouping the charities locally, according to their purposes, without
merging their administrations, and stressed that the guardianship over the charities
7 7 For the data on the local authorities' welfare expenditure see above, 6.2., table 6.2.2.
78 F. Sebregondi, 'Dell'unita d'intenti nella pubblica beneficenza', R.B.P., No.1, 1874, p. 5.
7 9 P. Locatelli, Miseria e beneficenza. Ricordi dl un funzionario di Pubblica Sicurezza
(Dumolard, Milan, 1878), pp. 209-14.
8 0 F. Sebregondi, 'Dell'unita d'intenti nella pubblica beneficenza', cit., pp. 4-5, 7-15. About
the detrimental effects of abundant and indiscriminate almoner relief see also: G. Du
Jardin, 'Di un nuovo modo di applicare la carita pubblica in Genova per mezzo di
Comitati di Sestiere', R.B.P., No. 2, 1877, pp. 98-100; Dr. A., 'Intorno al
riordinamento delle opere pie in Crema', R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, pp. 513-526.
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must be extended to the distribution of benefits, and the provision of indoor relief -
under effective control by a special provincial junta 81. The need to coordinate the
distribution of relief was central also to the proposals elaborated by the
constitutional association of Milan. It was absurd to have thousands of congregations
of charity in thousands of tiny villages, where five people with administrative skill
were often hard to find. Hence the smallest communes should be allowed to unite and
share one congregation, while those with less than three thousand people should
appoint three rather than five members to run their congregations. As to the big
centres, authority should be given to the city councils to form a committee of
charities' chairmen, presided over by the mayor. This committee should ensure that
the charities behave in a rational and coordinated manner, and would be matched at
provincial level by a welfare committee (consulta di beneficenza ), formed by
charities' representatives, provincial and communal councillors, and equally aimed
at monitoring not only the administration of the charities, but also their relief
activity. At the top there would be a supreme council of the charities (consiglio
superiore delle opere pie), as a special department of the Interior Ministry. Strict
administrative rules and controls would ensure a sound management 82. The
substance of the conclusions reached by the Venetian committee of the Society for the
Progress of Economic Studies was very similar. The present lack of controls on the
allocation of welfare expenditure, and the isolation of the charities from one another,
obstructed any comprehensive vision of the poverty problem, and hence impeded
effective relief action. Moreover excessive caution surrounded the reform of obsolete
charities, making effective change impossible. The Venetian committee proposed
creating a central welfare committee, appointed by royal decree and formed by
officials from the Ministries of the Interior, Public Instruction, Agriculture,
Industry and Commerce, with powers of surveillance. The guardianship presently
exerted by each provincial deputation would be taken over by a provincial junta,
chaired by the prefect and consisting of representatives of the government, the
province, and the province's chief town. In the communes the powers of the
congregations of charity whould be enhanced, and the reform of the charities made
easier83. It is interesting to note that, in the context of this debate, although there
81 V. Tamburini, 'L'erogazione della beneficenza', R.B.P., No. 12, 1875, pp. 1009-24;
'Delia tutela sulle opere pie', R.B.P., No. 4, 1876, pp. 321-31.
82 Alberto Errera, 'Le opere pie in Italia e all'estero', R.B.P., No. 7, 1876, pp. 577-97,
partic. 581-85.
83 A. S. De Kiriaki, 'Sull'ordinamento delle opere pie e sul loro reggimento economico ed
amministrativo', R.B.P., No. 8, 1876, pp. 727-58, partic. 733-35, 738-39, 741-48,
756-58.
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was general agreement on the flaws and inadequacy of the 1862 act, the strongest
attacks on it came from southerners. Whereas Lombards and Venetians were more
concerned with the rationalization of charitable action, the southerners were mostly
interested in tackling maladministration, since they were only too well aware of the
plundering of charitable assets, and the collusion between charities managers and
local authorities. From Naples Nereo Dominicucci lamented the inadequacy of the
prefects' inspections, and invoked the control of budgets. Local authorities were too
slow, inept and corrupt to promote reform, hence the government should declare
compulsory the reform of all obsolete charities, and impose it on the town councils
84. Vito Chieco, from Bari, went further, invoking not only strict administrative
controls, but proposing the re-orientation towards welfare of the confraternities'
assets, the grouping of all independent charities in the congregations of charity, the
complete abolition of any interference by the town councils in welfare, and more
power to the provincial and central authorities 85. The confidence of the northerners
in local self-government was not shared by the southerners. It was a difference of
opinion that reflected the different degree of socio-economic develepment of the two
Italies. Behind the concern of the northern philanthropists for the creation of a
welfare network able to grant relief only to those truly in need without benefit
duplication one could see the need of the industrialists for a free labour market,
where the level of wages be not distorted by high and freely available alms. Behind
the concern of the southerner s for tight financial control and direct State
intervention was the awareness of the clientelistic nature of a welfare system set in
the background of a pre-industrial society.
While the philanthropists discussed, the Right was fighting and losing its last
political battle 86. Nicotera, Interior minister in the new cabinet chaired by
Depretis, did not waste time, and on 20 April 1876 appointed a committee to study
the reform of the 1862 act. The committee, chaired by Cesare Correnti, included
84 N. Dominicucci, 'Di alcune proposte di riforma alia legge sulle opere pie', R.B.P., No. 7,
1875, pp. 553-62.
85 V. Chieco, 'Proposte ed osservazioni intorno alia riforma del la legge sulle opere pie',
R.B.P., No. 7, 1876, pp. 598-621.
8 6 On the fall of the Right, the railway question, the caracteristics of the Left, and the
first Depretis cabinet, see: G. Morandi, La Sinistra al potere e altri saggi (Barbera,
Florence, 1944), pp. 63-121; G. Carocci, Agostino Depretis e la politica interna italiana
dal 1876 al 1887 (Einaudi, Turin, 1956), pp. 21-66; G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia
moderna, vol.VI (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1978 [1st ed. 1970]), pp. 84-111; G. Ghisalberti,
Storia costituzionale d'ltalia. 1848-1948 (Laterza, Bari, 1986) (1st ed. 1974), pp.
149-51, 155-67, 174-95; Umberto Levra, 'Sinistra storica', in Storia d'ltalia, 3 (La
Nuova Italia, Florence, 1978), pp. 1258-87; Giuseppe Galasso, 'Sinistra storica e
mezzogiorno', Rivista storica italiana, vol. XC, 1978, pp. 72-88; Raffaele Romanelli,
L'ltalia liberate (1861-1900) (II Mulino, Bologna,1979), pp. 183-217.
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men like Caravaggio, determined to overhaul the act radically, and men like Scotti,
determined to save the charities' autonomy 87. Hence it was bound to split into
opposite factions, and thereby conclude little. The committee, which effectively
worked only from March to November 1877, issued some basic guidelines for the
reform. Caravaggio disagreed, and drafted a bill of his own. Nicotera drew
inspiration from both proposals to draft his bill, which was presented to parliament
on 1 December 1877 88. As is known, Nicotera lost his ministerial job about two
weeks later, to recoup it only in 1891 - and then but briefly 89. In consequence his
bill on charities was dropped without discussion and never resumed, a fate that
likewise befell those concerning foundlings and lunatics, and those reforming local
administration, public security, political elections, and public health. Despite their
irrelevance in the short term, Nicotera's plans to overhaul the Italian welfare
system are worthy of attention, because they incarnated, in theory at least, the
reforming fervour of part of the Left - soon to get lost in the moving sands of
trasformismo . They spelled out clearly the government's attitude towards welfare
spending, and contained elements which Crispi would retrieve twelve years later,
re-elaborating them in a less radical manner.
In Nicotera's bill the charities, which in the 1862 act were called Opere pie
(pious works), were now defined Istituzioni di beneficenza pubblica (public
welfare institutions). It was no mere change of name, since the new definition
entailed a thorougly different concept, minimizing the private nature of the
foundations, and emphasizing their public function - and hence their duties towards
the state, as well as the full right of the state to rule them and avail itself of their
revenues for purpose of public welfare 90. The congregations of charity would be
replaced by welfare councils (consign di beneficenza ), entrusted with the
administration and management of all the charities of the commune. These would be
8 7 The other members were the senators Gustavo Ponza di San Martino, Cesare Cabella,
and Alessandro Rossi, and the deputies Luigi Abignente, Giuseppe Bonomo, Enrico
Castellano, Giuseppe Cencelli, Enrico Fano, Francesco Loviti, Giovanni Battista Morana,
Pasquale Villari, Pietro Cocconi, Federico Spantigati, Michele Amadei, Ernesto Pasquali,
Federico Martini (cf.: S. Sepe, 'Stato e opere pie: la beneficenza pubblica da Minghetti a
Depretis (1873-1878)', cit., p. 194, fn. 49.
88 A detailed account of the committee's meetings in S. Sepe, 'Stato e opere pie: la
beneficenza pubblica da Minghetti a Depretis (1873-1878)', cit., pp. 197-203. See also
A. Gabelli, 'II progetto di legge sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza', Nuova
Antologia , vol. 109 (16 Jan. 1890), pp. 249-51. For Scotti's position: G. Scotti, 'Di
alcune riforme alle opere pie' (lettera al comm. prof. Pasquale Villari), R.B.P., No. 12,
1876, pp. 1081-88. For the guidelines issued by the committee see: G. Scotti, 'II
progetto ministeriale per la riforma della legge 3 Agosto 1862', R.B.P., No. 3, 1889,
pp. 178-80.
8 9 G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna, vol.VI, cit., pp. 110-11, 413-17.
90 Nicotera's preface to the bill on charities, in R.B.P., No. 4, 1878, pp. 325-26.
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elected in the same way as the communal councils, and would be legally equal to them
in all respects. In the large centres these councils could be split into two or three
sections to ease management. Only the charities with no other income but private
donations would enjoy administrative autonomy, but under the welfare council's
supervision. Members of the provincial deputation and communal councils could not
be elected to the welfare councils. The guardianship remained with the provincial
deputations, whose powers were enhanced, notably through including the control of
budgets, the authorization to start law-suits, rent-contracts, sale of assets, and the
right to approve the administrative regulations, which were made compulsory for
both welfare councils and charities. The accounts would be checked by the Accounts
Court. The charities should remit all their patrimonial burdens, including the
devotional ones. The charities' surveillance would be exerted by a supreme welfare
council (Consiglio superiore di beneficenza ) attached to the Interior Ministry and
formed by twelve members appointed by royal decree. This council would report
every two years to parliament on the welfare services' situation, and would inspect
the charities every five years. All charities whose purpose no longer corresponded to
present social needs must be reformed by an easier procedure than under the 1862
act. Confraternities, devotional foundations, estaurite, dowry trusts, and almoner
foundations granting benefits to the able-bodied, such as the shamefaced poor, would
be suppressed, and their assets taken over by the welfare councils. The assets of
dowry trusts whould serve to sponsor female education. Those of all the other
foundations listed above, plus half of the revenues of those almoner charities without
specific purposes, and all the revenues of foundling homes, would finance the keeping
of foundlings. Only when these funds were inadequate, would the communes meet any
shortfalls. Foundlings would be entrusted to the welfare councils, which would act as
their legal guardians until their coming of age, and care for their maintenance and
primary education up to the age of twelve. Those foster families which would keep
the foundlings up to the age of eighteen qualified for a grant of at least one hundred
lire. The wheel was abolished as a means of introducing babies in foundling homes, so
as to make abandonment more difficult. Nicotera, who supported this bill with a
thorough statistical study of the appalling mortality levels in the foundlings homes,
wanted to reduce as much as possible their permanence in the homes, and speed their
allocation to foster families. Hence the babies would be handed over to the commune
welfare office by the mother, or her relatives and relations, who would not be
allowed to conceal the mother's identity. The mother was eligible to become a paid
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wet nurse of her own baby, providing she was poor and did not live in concubinage
91.
Altogether it was a great shake-up of the whole system, likely to produce much
discontent and hostility, and hardly workable. As Nicotera's critics immediately
noted, the bill lacked technical details, leaving many loopholes and ambiguities 92. To
entrust the accounts' control to the Accounts Court would enormosly inflate its
work-load: if at present the provincial deputations failed to clear the accounts in
time in most provinces, how could one single court hope to clear those of the entire
peninsula? Despite the authority to split the welfare councils in sections in the
larger towns, management would probably be difficult where the charities were
numerous , since common management did not entail merger, and each charity would
maintain its separate administration. Conversely, in the small centres the charities'
assets would not suffice for all the new tasks set by the bill. According to the mini-
statistics of 1878, already mentioned, 40.95% of the charities' gross patrimony
was concentrated in the ten major cities with over 100,000 inhabitants: the other
fifty-nine towns chief of province got 18.88%. The remaining 40.16% of the gross
patrimony was scattered among 5,882 medium and small communes; while 2,431
communes with 4,571,605 inhabitants (i.e. 29% of the communes with 17% of the
total population) had no charities at all. As to the geographical distribution of
charitable assets, northern and central Italy, with 61.21% of the population
91 Prefaces and texts of the bills presented to the Chamber on 22 Nov. 1877 (foundlings)
and 1 Dec. 1877 (charities), in R.B.P., No. 3, 1878, pp. 210-52, and No. 4, 1878, pp.
322-51. On the foundlings' bill and following aborted bills of 1892 and 1900 see:
Mariagrazia Gorni, Laura Pellegrini, Un problema di storia sociale. L'infanzia
abbandonata in Italia nel secolo XIX (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1974), pp. 76-84.
Caravaggio's bill was based on the same principles as that of Nicotera, and shared its
basic characteristics, but was longer, more complicated, more radical and, under many
respects, probably less workable, since many of its features entailed dangerous
interferences by the communes into welfare administration. Caravaggio wanted the
suppression not only of confraternities, devotional foundations, and dowry trusts, but
also that of all almoner foundations, Monti Frumentari, conservatorii, retreats, and
hermitages. Dispossessed sisters and oblates would be granted a pension, according to
the act of 6 July 1866. Another distinctive feature of Caravaggio's bill was that, in
order to reduce administrative expenditure, the administration of the smaller charities
would be entrusted directly to the communes. This would probably lead to confusion and
did not offer adequate guarantees against collusion and mismanagement at local level.
Guardianship was split on two levels, and was entrusted to the communal councils in the
large centres, and to the provincial deputations in the small ones (cf. text, and
comments by Nereo Dominicucci in R.B.P., No. 6, 1878, pp. 530-56).
92 Detailed criticism of the 1877 bills in N. Dominicucci, 'Del progetto di riforma della
legge sulle opere pie presentato alia Camera dei Deputati nel dicembre 1877', R.B.P.,
No. 7, 1878, pp. 609-21; L. De Marinis, 'La riforma delle leggi sulle opere pie secondo
il progetto presentato alia Camera dall'ex Ministro dell'lnterno, on. Nicotera', R.B.P.,
Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1878, pp. 777-90, 857-71, 953-73, 1134-44; G. Scotti, 'Di
alcune riforme proposte all'ordinamento delle opere pie', R.B.P., No. 1, 1879, pp. 1-7.
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(16,405,084 inhabitants), held 75.78% of the net patrimony (1,017 million),
while the south, plus Sicily and Sardinia, with 38.79% of the population
(10,396,070 inhabitants) held 24.22% (325 million) of the net patrimony 93. As
a consequence, many small communes, especially in the south, might still have to
meet large welfare bills, since Nicotera did not provide any corrective device to the
basic distorsions of the system, apart from the incorporation of the confraternities'
assets into the welfare funds - an operation likely to cause endless law-suits, and
probably bound to fail. Another flaw in the project concerned the method of election
of the welfare council members. In theory the concept of having two parallel
councils, one for the communes' general businesses, and one for welfare and health,
looked very neat. In practice there were serious risks to the impartiality of the
welfare councils, which were liable to be taken over by those local cliques which
already dominated the communes and the charities. Collusions and swindles could not
be guaranteed to disappear, under such a system. Nevertheless, beyond all these
faults, Nicotera's bill represented an important turning-point, for it was based on
the principle of trimming public spending on welfare, and was aimed at rationalizing
the entire welfare system. The suppression of confraternities and other socially
useless charities, and the reallocation of their assets to fund basic welfare services
dated to the eighteenth century, yet it was still revolutionary, especially for
southern Italy. Furthermore the creation of a locally centralized management, and
the abolition of all almoner charities granting benefits to the able-bodied, responded
to the need to rationalize the system of distributing relief, voiced by many
philanthropists. The charities, which were now declared public institutions, would
be forced to deliver efficient relief. The principle of cutting public welfare
spending, which had been scattered throughout the ill-fated circulars of 1875, was
now spelled out clearly, and implemented in a systematic manner. In this respect, no
contradiction can be found between the attitudes of Right and Left to welfare, but
rather a better definition of the means to achieve a goal which was the same in 1877
as in 1861. In this sense the 1862 act could be seen as the result of a contradiction
between an abstract concern for the purity of principles, and a defective knowledge
of reality. The repugnance of any form of state interference into welfare, perceived
as a first step on the road to legal charity, led to the wildest autonomy of the
charities. On paper there seemed to be no contradiction: Italy was rich in charities,
thus they should suffice to cater for the poor. Article 237 of the act of 5 March
1865 was not intended as a measure of 'legal charity', but merely as a subsidiary
and temporary device. Still, the practice of non-interference made the welfare bills
93 L. Bodio, 'Le opere pie in Italia', R.B.P., No. 2, 1881, cit., pp. 105-106.
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of the local authorities soar. Legal charity, thrown out of the door, came back
through the window. Fifteen years of disastrous administrative practice proved that
there was contradiction, and forced a re-definition of principles based on, and no
longer in contrast with the real objectives. Now it was clear that the antidote to legal
charity was indeed state interference with the charities, to curb their autonomony
and force them to deliver efficient services. Yet the road ahead was still long before
the principles inspiring Nicotera's bill would be incarnated into legislation. We will
see that the targets set by the act of 17 July 1890 were more modest than those set
by Nicotera's bills, and entailed a much slower transformation of the system. Crispi
probably bore in mind the flaws of the 1877 plan, and was aware that the resilience
of a century-old system could not be overcome at once with a radical overhauling.
Nevertheless, with Nicotera's bills the ideological basis had been laid down for a re¬
definition of the role of the state with respect to the problems of welfare.
7.5.The welfare congresses of 1879 and 1880. and Depretis' mini-reform .
Nicotera's bills provoked flare-ups of criticism and fear, but the real answer
came from the congresses of 1879 and 1880, held respectively in Naples and Milan
94. Cantelli's circulars and Caravaggio's analysis had catalyzed a first reflection
among the "charities' friends"; likewise, Nicotera's bills encouraged them to rally
together to define their objectives and priorities, and show the government that any
attempt to undermine the charities' autonomy would face strong and organized
opposition. The main objective of both congresses was to define the limits of state
interference into charities' territory, the best system for their management,
94 The proposal of a national congress of the welfare organizations was launched by the
Neapolitan committee of the Association for the Progress of Economic Studies, chaired
by Leopoldo Rodind. The congress took place in Naples from 22 to 30 March 1879, with
150 participants, among whom were Giuseppe Scotti, Pasquale Turiello, the Senators
Fedele De Siervo, Antonio Ciccone, Salvatore Fusco, and Agostino Casati, and the
Deputies Giovanni Lanza, Giustino Fortunato, Giuseppe Pisanelli, and Giorgio Ambrogio
Molfino. The international congress of Milan was first planned during the Naples
congress, and took place from 29 August to 5 September, with about 600 participants.
It was intended as a follow-up to the three international welfare congresses held in
Brussels (1856), Frankfurt (1857), and London (1862). On the preparatory committee
were the Senators Agostino Casati, Carlo Prinetti, and Andrea Verga, the chairman of
the Italian Society for Sanitation, Alfonso Corradi, Giuseppe Scotti, Giuseppe Sacchi,
and various other chairmen of Lombard charities. See: G. Scotti, 'II Congresso delle
opere pie in Napoli', R.B.P., No. 12, 1878, pp. 1129-33; 'II Congresso Italiano per le
proposte di riforma e di ordinamento delle opere pie seguito in Napoli dal 22 al 30 Marzo
1879', R.B.P., No. 3, 1879, pp. 208-13, 233-35; 'Atti del Congresso internazionale di
Beneficenza che si terra a Milano dal giorno 29 agosto al 4 settembre 1880', R.B.P., No.
1, 1880, p. 3; G. Scotti, 'II Congresso Internazionale di Beneficenza in Milano', R.B.P.,
No. 8, 1880, pp. 731-33.
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guardianship and surveillance, and suggest a system of public assistance not in
conflict with the charities' interests. In addition, the Milan congress discussed four
other themes: how to link almoner foundations with friendly societies, and what was
the best system of distributing almoner relief, health care at home versus
hospitalization, patronage and rehabilitation of ex-prisoners, foundling homes and
abandoned children.
The conclusions reached by the congresses of Naples and Milan differed as to which
was the best way to manage and monitor the charities; but there was substantial
agreement about the limits of state interference. Respect for the founders' will must
be the guideline for any future law or reform, while no state interference was
admitted in the distribution of relief. Any rationalization of the system was left to
the charities themselves. The concept that communal and provincial welfare
expenditure must be charged to the charities - a concept that was central to
Nicotera's bills - was reversed. Whenever the charities' funds were inadequate,
communes and provinces must meet any shortfall. According to the congress of
Milan, the role of the almoner foundations, which in Nicotera's plan were largely
destined to go, was far from over. They should become the back-bone of the system,
by coordinating and widening their action to cover housing, urban sanitation,
training schemes, and workshops for the unemployed. Some concepts underlying
Nicotera's reform - such as the uselessness of some forms of alms, especially
dowries, were accepted but overturned. Nicotera's bill claimed that it was for the
state to decide which charities were obsolete, and how to use their assets. The
congresses claimed that it was up to the charities to transform themselves in order
to keep their independence and their grip on society. In this sense one can see a
development from the Naples congress to that of Milan. The former was exclusively
intent in defending the charities' autonomy, dismissing as false any allegation of
excessive administrative expenditure. The latter, while holding to the tenet of
autonomy, made major efforts to encourage the charities to re-generate themselves
and rationalize their action 95. Independence, taken for granted durin the last fifteen
95 For Naples' congress see: 'II Congresso Italiano per le proposte di riforma e di
ordinamento delle opere pie seguito in Napoli dal 22 al 30 Marzo 1879', R.B.P., No. 3,
1879, pp. 213-32; A. Errera, 'Di alcune riforme nell'ordinamento dell'amministrazione
delle istituzioni di beneficenza in Italia', R.B.P., No. 4, 1879, pp. 293-300; G.Scotti,
'Delia tutela e vigilanza delle istituzioni di beneficenza', ibidem, pp. 301-12; A.
Turchiarulo, 'Dell'ordinamento delle istituzioni di beneficenza in Italia', ibidem, pp. 313-
18; L. Vitali, 'Di alcune proposte presentate al congresso delle opere pie', ibidem, pp.
319-26; Francesco D'lppoliti, 'Sul programma del congresso per le opere pie seguito in
Napoli nel marzo 1879', R.B.P., No. 6, 1879, pp. 527-32. For Milan's congress: 'Atti
del Congresso Internazionale di Beneficenza tenutosi in Milano dal giorno 29 agosto al 5
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years, was now at stake; and it was now necessary to demonstrate one's worthiness of
independence.
However, the much invoked and feared reform of the 1862 act was not imminent.
The question was debated in 1879 and 1880, during the discussion of the Interior
Ministry budget. The same old arguments in favour, and against, a speedy reform,
were repeated once again. In 1879 Depretis agreed that the charities' administration
was a disaster, and seemed willing to rescue Nicotera's bill. But in 1880 he
maintained that the situation was slowly improving, and made it clear that, although
he agreed on the necessity of a reform, he preferred to wait and see the results of a
thorough inquiry, launched by royal decree on 3 June 1880. Despite this declaration
by the prime minister, the Chamber voted in favour of immediate reform, so
Depretis found himself in an odd situation. On the one hand he had set up a Royal
Commission of Inquiry, entrusted with the drafting of a bill based on the gathered
evidence. On the other hand the Chamber's vote entailed immediate legislative
changes to the 1862 act, and hence the effective overruling of the Royal Commission.
Depretis had a gift to find clever solutions to far more complicated situations. He
prepared a short bill which modified articles 6, 7, 15, 19, 23, and 29 of the 1862
act, and persuaded the Royal Commission to collaborate - with whose chairman,
Cesare Correnti, he was on very good terms. Many commissioners were unhappy
with the solution forced upon them; but on the other hand, nobody had the courage to
object to Depretis when he announced it, during the first meeting of the Royal
Commission. Hence they agreed to the modifications proposed by Depretis to articles
6, 7, 15, and 19 of the 1862 act. These alterations made ex-criminals ineligibile
as charities' administrators, invalidated all deliberations involving private
interests of the administrators and their families, entrusted the approval of budgets
to the provincial deputations and that of the accounts to the councils of prefecture.
Other modifications proposed by Depretis in order to facilitate reform when a
charity's purpose no longer corresponded to social needs, and to concentrate under
the congregation of charity all almoner bequests presently administered by special
boards (articles 23 and 29 of the 1862 act) were instead rejected by the Royal
commissioners. They entailed radical changes, and hence threatened the autonomy
and power of the Commission. Depretis accepted the Royal Commission's opinion and
presented a bill to the Chamber in December 1880, which basically conformed to the
Commission's suggestions 96.
settembre 1880. Resoconto delle discussioni e deliberazioni del congresso medesimo',
R.B.P., No. 9-10, 1880, pp. 875-1011.
96 'Le opere pie e la discussione del Bilancio del Ministero dell'lnterno', R.B.P., N. 2, 1879,
pp. 93-104; 'Le opere pie e la discussione del Bilancio del Ministero dell'lnterno nel
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But the Chamber committee that was entrusted with the study of the bill found it too
moderate, and altered it radically. The new bill, presented to the Chamber on 30
November 1881, was thirty-one articles long, and introduced substantial
modifications to the 1862 act, without scrapping it altogether. The condition of non-
eligibility to the administrative boards of charities or congregations of charity was
extended to the provincial councils' members and to the staff of the local authorities'
offices. The control of the budgets was entrusted to a provincial commission, formed
of provincial councillors, whereas the accounts were checked by a new figure, the
royal commissioner for the welfare institutions. This was a prefecture councillor,
appointed by royal decree, and accountable to the prefect, but enjoying large
autonomy. He was the Interior Ministry's representative, and would act as a sort of
charities' watch-dog, ordering inspections. He would denounce to the judiciary the
infractions to the law by the charities, he would draw-up statistics, and suggest to
the prefect all those measures necessary for a proper welfare service. The prefect's
powers were also enhanced, in that he could take direct action without referring
every single infraction to the minister. Finally, there was another new feature,
called 'popular action' (azione popolare), which allowed the single citizen, through a
very complicated legal procedure, to start legal action against fraudulent or unlawful
administrators; or to defend the right to enjoy a charity's benefit, or to appeal
against unlawful reforms of a charity's purpose, or to ensure the rights of a charity
regarding a bequest. This time the Royal Commission was determined not to give up
its authority, and, through Correnti, made its worries known to Depretis. The bill
was therefore shelved for the time being, without debate 97.
Senato del Regno', R.B.P., No. 3, 1879, pp. 181-192; 'La riforma delle opere pie e la
Camera dei Deputati', R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, pp. 536-586. In 1879 at the Chamber only
the budget committee and Costantini, deputy of Teramo, were openly in favour of a new
act, while at the Senate, Pepoli, in favour, was opposed by Casati. In 1880 at the
Chamber those who pressed for a speedy reform were Ferrari, Luchini, Pepe, and
Lanza, who was the only one to denounce the political interests involved in the
charities' maladministration (see above, 6.3.). Berti and Costantini were favourable to
the inquiry; Spaventa feared that a law insisting on the charities' transformation with
no respect for the founders' will would dry up the bequests. Giustino Fortunato made his
famous speech about the Monti Frumentari in the South which, he alleged, were
transformed into rural credit agencies only to serve the interests of the middle
classes, to the detriment of the peasants, and had a squabble with Costantini on the
subject. For Depretis' mini-reform and its discussion by the Royal Commission see:
M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P.,1, pp. 8-11, 15-35, 157-60; 'Le modificazioni alia legge sulle opere
pie', R.B.P., No. 3, 1881, pp. 209-220.
9 7 The Chamber's committee was chaired by Mazza, and formed by Ferdinando Berti,
Boselli, Gorio, Pianciani, Solidati, Sidney Sonnino, Turella, and Odoardo Luchini
(secretary and relatore). For the bill, its introduction by Luchini, and the Royal
Commission's reactions see: 'Le proposte della Commissione Parlamentare incaricata di
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Indeed, the new proposals were controversial in many respects, especially with
regard to the provincial commission which, being formed exclusively of provincial
councillors, would be a carbon-copy of the provincial deputation, with all its faults.
On the other hand, some of the new features could have beneficial effects. The non-
eligibility of provincial authorities and their staff seemed particularly necessary,
since much of the rot originated from the collusion between charities administrators
and local authorities. The introduction of a royal commissioner with ample powers of
inspection, and the widening of the prefects' ability to enforce punitive measures
onto the faulty administrations, could enhance central controls, making them more
effective. Whilst the azione popolare, though very complex and practically
inaccessible to the man in the street, could be a first step towards the concept of
popular syndicate.
As we will see later, some of these new features were to ri-emerge in Crispi's bill
of 1890, so not all the studies of the Chamber committee of 1880 would be lost. For
the moment, however, they would go to sleep. Not that there was no urgency of
reform. As shown by a mini-inquiry made by Bodio in 1881 98, very little had
changed on the front of the administrative performance of charities and provincial
deputations since 1873. As late as 1881, about one third (7,116) of 21,929
registered charities were still without inventories, and over two thirds (15,355)
had no treasurer. Eight hundred and thirty-four charities never rendered their
accounts since 1862, out of a total of 324,484 accounts rendered to the provincial
deputations from 1863 to 1880, 25,164 had not yet been cleared, of which 682
dated back to 1863. Restricting the analysis to the period 1876-79, it was evident
that both charities and provincial deputations were still conspicuously late in
submitting and clearing the accounts:






in 2nd year... in 3rd year... in 4th year.. total
Accounts
submitted 49,141 1 3,432 2,746 905 66,224
Accounts
cleared 47,065 4,395 1,052 212 52,724
riferire sul progetto di parziali modificazioni all'attuale legge sulle opere pie', R.B.P.,
No. 12, 1881, pp. 1037-1144; M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp. 148-49, 185.
98 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp. 33, 186-87.
267
The urgency of reform was indisputable. Yet the ambiguity of the situation created by
Depretis - eager to keep everybody happy, as well as the failure of the Chamber's
committee to understand that the pursuit of maximum targets would entail the loss of
those minimal reforms agreed upon by the Royal Commission, ensured that - once
again - nothing would change. The charities' destiny was now entrusted to an inquiry.
At the beginning the Royal Commissioners were confident of completing their work
in two years; but, as predicted by Odoardo Luchini during the Interior Ministry
budget debate in 1880, it would take ages for the data to be gathered and digested ".
Managers and staff of the charities could sleep peacefully for another decade .
99 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp. 55-57; 'La riforma delle opere pie e la Camera dei Deputati',
R.B.P., No. 6, 1880, cit., p. 564.
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8. The Roval Commission of Enquiry into the charities. Reform bv committee?
8.1. The enquiry. Method, structure, and objectives .
The decree of 3 June 1880 entrusted the Royal Commission with a 'vast and detailed
enquiry into the moral, economic, and administrative situation of the charities', and
with the study of a general plan of re-organization 'corresponding to the spirit of our
time, and the changing social conditions' 1. It was not the first time that the Italian
state tried to find out the truth about the so-called patrimony of the poor. A first
inquiry had been launched in 1863. Far from aiming either at any assessment of the
dimensions of pauperism, or at providing evidence to reform the system, it was a
purely administrative exercise - within the framework of the 1862 act - and
exclusively targetted at the patrimonial situation of the charities. The collection of
data by prefectures and sub-prefectures dragged on interminably. The results were
published between 1868 and 1873. By that time they were largely obsolete,
although they provided some evidence on the exorbitance of administrative
expenditure 2. The enquiry of 1880 was different. It was not aimed at gathering
information on pauperism, but it would provide evidence for the legislative reform,
and was entrusted to an allegedly independent group of experts. The enquiry was still
basically administrative, but the Commissioners were free to organize themselves as
they pleased, although the guidelines for the general structure of the enquiry were
defined by the decree. The Commission must propose to the Interior Minister the
appointment of provincial committees to which would be entrusted the investigations
and collection of data. The Commissioners were, however, free to conduct in loco
investigations, and could avail themselves of the collaboration of the prefects. The
secretarial staff and the offices necessary to the Commission and provincial
committees would be provided by the Interior Ministry, but the decree was silent as
1 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, p. 155 (Allegato A. Decreto Reale che istituisce una Commissione
d'inchiesta sulle Opere Pie , art. 1).
2 M. Piccialuti Caprioli, 'II patrimonio del povero. L'inchiesta sulle Opere pie del 1861',
Ouaderni storici, No. 45, 1980, pp. 918-41; Statistica del Regno d'ltalia. Le Opere Pie
net 1861. The volumes of Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy were published in 1868.
Those of Emilia, Tuscany and Sardinia in 1869. Those of Umbria-Marches, Venetia and
Abruzzi-Molise in 1870. Those of Basilicata, Calabria, Campania and Puglia in 1871.
The volume of Sicily was the last published, in 1873. The results were synthesided by
Pietro Castiglioni, 'Le Opere Pie del Regno d'ltalia secondo la statistica del 1861', in
L'ltalia economica nel 1873 (Rome, Barbera, 1873). For a critical assessment of the
Italian statistical enquiries see: Raffaele Romanelli, 'La nuova Italia e la misurazione dei
fatti sociali. Una premessa', Quaderni storici , No. 45, 1980, pp. 765-78. For the
organization of the Italian statistical services see Dora Marucco, Mutualismo e sistema
politico. II caso italiano (1862-1904) (Angeli, Milan, 1981), pp. 40-6.
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to the funding of the enquiry, as it did not even set up an initial allocation 3. It was
thus clear from the outset that the Royal Commissioners did not enjoy full autonomy,
since for their investigations they were bound to have recourse to provincial
committees appointed by the minister. The whole structure of the enquiry was
conditioned by this stipulation, whose implementation proved extremely awkward
and incapable of success. The commissioners chose as their chairman Cesare
Correnti, one of Depretis' best friends, always available to advise, write speeches,
and help the prime minister discreetly out of trouble. Indeed, the reform of the
charities had been pinpointed to Depretis by Correnti in the Spring of 1876 4.
Indeed, the job was already spoken for well before the appointment was made official,
and Correnti made it clear to Depretis that he was not prepared to share his office
with Bodio - the head of the Central Statical Office - who should help but not lead 5.
There is no evidence to suggest that Correnti deliberately slowed down, or hampered
the Commission's works, but it is undeniable that he would not stand for anything
contrary to Depretis' will. He surely was in the best position to negotiate with the
3 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 155-56. The Commissioners, appointed by Depretis with
the same decree, were the Deputies Giovanni Codronchi-Argeli, Eugenio Corbetta,
Cesare Correnti, Settimio Costantini, Francesco De Renzis, Luigi Luzzatti, G. Battista
Morana, Giuseppe Mussi, Luigi Pianciani, Francesco Salaris, Casimiro Sperino, Diego
Tajani; the Senators Pietro Manfrin, Paolo Mantegazza, Ferdinando Palasciano,
Gioacchino Pepoli, Alfonso Sanseverino-Vimercati, Tiberio Sergardi, plus Giovanni
Bodio, Director General of the Central Statistical Office, Giuseppe Scotti, editor of the
R.B.P., and Querino Querini, known for his studies of Rome's charities. The death of
Pepoli and Corbetta, and the impossibility for Costantini, Manfrin, and Sanseverino to
attend the meetings brought the appointment of the Deputies Enrico Fano, Giorgio
Molfino, Gabriele Bordonaro di Chiaramonte, and the Senators Antonio Colocci,
Francesco Magni, and Giuseppe De Simone. Four new members were added with R.D. 13
Dec. 1880, in the persons of Deputies Gaetano Brunetti, Carlo Buttini, Odoardo Luchini,
and the Senator Vincenzo Tommasini (M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp. 155-56, 432-33).
Further changes occurred with the passage of time. By 30 March 1886 the Royal
Commission had acquired Paolo Baravelli, re-acquired Costantini and Manfrin, and lost
Morana, Mussi, Mantegazza, Sperino, and Tajani (M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 3, pp. 3-4). By 23
June 1887 the Commision had lost Molfino, re-acquired Senator Sanseverino-
Vimercati, prefect of Naples, and acquired Amedeo Anselmi, inspector general of the
Intendenze di finanza , Giovanni Minghelli Vaini, prefect a disposizione , Count Vittorio
De La Tour Sallier, and the Senators Gaspare Cavallini and Luigi Sormani-Moretti (M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, pp. 1-2).
4 Correnti was elected chairman during the first meeting of the Royal Commission, held
in Rome on 31 October 1880, in the presence of Depretis (M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp.
1-2). On the relationship Correnti - Depretis' see C. Morandi, La Sinistra al potere e
altri saggi (Barbera, Florence, 1944), pp. 72-3, 84-92, 131-134, G. Carocci,
Agostino Depretis e la politica interna italiana dal 1876 al 1887 (Einaudi, Turin,
1956), passim. Biografical information in D. Marucco, Mutualismo e sistema politico. II
caso italiano (1862-1904) , cit., pp. 61-5.
5 D. Marucco, Mutualismo e sistema politico. II caso italiano (1862-1904) , cit., pp. 64-
5. For information on Giuseppe Bodio see ibidem, pp. 54-61.
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prime minister, and often did; but, at the same time, he fully availed himself of his
authority to impose his own solutions, in open conflict with Bodio. And often
Correnti's methods proved inadequate. As indicated by the episode of the partial
reform of the 1862 act, described above, the Commission was dependent on the
government's whim and unlikely to try and break the bond 6.
Despite early confidence that it would complete the work in one or two years, the
Royal Commission sat for nine, and when it was dissolved by Crispi in February
1889 7, it had achieved only part of its objectives. These were defined in November
1880: first of all it was necessary to gather statistical data on the charities' assets,
to know the exact content and nature of the 'patrimony of the poor', how much of the
revenue was spent in administration, patrimonial burdens, devotional duties, and
welfare; then the commission would investigate the administration of the charities,
their economic conditions, the way in which they distributed relief and treated their
inmates, in order to gather substantial evidence of the flaws of the 1862 act 8. How
to meet these targets, took a long time to decide. Bodio wanted the statistical work
entrusted exclusively to the Central Statistical Office. The Royal Commission would
draw up the statistical forms, and the provincial committees would collaborate with
the collection of data, but would not be entrusted with their elaboration. As to the
other part of the inquiry, Bodio suggested a sampling technique, which would enable
the Commission to study in depth a number of areas and institutions. These samples
would provide sufficient evidence of the flaws in the 1862 act, without
overwhelming the Commission with evidence. Furthermore, this method would
identify the location of particularly problematic areas, where the Commissioners
could conduct thorough in loco investigations. The Commission agreed that the
statistical work should be handled by the Central Statistical Office, but most
Commissioners did not grasp the scientific soundness of the second part of Bodio's
suggestions. With Correnti and Scotti, they felt that both the statistical, and the
'moral-administrative' enquiry must include every single charity. To their minds
sampling entailed the loss of vital information. The majority of the Royal
Commissioners thought that their task was to dig out the entire truth about the
charities, not to provide the public with limited if indicative evidence. Bodio made
two unsuccessful attempts to explain his point, but probably felt isolated, and soon
gave up. These methodological disputes were intertwined with the issue of the
8 See above 7.5.
7 The Royal Commission was dissolved by Crispi with R. D. 24 February 1889, six days
after Crispi presented his bill to the Chamber. See R.B.P., No. 6, 1889, 'Sulle
Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza', report of the Chamber's committee, 13 June 1889.
8 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 11-13 (18 Nov. 1880).
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provincial committees, how to form and monitor them, and their role within the
enquiry. For Bodio the provincial committees were acceptable, since he favoured
centralized statistics and a quick enquiry by samples into the administrative and
moral conditions of the charities. But for those who planned a detailed charity-by-
charity enquiry, the province was too large a unit. Bad roads and means of
communication were likely to make it very difficult to assemble provincial
committees that were truly representative of the whole province 9. In the end the
Commission opted for district committees. Thus every province would have a number
of committees, according to its size. Each would have from three to nine members,
according to the district's size and the importance of its charities. The 232
committees would be co-equal, and would correspond directly with the Royal
Commission. Thanks to Correnti's good offices, Depretis accepted this change to his
original stipulation 10. Then came the problem of whom to appoint to the committees.
In theory they should be chosen independently by the Commission, but it was difficult
for the Commissioners to find over a thousand suitable people, and Correnti's
proposal to spend the Christmas vacation of 1880 in explorative trips up and down
the country was not popular with the majority of the Commission. Hence it was
inevitable that they relied largely on the prefects' advice. As to monitoring the local
committees, the peninsula was divided in six areas, each entrusted to a number of
royal commissioners. This decision had been taken in December 1880, and was based
on the assumption that there would be one local committee in each province. When in
the Spring of 1881 it was decided to set up district committees, the problem of how
to monitor them was not re-discussed, although most commissioners were aware that
such a large number of committees would be impossible to monitor properly 11. The
actual appointment of the committees' members was another very complicated affair,
hampered by resignations, replacements, mistakes, etc. Most local committees were
established by the end of June 1882. However, due to resignations, deaths, and
widespread obstructionism, as late as February 1883 only about 200 local
9 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 80-85 (2 Febr. 1881), 96-100 (10 March 1881).
Codronchi alone fully agreed with Bodio.
10 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 101-103 (10 March 1881), 104 (12 March 1881), 117-
20 (15 March 1881), 121-24 (28 April 1881), 125-43 (29 and 30 April 1881, 16
Oct. 1881), 163-64 (Allegato D. Regolamento per I'azione dei Comitati locali ). The
committees' work was unpaid, but the government would provide them with an office,
and staff and stationery as required.
11 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 3-4 (31 Oct. 1880), 13-14 (18 Nov. 1880), 36-52 (26
and 29 Nov. 1880), 64-69, 71-79 (16, 19 and 21 Dec. 1880), 121-24 (28 April
1881), 161-62 (Allegato C. Regolamento pei lavori delta Commissione).
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committees were actually able to work 12. As to their role in the gathering of the
statistical data, it was agreed that they would act as a first filter between the
charities and the Royal Commission, according to the pattern synthesized in the
diagram below13.
12 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 144-47 (5 Dec. 1881), 187-92 (26, 28, and 30 June
1882), 196-199 (12 Febr. 1883).
13 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 83-85 (2 Febr. 1881), 100-103 (10 March 1881).
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The choice of sending the statistical forms to the charities via the prefects was
inevitable, given the long time it took to set up local committees. The decision to
entrust the first checking of the data to the municipal juntas of statistics and to the
local committees was intended as a means to involve the local authorities and the local
people into the enquiry, but it proved disastrous. As Scotti and Pianciani repeatedly
pointed out during the meetings of 10 and 12 March 1881, the municipal juntas of
statistics were usually formed by people who knew nothing of statistics, and were
very often involved in the charities' administration, which made them less than
eager to find out the truth about them. Indeed Scotti and Pianciani were right, while
Bodio's confidence in recalling the juntas to new life by giving them an active role
within the enquiry proved wholly unfounded. Instead of checking the data received
from the charities, most statistical juntas simply approved them without reading
them - or sat on them, thereby hampering the work of the local committees - whilst
the mayors, and even the prefects and subprefects, did not care to speed up the
procedures. Eventually Correnti told all those concerned to override the juntas, thus
acknowledging that the Royal Commission had made a big mistake to involve them in
the enquiry. The local committees did not perform much better, being on the whole
equally lazy and disorganized. Many simply disintegrated; others, despite abundant
and detailed instructions from Rome, did not know what to do with the data; many
believed that, as with the previous statistics on charities, the data were destined to
gather dust in the archives, and hence did not bother. But, on the other hand, many of
those which took their duties seriously, found that the prefects did not fulfill the
stipulations set up in the decree of 3 June 1880. Offices, stationery, and staff, were
often not provided. Some local committees incurred expenses in order to complete
their work on time, only to be told that such expenditure was unauthorized, and
hence would not be refunded. Furthermore, even the keenest local committee
depended on the charities for the completion of its work. These had received the
statistical tables during the second half of August 1881, and were supposed to return
them to the mayors by October; but, as late as June 1882, a huge number of
charities had not complied. The only response of the Royal Commission and the
Interior Ministry was to inundate the defaulters with innumerable entreaties and
circulars, threatening the charities with the prospect of sending in prefecture
employees to fill in the forms at the charities' expenses. This never happened of
course, because no prefecture office had the requisite armies of staff to spare, and
the prefects' attitude to the enquiry was far from enthusiastic. The Royal Commission
also planned to discover hidden charities, but largely failed. The communes were
ordered to publicize the lists of local charities under the guardianship of the
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Provincial deputation. It was believed that the citizens would flock to denounce those
unregistered charities that they knew about. On the contrary, such patriotic
denunciations were very rare. Only a limited number of diligent local committees put
themselves at pains to find for themselves how many charitable enterprises evaded
the law. By February 1883 197 (85%) of the 232 local committees were
theretically 'able to work', whereas a mere 35 (15%) were still to be set up. The
collection of data, originally to be completed by September 1882, was still in
process, as shown in the table below.
Table 8.1.1. State of the works of the local committees in February 1883.
Local committees No. %
still to be set up 35 15.1
able to work 1 97 84.9 of which
work completed 56 24.1
work completed by half or more 18 7.8
work completed by less than half 26 11.2
promise to finish soon 30 12.9
vague promises 67 29
total 232 1 00
Correnti suggested inspections by the Royal Commissioners to shake up the
negligent local committees; but nobody was keen to travel up and down the peninsula.
After three years of meetings the tacit agreement had been reached that the
Commissioners would not move from Rome. Correnti did not insist, and it was decided
to resort to yet another circular. At long last, the local committees completed their
work by the end of January 1884 14. But their performance had been soo poor that it
was clear that the target of setting up an effective peripheral network of data
collectors had failed. As the local committees collapsed and dissolved, the Royal
Commission and Central Statistical Office were forced to rely more and more on the
prefects, although originally they intended to safeguard the independence of the
enquiry 15. Despite the unwillingness of those concerned to admit it, the objective of
14 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 83-85 (2 Febr. 1881), 98-100 (10 March 1881), 105-
108 (12 March 1881), 192 (30 June 1882), 196-203, 207-10 (12 Febr. 1883), 214-
17 (13 Febr. 1883), 260-61 (26 April 1883), 448 (Allegato E. Tavola del progresso
del lavoro presso i Comitati ), 165-81, 449-51, 455-14 (list and texts of circulars to
prefects, mayors, local committees, and charities).
15 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., p. 262 (26 April 1883), 375 (16 Dec. 1883); R.B.P. , No. 1,
1887, 'I lavori dell'lnchiesta sulle opere pie', pp. 26-28.
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conducting an administrative inquiry independent of the administrative authorities
had proved unrealistic, perhaps because the Commissioners presumed too much upon
the citizens' good will and skills, and did not spend sufficient time to devise a
workable method 16.
The discussion about whether or not to inspect the local committees raised the
problem of funding: Royal Commissioners were entitled to be refunded, and alleged
shortages of cash offered a good pretext for not moving. Funding had been first
discussed in December 1880, in connection with the foreseable duration of the
enquiry. Correnti reckoned that the work would be completed in one year, and cost
60,000 lire; Costantini and Salaris estimated at least two years and 150,000 lire.
An official request to Parliament for an independent budget was excluded, for fear of
being accused of greediness. Hence Correnti privately negotiated with Depretis, and
an allocation of 30,000 lire was made available for 1881. Depretis had no objection
to presenting a bill to Parliament to fix a budget for the enquiry, but the Royal
Commission did not avail itself of this opportunity, and the matter was forgotten
until February 1883, when some commissioner argued that extra funds were needed
to finance local inspections, and that so far the Commission had been excessively
modest. It then turned out that from June 1880 to February 1883 the Royal
Commission had spent only 10,504 lire. Another 7,660 lire had been allocated in
the 1881 budget of the Interior for bonuses to those civil servants who helped the
local committees, but this had not yet been distributed. It also emerged that Depretis
could not be accused of being mean. Subsequent allocations of 30,000 lire had been
set aside for the Commission in the Interior budget, to a total of 90,000 lire, but
unclaimed allocations could not be retrieved now. It was again discussed whether to
keep relying on direct funding from the government, or request an independent
budget of Parliament, and again the first option was decided upon. In 1880 the
commissioners were afraid of being judged greedy; in 1883 their main concern was
to avoid criticism of their inability to offer any results after two years and a half of
work 17. Thus, during the first period of the enquiry, funding was not a serious
problem for the Royal Commission, but rather an obscure and forgettable matter,
16 Mario Tortello and Francesco Santanera, L'assistenza espropriata. I tentativi di
salvataggio delle IPAB e la riforma dell'assistenza. Quaderni di prospettive assistenziali
12 (Nuova Guaraldi, Florence, 1982), pp. 35-38 offer a much rosier picture, quoting
sparsely only some appropriate bits of the Atti. For these authors the local committees
were a true guarantee of the independence of the enquiry, they were appointed without
the interference of the prefects, and so on, although the poor performance of some
committees is admitted. We fully disagree on this part of an otherwise valuable work.
17 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 55-63 (16 Dec. 1880), 76-9 (21 Dec. 1880), 209-14
(12 and 13 Febr. 1883).
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since the commissioners found it very convenient not to squander state money in
tiring journeys which entailed an active involvement in the enquiry that would
excessively interefere with their agenda and private life.
Funding was conversely a vital issue for the Central Statistical Office, which could
not cope with the checking and elaboration of the huge amount of data coming in from
the local committees unless extra staff was provided. It was indeed an enterprise of
biblical proportions: each of the 23,000 or so charities had received forty-one
statistical tables to fill in, totalling 943,000 tables for the Central Office to digest.
The elaboration started in mid-December 1882 on a limited scale, since data had
arrived from only ninety-seven of the 232 committees. It was immediately evident
that about a half of the data furnished by the charities were flawed: the local
committees had largely failed to check them properly. By April 1883 1,166 (53%)
out of 2,202 files examined had to be returned for correction. By 1 July 1883 data
had arrived from 14,646 charities; 9,278 files had been analysed, of which 4,945
(53.29%) were returned for correction. By June 1884, when the first gathering
and checking of data was completed, 16,000 files out of 23,000 (69.56%) had been
returned for correction. By that date the statistics for Piedmont and Lombardy were
ready, but Bodio reckoned that, unless more staff was provided, it would take at least
another year and a half to digest and publish the rest. In April 1886 Bodio was
confident that all the statistics would be published within eighteen months, but, as
late as 17 January 1889, when he reported to the Royal Commission on the general
results of the statistical part of the inquiry, only the statistics for Piedmont,
Liguria, Lombardy, Venetia, Tuscany, and Sicily were published. For the other
regions, further checking of the data was needed, although the difference between the
provisional and definitive results was expected to be narrow. The last volume,
containing the data for Abruzzi and Molise, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, and the
general summary of the whole kingdom, was published in 1897 18.
The statistics of the charities were only a half of the objectives of the enquiry. The
other half was to provide fresh evidence on the charities' administration, the relief
distribution system, and the treatment of the inmates. This information was to be
obtained by means of questionnaires to the charities, the prefects, the local
committees, and the mayors. The discussion of these questionnaires, in great part
18 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 204-05 (12 Febr. 1883), 251-52 (25 April 1883), 326
(7 July 1883), 343-44 (3 Dec. 1883); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, pp. 26-27 (3 June 1884);
M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 3, p. 48 (4 April 1886); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 8, pp. 2-3; Comm. Reale
d'lnchiesta sulle Opere pie istituita con R.D. 3 Giugno 1880, Direz. Gen. della Statistica,
Statistics delle Opere pie (Bertero, Rome, 1897), Vol.X, Abruzzi e Molise, Puglie,
Basilicata e Calabrie e Riassunto generate per il Regno (henceforth: Statistica delle
Opere pie (1897), Vol.X).
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drafted by Scotti, absorbed much of the Royal Commission's time19, but their actual
role was never thoroughly debated. The recorded evidence suggests that the
Commissioners expected the questionnaires to provide all the required evidence.
Nobody openly suggested cross-checking the information gathered through the
questionnaires with information obtained by visiting a number of welfare
establishments. Indeed, the idea of visiting hospitals, poorhouses, and orphanages,
was never discussed, since Bodio's approach, which could entail such methods, was
ruled out from the outset. Correnti emphasized several times that the study of
poverty and related social problems was central to the Commission's aims; yet it
appears that he could not offer any methodological solution other than the gathering
of an extensive bibliography of welfare theories and charities 20. Interviews with
local authorities and notables were not excluded outright, but they were seen merely
as a means to get additional information if needed, not as an alternative source of
information. Therefore local interviews, although vaguely planned from 1883, were
constantly postponed to the mythical moment when all the gathered information
would be transformed into digested and orderly knowledge. Only in 1887 were a few
interviews carried out, in a great hurry, in those districts in arrears with their
work; hence no proper oral enquiry ever took place. Which indeed was a great pity,
since those few and limited interviews that took place provided much more lively and
interesting evidence than the answers to the questionnaires 21.
Originally the Royal Commission thought of conducting the administrative part of
the inquiry contemporaneously with the gathering of the statistical data, but then
decided to wait until all statistical data were collected, for fear that the additional
19 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 89-93 (3 March 1881: presentation by Scotti of six
questionnaires targetted at six groups of charities), 108-117 (12, 14, and 15 March
1881: discussion of the administrative questionnaire, and questionnaire for hospitals),
258 (25 April 1883: time to set up more questionnaires), 262-64, 271-72 (26, 27
April 1883: discussion of the administrative questionnaire), 279-83 (28 April 1883:
discussion of questionnaire for the almoner foundations), 290-91(6 May 1883:
kindergartens), 296-326 (15 May 1883: nurseries, 17 May 1883: foundling homes,
18 May 1883: dowry foundations, 6 July 1883: Monti Frumentari, 7 July 1883: deaf
and dumb homes, casse di prestanza agraria, and administrative questionnaires for
charities, local comittees, and local authorities), 331-40 (30 Nov. 1883: Monti di
Pieta ); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, pp. 7-25 (30 May and 2 June 1884: lunatic asylums and
poorhouses), 33-36 (4 June 1884: homes for the blind).
20 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 204 (12 Febr. 1883), 250-51 (25 April 1883), 457-460
(Circular from the Royal Commission to the prefects and sub-prefects asking them to
pass on bibliographical information on welfare matters, Rome, 9 Jan. 1883).
21 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., p. 326 (7 July 1883); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, pp. 36-41 (4 and
16 June 1884); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, pp. 3-6, 8-11 (15, 16, and 20 Dec. 1886); M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 5, pp. 218-51 (reports by A. Anselmi on his interviews with the local
committees of Palermo, Trapani, and Messina; Q. Querini: Venice and Padua; P.
Baravelli: Florence, Arezzo, Bologna; Sormani-Moretti: Milan, Turin, Genoa).
278
information elicited by the questionnaires could help the managers of the charities to
fiddle the figures. Thus the administrative questionnaires for the charities, and those
for the local authorities and local committees, were sent only at the beginning of
1884. The special questionnaires, targetted at the relief distribution system, and the
internal situation of the establishments, were distributed between the middle of
1885 and the beginning of 1886, as it was decided to send them after the
administrative questionnaires had been returned 22. By 1883 the slowness of the
statistical inquiry, and the poor performance of the local committees and all those
supposed to collaborate, should have taught the Royal Commission that it was
unrealistic to expect quick and satisfactory replies to a huge quantity of questions
from people who were either afraid to tell the truth, or would simply not bother.
Moreover, even in the event that half of the charities answered, the mass of paper to
process and digest would be nightmarish to handle, and its elaboration extremely
long. There was a real risk of the Commissioners being submerged by evidence
which was unusable because impossible to synthesize in time. This was the point of
view of Bodio, who tried again to persuade his collegues to proceed by samples. Again
he failed. The Commissioners had experienced the frustrating difficulties and delays
of the statistical part of the inquiry. Yet most of them still believed that the value of
the enquiry would be nil unless full evidence was obtained from all charities. Even
Correnti, who in 1881 had conceeded that the statistical inquiry should be followed
by enquiries targetted at specific areas and institutions, now reckoned that the
Commission could not avoid investigating the conditions of every single charity 23.
Any in-depth studies of specific areas, or groups of institutions, were effectively
ruled out for the sake of uniform and thorough evidence which was never to
materialize.
As predicted by Bodio, it proved extremely awkward to obtain information about the
administrative and financial situation from the charities, the mayors, the prefects,
and the local committees; and to analyse and synthezise them proved very complicated
and time-consuming. At the end of May 1884, when the deadline for the charities to
answer the 185 questions had already elapsed, partial answers had been gathered in
102 districts out of 232. When Scotti and Bodio started to analyse them, in May
1885, no complete answers had been obtained from any district; but all entreaties
22 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., pp. 84-85 (2 Febr. 1881), 192 (30 June 1882), 341-42 (1
Dec. 1883), 375 (16 Dec. 1883), 396-99 ( 25 Jan. 1884), 403-411 (Relazione a S.E. il
Presidente del Consiglio, Ministro dell'lnterno, intorno ai lavori della Commissione
Reale d'lnchiesta sulle opere pie dalla sua istituzione al 25 gennaio 1884 ); M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, pp. 36-40 (4 and 16 June 1884).
23 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit., p. 98 (10 March 1881), 284-89 (4 and 5 May 1883), 292-
96 (15 May 1883).
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and threats had been abandoned. Even so, the amount of paper was so great that the
dream of processing all the information had to be abandoned. Moreover, a
preliminary analysis of eight districts showed that most administrative
questionnaires had been answered in an incomplete and vague manner. The local
committees had failed to check the evidence offered by the charities, thus there was
no guarantee of their truthfullness. To speed up the work, the analysis was restricted
to thirty-five provinces, the charities were classified into six groups, according to
their economic importance, and more attention was paid to the bigger charities. It
was also decided not to analyse all the answers to the 185 questions, but to
concentrate on those concerning the guardianship, administrative procedures, and
financial situation. Hence sampling methods, rejected at the beginning as improper,
were in the end adopted out of necessity. The full report on the results of the
administrative questionnaires was finally compiled and read to the Commission by
Scotti in March 1887 24. The situation was no rosier with regard to the other
questionnaires addressed to prefects, mayors, and local committees. By April 1886
the Royal Commission had the replies from all prefects except one, but only about
5,000 out of 8,259 from the mayors - and 114 out of 232 from the local
committees. In the end, replies were obtained from 123 local committees and 7,422
communes. Needless to say, these questionnaires were also very unsatisfactorily
answered, and awkward to analyse and synthezise for want of uniformity. Their
study, conducted by Costantini, Baravelli, and Querini between the end of 1886 and
the Spring of 1887, turned up very little of use, as it only confirmed the messy state
of the charities, the inefficiency of the provincial deputations' guardianship, and the
unwillingness of prefects and mayors to admit their problems in this field of civil
administration - which was no novelty by that time 25.
The results of the third part of the inquiry never materialized. By June 1887 the
Royal Commission had received about 10,000 answers - mostly vague and
incomplete - to the special questionnaires, targetted at the distribution of relief and
the treatment of the inmates. Their analysis was postponed several times, and
effectively never started. Hence the Commission failed to meet its most interesting
objective, although it is arguable whether evidence obtained by such disputable
methods would have been of much use. Indeed, by 1886 the Commission was split into
24 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, cit., pp. 7-8 (30 May 1884); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 3, pp. 19-20 (30
March 1886), 22-50 (31 March, 1st and 4 April 1886), 69-70 (16 April 1886); M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, pp. 12-15 (29 March 1887); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 6, passim.
25 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 3, cit., p. 45 (1st April 1886); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, cit., pp. 5-6
(16 Dec. 1886), 16-19 (30 and 31 March 1887); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 5, passim, and
partic. pp. 96, 115.
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two factions. One was headed by Costantini, who pressed for a speedy conclusion of the
studies and the elaboration of a bill solely concerned with the administration of the
charities. The other, headed by Correnti, wanted to study more thoroughly the
evidence gathered, and complete the study of the structure of the relief system. It was
argued that the reform of the administration of the charities was only part of the
Commission's duties, and that a bill that left unresolved the problem of the relief
distribution system was not worth proposing. Correnti was certainly right in
theory, as the outcome of the 1890 act would prove; but, on the other hand, he did
not have the power to force the flimsy and flawed structure on which the enquiry was
based, to deliver the evidence he needed. And, we could add, he probably lacked the
imagination to devise other methods to find out what a thousand questionnaires would
probably never reveal. Thus Correnti was short of practical solutions, whilst
Costantini supported his argument by proposing a tight schedule and a concrete
program of action. Parliament and the country at large wanted results, so Costantini
won the argument. The reform of the relief distribution system would come later,
once the special questionnaires were obtained and studied. For the moment the
Commissioners would elaborate a bill based on the evidence available, targetted at the
administrative reform of the charities.
With the coming to power of Crispi, things were changing for the Commission. In
May 1887 in the Chamber, Costantini stressed that the Royal Commission had not
completed its work, since the replies to the special questionnaires must be analysed.
But Crispi, Interior Minister in the eighth Depretis cabinet, made it clear that in his
mind enough evidence had been produced, and the time was ripe to reach
conclusions26. Hence, despite all good intentions, those 10,000 special
questionnaires returned by the charities were destined to gather dust in some
archive: nothing was published, apart from their texts. In February 1889 the
dissolving decree did not kill the Royal Commission, but rather acknowledged its
natural death. We cannot say whether things would have developed differently, had
the Royal Commission completed its task. But it seems significant that, from the
outset to the conclusion of its work, the Commission concentrated on the patrimonial
26 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 3, cit., pp. 51-73 (4, 7, 9, 15, and 16 April 1886); M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, cit., pp. 7-8 (20 Dec. 1886), 14-15 (29 March 1887), 25-26 (1st
April 1887); R.B.P., No. 1, 1887, 'I lavori dell'lnchiesta sulle Opere pie', cit., pp. 23-
29; No. 5, 1887, 'L'lnchiesta sulle opere pie avanti la Camera dei deputati' (disc, of M.I.
budget for 1887-88, 20 May 1887), pp. 401-07; No. 6, 1889, 'Sulle Istituzioni
pubbliche di beneficenza', cit., pp. 430-31. About Crispi's role in the 8th Depretis'
cabinet, his succession to 'the wizard of Stradella', and his two first cabinets, see G.
Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1978) (1st ed. 1970), vol. VI,
pp. 328-73; M. Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1982 (Longman, London, 1984), pp. 92-
1 01.
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and administrative aspects of the charities' problem. In this sense little had changed
from the times of Charles Albert and his Edict. In the 1880s, as in 1836, the
liquidity, and orderly administration of the welfare institutions were paramount.
The fact that so much time was spent in devising questionnaires on the treatment of
inmates and the way benefits were distributed, was a sign that something was
beginning to change in the perception of the problem of poverty. Yet, the notion of
going out to find the facts was still foreign to a Royal Commission of Inquiry.
Such extravagant undertakings were better left to outsiders, like Franchetti and
Sonnino; writers, like Valera, Fucini and Serao; or eccentric foreigners and former
Garibaldians, like Jessie White Mario. They had sufficient imagination and courage to
challenge the traditional patterns of knowledge gathering in the social field 27. The
Royal Commissioners had plenty of erudition and courage, but very little
imagination.
8.2.The Italian charities in 1880. Administrative boards and patrimonial structure.
The picture emerging from the administrative inquiry confirmed what was already
known for at least a decade. The charities' world was static. The administrative
boards, mostly based on the foundation deeds, were renewed very seldom, hence there
was little turn-over in the management. Prefects and mayors failed to avail
themselves of their power to inspect charities and institutions; the guardianship
exerted by the provincial deputations was purely nominal; the arrears in submitting
and clearing the accounts were huge; the rules concerning inventories and treasurers
were largely disregarded; statutes and internal regulations often did not exist; the
reforms of the purposes were negligible 28. A later elaboration by the Central
Statistical Office showed that the congregations of charity managed about half the
27 R. Romanelli, L'ltalia liberale (1861 -1900) (II Mulino, Bologna,1979), pp. 190-91;
John A. Davis, Conflict and Control. Law and order in Nineteenth-Century Italy
(MacMillan, London, 1988), pp. 290-313; Cinzia Botta, 'Paolo Valera e gli "abissi
plebei" di Milano fin de siecle: immagine letteraria e realta sociale', Rivista di storia
contemporanea, No. 1, 1988, pp. 3-36; J. White Mario, La miseria in Napoli (Quarto
potere, Naples, 1978, 1st ed. 1877); Elizabeth Adams Daniels, Jessie White Mario.
Risorgimento Revolutionary (Ohio Univ. Press, Athens, 1972), pp. 122-7; R. Fucini,
Napoli a occhio nudo (1878); L. Franchetti, S.Sonnino, Inchiesta in Sicilia (Vallecchi,
Florence, 1974), passim, and partic. pp. XII, XVIll-XV, XXX.
28 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 5, passim; 6, passim, and partic. pp. XX-XXVIII, XXX, LXXIV-LXXVII,
LXXXI, LXXXIII-C, CVIII-CIX; Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. X.
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charities; confraternities, vestry boards, or priests about a quarter; special
administrations according to the statutes or tradition, about a sixth 29.
Chart 8.2.1. Administrative boards of the charities (%, 1880).
Spec. Congr. Loc. Founders Clergy Confr. Vestry Jewish
adm. of Ch. auth. boards Univ.
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. X.
The pattern however varied significantly throughout Italy, as shown in the chart
below.
29 See complete data in appendix 8, tables 1 and 1a.
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Chart 8.2.2. Administrative boards of the charities by geographical area (%,
1880).
60.00
Spec. Congr. Loc. auth. Founders Clergy Confr. Vestry Jewish
adm. of Ch. boards Univ.
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. X.
The proportion of charities managed by the congregations was constant throughout the
Peninsula, but the distribution of the other administrative boards varied greatly. The
most interesting feature was that in the South the clergy controlled a small number
of charities, while the confraternities managed 34%. Conversely the clergy had more
direct control in the North, where the confraternities had negligible power. In the
Centre clergy and confraternities each managed 8% of the charities. Vestry boards
administered 6% of the charities in the North, mainly in Lombardy and Venetia, none
at all in the rest of Italy. These patterns appear related to the different historical
development of the ecclesiastical structures. In the North the power enjoyed by
clergy and vestry boards was a consequence of the successful implementation of both
the directives of the Council of Trent and the eighteenth-century reforms. In the
South the predominance of the confraternities in the charities' administration was a
consequence of the failure of the Council of Trent and of any successive reforming
attempt by the either the Church or the State. In the Centre the equal share of control
enjoyed by both clergy and confraternities suggests the image of a transition area
between two worlds.
The 1880 statistics - that did not include all those welfare institutions which were
not registered as charities, nor Monti di Pieta, Monti Frumentari, and casse di
prestanza agraria (rural banks) - was the first complete survey of the charitable
284
foundations and the last to be carried out in such detail 30. The registered charities
were 21,866 with a gross patrimony of 1,897,659,222 lire. If compared with the
data from the statistics of 1861 this figure revealed an average increase of the
charities' assets' value by about 72%. This provoked widespread satisfaction among
many philanthropists: the charities had grown fatter during the thirty years of the
regime of liberty, hence everything was all right, and there was no need to change a
law which had made the charities so prosperous 31. What these optimists preferred
to overlook was that any comparison between the statistics made in 1861 and 1880
was at best of dubious methodological value, given the disparity of the underlying
criteria 32. Moreover, whatever the real increase of the charities' assets, they were
fragmented into a myriad of tiny foundations. The chart below illustrates the
irrationality and inadequacy of a system of relief that entailed huge administrative
expenses 33.
30 M. Tortello, F. Santanera, L'assistenza espropriata. I tentativi di salvataggio delle IPAB
e la riforma dell'assistenza, cit., pp. 14-15, 22, 31-32; Umberto Levra (ed.), II
catasto delta beneficenza. Ipab e ospedali in Piemonte 1861-1985 (Regione Piemonte,
1986), p.9. In 1905 and 1909 two further surveys were published, but they were
summaries which did not give information on the single charities: M.I., D.G.A.C.,
Rilevamento statistico-amministrativo circa le condizioni dell'assistenza all'infanzia ed
agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e della beneficenza elemosiniera (Mantellate, Rome,
1905); Le condizioni patrimoniali e finanziarie delle Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza.
Relazione del Direttore generate dell'Amministrazione civile a S.E. il Ministro
dell'lnterno Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (Cecchini, Rome, 1909).
3^ Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XI, XLIII; G. Gozzoli, 'L'inchiesta sulle
Opere pie in Italia', Nuova Antologia, vol. 91 (1887), pp.677-92; R.B.P., No. 4-5,
1890, 'II progetto di legge sulle Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza ed il Senato del
Regno' (report by Sen. Costa for the Senate's committee, 21st April 1890), pp. 265-
66. Bodio's first report on the general results of the statistic inquiry (M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 8, cit.) gave different figures. We will refer to the later elaboration of
1897 because it appears more accurate. For instance, the first report's data on the
patrimony were not adjusted to compensate for the real increase in value of the rural
landed properties, and the population data were those of the 1871 census.
32 P. Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza', in Scritti vari (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1894),
pp. 312-6 (the article first appeared in Nuova Antologia , vol. 111 (1 st May 1890), pp.
5-40).
33 See also table 2. in appendix 8
285
Chart 8.2.3. Charities grouped by size of income (%, 1880).
50
up to 500 500 to 1500 to 5000 to 20000 to over
lire 1500 5000 20000 100000 1 00000
Source: R.B.P., No.7, 1889, 'Sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza' (report to the
Chamber on 13 June 1889 by Odoardo Luchini, chairman of the Chamber's committee
set up to study Crispi's bill on charities), p. 592.
Assets were not only greatly fragmented, but also unevenly spread all over Italy.
The higher concentration of charitable assets (36.7%) was in Piedmont and
Lombardy, which accounted for 24% of the population. The North (Piedmont,
Lombardy, Liguria, and Venetia), with 37.1% of the population, had almost half of
the charitable assets, but we must note that Venetia was much worse off than her
western sisters. Central Italy, with about 24% of the popoulation, had 29% of
assets, but there were considerable differences between Emilia-Romagna and
Latium, with above average patrimony/population ratios, and Tuscany, Umbria, and
the Marches, with below average ratios. The South, with 39% of the population, had
only 22.7% of assets, generally greatly fragmented. Abruzzi and Molise, Basilicata,
Calabria, and Sardinia were the worst-off regions, but nowhere in the South were
the patrimony/population ratios above average. The two following graphs illustrate
the trend 34.
34 See table 3 in appendix 8 for the full figures.
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Chart 8.2.4. Gross patrimony of the charities related to population (%, 1880).
Source: Statistics detie Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV.
Chart 8.2.5. Ratio of gross patrimony to population (lire per head, 1880).
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Source: Statistics delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV.
This distortion of the system was structural, since it was only natural for the
richer areas of the country to attract the largest shares of charitable resources, and
this was unlikely to disappear with the passage of time. Out of 261,957,346 lire
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bequeathed to the charities in the period 1881-1896, the North got 69%, the
Centre 17%, and the South 13.6% 35. As we will see, regional and local disparities
showed up even more clearly with regard to the actual welfare expenditure. But first
it is useful to concentrate on the charities' patrimonial structure.
The charities' assets consisted of 47% of landed properties and 53% of bonds plus
other investments. However there were huge differences between regions, as shown
in the chart below 36.
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XVI-XXI.
The higher investments in landed properties were in the Marches, Umbria, and
Emilia-Romagna, with a marked predominance of rural estates. These regions had not
suffered those compulsory sales which had severely affected the Tuscan charities
during the last decades of the eighteenth century, and whose effects were still very
visible: in Tuscany landed properties represented only about 16% of the charitable
assets, with a clear predominance of urban buildings 37. Landed properties accounted
for 57 to 51% in Lombardy, Apulia, Latium and Campania; for around 40% in
Piedmont and Venetia, and for about 35 to 37% in Sardinia, Basilicata, Liguria, and
35 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. LX. See appendix 8, table 4 for
detailed figures.The fact that charity systems solely based on bequests were bound to
produce structural distortions in the assets distribution was first noted by the French
illuminists. See: Colin Jones, Charity and bienfaisance. The treatment of the poor in the
Montpellier region 1740-1815 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 3.
36 See also table 5 in appendix 8.
37 For the Tuscan charities' troubles before and during the Napolenic period see: S. Woolf,
The poor in Western Europe (Methuen, London & New York, 1986), pp. 76-117.
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Calabria. After Tuscany, the lower landed investments were in Abruzzi-Molise
(about 29%), and Sicily (about19%). The Government never tired of advertising
and recommending State bonds (titoli di rendita del debito pubblico ) to the charities
in innumerable circulars, but they were not very popular. Only the Piedmontese
charities had dutifully invested in them about 40% of their assets. Followed Tuscany
with almost 35%, and Liguria, Sicily and Calabria with investments between 32 and
34%. In most other regions state bonds represented from 20 to 30% of the charities'
assets, with the exception of Umbria (6%), and the Marches (8%). This reluctance
to invest in the public debt revealed a widespread diffidence towards the State. In
some cases it was possibly an outcome of the lesson learnt during the Napoleonic
rule, when the conversion of landed assets into Luoghi di Monte and other similar
investments had ruined many charities.
8.3. Patterns of expenditure and recipients of charity.
The overall revenue of the charities amounted to 90,446,446 lire a year, which
was equal to an interest rate of 4.8%. In the single regions the rate varied from a
minimum of 4.11% (Liguria), to a maximum of 5.04% (Campania) 38. The gross
patrimonial revenue was burdened by temporary and perpetual patrimonial burdens,
which included mortgages, obligations of various nature, and devotional duties, taxes,
and expenses for the maintenance and administration of the patrimony itself. All this
required 38,682,037 lire, equal to almost 43% of the gross revenue. The table
below shows the relations between these headings of patrimonial expenditure by
region.
38 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXII, XXVII. See table 6 in appendix 8
for figures and percentages by region.
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Piedmont 13,165,422 6.4 1 4 1 2 32.4 8,892,228 67.5
Liquria 3,544,053 7.8 14.2 1 5.9 37.9 2,1 98,051 6 2
Lombardy 20,456,416 8.9 18.5 1 6.4 43.8 1 1 ,490,664 56.2
Venetia 6,341,653 5.8 18.8 1 9.2 43.8 3,561 ,097 56.2
Emilia-Rom. 10,320,005 6.7 18.1 21 45.8 5,587,989 54.1
Tuscany 5,241,428 9.5 13.1 1 7.7 40.3 3,127,115 59.7
Marches 2,684,790 7.8 18.3 20.8 46.9 1 ,427,1 45 53.2
Umbria 1,640,411 10.4 1 9.2 1 6.7 46.3 881,020 53.7
Latium 6,115,180 10.4 18.6 1 7.1 46.1 3,290,757 53.8
Abr.-Molise 1,209,984 6.8 1 5.6 18.5 40.9 71 5,1 74 59.1
Campania 9,638,423 8.3 1 9.7 1 9.4 47.4 5,070,627 52.6
Basilicata 315,735 4.2 1 9.5 1 8.3 42 1 82,861 57.9
Apulia 2,584,967 10.3 1 6.4 1 8.4 45.1 1 ,420,053 54.9
Calabria 498,933 6.7 1 5.1 20.9 42.7 285,597 57.2
Sicily 6,316,436 15.1 11.9 18.9 45.9 3,411,565 5 4
Sardinia 372,610 7.6 1 5.8 1 6.9 40.3 222,347 59.7
Kingdom 90,446,446 8.5 16.9 1 7.4 42.8 51 ,764,290 57.2
The most cautious charities were those of Piedmont and Liguria. The record for high
patrimonial expenditure belonged to Campania, followed by the Marches, Umbria,
Latium, Sicily, Emilia-Romagna, and Apulia. In the other regions patrimonial
expenditure ranged from about 44% (Venetia) to about 40% (Sardinia). The old
complaint that the charities spent too much on the upkeep of their assets appeared
well founded. Conversely, the argument that the best way to reduce patrimonial
expenditure was to sell land and buy bonds, was not fully confirmed by these figures.
Sicily and Tuscany had the lower proportion of landed assets (respectively 19 and
16%), but not the lower patrimonial expenditure. Their taxes were low (12 and
13%), but administration and maintenance were expensive (19 and 18%), and
patrimonial burdens disproportionately high. Indeed, those of Sicily were the highest
of all (15%), while those of Tuscany (10%) were lower than those of Apulia,
Umbria and Latium, but higher than those of all other regions. This indicates that
small landed patrimonies, burdened with myriads of obligations and uneconomically
run, could cost much more than large ones, rationally managed and free from old
burdens. Leaving aside taxes, which did not depend upon the good-will or skills of the
managers, we can add that only the Piedmontese charities appeared rationally run,
whilst those of all other regions offered at best mixed performances. For example,
39 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXVII-XXVIII.
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Liguria and Lombardy had the lowest administrative expenditure after Piedmont, but
quite high patrimonial burdens. Conversely, the charities of Venetia, Emilia-
Romagna, Calabria, and Basilicata had low patrimonial burdens, but expensive
administrations.
Patrimonial burdens included those devotional expenses attached to the charitable
bequests by foundation deeds. It was common for pious benefactors to stipulate that
their bequest should serve partly or exclusively for a number of masses to be said
each year to the benefit of their souls. But the charities' devotional expenditure was
not limited to these burdens, which amounted to 2,092,157 lire (i.e. about 27% of
the total patrimonial burdens), and were called oneri di culto 40. There were other
devotional expenses, independent of the stipulations made by the benefactors. In the
case of the mixed charities, that had both charitable and devotional purposes,
devotional expenditure was obviously central to the foundation's purposes. In the case
of hospitals, poorhouses, orphanages, etc., such expenditure was accessory. It served
to maintain chapels or churches attached to the institution; for the daily masses
which were said for the benefit of the inmates; and for the stipends to the clergy who
attended to the church. These expenses, called spese di culto per lo scopo
dell'istituzione, were included among the charities' welfare expenditure. Finally,
there were other devotional expenses, called spese volontarie di culto, which did not
depend upon statutory stipulations, but were part of the foundations' tradition. A
first feature worth noting is the uneven distribution of the overall devotional
expenditure, as shown in the chart below.
Chart 8.3.1. Distribution of devotional expenditure (1880).
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXXII.
40 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXVII, XXXII.
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Fifty-eight percent of the total sum spent by the charities for devotion belonged to
the South, with maxima in Campania and Sicily; the Centre accounted for 19%, and
the North for 23%. After Campania and Sicily, Lombardy was the region which spent
more in absolute terms in devotional duties, whilst the minima belonged to Sardinia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Umbria, the Marches, and Liguria 41. These figures do not tell
us how much devotional duties absorbed the charitable revenues in relative terms,
but are useful to pinpoint the fact that in some parts of Italy and some regions the
charities were more likely to spent their resources in devotional duties. This was the
outcome of different historical backgrounds, and was linked to the nature of the
charities, and their function within local societies. If we consider the relation
between oneri di culto and accessory and voluntary devotional expenditure, we may
find a clue to the uneven distribution of the devotional expenditure throughout Italy.
Chart 8.3.2. Composition of the devotional expenditure by region (1880)
(Other devotional expenditure includes spese per to scopo dell'istituzione
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXXII.
In the North and Centre, with the sole exception of Latium, more than half of the
devotional expenditure was represented by the oneri di culto, which ranged from
over 67% (Lombardy), to about 52%(Umbria and the Marches). In other words, the
charities of Northern and Central Italy were still burdened by statutory devotional
41 See detailed figures in appendix 8, table 7.
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duties, but were not however overindulging - relatively speaking - in voluntary
devotional duties. In Latium and especially the South the relation was inverted. Oneri
di culto absorbed from 12.5% (Abruzzi e Molise) to 4.1% (Calabria), whilst the
greatest part of devotional expenditure was not statutory, but voluntary and
customary 42. This undoubtedly indicates a different function of both the devotional
expenditure, and the charities themselves within the socio-economic structure. The
fact that devotional expenses made by the charities to meet their own purposes, or to
satisfy old customs, greatly outweighted those stipulated by the benefactors to the
benefit of their own souls, suggests not only the presence of a larger number of
mixed charities (which is indeed confirmed by the statistics), but also that in the
South a major role of the charities was to provide funds for the religious cult,
whether out of mere tradition, or by statute. Hence the partial evidence previously
produced in this work seems to be confirmed: in the South welfare was not
necessarily the primary objective of the charities, due to the peculiarity of that
ecclesiastical structure. A further confirmation is provided by the relations between
total devotional expenditure, gross patrimonial revenue, and welfare expenditure, as
shown in the table below.
42 See detailed figures in appendix 8, table 8.
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Table 8.3.2. Charities' devotional expenditure as a percentage of gross patrimonial
revenue and welfare expenditure (1880) 43.
Region tot. devotional
expenditure
as a % of gross
patrimonial rev.
as a % of welf. exp. net
of devotional expendit. *
Piedmont 389,250 3 3
Liguria 153,600 4.3 3.3
Lombardy 706,335 3.5 4.6
Venetia 223,176 3.5 2.6
Emilia-Rom. 323,397 3.1 3.4
Tuscany 404,543 7.7 5.3
Marches 99,472 3.7 4
Umbria 73,449 4.5 4.1
Latium 318,262 5.2 6.5
Abr.-Molise 237,147 19.6 3 6
Campania 2,132,580 22.1 3 1.3
Basilicata 30,724 9.7 10.8
Apulia 394,701 15.3 21 .3
Calabria 65,055 1 3 10.4
Sicily 855,157 13.5 1 9
Sardinia 15,883 4.3 3.8
Kingdom 6,422,731 7.1 7.8
* As explained below, welfare expenditure depended upon the charities' net revenue plus
subsidies from the local authorities and other sources of non-patrimonial income. The
statistics do not supply data for the welfare expenditure met by the charities with their
own means alone, hence the percentages on this column reflect the impact of devotional
duties on the overall welfare expenditure, including subsidies and other non-patrimonial
income.
In the North and Sardinia the overall devotional duties were modest, ranging from
3% of the gross patrimonial revenue (Piedmont), to around 4% (Liguria). In the
Centre, they were modest in some regions and higher in others, ranging from 3%
(Emilia-Romagna), to almost 8% (Tuscany). But in the South they ranged from
nearly 10% (Basilicata), to 22% (Campania). The trend was basically the same for
the relation between welfare and devotional expenditure. It seems incontrovertible
that the religious function of the southern charities was far from over, despite the
early struggle of the provisional rulers to trim devotional expenditure.
The net revenue available for welfare totalled 51,764,920 lire, which was equal to
57% of the gross revenue, but the sum actually spent on welfare was higher, since
the charities enjoyed non-patrimonial incomes, such as donations, fees from paying
inmates, profits from the inmates' work, and contributions from provinces and
communes, which last were the most substantial. This non patrimonial income
amounted to 44,744,781 lire, which brought the sum available for welfare to
43 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXXII.
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96,509,071. The composition of the welfare funds and their distribution by region
are shown in the chart below 44.
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol. X, cit., p. XXII.
On average the funds available for welfare were provided by 50% by patrimonial
revenue and by 50% by non-patrimonial income. The less-subsidized charities were
those of Abruzzi-Molise and Lombardy (32 and 35.5%); those more heavily
subsidized were those of Sardinia, Liguria, Venetia, Tuscany and Calabria (from
around 54 to 63%). In Apulia, Piedmont, and Sicily poor relief depended on
subsidies from 40 to 42%, and in the other regions from 44% (Latium), to over
48% (the Marches). It seems uncontroversial that poor relief relied substantially
on public money, despite the huge assets of the charities. In 1880 local authorities
spent 52,165,250 lire (communes 34,731,016; provinces 17,434,234) in
subsidies to hospitals, lunatic asylums, foundling homes, poorhouses, and other
welfare establishments, and stipends to medici condotti and municipal midwives. In
1889 the welfare bill met by the local authorities amounted to 62,957,417 lire
(communes 42,683,917; provinces 20,273,500). In the city of Rome alone the
charities' gross revenues amounted to over seven million, but only four were
actually spent on welfare, and those municipal authorities had to grant subsidies for
44 See table 9 in appendix 8 for detailed figures.
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one million six hundred thousand lire a year 45. The traditional arguments in defence
of private charity were fully disproved by these figures. However, the power of the
myth was such that even the Central statistical office arranged the data in order to
emphasize those showing the total sums available for welfare, and minimize the
dimensions of public contributions. It woud be incorrect to say that the figures were
fiddled, but it takes some laborious elaboration to extract the naked truth from them.
Communes and provinces spent a lot on welfare, but their contributions did not
usually compensate for the inequalities of the system. Proportionally low subsidies
from local authorities did not necessarily entail high patrimonial incomes of the
charities, and viceversa. The best example was offered by Lombardy and Abruzzi-
Molise, the two least subsidized regions. The proportionally low public contributions
to the rich Lombard charities undoubtedly indicated their financial strength and
relative self-sufficiency. Conversely the low subsidies enjoyed by the poor charities
of Abruzzi-Molise seem indicative of the general poverty of that region. Since
provinces and communes were bound to pay for the hospitalization of the poor,
lunatics, and foundlings, it followed that those regions better endowed with hospitals,
lunatic asylums, and foundling homes were likely to attract more subsidies than
those with fewer or smaller establishments. Moreover, in prosperous areas the
local authorities had more to spend, thus public subsidies did not compensate for the
charities' weaknesses and inadequacies, but rather their distribution throughout
Italy tended to mirror the structural distortions of both the charity system and the
economy in general. If we group the figures geographically, we can observe that the
Centre-North (Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Venetia, Emilia-Romagna, and
Tuscany), with nearly 53% of the population, enjoyed nearly 69% of the total funds
available for welfare, and nearly 70% of subsidies. The central regions of Umbria,
the Marches, and Latium, with 8.4% of the population, had about 11% of the welfare
funds, and 10.5% of public subsidies. The South, including Sicily and Sardinia, with
about 39% of the population, enjoyed nearly 21% of the total welfare funds, and
20% of subsidies. Welfare resources, of whatever nature, tended to be distributed
along the North-South divide lines.
This characteristic of the Italian system of poor relief is all the more evident if we
consider the relation between welfare expenditure and population. The share of gross
income - inclusive on non-patrimonial income - spent on welfare by the charities
averaged around 66%. The minimum was in the minor towns of Abruzzi-Molise
45 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. LXI; R.B.P., No. 4-5, 1890, 'II
progetto di legge sulle Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza ed il Senato del Regno', cit., p.
265.
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(47%), followed by Umbria, Calabria and Sardinia (56%). The maximum was in the
major cities of Liguria and Tuscany (76%) 46. Our source does not permit to
extrapolate the local authorities' subsidies from the funds spent on welfare by the
charities themselves at the level of major and minor centres, however higher
percentages can probably be interpreted as an indicator of larger subsidies. If we
observe the figures concerning the provincial cities and the other communes, we can
note that almost everywhere the urban charities spent on welfare a greater share of
their gross income than those of small towns and villages. This seems consistent with
what we know about the system's mechanism, which generally granted subsidies only
to those indoor-relief establishments that could claim the fees for part of their
inmates, and were usually situated in the major centres. It followed that about
three-quarters of the welfare resources concentrated in the cities, which accounted
for a quarter of the population, while the remaining three-quarters of the Italian
people, living in minor towns and rural villages, had to make do with only one
quarter of the resources. It is true that urban hospitals took care of those rural sick
poor who could reach them, but it is also true that in many isolated areas the sick
were out of reach of any hospital. Furthermore, financial liability for hospital fees
befell the commune of residence of the patient. On average the national welfare per
capita expenditure was 3 lire, but this rose to nearly 10 in the provincial cities and
fell to 0.9 lire in the minor ones 47. The disparity between regions and between
major and minor centres is illustrated by the three following charts.
46 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XXXV. See table 10 in appendix 8
for detailed figures.
47 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XXXV. See table 10 in appendix 8
for detailed figures.
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Chart 8.3.4. Average per capita welfare expenditure in the North (lire,1880).
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Source: Statistics delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV. 'Piedmont',
'Liguria', etc.: averages for the whole region. 'Major cities': averages for the
cities chief of province and district. 'Other towns': averages for towns and villages
not chief of province or district.
Chart 8.3.5. Average per capita welfare expenditure in the Centre (lire, 1880).
max 1
other towns j^B 1
Major cities 1 4
Latium ■■■■■■■ 6
other towns JBBB 1,3
Major cities jBWWIW 7
Umbria JMMW— 2.7
other towns 1.6
Major cities JBBBBMBBIM^^B^^^M 8
Marches J^^BBBi 2.7
other towns JB 0.7




Emilia-Rom. pBB^BBB^B4.4 | ( ( ( (
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV. 'Emilia-
Rom.', 'Tuscany', etc.: averages for the whole region. 'Major cities': averages
for the cities chief of province and district. 'Other towns': averages for
towns and villages not chief of province or district.
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV. 'Abr.-
Molise', 'Campania', etc.: averages for the whole region. 'Major cities':
averages for the cities chief of province and district. 'Other towns': averages for
towns and villages not chief of province or district.
The inhabitants of Turin, Milan, Genoa, Bologna, Florence and Rome appeared to fare
better than those of Naples, Palermo, Potenza, Teramo, and Cagliari. Those worst off
where the people living in small towns and rural areas of Sardinia, Calabria,
Basilicata, Abruzzi-Molise, and Venetia, although the North-South gap tended to
narrow in the minor centres. It seems correct to conclude that the distribution
pattern of the welfare resources was the same at both macro and micro level: the
rich-poor divide determined the availability of welfare resources at national as well
as at regional, provincial, and district level.
Finally we must note that under 'welfare expenditure' were included those
devotional expenses described above as voluntary, and to meet the charities'
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purposes, plus the expenses for the maintenance and administration of the welfare
establishments themselves, such as stipends to nurses and doctors, employees, etc.
The final release of the statistics did not clarify these headings further and thus we
are left in the dark as to the cost-effectiveness of the welfare institutions. Some
indicative figures can be found in the first release, but one must bear in mind that
generally the data of the first release appeared less reliable and differed greatly
from those of the last. Thereby what follows has a purely indicative value. On
average, devotional duties per lo scopo dell'istituzione required 3.9% of the overall
welfare expenditure; taxes on buildings such as hospitals, orphanages, poorhouses,
etc. required 0.8%; maintenance of the same, plus administrative staff and
stationery, 7.3%; stipends and pensions to doctors, nurses, teachers, etc., 15.6%.
Altogether these headings of expenditure amounted to 27.6% of the welfare
expenditure. The remaining 72.4% was allocated as follows: inmates' maintenance:
47.1%; drugs, dressing, and patients' transport: 5%; educational grants: 2.2%;
alms and dowries: 15.5%; subsidies to other charities: 2.6% 48. Regional
differences were remarkable; but, given the dubious reliability of the figures, it is
better to refrain from further analysis.
The statistics offered no evidence of the numbers of people sheltered or subsidized
by the charities, due to the failure of the Royal Commissioners to complete their
research. Nor were the population censuses of help, for they endaevoured to conceal
rather than explore the real dimensions of pauperism 49. To compensate for this
Crispi ordered a mini-enquiry in August 1888. He wanted to know how many people
had received benefits from almoner foundations, congregations of charity, and
communes; how many begging licences had been issued by the municipal authorities;
and how many people had been sheltered in poorhouses at the expense of public
charity in 1887. These data would offer indications for the reform of both the act on
charities, and that on public security. As late as June 1889, 75% of the communes
had answered (6,197 out of 8,257). Of the 19,321,037 inhabitants of these
communes 9,614 (0.05%) were mendicants with begging licences, and 15,059
(0.08%) were paupers needing shelter. Of these 7,759 had been accommodated in
poorhouses. The rest (7,300) had not been sheltered, for want of adequate
institutions 50. The data about those subsidized were later published in the ninth
48 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 8, p. 100.
49 Giovanni Gozzini, 'L'archivio della Pia Casa di Lavoro a Firenze', in Passato e Presente,
No. 17 (May-August 1988), pp. 181-2.
50 A.C.S., Carte Crispi Roma, B.13, f. 106: Bodio, M.A.I.C., Direz. Gen. Stat., Rome, 12
June 1889, to Crispi; M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 9, pp. 95-109 (the circular to the mayors
requesting the data was dated 5 August 1888).
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volume of the records of the Royal Commission. They concerned 7,906 communes
(96%) with a population of 29,045,109. It is impossible to disgregate the amounts
contributed by almoner foundations, congregations of charity, and communes, but the
figures are nevertheless eloquent. On average 2.6% of the Italian people had received
benefits in 1887, but 4.2% were in the big cities, while in the minor centres the
percentage fell to 2.1.The average benefit was about 14 lire, but it rose to 17 in the
big cities and fell to 12.5 in the minor towns 51.
Chart 8.3.7. Average benefit per recipient and recipients of out-door relief as a %
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Source: M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 9, pp. 107 -109. Major cities = chief of province and
district. Minor centres = all the others.
The chart below shows the percentages of those in receipt of out-door relief in the
chief cities of province or district and in the other communes. Umbria excepted, the
poor living in the major centres were more likely to get relief than their rural or
semi-rural counterparts. Piedmont and Lombardy stood out as the regions with the
highest concentration of recipients, both within and without the cities. Most southern
regions - Apulia and Campania excepted - were below average, while the other
regions showed roughly similar patterns, with the exception of Umbria.
M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 9, pp. 107-109. See also table 11 in appendix 8.
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Source: M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 9, pp. 107 -109. Major cities = chief of province and
district. Minor centres = all the others.
The difficulty in interpreting these data increases when we look at the amount of the
average benefit. In Piedmont, Liguria, Venetia, Marches, Umbria, Abruzzi-Molise,
Campania, Calabria, and Basilicata the relative difference between the average sums
doled out to city and non-city dwellers was small. But the discrepancy was striking
in Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Latium, Apulia, Sicily, and Sardinia. It
would seem that in the regions of the first group some sort of harmonization was
being reached in the availability of out-door relief resources, whereas in those of
the second group the cities seemed to mantain their traditional monopoly of
charitable resources. These are, however, impressionistic observations. Perhaps
these data would become less puzzling if related to the carachteristics of the
relationship city-countryside in each region.
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By all accounts, even those few who received the highest benefits would not go very
far. At the turn of the century the daily wage of a skilled factory worker averaged
three lire. Twenty-five lire bought basic food for six days for a family of five adults,
or for eleven days for a family of two adults and two children 52. Nobody in receipt of
out-door relief was likely to grow rich and idle. Those areas of Italy where poverty
was endemic were also those with the lowest percentages of recipients of relief and
with the lowest benefits. Conversely, relatively high benefits were doled out to a
greater number of recipients in the north and centre. But even there out-relief
seemed to play an insignificant role in protecting the purchase power of the low-
paid.
8.4. The congregations of charity.
So far we have analysed the statistics from a quantitative perspective, to offer an
overview of the system, its mechanisms, and flaws. To complete the picture we must
now pay some attention to the qualitative aspects of the system. A first feature
worthy of note was the weakness of the congregations of charity. We have seen above
52 Stefano Merli, Proletariate di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. II caso italiano:1880-
1900 (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1972), vol.I, pp. 426-57, passim, and particularly
432-3; Patrizia Audenino, 'Dati strutturali sulla classe operaia all'inizio del
Novecento', in A. Agosti, G. M. Bravo (eds.), Storia del movimento operaio del
socialismo e delle lotte sociali in Piemonte, vol. 2, L'eta giolittiana, la guerra e il
dopoguerra (De Donato, Bari, 1979), pp. 27-42.
303
that the congregations administered about a half of the charities, but administration
did not entail complete control of the funds. A congregation could well administer
large assets, and have very little say as to their destination. The only way for the
congregations to gain larger authority was to obtain radical reforms of the purposes
of the charities entrusted to them. But under the 1862 act such reforms were
difficult to introduce, and the congregations had no say about them. Therefore the
patrimony of the congregations was the only valid indicator of their real power. On
average the congregations with assets of their own were about 8.6% of the total
number of charities, and their gross patrimony was about 3.5% of the total. The
chart below confirms that the choice made in 1862 not to enhance the powers of the
congregations of charity had ensured their nominal existence almost everywhere.
Chart 8.4.1. Congregations of charity with assets of their own in 1880: number and
gross patrimony as percentages of total number and gross patrimony of the
charities.
Source: Statistics delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. VI; XIII-XIV.
Only in Piedmont, Liguria, Sardinia, Lombardy, and Basilicata did the
congregations represent more than one tenth of the charities in numerical terms. For
the first three regions this can be explained by the existence of the congregations
prior to the unification; while for Lombardy it may be related to the pre-existence
of the Luoghi Pii Elemosinieri which were replaced by the congregations in 1859.
The data of Basilicata suggest a different explanation. Under the provisions of the
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1862 act, in the ex-Bourbon Kingdom the local welfare administrations, based on
the communes, should be replaced by the congregations of charity. It would seem that
this happened only in Basilicata. In the other southern regions the charities
previously administered by the local committees were by and large privatized, hence
the low importance of the congregations. However, even in those regions with a
relatively high number of congregations with assets of their own, their proportional
share of assets was low. Only in Basilicata did the congregations hold one quarter of
the region's meagre charitable assets; in Piedmont, Sardinia, and Abruzzi-Molise
they held between 9 and 12%; in all other regions the assets of the congregations
were less than 4% of the total. There were no congregations with assets
independently managed in Umbria and in the Marches: the 1862 act had duly wiped
out the effects of the Pepoli and Valerio's decrees, if any 53. On average the
congregations' patrimonies were very modest, about 35,000 lire, but there were big
regional differences, as shown in the chart below.


































100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. VI; XIII-XIV.
Latium had only four very rich congregations; those of Emilia-Romagna, Apulia,
Sardinia, Sicily, and Campania had above-average patrimonies; while those of
Liguria and Venetia had assets below average. Such remarkable disparities were the
result of the different historical backgrounds which provided the setting for the
53 See detailed figures in appendix 8, table 12.
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1862 act. The act did not attempt a radical reshuffling of the existing order, with the
result that, twenty years after the unification, the congregations of charity had little
say within the charity system. As we will see shortly, the 1890 act aimed at
enhancing the role of the congregations, but did not take into account the regional
differences described above. Consequently in many parts of Italy the original
weakness of the congregations prevented them from becoming the back-bone of the
system54.
8.5. A charity for every need?
The 1880 statistics listed thirty-two categories of charities - congregations
excluded. There were charities for brides, widows, mothers and babies, orphans and
foundlings, disabled, prisoners and ex-prisoners, vagrants and rogues, lunatics, the
ill and the elderly, the burial of the dead, and - above all - a huge number of almoner
charities with multiple purposes. If we group the assets into four main categories -
congregations of charity, indoor relief 55, outdoor relief 56, and educational
charities 57 - we can note that hospitals, foundling homes, poorhouses, and other
establishments to shelter the sick, the old, and the disabled, accounted for less than
half of the total assets. About a third belonged to those charities devoted to outdoor
relief; a good fifth to orphanages, schools, conservatorii, and educational trusts, and
less than four percent to the congregations 58.
54 Also the French bureaux de bienfaisance - on which the Italian congregazioni di carita
were broadly modelled - were unevenly endowed and often existed only on paper. See
Roger Price, 'Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-Nineteenth-Century France', European
Studies Review, Vol. 13 (Oct. 1983), pp. 429-35.
55 Hospitals, hospitals for the chronically ill and incurables, ospizi marini , institutes for
children affected by rickets, maternity homes, foundling homes, nurseries,
kindergartens, workhouses, poorhouses, shelters for widows, lunatic asylums, deaf
and dumb homes, blind homes.
56 Almoner charities, dowry trusts, benefits to widows, benefits for wet-nursing,
benefits to orphans and abandoned children, charities for health care at home, benefits
to parturient women, foundations to assist the prisoners, foundations to assist the ex-
prisoners, transport of the ill to the hospital, charities to bury the dead, charities for
alms and devotion, devotional charities, charities with various purposes.
57 Studentships, schools, orphanages and conservatorii, reformatories.
58 See also table 13 in appendix 8.
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Source: Statistics delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
A superficial look at the list of the thirty-two categories might suggest that the
Italian poor were lovingly cared for from the cradle to the grave by a host of
foundations that would never leave them out in the cold. Apparently there was a
charity for every need. However a less superficial look revealed that only a limited
number of charities had some means to help in a significant manner large numbers of
beneficiaries. As shown in the following chart, eight out of sixteen outdoor charities
and nine out of fifteen indoor relief establishments accounted for tiny and
statistically meaningless portions of the total assets. All together the assets of these
seventeen "highly specialized" charities summed up to 31,683,785 lire, i.e. 1.67%
of the total. It seems self-evident that the much-praised variety and versatility of
the Italian charities was only a myth likely to be easily disproved when put under
close scrutiny 59.
59 See table 14 in appendix 8 for detailed figures.
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Chart 8.5.2. Distribution of the assets of the charities by category(1880).
Studentships _■
Ben. to widows
Ben. to orphans etc.
_



























1 0 1 5 20 25 30
Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
In the chart below the charities have been grouped into eleven categories: one for
the congregations, three for the almoner charities 60, six for indoor relief
Alms, devotion, various = Almoner charities, devotional charities, devotional and
charitable foundations, charities with variuos purposes. Dowries = Dowry trusts.
Specific purposes = Health care at home (3.71%), foundations to help prisoners and ex-
prisoners, transport to hospital, burial, benefits to parturient women, benefits for
wet-nursing, benefits to orphans and abandoned children, benefits to widows.
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establishments 61, and one for educational institutions 62. This is only one of the
many ways in which the data can be re-elaborated, but it seems appropriate to
understand the pattern underlying the dispersion of the charitable assets through a
host of tiny foundations 63.
Chart 8.5.3. Distribution pattern of the charitable assets (1880)
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
The scenario was dominated by three main groups that accounted for about 76% of
the assets and provided the back-bone of the system: almoner charities, including
those with devotional and various purposes; hospitals; and educational institutions.
The latter was probably swelled by a number of institutions like the conservatori ,
that had seldom any educational function and were rather monuments to the past. The
distribution pattern of the remaining 24% offers a clue to the priorities of the pious
Italian benefactors. The assets of the dowry trusts (3.2%) were almost equal to those
of the congregations of charity (3.5%) and only fractionally smaller than those of
the eight categories of almoner charities with specific purposes (4%) which were
all insignificant, except those providing health care at home (3.7%). Dowry trusts
were also richer than all minor indoor-relief establishments, poorhouses excepted
61 Mother and child = Maternity homes, foundling homes, nurseries, kindergartens.
Disabled children = Deaf-dumb homes, blind homes, homes for children affected by
rickets, ospizi marini . Poorhouses etc. = Poorhouses, workhouses, shelters for
widows. Hospitals = Hospitals. Chronics and incurables = Hospitals for the chronically
ill and incurables. Lunatic asylums = Lunatic asylums.
62 Education = Studentships, schools, orphanages and conservatory , reformatories.
63 See also table 15 in appendix 8.
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(6%): foundling homes, which were the larger institutions in the mother and child
group, accounted for only 2.4% of the total assets; institutions for disabled children,
for the chronically ill and incurables, and for lunatics accounted - together - for
only 2.8% of the total. It seems incontrovertible that welfare establishments
targetted at the most vulnerable social groups such as disabled and abandoned
children, the incurables, and the chronically and mentally ill were much worse off
than almoner charities in general and the dowry trusts in particular. The
proposition that there was a charity for every need could be reversed: in the Italy of
1880 those most in need were unlikely to find a charity able to help them. This was
the outcome of an age-long trend of pious bequests that gave prefernce to charities
like hospitals and almoner foundations, or those targetted at the family, like dowry
trusts. Furthermore, the basic imbalance in the geographical distribution of the
welfare assets affected heavily the most necessary establishments. It will suffice to
look at the figures concerning general hospitals and those for the chronically ill and
incurables. Piedmont and Lombardy alone accounted for almost 45% of the assets of
the general hospitals (602,341,196 lire). The South - Sicily and Sardinia included
- accounted for 12%. The picture was even bleaker with regard to the hospitals for
the chronically ill and incurables: nearly 69% of their modest assets (21,050,558
lire) were concentrated in Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy, while the continental
South appeared to have no such establishments, and Sicily and Sardinia together
accounted for 0.4% of the total. The pattern is shown in the two following charts 64.
64 See complete data in table 16, appendix 8. There was one hospital for the incurables in
Naples, but as it was attached to the Albergo dei Poveri, its assets were not accounted
for separately. For the general conditions of hospitals see P. Frascani, Ospedale e
society in et& liberale (II Mulino, Bologna, 1986).
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Chart 8.5.4. Regional distribution of the gross assets of general hospitals ( %,
1880).
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXIll-XXIV.
Chart 8.5.5. Regional distribution of the gross assets of hospitals for chronics and
incurables (%,1880).
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Source: Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXIll-XXIV.
It was a huge gap, unlikely to be filled by the generosity of the pious benefactors.
Not that they were totally insensitive to the changing requirements of society. As the
3 1 1
chart below shows, at the turn of the century their attitudes were beginning to
change. In the pious bequests the hospitals enjoyed consistent popularity, but the
general pattern was slowly shifting. Devotional, almoner, and dowry charities were
losing ground in favour of congregations of charity, kindergartens, homes for
disabled children, poorhouses, hospitals for the incurables 65. Yet, no shift of
attitude of the donors could realistically redress the balance.
65 See also table 17, appendix 8.
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8.6.The bill of the Roval Commission.
While the Royal Commissioners carried on their studies, Italy's poor were having
as thin a time as ever. Maladministration of charities continued undisturbed, and
public debate about the reform of the 1862 act intensified. In the 1880s the Italian
economy was undergoing remarkable changes. On the one hand the North was enjoying
a period of fast industrial growth, with its trail of social side-effects, linked to
social dislocation, urban proletarianization, poor housing, appalling working
conditions, health degradation, etc. On the other hand, the worldwide fall of cereal
prices, caused by the massive import into the European markets of cheap American
wheat and Asian rice, was having profound effects on the Italian countryside. The
capitalistic farms of the North were particularly damaged, but allover Italy the fall
in cereal prices forced a restructuring of the use of the land and the introduction, or
further development, of specialized crops: wine, oil, and fruit in the South; corn,
rice, potatoes, hemp, and dairy products in the North. Such restructuring was
possible and lucrative for the capitalistic farms and latifundia, not for the
smallholdings, whose production of wheat, or other crops, was mainly for self-
consumption, and only marginally for the market. Smallholders and sharecroppers
enjoyed no credit facilities to help them restructure their farms, hence they
suffered most from the agricultural crisis, which was worsened in 1881-82 by a
severe drought. Wheat prices fell from an average 31.61 lire a quintal in the decade
1870-1880, to 26.36 lire in 1881, down to 21.28 lire in 1886, but popular
consumption shrank, because smallholders and sharecroppers responded by eating
less in order to sell on the market a larger share of their produce, and thus
compensate for price reduction. Notwithstanding such sacrifices many fell into debt
and lost their plots to the big landowners, and either joined the growing armies of
landless braccianti (wage-labourers), or emigrated abroad. Hence the agricultural
crisis of the 1880s accelerated the proletarianization process of the peasants,
especially in the North. It was not by chance that the first organized strikes of
agricultural labourers, duly repressed by the government, occured in these years in
the Po plains. A consequence of the impoverishment and proletarianization of the
smallholders was thus to accelerate the political maturation and organization into a
class-conscious movement of those who did not leave the country in search of a better
life across the Atlantic. This process of political maturation of the peasant masses
was by and large geographically confined to Northern and Central Italy. In the South
none of the problems which had characterized the first years of the unification had
been tackled. Few resources were made available for the much-needed reclamation of
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marshlands, hotbeds of malarial infection, while deforestation increased the
marshes, with disastrous effects on the quality of the arable land. Roads were bad,
and the new railways ran mainly along the coasts, leaving the interior areas in their
traditional isolation. The demesne question was still pending, while the demesne
itself was usurped by the middle and rich landowners. The huge sales of ecclesiastical
land, subsequent to the suppressive laws of 1866 and 1867, had not improved the
lot of the peasants who, even on the rare occasions when they had managed to
purchase a plot, had generally failed to maintain it, for want of tools, machinery,
fertilizers, and cash to pay the land tax. Those who benefited were the latifondisti,
whose different mentality from that of their northern counterparts meant that
southern agriculture did not undergo substantial capitalistic transformation. As a
consequence, the masses' hunger for land was still causing upsurges of discontent and
popular revolts, often bloody; but these riots strongly resembled medieval
jacqueries. It would take another fifteen years for the South to produce its first
politically mature mass movement. In the long run the prospect for the northern
labouring masses was one of a slow improvement through a hard class struggle, but
for most of their southern counterparts emigration was the only alternative to
indigence 66.
We do not know how much the charities helped the poor to overcome the hardship
caused by the agricultural crisis and the cholera epidemics of the mid 1880s, with
the exception of Naples. There the charities offered no help at all during the epidemic
of 1884, which killed 28 inhabitants per thousand in the poor district of Mercato,
and only three per thousand in the noble distict of S. Ferdinando. There is also
evidence that in the South their mismanagement continued undisturbed, since the
prefects were unable to tackle it, although they knew what was going on 67. Likewise,
G. Carocci, Agostino Depretis e la politica interna italiana dal 1876 al 1887, cit., pp.
547-54, 556-581; Stefano Merli, Proletariate di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. II
caso italiano:1880-1900 , cit., vol.I, passim and partic. pp. 15-16, 31-84, 99-139,
143-333, 427-57; Renato Zangheri, 'Lotte agrarie in Italia. La Federazione nazionale
dei lavoratori della terra (1901-1926)' in Sergio Zaninelli (ed.), Introduzione alio
studio del movimento sindacale italiano (CELUC, Milan, 1972), pp. 39-61; Paola Corti
(ed.), Inchiesta Zanardelli sulla Basilicata (1902) (Einaudi, Turin, 1976), passim and
partic. pp. IX-XIX; Brunello Mantelli, 'Emigrazione', in Storia d'ltalia, 1 (La Nuova
Italia, Florence, 1978), pp. 281-9; Massimo Paci, 'Mercato del lavoro', ibidem, 2, pp.
629-33; P. Corti, 'Movimemto contadino: dall'unita' alia resistenza', Ibidem, pp. 682-
97; R. Romanelli, L'ltalia liberale (1861-1900) , cit., pp. 242-68, 285-324; M. Clark,
Modern Italy 1871-1982 (Longman, London & N.York, 1984), pp.12-28; G. Toniolo,
Storia economica dell'ltalia liberale 1850-1918 (II Mulino, Bologna, 1988), pp.119-
23.
67 G. Carocci, Agostino Depretis e la politica interna italiana dal 1876 al 1887, cit., pp.
554-56; P. Macry, 'Borghesie, citta e stato. Appunti e impressioni su Napoli: 1860-
1880', Quaderni Storici , No. 56, 1984, pp. 351-2.
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the debate on charity reform continued. Inadequate guardianship by the provincial
deputations, ignorance and dishonesty of the administrators leading to loss of assets,
obsolescence of the pious foundations, exorbitant administrative expenditure, due to
the fragmentation of the charitable patrimonies, and their uneconomic management,
indiscriminate and insufficient relief: these were the all-too-familiar leit-motifs of
articles, books, and pamphlets whose increase witnessed to the spreading expectation
for reform 68. Conversely the non-k/'ofcbility of the founders' will, the merits of the
clergy as benefactors of the poor, the beneficial effects of the charities' autonomy
guaranteed by the 1862 act: these too were well known arguments, revived in the
1880s by those who feared reform 69. The proposals by the Royal Commission were
likely to disappoint the first, and please the latter.
The bill was prepared by a sub-commission in April 1887, discussed by the full
Royal commission in June 1887, and presented to the Chamber by Costantini in
January 1889 70. During the first days of the plenary meeting Giovanni Minghelli
Vaini - a prefect who had theorized about charity reform since the late 1860s -
proposed creating a Ministry of welfare, and merging all charitable assets into a
welfare demesne. The charities would get a revenue from this demesne, to serve for
their upkeep and the distribution of relief. His fellow commissioners unanimously
rejected his proposal. Thereafter the discussion was quite uneventful, and its
68 A. Setti, 'Ludovico Ricci, o la beneficenza pubblica nel secolo scorso', Nuova Antologia,
23, 2nd series (Barbera, Rome, 1880), pp. 428-467; P. Celli, Del riordinamento delta
pubblica beneficenza (Hoepli, Milan, 1883); G. Ferroglio, La questione sociale e le Opere
pie (Paravia, Turin, 1885), passim and partic. 46-73; G. Gallarati, Pensieri sopra i
consigli e la tutela delle Opere pie (Civelli, Milan, 1885), passim and partic. pp. 15-23,
42-47; A. Goretti, L'amministrazione delle Opere pie in Italia (Boncompagni, Perugia,
1886), passim; M. Riva, Opere pie ed istituti pubblici minori (Loescher, Turin, 1887),
pp. 396-413; G. Capitani, Stato beneficenza e previdenza pubblica (Derossi, Turin,
1888), passim and partic. pp. 105-120.
89 G. Pagni, La legge sulla riforma delle Opere pie (Le Monnier, Florence, 1883); S. Di
Rorai, Abbasso le Opere pie!... (Manzoni, Rome, 1880), passim, and partic. pp. 114-
117: this text was a good specimen of the Catholic opposition, which sought the local
grouping of the charities under municipal control: the Catholics' hostility to the State
was matched by their active struggle to take control of the local administration (cf.: M.
Belardinelli, Movimento cattolico e questione comunale dopo I'Unita (Studium, Rome,
1979).
70 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, pp. 27-112, 142-224. The preparation of the bill by a sub-
commission formed by Correnti, Anselmi, Bodio, Costantini, Querini, Scotti, and
Sormani-Moretti took thirteen meetings, from the 2nd to the 27th of April 1887. The
discussion of the bill by the full commission took ten meetings from the 14th to the
23rd of June. The first four meetings were devoted to a further reading of the reports
on the administrative inquiry, to appease those members of the commission who never
materialized at the meetings for over a year, and then accused those few who had being
working hard, of conspiring to exclude them from the decision-making process (cf. M.I.,
A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, cit., pp. 125-34).
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outcome very moderate, far more than the proposals made by the Committee set up in
1876 by Nicotera 71. Whoever wished for a general overhauling of the system was to
be disappointed. The 1862 Act was modified in some parts, and some additions were
made, but its basic principles were not questioned, since the majority of the
Commission was opposed to excessive infringements of the charities' autonomy. The
j .{jiO'hoK-
novelties concerned the ineligibility, incompatibility, and o)iso^«.tiJof the
administrators; the transfer of the guardianship from the Provincial deputations to
guardianship councils (Consign di tutela ), formed by provincial councillors and
government-appointed members, and entrusted with the approval of the accounts and
the formal checking of the budgets; the creation of a high council for the charities
(Consiglio superiore delle Opere pie ) within the Interior ministry, entrusted with
the general supervision of the charities' network, and the approval of their reform;
and the establishment of special inspectors of the charities. There were
contradictions as to whom would manage the charities. Art. 4 recited that the
administrative boards would be set up according to statutes and foundation deeds,
which was exactly as under the 1862 act. But art. 36 talked of grouping the charities
by kind, and prescribed that all almoner foundations would be administered by the
congregations of charity, which would also manage all other charities in those
communes with less than 5,000 inhabitants. Not only did the two articles contradict
one another, but how the groupings and devolution of powers from the single
charities' administrations to the congregations would take place, was not explained.
The procedures for reforming obsolete charities were not substantially modified: the
Royal Commission held on to the principle of the intangibility of the founders' terms.
We do not know Depretis' opinion on these proposals. But whether he was favourable
or not, it did not matter any longer. By August 1887 the helm of the state was in
Crispi's hands, and he was not impressed by the substantially conservative bill
7^ M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, cit., pp. 134, 138-42. Minghelli Vaini was a lawyer, ex-member
of Parliament, and ex-general inspector of prisons. He was prefect at Cagliari (1876-
78), Turin (1878-80), Catania (1880-81), Lecce (1881-83), Padua (1883-85),
Vicenza (1887-91) (see M. Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello Stato e prefetti del
Regno d'ltalia (M.I., Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Rome, 1973), pp. 315, 328,
383, 419, 491, 516). in 1886 he was co-opted into the Royal Commission of inquiry
into the charities, while he was a disposizione. In his book L'individuo, lo Stato e la
societa, ovvero proposta di un codice sull'assistenza pubblica (Boncompagni, Florence,
1868) Minghelli-Vaini proposed much more than the charities' demesne and the Welfare
Ministry. He derived his ideas partly from the welfare legislation of revolutionnary
France, but excluded any automatic right to relief. At the core of his system was a sort
of national assurance scheme. Only those in work and contributing to the scheme would
be assisted. Beggars would get no relief, and those deserving poor not insured would get
the eventual let-overs. Hospitals would be abolished, and health care would be
completely privatized. The rich would go in private clinics, and the poor in rooms
rented out by private citizens.
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pieced together by the Royal Commission. He dismissed it as inadequate to modern
social needs, and replaced it with his own bill. The new prime minister had in mind
'revolutionary' changes 72.
72 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 4, cit., pp. 222-34; M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 7, pp. 3-39. See also: A.
Gabelli, 'II progetto di legge sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza', Nuova Antologia,
vol. 109 (Jan. 1890), pp. 253-54; S. Restelli, 'Chiesa e mondo cattolioo italiano di
fronte alia legge Crispi del 1890 sulla riforma della benefioenza', in Bollettino
dell'Archivio per la storia del Movimento Sociale Cattolico in Italia, No. 1, 1978, pp.
109-10. The contradiction between arts. 4 and 36 of the bill was noted by A. Sciuto,
'Intorno al progetto di riforma della vigente legge sulle Opere pie', R.B.P., No. 3, 1888,
pp. 177-78.
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9. Crispi's reform. Rationalization - or patching up in the best Piedmontese
tradition?
9.1 .The Act of 17 July 1890.
Crispi, 'genuine man of the new bourgeoisie', provided Italy with a variety of
administrative reforms that were considered necessary since the coming to power of
the Left, but had remained in the realm of good intentions for over ten years. The
internal contradictions of both Right and Left and their fragmentation into disparate
groups of interest - coupled with a limited suffrage and a politico-administrative
system which provided no outlets for local issues outside Parliament - had
condemned Italian politics to sink into the mire of trasformismo. The focus of
parliamentary and government activity was no longer on issues of national interest,
but revolved around day-to-day politics dictated by local lobbies and interest
groups, which hindered any long-term approach. Far from fighting trasformismo,
Depretis brought it to its highest level of sophistication, using it to keep himself in
power. In 1887 Crispi put a partial end to this legislative paralysis by offering
protectionist measures and a more active foreign policy to the various groups of
industrialists and agrarian capitalists, in exchange for agreement on a package of
administrative reforms. By doing so he succeded in allying those groups hitherto
disgregated and devoted to the pursuit of their own interests through transformistic
procedures. He did not conjure trasformismo away; but, coming to terms with its
more impelling requirements, he managed to reduce its hampering effects on the
legislative mechanisms. However, Crispi's approach to politico-administrative
reform did not entail the channelling of local issues and interest outside Parliament
through the enhancement of local autonomy. In the long run trasformismo remained a
prominent feature of Italian parliamentary life, though its worst effects were
reduced by strengthening the executive's power over Parliament, while very
moderate concessions to local administration were carefully counterbalanced with
the tightening of central controls at local level. In the mean time, the rising tide of
the labour movement was contained by the enhancement of police control on mass
organizations and single individuals 1. Crispi's reforms of central and local
1 G. Candeloro, Storia dell'ltalia moderna, vol. VI (Feltrinelli, Milan, 1978) (1st ed.
1970), pp. 351-60; C. Ghisalberti, Storia costituzionale d'ltalia. 1848-1948 (Laterza,
Bari, 1986) (1st ed. 1974), pp. 174-215; E. Ragionieri, Storia d'ltalia (Einaudi, Turin,
1976), Vol. 4, part 3 , pp. 1730-1767; A. C. Jemolo, Crispi (Le Monnier, Florence,
1970), pp. 104-112; R. Romanelli, 'Francesco Crispi e la riforma dello stato nella
svolta del 1887', Quaderni storici , No. 18, 1971, pp. 763-834; Id., L'ltalia liberale
(1861 -1900) , cit., pp. 261-84, 338-54. For a vivid description of trasformismo :
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administration were to last longer than his personal political fortune: to this day
many of the structures he set up remain the back-bone of the Italian administrative
system. This was true also for the charities act, which some regard as his most
original creation.
Crispi presented his bill to Parliament in February 1889. His first batch of
administrative reforms were either approved, or well on their way, while hopes of
conciliation with the Church had vanished 2. The Chamber committee reported to the
Chamber in June, and the bill was approved by the deputies on 19 December 1889
by 196 votes to 98. The new draft was then studied and discussed by the Senators,
who proposed to scrap those articles that hit confraternities and devotional bequests,
on the grounds that the matter required a specific act. Crispi - so far in quite a
conciliatory mode - was not prepared to give in on that point. Hence he threatened to
resign and call a general election. The Senate withdrew the amendment and the bill
was returned to the Chamber in May 1890. After the introduction of further
alterations, the law was finally passed by the Senate on 14 July 1890, by 65 votes
to 22. Three days later it was published on the Gazzetta Ufficiate del Regno, becoming
the act 17 July 1890 on the Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza , No. 6972 3.
As indicated by the wording, many features and basic principles of the act reminded
one strongly of the bills of 1876, which first introduced the notion of public
accountability of the charities, denying them that right to autonomy on which the
1862 act was founded. Indeed, Crispi had drawn many concepts from the Napoleonic
reforms; the decrees of Cipriani, Valerio, and Pepoli; and the projects of Nicotera
Judith Chubb, Patronage, power, and poverty in southern Italy. A tale of two cities
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 19-24. For the Italian electoral system: R.
Romanelli, 'Le regole del gioco. Note sull'impianto del sistema elettorale in Italia (1848-
1895), Quaderni storici , No. 69 (Dec. 1988), pp. 685-725.
2 For a 'timetable' of Crispi's first reforms see R. Romanelli, 'Francesco Crispi e la
riforma dello stato nella svolta del 1887', cit., p. 809, fn. 89. For a detailed account of
Crispi's bill see A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S.,
No. 3, 1964, pp. 580-4. For the negotiations with the Vatican in 1887 see G. Candeloro,
Storia dell'ltalia moderna, vol. VI, cit., pp. 330-5; Calogero Valenti, Crispi e la
questione romana (1887-1894) (Flaccovio, Palermo, 1977).
3 Abundant details of the parliamentary debate with a comparative account of the
evolution of the various parts of the bill are to be found in A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia
dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964, cit., pp. 589-633 and R.P.S., No.
5, 1964, pp. 1203-15. See also S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano
(Passerano, Naples, 1908), vol. 1, pp. 154-55; A. C. Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia
negli ultimi cento anni (Einaudi, Turin, 1971), pp. 351-59; S. Restelli, 'Chiesa e mondo
cattolico italiano di fronte alia legge Crispi del 1890 sulla riforma della beneficenza', in
Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del Movimento Sociale Cattolico in Italia, No. 1,
1978, pp. 111-17, 121-34. The Chamber committee was formed by Laporta
(chairman), Bonacci, Carmine, Chimirri, Coppino, De Bernardis, Odoardo Lucchini,
Giovanni Lucchini, Levi. The Senate central office by Ferraris (chairman), Saracco,
Canonico, Pessina, Villari, Boccardo, Tabarrini, Ceneri, Martinelli, Costa.
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and Caravaggio 4, but unlike them, chose a gradualistic approach. Charity reform
was to be achieved not by suppressions and confiscations, but through a series of
legal transformations that required the initiative and collaboration of the local
authorities, as well as the energetic interference of the prefects. Such reforms
through legal transformation were thus not immune from bureaucratic-politico
inertia and, in any case, were likely to drag on for decades.
The focus of the reform revolved around the congregations of charity which were
now promoted to a central role after thirty years spent as Cinderellas of the system.
The congregation members were elected by the municipal councils, as before, but
their numbers were increased 5; married women were made eligible for the
congregations - provided their husbands agreed; priests with care of souls were
excluded, on the grounds that civil administration must be free from ecclesiastical
interference. Strict incompatibility and ineligibility clauses tried to avoid collusion
between congregations and local authorities 6. The exclusion of parish priests from
the administrative boards of the congregations caused great polemics within and
without parliament. Yet - as noted by Cherubini - this measure did not entail
complete exclusion of the clergy from welfare administration. First, because it
applied only to those ecclesiastics with the care of souls. Secondly, because the
exclusion did not extend to such congregations' subcommittees as benefit dispensation
committees. Thirdly, because the general rules for setting up the charities'
administrative boards had not been changed. These boards would still be formed
according to statutes and foundation deeds, albeit those 'ancient traditions' mentioned
in article 4 of the 1862 act had been eliminated. Therefore the clergy could still sit
on many welfare administration boards, and the much-claimed laicization was more
imaginary than real 1.
4 A.P., Camera, Leg. XVI, session 1889, Documenti, No. 65 (introductory speech to the
bill). See also A. Gabelli, 'II progetto di legge sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza',
Nuova Antologia, vol. 109 (Jan. 1890), pp. 255-56.
5 Under the 1862 act (art. 31) the congregation members were four plus a chairman in
those communes with up to 10,000 people, eight plus a chairman in the others. Under
the 1890 act (art. 5) they were four plus a chairman in those communes with less than
5,000 people, eight plus a chairman in those with up to 50,000 people, twelve plus a
chairman in the others.
6 Arts. 10 to 16. The principle of complete separation between civil and ecclesiastical
administration had been implemented since 1475 in Venice, where priests were
excluded from all public offices, including the confraternities (B. Pullan, La politica
sociale della repubblica di Venezia 1500-1620 (II Veltro, Rome, 1982), vol. 1, Le
Scuole Grandi, I'assistenza e le leggi sui poveri , p. 51).
7 Arts. 4 and 11; A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S.,
No. 3, 1964, cit., pp. 605-606, 627-8 and R.P.S., No. 5, 1964, cit., p. 1228.
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So far the congregations had been merely entrusted with the administration of those
meagre funds bequeathed to the poor with no further indication. Now they were
promoted to the role of guardians of the interests of the poor, whom they represented
in the Courts; and tutors of abandoned and disabled children 8. Performing these new
tasks would be expensive, and the congregations were normally destitute, as revealed
by the statistics. Hence new funds must be injected. These were not provided by the
State, but by existing charities. All almoner foundations must be 'concentrated' in
the congregations, as well as all other charities with an income of up to 5,000 lire;
those belonging to communes with less than 10,000 people; and those charities
without a legitimate administrative board. Exceptions could be made only for big
almoner foundations which required a separate administration and were reckoned to
be particularly beneficial to the poor. These concentrations were not mergers, since
the charities maintained their juridical identity, and the patrimonies were
administered separately by the congregations. However, at the moment of the
concentration, the statutes had to be reviewed in order to achieve a better
coordination of relief distribution. The founders' terms would be taken into
consideration, but the law laid down a list of priorities whose observance was
compulsory. The initiative for these reforms belonged to the congregations and local
authorities, but if they were slow to comply, the prefect must step in and start the
procedures himself 9. Hence the concentrations were mandatory, and aimed at a
threefold objective: to trim administrative expenses by dismissing employees and
management boards; to reinforce financially the congregations and promote them
from the margins to the core of the relief distribution system; to overhaul and
reform the purposes of almoner foundations, and those small charities which,
according to the statistics, accounted for 85% of the total.
Originally, Crispi wanted straightforward mergers between the almoner
foundations and the congregations of charity; and he included in the list the monti
frumentari , dowry foundations for brides - notoriously small and of little use -
dowry trusts for nuns, foundations for prisoners, hospices for catechumens,
conservatorii with no educational aims, hospices for pilgrims, retreats and
hermitages, confraternities, and devotional foundations. The Chamber committee
excluded from reform the dowry foundations for brides, apart from the compulsory
8 Arts. 7 and 8.
9 Arts. 54 to 57, 60 to 69. The concentrated charities had to spend their income
preferably on: a) maintenance of disabled in poorhouses, b) maintenance and education
of abandoned children, c) wet nurses fees, d) educational grants, e) health care at home
for the poor, f) temporary benefits to able-bodied out of work, g) contributions to
friendly societies to help the poor (art. 57).
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revision of their statutes, and proposed that the other obsolete charities listed above
be first 'transformed', and then concentrated into the congregations. The Senate
wanted to exclude confraternities and devotional bequests from any reform. After
Crispi threatened to resign and call general elections if the Senate insisted on saving
the confraternities, a compromise was reached. Dowry foundations for brides and
monti frumentari were excluded from any reform apart the revision of their
statutes, whereas trusts for nuns, foundations for prisoners, hospices for
catechumens, conservatorii with no educational aim, hospices for pilgrims, retreats
and hermitages, confraternities, and devotional foundations which did not provide
essential religious services, were made subject to transformation. The congregations
of charity played a central role in deciding how to use the assets of the transformed
charities, but would directly benefit from them only if the new charity resulting
from the transformation were an almoner foundation 10. The law also recommended
the grouping of those charities with similar purposes, that were not subject to
compulsory concentration or transformation (eg. colleges and orphanages, small
hospitals, etc.)11. The law also addressed the issue of rationalization of out-relief
distribution. There is some evidence that Crispi had a keen personal interest in the
matter. Not only he ordered an enquiry in 1888 into the total number of out-door
relief recipients to support his bill, but also - in his capacity of chairman of the
Central Welfare Committee of Palermo - in 1885 he ordered and closely monitored a
revision of the lists of those supported by that Congregation of charity, to trim
abuses and stop the award of double benefits 12. The evidence is limited, but
significant. It indicates that Crispi attached much importance to the streamlining of
1 0 Arts. 70, 90 to 93.
1 1 Arts. 58, 59. For parliamentary debate on congregations of charity, concentrations,
transformations, and groupings see: A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza
pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964, cit., pp. 610-33.
12 A.C.S., Carte Crispi, Roma, fasc. 48: Chairman of C.of C., Palermo, 17 Oct. 1885, to
Crispi, Rome; Notamento dei sussidi apprestati a domicilio per mezzo del Consigliere
Barone del Cugno (Sept. and Oct. 1885); Notamento delle persone sussidiate dalla
Congregazione di Carita di Palermo nei mesi di Settembre ed Ottobre 1885\
Sottocomitato di Beneficenza del Mandamento Molo, Palermo, 17 Oct. 1885, to Crispi,
Rome, Object: Rimessa elenchi statistici individui beneficati da questo Sottocomitato;
Mandamento Molo. Stato nominativo degli operai senza lavoro sussidiati con soccorso
giornaliero in denaro (Palermo, 23 Oct. 1885); Mandamento Molo. Specchietto dei
Poveri sussidiati con boni delle Cucine Economiche (Palermo, 23 Oct. 1885);
Mandamento Molo. Stato nominativo degli operai senza lavoro sussidiati con boni delle
Cucine Economiche (Palermo, 23 Oct. 1885); Mandamento Molo. Stato nominativo delle
famiglie bisognose sussidiate giornalmente in denaro (Palermo, 23 Oct. 1885). The
above material give the impression that the records of the Congregation and its various
sub-committees were in a considerable mess, and that there were no common standards
of registration. All those concerned promised to carry out rigorous checks and
reductions of benefits.
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benefits, and suggests that articles 64 of the law and 107 of the administrative
regulations were inspired by Crispi's personal involvement in Palermo's
Congregation of charity. These articles banned the congregations from granting
pensions and benefits, either permanent or temporary, to the able-bodied - with the
exception of studentships. The congregations of charity had to keep registers of
claimants and benefits, and share them with the other independent charities of the
commune. No restrictions were imposed on the independent charities with regard of
their recipients, probably because it was thought that concentrations and
transformations would anyway bring the bulk of the almoner assets under the
control of the congregations. At least in theory, cheating the system by getting
benefits from various charities would become more difficult, and the able-bodied
poor would be forced to seek work - as in Pinocchio .
The other relevant innovations concerned strict and compulsory administrative
procedures; the obligation for all charities to set up a statute, and have it approved
by the Interior ministry; the obligation to redeem all patrimonial burdens within
five years and make all future investments in state bonds; the introduction of
'popular action' (azione popolare), to allow the citizens to start legal action against
fraudulent or unlawful charities' administrators. The infamous Garibaldi decree of 9
June 1860, and subsequent act of 2 April 1865 were at last abrogated, after having
burdened the Sicilian charities with taxes in favour of the azienda danneggiati dalle
truppe borboniche for three decades. On the guardianship front, the powers
formerly belonging to the provincial deputations were now entrusted to the Giunta
Provinciate Amministrativa (GPA), the new body partly formed of provincial
councillors but dominated by the prefect, which monitored all local activities under
the new provincial and communal act. The charities must submit for approval to the
GPA not only the accounts, but also the budgets. The Interior ministry retained
powers of surveillance and inspection 13.
The law did not say much about the poor, apart from giving a definition of the much
controversial domicilio di soccorso, setting rules for the reimbursement of hospital
fees, and stipulating the obligation for congregations, hospitals, and all charities in
general to provide shelter and health care when urgently needed, irrespective of the
domicilio di soccorso of the needy poor, and provided there were resources
available. Indeed, it was not much. In the not-so-improbable event that resources be
not available, the rights of the needy sick remained on paper: this was far from any
13 Arts. 18 to 53.
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juridical sanction of the right to assistance 14. Disabled indigent, and destitute
children were dealt with by the new public security act of 23 December 1888.
Begging was forbidden; able-bodied beggars would be punished according to the penal
code; the indigent who were unable to work would be sheltered in the nearer
poorhouse, and their maintenance charged to the congregations of charity, the
almoner foundations, those confraternities not devoted to specific welfare action, the
communes, and the state. Children under the age of nine would be sheltered in any
available orphanage or reformatory. As remarked by Carlo Ferraris, who chaired
the Senate committee appointed to study the bill, not only would the whole matter be
better dealt with in the charities' act, but in effect a true system of state assistance
had been introduced - obliquely and hastily - without the necessary preliminary
studies15. Moreover, neither act ensured that there would be enough and adequate
welfare establishments, and the problems related to the treatment of the inmates,
their education, etc., were ignored.
9.2. The confraternities.
Perhaps the most remarkable novelty of the 1890 act was that confraternities and
devotional foundations were made subject to state interference - at least in theory.
Crispi regarded them as utterly useless and harmful institutions:
...One cannot find any public usefulness in institutions which, with a few and rare
exceptions, have the sole aim of making a performance out of religious services -
which is both cause and result of fanaticism and ignorance; of regulating the rights
of precedence in the processions [...] ; of defending the prerogatives of one
religious image against the other; of establishing the time and fashion of religious
1 4 Arts. 72 and 73, 75 to 80. See also A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza
pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964, cit., pp. 599-601; No. 5, 1964, cit., pp. 1203-
10. The poor were entitled to hospitalization or other assistance when they were born
in the commune, or had lived there for at least five years. Married women and their
children below the age of fifteen automatically acquired the domicilio di soccorso of the
husband and father. But those women, and their children aged over fifteen, who had
lived for five years in another commune from that of the husband or father, were
entitled to domicilio di soccorso in the commune where they lived.
15 Act 23 Dec. 1888, arts. 80 and 81; C. Ferraris, 'Le nuove riforme amministrative',
Nuova Antologia, vol. 103 (1889), pp. 794-5. See also: G. Scotti, "Gli inabili al lavoro',
R.B.P., No. 11, 1888, pp. 837-60; A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica
in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964, cit., pp. 563-70. For the chronic administrative mess
related to arts. 80 and 81 of the public security act, and its inadequacy to eliminate
begging, see above, chapter 6.2., and below, 9.4.
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services; of regulating the ringing of the bells, the timing of fireworks, and so
on.. J ®.
Indeed, confraternities were not only of dubious social and religious use: in this
respect a southern bishop, Nicola Monterisi, would have agreed with the substance of
Crispi's diagnosis, if not with his aggressive style and ideological premises 17. But
they were also an unruly and largely unknown kingdom. Legislation on
confraternities had been promised several times, but never materialized. Thereby
they were free from state control, apart from a nominal dependence on the Justice
ministry 18. The 1862 act (article 34) treated as charities only those of the ex-
Bourbon kingdom. And a decree of 1870 had declared charities the Tuscan
confraternities della Misericordia. All the others were left in a comfortable
juridical limbo 19. As a result of this lack of uniform legislation, nobody knew how
many confraternities there were, how rich they were, whether they spent any
revenue on welfare, and to find out was very difficult. The Royal Commission of
enquiry made several unfruitful attempts to track them down, and eventually gave
up, restricting its researches to those subject to the 1862 act 20. But Crispi was
determined to put an end to all ambiguities, and force the confraternities into the
framework of his reforms. Hence a further enquiry specifically targetted at the
1 8 A.P., Camera, Leg. XVI, session 1889, Documenti, No. 65 (introductory speech to the
bill).
1 7 G. De Rosa, 'Magia e popolo nelle esperienze di un vescovo meridionale: Nicola
Monterisi', in Id., Vescovi, popole e magia net Sud (Guida, Naples, 1971), pp. 216-20,
fn. 35. An attempt was made at the Catholic Congress of Salerno of 1901 to recoup the
confraternities and use them to introduce in the South the organizational structures of
the Opera dei Congressi. See Giuseppe Maria Viscardi, 'Vecchie confraternite e nuovo
associazionismo al I congresso cattolico della regione salernitano-lucana (Salerno
1901)', Bollettino deli'Archivio per la Storia del Movimento Sociale Cattolico in Italia,
No. 2 (May-August 1985), pp. 167-89, passim, and especially 178-89.
1 8 Details in 6.3, above. All religious affairs belonged to the Justice ministry, whose full
name was ministero di Grazia Giustizia e dei Culti.
19 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P.,1, cit., pp. 353-62 (5 Dec. 1883); 'Le confraternite in Italia', R.B.P.,
No. 12, 1898, pp. 1051-7. In Tuscany the confraternities della Misericordia provided
transport to the hospitals, night assistance, and alms for the sick and injured. In the
mid 1870s they joined the Opera dei Congressi e Comitati Cattolici (Fabrizia
Berera.'Note sul dibattito all'interno del movimento cattolico organizzato intorno ai
problemi dell'azione assistenziale in Italia nell'ultimo quarto dell'Ottocento', Bollettino
deli'Archivio per la storia del movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, No. 1, 1978, p. 83).
20 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, cit. pp. 218-23 (14 Febr. 1883), 345-53, 363-66 (3 and 5 Dec.
1883); M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 2, cit., pp. 8-9 (30 May 1884), 27-33 ( 3 and 4 June 1884),
41 (15 Dec. 1884); 'Le confraternite in Italia', R.B.P., No. 12, 1898, pp. 1048-9;
M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XII: the 1880 statistics of
the charities registered 3,306 endowed confraternities, with a groos patrimony of
92,573,344 lire, whereas the statistics of the confraternities registered 10,644
endowed confraternities with a gross patrimony of 179,105, 863 lire.
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confraternities was launched in 1887, which lasted about nine years, and was
published in 1898 21. Its reliability is doubtful, since the Holy See gave
instructions to fiddle the figures and produce false account books to conceal those
revenues so far hidden from the taxman 22. On the other hand, these statistics are
the only source available to permit an assessment of the confraternities' economic
power. The chart below shows the regional distribution of the 18,119
confraternities 23.
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Source: M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. IX.
21 A.C.S., Carte Crispi, Roma, B. 13, F. 302, sf. Ill; f. 307; M.A.I.C., Direzione Generale
del la Statistica, Statistica delle Confraternite (Bertero, Rome, 1898), 2 vols; 'Le
confraternite in Italia', R.B.P., No. 12, 1898, pp. 1049-50; No. 1, 1899, pp. 18-20.
The data for the north and centre were collected between 1887 and 1890, those for the
south between 1892 and 1896, hence they were not strictly comparable.The Central
Statistical Office decided to publish them as they were, reckoning that further checks
would excessively delay publication.
22 A.S.V.S.S., 1888-1892, Rubrica 165, f. 1: Card. Alimonda, Turin, 23 Nov. 1888, to
the Secretary of State, Card. Rampolla; the latter, Rome, 30 Nov. 1888, to the
former; the bishop of Tortona, 22 Dec. 1889, to Rampolla; the latter, Rome, 2 March
1889, to the former. Alimonda was worried because the account books showed
revenues so far concealed from the inland revenue officers. Rampolla replied that the
evidence in the account books must coincide with the sums declared on the tax forms.
Those books which were not in harmony with the tax declarations, must be 'renewed'.
23 M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. IX. See also table 1 in
appendix 9.
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Piedmont, Tuscany and Campania were the regions with more confraternities in
absolute terms. But it must be noted that not all confraternities were endowed. Seven
thousand four hundred and seventy-five (41.26%) were solely financed by their
members' fees and donations, and were more numerous than those endowed in
Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, Venetia, Lombardy, and Liguria 24. Non-endowed
confraternities were obviously not subject to transformation, therefore the
statistics paid more attention to those endowed, whose total assets amounted to
179,085,863 lire. The two following charts show the distribution of the patrimony
of the confraternities within regions and pre-unification states 25.


















0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Source: M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XI.
24 See table 1 in appendix 9.
25 See also tables 2 and 3 in appendix 9. Emilia-Romagna, which resulted from the merger
of three states (the Duchies of Modena and Parma and the Legazioni Pontificie) cannot be
split, and hence is not representative of the pre-unification borders.
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Chart 9.2.3. Distribution of the assets of the endowed confraternities according to







Source: M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XI.
The lowest concentrations of assets were in Lombardy-Venetia and Tuscany, where
the majority of the confraternities were non-endowed: the legacy of the eighteenth-
century reforms was self-evident. Piedmont showed a relatively large concentration
of assets. This too was a consequence of the past, as the Dukes of Savoy had repeatedly
and unsuccessfully tried to bring the confraternities under state control. The ex-
Papal States and the ex-Bourbon kingdom housed about 80% of the confraternities'
assets 26. The gross patrimonial revenue amounted to 9,376,702 lire, and the gross
income, including non-patrimonial revenues, to 11,776,101 lire. The total
expenditure amounted to 10,695,319 lire, of which nearly 16% was spent on
welfare; 17% on taxes; 5% on patrimonial burdens; 16% on administration; and
47% on devotion. There were however remarkable regional differences, which seem
to form a pattern. In the North devotional expenditure averaged 70%, and welfare
ranged from 2% (Lombardy), to 7% (Liguria and Venetia). In the Centre and South,
with some exceptions (Sardinia, Calabria, and Basilicata), devotional expenditure
2® For Piedmont and Lombardy see above, chapter 3. For the peculiar role of the
confraternities in the Venetian republic, see B. Pullan, La politica sociale delta
repubblica di Venezia 1500-1620 , cit., vol. 1, Le Scuole Grandi, I'assistenza e le leggl
sui poveri , pp. 41-210; for Tuscany: S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto italiano,
cit., vol.1, p. 65; L. Cajani, 'L'assistenza ai poveri nella Toscan settecentesca', in G.
Politi, M. Rosa, F. Delia Peruta (eds.), Timore e carita. / poveri nell'ltalia moderna
(Cremona, 1982), p. 204.
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ranged from 30 to 50%, and welfare from 6 to 30%, averaging 15-20% in Emilia-
Romagna, Tuscany, Latium, Abruzzi-Molise, and Campania 27. The chart below shows
the relation between devotional and welfare expenditure by region.
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Source: M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Coniraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XI.
There seem to be two possible explanations of this pattern. One is that the
confraternity officials of the central and southern regions were more skilled in
fiddling the figures than their northern counterparts, and boosted their welfare
expenditure in the hope of deceiving the law. The other is that the data reflect real
structural differences of the socio-religious function of the endowed confraternities
throughout the peninsula. If we choose this explanation, we can observe that the
relatively few and modestly endowed confraternities of the North behaved as wholly
devotional foundations. With a few exceptions those of the Centre and South - much
more numerous and rich - behaved as devotional foundations that still retained a
relevant welfare function. The above analysis of the charities' devotional expenditure
- which does not include all the confraternities - has already suggested that in
southern Italy the charities still played an important role in the ecclesiastical
structure, whereas in the North the charities' field of action was more rigourously
restricted to welfare. These last figures, concerning the confraternities, seem to
offer a further confirmation. In the North the spheres of action appeared quite
27 See table 4 and charts 1-17 in appendix 9.
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clearly cut: by and large the charities were concerned with welfare, and the
confraternities with devotion. In the South the roles were not so clearly defined: both
charities and confraternities appeared involved in devotional and welfare activities
as well. The central regions offered a mixed pattern, a sort of transitional ground
between two different worlds. It would seem that at the turn of the nineteenth
century the medieval bond between welfare and devotion was still strong in large
areas of Italy. This meant that the transformations prescribed by the 1890 act were
likely to hit the southern confraternities harder. But these were also more likely to
lodge appeals on the grounds that their religious services were essential to popular
needs, making the implementation of the reform more awkward.
Altogether, Crispi brought about a remarkable reshuffle of assets, priorities, and
roles, although the act was much less radical than the original draft. Most small and
medium charities were now theoretically poised to fall into the net, and undergo
some modification. Even some confraternities would be caught, eventually, although
it could be argued that the confraternities' assets available for transformation were
not perhaps worth all the effort and fuss involved in the complicated legal
procedures needed to transform their purposes. There were, of course, other evident
flaws, as some perspicacious contemporaries immediately pointed out. The new
system was similar in many respects to that established in Germany in 1890 by
Bismarck, but it differed from it in one fundamental point: in Italy there was no
recourse to taxation in the event that charities and local authorities lacked the means
of securing relief 28. The stipulation of the duty for the welfare foundations to assist
- within the availability of their resources - was not matched by any provision to
warrant the right of the needy to assistance. Moreover, the appointment of the
congregations of charity by the municipal councils perpetuated their clientelistic
features: relief might be awarded not on grounds of genuine necessity, but of political
patronage; and there were no adequate safeguards against this 29. Furthermore, the
congregations were charged with many important tasks. In theory concentrations and
transformations would boost the congregations' finances. This could be true in some
cases, but many congregations might well lack the means and the structures to
perform those new tasks, especially in rural areas, where charities were scarce and
poorly-endowed. No provisions were made in the law in this respect, since the
28 C. Ferraris, 'Le istituzioni di beneficenza davanti al Parlamento', in Nuova Antologia,
vol. 104 (1889), p. 726.
29 A. Gabelli, 'II progetto di legge sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza', in Nuova
Antologia , vol. 109 (Jan. 1890), pp. 262-4; P. Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza',
in Id., Scritti vari, (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1894), pp. 348, 364-5 (first published in
Nuova Antologia, vol. 111, (1st May 1890), pp. 5-40).
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reform was basically administrative. Concern for rationalizing the relief
distribution system lay in the prescription that the statutes of those charities
concentrated or transformed be revised, and that almoner charities share the lists of
the recipients of benefits, plus the prohibition for the congregations to grant
permanent benefits to the able-bodied. But it was arguable whether this was enough
to restructure the entire system. Crispi had rejected the proposal by the Royal
Commission to institute a High Council for the Charities to oversee a gradual
restructuring of the system, on the grounds that there were no technical issues
involved in welfare, and that sound administration coupled with concentrations and
transformations, would be enough to secure a better distribution of relief. In this
respect he was probably optimistic, since no sound administration of assets could
compensate for deficient distribution of income, or lack of funds 30. Any
restructuring aimed at the provision of equitable relief required a direct and
consistent financial intervention by the state, since the nature of the Italian charity
system, and its structural distortions were such, that only fresh resources injected
at the weak points, could transform it into an efficient and fair system of relief 31.
This sort of committment was as far away from Crispi's mind as it had been from
those of the founders of the Italian state. Besides, it could also be argued that the
creation of a welfare system where all needy citizens were granted equitable relief
was not the real aim of the whole exercise. If so, those flaws listed above could be
interpreted as technical devices effectively ensuring that the charity system became
more selective while undergoing only a limited restructuring. Finally, the success of
the reform depended on the alertness of congregations of charity, local authorities,
and prefects. Penalties were set up for those who failed to comply, but the trouble
was that the prefects had many other jobs to attend to, whereas local authorities
were often reluctant to wage war in their own backyards. As always, the level of
maturity and committment of the citizens was paramount to the success of any
reform that hit huge vested interests. Crispi's reform would not engender the
revolution that many feared.
9.3.The Catholic opposition.
Needless to say, the fiercest and loudest opposition came from the Catholics. 'L'
Osservatore Romano' , 'L' Osservatore cattolico' , 'La Civilta Cattolica' , 'La Voce della
30 P. Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza', in Id., Scritti vari , cit., pp. 316-24, 350-1.
31 C. Ferraris, 'Le istituzioni di beneficenza davanti al Parlamento', cit., pp. 727-31.
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verita' , poured buckets of ink to save the autonomy of the charities, and went as far
as suggesting obscure plots masterminded by the Jews in collusion with Crispi. Leo
XIII expressed his disapproval on several occasions. In January 1890, under Vatican
directions, the bishops issued a collective pastoral to protest against the bill 32.
These were predictable reactions, but the reform of the charities was a challenge
which the Opera dei Congressi could not miss. Consequently on this occasion the
Catholics resorted to a series of initiatives which were not fully coordinated with one
another but nevertheless showed a remarkable capacity for self-defence, and went
far beyond a purely negative protest. The first plan of action was devised early in
1889 by a Roman 'Comitato per le istituzioni Pie d'ltalia', set up by three
aristocrats, members of the Opera: the Marquis Filippo Crispolti, the Prince Luigi
Boncompagni Ludovisi di Piombino, and the Count Mario Filippo di Carpegna.
Charities' managers and whoever disagreed with the bill were advised to lobby their
MPs, and send to the Chamber as many individual petitions as possible. These
petitions had to be specific and avoid saying anything against the principles
underlying the bill; they should concentrate on the particular disadvantages which
the new regime would cause to the petitioning institution. The aim was to inundate
the Chamber committee with overwhelming and detailed evidence of the unpopularity
and impracticability of the reform. As the Chamber committees were bound by law to
examine all representations concerning a bill, it was hoped that the avalanches of
petitions would slow down the procedures, as well as persuade at least some
32 A. Robbiati, 'L'Opera dei Congressi ed il nuovo ordinamento della beneficenza pubblica
introdotto dalla legge Crispi (1890-1901)', in Bollettino dell'Archivio per la storia del
Movimento Sociale Cattolico in Italia, No. 2, 1977, pp. 262-3; S. Restelli, 'Chiesa e
mondo cattolico italiano di fronte alia legge Crispi del 1890 sulla riforma della
beneficenza', ibid., No. 1, 1978, cit., pp.117-20. The Pope disapproved of the
Chamber's vote in his addresses to the Sacro Collegio of 24 and 30 December 1889, and
condemned the law during the consistory of 26 June 1890, and in his encylcical of 15
October 1890. For the organization of the bishops' collective protest see A.S.V.S.S.,
1888-92, Rubrica 165, f.1, cit.: the Card. Vicario to the Secretary of State, Card.
Rampolla, 5 Jan. 1890; memo from the S. Uffizio, 11 Jan. 1890; Rampolla to Mons.
Assessore of the S. Uffizio, n.d., but Jan 1890. It is interesting to note that in 1888 the
Vatican did not take any direct initiative against those articles of the new civil code
concerning the 'clergy's abuses'. The archbishop of Naples, Card. Sanfelice organized a
collective protest of the southern bishops. He was followed by the prelates of Umbria,
the Marches, Piedmont, and Florence, but the reluctance of Leo XIII to put pressure on
those who, like the archbishop of Milan, refused to issue similar addresses, meant that
the protest was not unanimous, and its organization quite inefficient (see A.S.V.S.S.,
1890, Rubr. 165, fascicolo unico).
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parlamentarians of the inopportunity of the reform 33. It seems that this strategy
did not work, presumably because the Comitato failed to build up an adequate network
of subcommittees at local level. The Chamber committee was not hampered by
thousands of petitions, and quickly delivered a verdict on the bill which did not
modify it in the way the Catholics hoped. Hence the newly-appointed chairman of the
Comitato Generale Permanente of the Opera, Giambattista Paganuzzi, stepped in
proposing a collective petition to the Senate in December 1889. This time it was a
general protest, openly critizicing the government's policy, and forecasting all sorts
of dire social consequences that would stem from ousting the clergy from the
congregations of charity, tampering with the autonomy of the charities, and
reforming their purposes. Leo XIII had little confidence that the petition would make
any difference; nevertheless he gave his consent, ensuring in the mean time that the
Holy See was not directly involved in the affair. The collection of signatures was
organized through the Regional, Diocesan and Parish committees in the 163 dioceses
where the Opera dei Congressi had active cells, and through activists in those
dioceses where the Opera was not officially represented. The 'Istruzioni per
raccogliere le firme nella Petizione al Senato per la difesa delle Opere Pie'
recommended promoting small and friendly meetings to explain the aim of the
petition, and support the protest with leaflets and short articles on the local Catholic
press 34. The signatures collected in time and presented to the Senate were
150,000. This was not too bad, considering the short time available, but was far
below Paganuzzi's plans, who had printed and distributed 28,000 forms, each of
33 Comitato per le istituzioni Pie d'ltalia , Rome, 11 April 1889 (printed circular), in
A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubrica 165, f. 1, cit. See also A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia
dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964, cit., p. 585. About Filippo
Crispolti see Dizionario storico dei movimento cattolico in Italia (Marietti, Casale
Monferrato, 1982), vol. II, pp. 137-42.
34 A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f.1, cit.: Paganuzzi, Venice, 20 Dec. 1889, Christmas
Eve 1889, 2nd and 25 Jan. 1890, to the Seer, of State; the latter to the former, Rome,
23 Dec. 1889 (minute), and 30 Dec. 1889; text of the petition; circular to the parish
priests by the bishop of Vigevano, Epiphany 1890, recommending the petition; Circular
from Comitato Generale Permanente, Bologna, 28 Dec. 1889, to Regional and Diocesan
Committees, and correspondents; Istruzioni per raccogliere le firme nella Petizioone aI
Senato per la difesa delle Opere Pie, Bologna, 30 Dec. 1889 (printed leaflet). See also
A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 3, 1964,
cit., pp. 586-98. About Giambattista Paganuzzi see F. Traniello, G. Campanini
(eds.),Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia , cit., vol. II, pp. 441-8. For
the Opera dei Congressi e Comitati Cattolici in Italia see G. Candeloro, II movimento
cattolico in Italia (Riuniti, Rome, 1972), passim, and partic. pp. 129-304;
S.Tramontin, 'Opera dei Congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici in Italia', in F.Traniello, G.
Campanini (eds.), Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia , cit., vol. I/2,
pp. 336-47; G. De Rosa, II movimento cattolico in Italia dalla Restaurazioone ail'eta
giolittiana (Laterza, Bari, 1988), passim, and partic. pp. 45-223.
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them with room for seventy-two signatures, to cover abundantly the 26,000
parishes 35. It is possible, although undemonstrable, that the petition had something
to do with the modifications introduced by the Senate to the bill. However, it was a
partial and short-lived success, since in the end Crispi curbed the Senate's attempts
to save the confraternities and reduce the range of charities subject to concentration.
The failure of these lobbies left two options open: a careful exploitation of any
loopholes within the law, and subsequent jurisprudence; and the conquest of the local
administrations. The proposal to set up a countrywide service of legal defence of the
charities came from a Sicilian lawyer living in Naples, Francesco Parlati. The Holy
See wholeheartedly welcomed it and ordered the Opera dei Congressi and the bishops
to put all efforts to implement the plan. Parlati suggested organizing within the
Opera a network of committees of Catholic lawyers to offer free legal assistance to
the charities. All charities should send their statutes to these legal committees
before the enactment of the law, to allow time to prepare their defences. Whenever a
charity was hit by measures of concentration or transformation, the committees
would start the legal procedures to fight the reforms, free of charge, or for minimal
fees 36. Parlati's plan was fully endorsed by the Opera during its Congress in Lodi,
in October 1890. Legal committees, called 'Consign per la difesa delle Opere Pie',
35 S. Restelli, 'Chiesa e mondo cattolico italiano di fronte alia legge Crispi del 1890 sulla
riforma della beneficenza', cit., p. 121; A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f. 1, cit.:
Paganuzzi, Venice, 2nd Jan. 1890, to the Seer, of State, cit.
36 A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f. 1, cit.: F. Parlati, Naples, 16 Aug. 1890, to the
Seer, of State; the Seer, of State, Rome, 23 Aug. 1890, to Paganuzzi (minute); the
latter, Venice, 24 Aug. 1890, to the former; Circular to the archbishops, Aug. 1890
(minute and print proofs); Circular 25 Aug. 1890 from the Comitato Generate
Permanente of the Opera, to Regional and Diocesan Committees, and correspondents,
giving details and instructions about Parlati's proposal; the Seer, of State, 28 Aug.
1890, to Card. Zigliara, Prefect of the Sacra Congregazione degli Studi; letters of
agreement to the Seer, of State from the archbishops of Capua, Ferrara, Siena, Turin,
Catania, Modena (Aug.-Sept. 1890). Francesco Parlati was member of the Opera's
Regional Committee of Campania, and municipal councillor of Naples responsible for the
public instruction department. He had defended the rights of the parish priests to some
contributions abolished by Naples' city council, as well as the liberty of processions and
religious ceremonies, and imposed religious instruction in the municipal schools. In
February 1890 he held a public conference on the charities' reform, attended by 500
people and much praised by the Holy See. His efforts to defend the charities were
rewarded with the honorary membership of the Comitato Permanente of the Opera. See
A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f. 1, cit: the archbish. of Naples, Card. Sanfelice, 17
Febr. and 29 Aug. 1890, to the Seer, of State; the latter, Rome, 19 Febr. 1890, to the
former (minute); the Regional Committee, Naples, 23 March 1890, to the Seer, of
State; the latter to the former, Rome, 11 April 1890; Conferenza pubblica sul progetto
di legge delle Opere Pie pronunziata dall'Avv. Cav. Francesco Parlati nella Sala della
Carita in Napoli a' 16 febbraio 1890 raccolta stenograficamente e pubblicata a cura del
Comitato promotore (Tip. Pesole, Naples, 1890); Dizionario storico del movimento
cattolico in Italia (Marietti, Casale Monferrato, 1984), vol. III/2, pp. 627-28.
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were set up first in Naples and Piacenza, then in Turin, Genoa, Milan, Rome, and
Venice. They provided consultancy to the bishops and other local committes through a
network of 'corrispondenti'. A handful of devout lawyers supported the operation
compiling comments to the act and magazines to update the jurisprudence. The
'Sottosezione permanente per la difesa legale delle Fondazioni pie' was established in
Piacenza, under the direction of Carlo Radini Tedeschi, despite pressure from
Cardinal Sanfelice to keep the headquarters of the operation in Naples, where the
initiative was born 37. The loopholes offered by the 1890 act and related
jurisprudence concerned the dowry foundations, which were initially considered of
almoner nature, but were declared non- almoner by the Council of State in 1892;
the confraternities, which could be saved by adding the purpose of mutual help; and
the devotional bequests, which could be transferred to communes or other charities.
By 1901 whatever could be saved, had been saved: not much, according to some
Catholics. The last option remained: conquering as many local administrations as
possible to gain control of the congregations of charity. This target had been
pinpointed by the Opera dei Congressi to its activists since the mid 1870s, when the
first storm clouds started gathering over the charities. It was strongly re-asserted
by the Opera in its Congresses from 1891 onwards:
...When the Catholics will understand that nowadays the composition of the
communal councils is of direct interest to the Church, and the vote given or not to
the Catholic candidates entails the defence or the ruin of the charities, then we will
have acquired the best weapon against the law and its overzealous implementation,
which can make it even more harmful...
37 A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f. 1, cit: the archbish. of Naples, Card. Sanfelice, 29
Aug. 1890, to the Seer, of State, cit.; A. Robbiati, 'L'Opera dei Congressi ed il nuovo
ordinamento della beneficenza pubblica introdotto dalla legge Crispi (1890-1901)', cit.,
pp. 264-8. For the comments to the act see G. Bortolucci, Pro Veritate et justitia. Sulla
nuova riforma delle Opere Pie in Italia (Toschi, Modena, 1890); V. Palmulli, Comento
sugli articoli 70, 91 e 93 No.1 delta legge sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza (De
Bonis, Naples, 1890); G. M. Grassi, Le Opere Pie ed il concetto religioso. Sul progetto
dell'on. Crispi per I'eversione delle Opere Pie (Ciardi, Florence, 1890); C. Radini
Tedeschi, Massime e ammonimenti a tutela delle opere pie (Solari, Piacenza, 1892);
SuH'applicabilita legale della legge 17 luglio 1890 alle istituzioni di beneficenza,
confraternite e legati pii (Solari, Piacenza, 1894); Sezione Permanente dell'Opera dei
Congressi, Istruzioni e giureprudenza per la difesa legale delle fondazioni e legati pii di
beneficenza e di culto contro le riforme della legge 17 luglio 1890 nonche di altre leggi
precedenti (by C. Radini Tedeschi) (Solari, Piacenza, 1901, 5th ed.). The magazines
updating the jurisprudence were "II Consultore Giuridico civile ed ecclesiastico",
founded in 1876 in Florence by G.M. Grassi, who got little support from the Vatican and
was in great financial distress (see A.S.V.S.S., 1888-92, Rubr. 165, f. 1, cit: Grassi,
Florence 24 Sept., 30 Oct. and 21 Nov.1890 to the Seer, of State; the latter to the
former, 17 Nov. 1890); and, from 1901 "II contenzioso ecclesiastico", published in
Genoa (A. Robbiati, 'L'Opera dei Congressi...', cit. p. 268). For G.M. Grassi and C. Radini
Tedeschi see also Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia , cit., vol. 111/1,
pp. 427-9; vol. III/2, p. 694.
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By the early 1900s the Catholics were fully prepared and steadily marching in that
direction 38. On the other hand, the scope of action of the Catholics in the social field
was not confined either to fighting the 1890 act on legal grounds or conquering local
administrations to gain control of the congregations of charity. From the mid 1850s
priests like don Bosco and Murialdo - who had a clear vision of the opportunities
offered to the Church by industrial society - set up organizations to educate and
assist - morally as well as materially - apprentices and young industrial workers.
Religious charity was the starting point of these enterprises, but their outcome
reached well beyond the traditional boundaries of Catholic welfare organizations. By
the late 1880s awareness that the challenges of capitalism and socialism alike
required a profound redefinition of strategy was slowly but surely spreading
throughout the hierarchy and laity clustered around the Opera dei Congressi. In
1891 Leo Xlll's Rerum Novarum gave official consent as well as encouragement to
those who claimed the right and duty of the Church to play an active role in social
conflicts, rather than simply hand over alms and sympathise with the labouring
poor. The new Catholic welfare organizations that flourished in northern and central
Italy and - to a lesser extent - in the South, were rural cooperatives and banks to
improve productivity and offer small loans at low interest, agrarian consortia to
provide free consultancy and low price tools and fertilizers to small freeholders,
friendly societies and labour unions to conteract the socialist labour organizations,
oratori and ricreatori festivi to provide young industrial workers with safe leisure
activities, night schools to offer vocational training 39. From the old tree of
religious charity a new, vigourous branch sprouted. The negative and self-defensive
reaction to the 1890 act was only one face of the coin. The other was an aggressive
and self-confident crusade to regain control of the vital ganglions of society. In the
Opera dei Congressi and mother Church there was enough room to house the
champions of the old charity as well as those of the new.
38 G. Candeloro, II movimento cattolico in Italia , cit. pp. 142-5; M. Belardinelli,
Movimento cattolico e questione comunale dopo I'Uniti (Studium, Rome, 1979), partic.
pp. 77-166; A. Robbiati, 'L'Opera dei Congressi ed il nuovo ordinamento della
beneficenza pubblica introdotto dalla legge Crispi (1890-1901)', cit., pp. 269-70, 272-
3. The quotation is by F. Parlati at the nineth Congress (Vicenza, 1891), quoted in A.
Robbiati, 'L'Opera dei Congressi ..., cit., p. 270.
39 Alfonso Prandi, 'Genesi ed evoluzione dell'insegnamento sociale della chiesa', in
F.Traniello, G. Campanini (eds.),Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia ,
cit., vol. 1/1, pp. 180-9; Sergio Zaninelli, 'L'azione sociale dei cattolici', ibidem, pp.
320-58 (with extensive bibliography). For don Giovanni Bosco and don Leonardo
Murialdo see ibidem, vol. II, pp. 52-55, 409-14.
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9.4. Implementation and results.
After the Catholics, those most worried about the consequences of the 1890 act were
the charities' employees, particularly the accountants. Accustomed as they were to
keep the books as they pleased, they felt threatened by the imposition of double book¬
keeping and the huge quantity of minute rules and tight financial controls set up by
the act and related regulations of 5 February 1891 40. The accountants voiced their
worries at the congress of the charities held in Bologna in November 1891. It seemed
that their opposition would not be easily overcome, but in a couple of years the
protest died out, with the help of another few congresses, some ministerial
circulars, and numerous administrative manuals 41. After all, the law offered some
benefits to the employees, such as pensions and job stability, so there was some
compensation for having to work harder. As the accountants' complaints gradually
died out, the Rivista delta Beneficenza Pubblica started to voice another kind of
concern. With the passage of time it was becoming increasingly clear that the
implementation of the act was at best sluggish. In the villages it was difficult to set
up the congregations of charity, for want of means, and skilled people willing to
assume responsibility. As a result many of the poorest and smallest communes had no
congregation. The legal guardianship of abandoned children entrusted to the
congregations was far from efficient. It was hampered everywhere by bureaucratic
delays, and in many villages the congregations failed to set up the guardianship
councils (consigli di tutela). Concentrations, groupings and transformations were
obstructed everywhere and were sluggishly implemented. For instance in Verona a
plan of reform agreed in 1893 by the congregation and the commune was still
4^ Regolamento amministrativo, 5 Febbraio 1891, No. 99; Regolamento di contabilita, 5
Febbraio 1891, No. 99. See them in S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza net diritto italiano , vol.
1, cit., pp. 197-290.
41 'La nuova legge 17 luglio 1890 e le disposizioni per la sua pratica applicazione', R.B.P.,
No.8, 1891, pp. 601-5; C. Rosati, 'Le attuali dispute sul nuovo regolamento di
contabilit& delle Opere pie', Ibidem, pp. 606-15; P. D'Alvise, 'II Collegio dei ragionieri
di Padova per le Opere pie', Ibidem, pp. 724-32; 'II Congresso Nazionale delle Istituzioni
pubbliche di beneficenza in Bologna', R.B.P., No.11, 1891, pp. 872-91; C. Rosati,
'Un'ultima parola sulle dispute intorno al nuovo regolamento di contabilita delle Opere
pie', Ibidem, pp. 967-75; C. Rosati, 'I voti del Congresso di Bologna in ordine alia
contabilta delle Opere pie', R.B.P., No. 2, 1892, pp. 101-34; 'A proposito dei voti del
Congresso di Bologna in ordine alia contabilta delle Opere pie', R.B.P., No. 3, 1892, pp.
231-6; C. Rosati, 'La contabilita delle Opere pie al Congresso Nazionale dei ragionieri di
Genova', R.B.P., No. 10-11, 1892, pp. 749-63, No. 12, 1892, pp. 918-32. Among the
many manuals: G. Donati, C. Rosati, Guida di amministrazione e di contabilita per le
Opere pie del Regno secondo il nuovo regolamento di contabilita approvato con regio
decreto 5 febbario 1891 (Boncompagni, Perugia, 1891); Luigi Castiglioni, Manuale delta
Beneficenza (Hoepli, Milan, 1901).
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pending in 1899. Nationwide only the less astute among the charities' managers were
caught in the net of the reforms. Most were bright enough to exploit the many
loopholes offered by the act. Municipal councils and prefects often preferred to do
nothing, for laziness and fear of conflicts. The slowness of the bureaucratic
procedures involved in concentrations, groupings and transformations did the rest.
Naples was a good example of the inaptness of the act: some results were achieved
only after a special law was passed in 1897. The transformation of obsolete charities
such as confraternities and conservatori, was largely a dead letter. One of the
principal aims of the 1890 act was to trim administrative expenditure and improve
guardianship and surveillance. The general opinion of philanthropists and charities'
managers was that administration had become more complicated - and even more
expensive, as treasurers and employees were now compulsory also for the small
foundations - whereas the guardianship exerted by the GPAs was no better than that
once exerted by the Provincial deputations. It was probably a very biased opinion,
but there was some truth in it. An Interior ministry statistic published in 1909
revealed that from 1880 to 1900 the expenditure for the administration of the
charities' patrimony and the management of the welfare services had increased on
average by at least 30.3%. The Director-general of the civil administration
department, Commendator Pironti, attributed the increase partly to the necessary
amelioration of sanitary equipment and welfare structures, and partly to the
betterment of the salaries of the charities' staff - including pensions and health
insurances - but also reckoned that those severe checks of budgets and accounts
prescribed by article 39 of the 1890 act to reduce unnecessary expenditure were a
dead letter. This was not the only black spot on the record of the GPAs. As it emerged
during the Interior budget debate, in 1896 the GPAs were already in arrears with
half of the budgets and one quarter of the accounts. And too often budgets and accounts
were approved hastily, without proper auditing. Surveillance was no better, both at
peripheral and central level. Article 44 entrusted one councillor of prefecture with
the monitoring of the charities and welfare services in each province, but this turned
out to be a purely formal exercise. The redemption of patrimonial burdens and debts
should have been completed within five years, yet it was still by and large a dead
letter as late as 1909. In August 1900 the deputy Giacomo De Martino requested data
from the Interior ministry about concentrations, groupings and transformations.
Although the act stipulated that the Interior ministry publish yearly reports on the
charities' state of affairs, those officials were unable to reply immediately and it
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took them three months to patch up an answer. It turned out that only 6,604,081
lire of revenue had been concentrated or transformed 42.
Assistance to those unable to work was another disaster area. The public security
act entrusted the local police with locking up in institutions those indigents unable to
work, but in a few years it became clear that the whole operation was extremely
expensive as well as inefficient, since the existing poorhouses were inadequate, and
there were no provisions to enhance their number and capacity. First a number of
circulars were issued to persuade the police to lock up beggars and vagrants with
greater parsimony. Then, on 22 July 1897, a law was passed transferring the
decisional power from the local police to the Interior ministry. Some savings were
thus achieved, at the cost of the homeless indigents. In 1900, according to official
figures, those sheltered in institutions were 61,887; those in need of shelter were
40,834. Not a few died of hunger and cold in the streets. Furthermore, the byzantine
administrative system set up by the public security act was in total chaos.
Confraternities, other charities and communes were bound to pay for the
maintenance of the inmates of the poorhouses but, from 1889 to 1900 no refunds
were required by the central government, who picked up a bill of about eight million
lire. In 1900 and 1901 charities and communes were showered with the bills in
arrears which - they claimed - they could not foot, as the residue from past financial
years had already been absorbed by the following budgets. There followed endless
litigation between local administrations and charities and the Treasury 43.
42 'La nuova legge 17 luglio 1890 e le disposizioni per la sua pratica applicazione', R.B.P.,
No.8, 1891, pp. 601-2; Giulio Bertoldi, 'Gli orfani e la legge sulle Istituzioni pubbliche
di beneficenza', R.B.P., No. 11, 1894, pp. 879-81; 'Le Opere pie e il Parlamento',
R.B.P., No. 9-10, 1896, pp. 627-30, 638-46 (deputies Magliani, Nocito and Vischi); 'IV
Congresso delle Opere pie in Torino', R.B.P., No. 9, 1898, pp. 796-99; R. Laschi, 'II
patronato in Italia', R.B.P., No. 11, 1898, p. 961; Idem, 'Le Congregazioni di Carita nel
presente e nell'avvenire', R.B.P., No. 4, 1899, pp. 337-39; Idem, Raggruppamento delle
istituzioni di beneficenza in Verona', R.B.P., No. 5, 1899, pp. 401-6; 'Lo Stato e la
beneficenza pubblica' (report on the Interior budget by Giacomo De Martino), R.B.P., No.
12, 1900, pp. 810-15, 817-18; N. Tabanelli, 'La questione della pubblica beneficenza in
Parlamento', R.B.P., 1902, pp. 462-68; M.I., D.G.A.C., Div. 3, Sect. 3, Circular No.
25279, Rome, 28 Sept. 1902, to the prefects (questionnaire about the implementation
of surveillance measures, given the hitherto unsatisfactory results, in R.B.P., 1902,
pp. 745-51); A. Magnani, 'Mali e rimedi della beneficenza pubblica', R.B.P., 1903, pp.
465-71; A. Pironti, Le condizioni patrimoniali e finanziarie delle Istituzioni Pubbliche di
Beneficenza. Relazione del Direttore gene rale dell'Amministrazione civile a S.E. il
Ministro dell'lnterno Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (Cecchini, Rome, 1909), pp.
XCVI-CVI; A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 5,
1964, cit., pp. 1218-32.
43 'Le Opere pie e il Parlamento', R.B.P., No. 9-10, 1896, cit., pp. 632-33 (deputies
Magliani, Nocito and Vischi); 'Lo Stato e la beneficenza pubblica' (report on the Interior
budget by Giacomo De Martino), R.B.P., No. 12, 1900, cit., p. 815; N. Tabanelli, 'La
questione della pubblica beneficenza in Parlamento', R.B.P., 1902, cit., pp. 454-61;
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The long-awaited official figures about the implementation of the 1890 act were
published in 1903 and updated in 1904. Carlo Schanzer, author of the two reports,
was not too disappointed about the results of the law twelve years after its
enactment, given the low targets set by the ministry. Nearly 82% of charities
subject to concentration had been concentrated. Their revenue amounted to almost
72% of the total revenue subject to concentration. The figures seemed even better
with regard to those charities subject to grouping: those already grouped were
nearly 69% of the total to be grouped, and their revenue amounted to 84% of the
total revenue subject to grouping. The figures regarding transformations were less
comforting. Only 29% of those charities subject to transformation had been
transformed, and their revenue was 30% of the total revenue to be trasformed 44.
The strongest opposition to transformations came from the confraternities, as shown
in the chart below 45.
M.I., D.G.A.C., Div. 3, Sect. 3, Circular No. 25271, Rome, 8 Sept. 1902, to the
prefects, Object: Rilevamento statistico amministrativo sulle condizioni dell'assistenza
all'infanzia abbandonata ed agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e della beneficenza
elemosiniera (in R.B.P., 1902, pp. 609-34, partic. p. 614); A. Cherubini, 'Per una
storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 5, 1964, cit., pp. 1245-52. See
also above, 6.2.
44 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc... 1902-1903 (1904), pp. 13, 35,
47. See also Tables 5, 6 and 7 in appendix 9.
45 See also table 8 in appendix 9.
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various Confrat. Catecum. Monti
kind Frum.
Source: M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904),
p. 47.
The ministerial reports offered detailed information on many aspects of the process
- including the innumerable legal loopholes which allowed many foundations to
eschew the law - but failed to say what difference concentrations, groupings and
transformations made to the overall situation. Indeed, they made no great difference:
little more than 11% of the total revenue of the charities had been affected by the
reform, as shown in the chart below 46.
4 ® See also tables 9, 10 and 11 in appendix 9. The revenue is calculated on the 1880 data
for charities and congregations of charity, and on the 1898 data for the confraternities.
Revenue belonging to the congregations of charity has been deducted, for it was not
subject to transformation. Revenue belonging to the endowed confraternities had been
included, for the opposite reason.
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Chart 9.4.2. Revenue of the charities concentrated, grouped and transformed in the
period 1891-1903 as a percentage of the gross patrimonial revenue, net of the







Source: M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903),
pp. 386-7, 428-9, 470-1; M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf.,
ecc...1902-1903 (1904), pp. 9, 32, 50-51; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie
(1897), pp. XXIV-XXVi; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle confraternite (1898), vol. II, p.
XII.
The only regions where some considerable changes had occurred were Latium,
Campania and Basilicata. In Latium and Campania respectively 26% and 31% of the
revenues had been grouped, and in Basilicata nearly 44% appeared to have been
concentrated. The better results achieved in Latium and Campania were due to special
laws for Rome and Naples. With the establishment of the capital in Rome the demands
of public charity had overgrown the badly-coordinated resources of the charities,
and the Municipal council had to foot an annual shortfall of 1.6-2 million lire. The
commune's finances were overstretched but, on the other hand, prestige dictated that
in the capital social degradation should not sink too low. Hence on 20 July 1890
Parliament passed a special law. The confiscation of the confraternities of Rome
would provide the cash needed to relieve the municipal finances, and the grouping of
the hospitals would make the health service more efficient. These objectives were
only partly achieved, since the confiscated revenues of the confraternities turned out
to be lower than expected. However in the mid 1890s other projects were on their
way to group orphanages, kindergartens, poorhouses, and concentrate all almoner
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charities in the congregation of charity 47. The act of 2 August 1897 No. 348 for
Naples originated not in reasons of prestige but in the solid opposition of both
congregation of charity and charities to any reform suggested by the Prefect 48. The
act, strongly opposed during its parliamentary passage by the Catholics and the
charities' managers, ordered the grouping of conservatori, colleges, ritiri,
hospitals, and the like. Twenty-five conservatori, convitti, ritiri and other
foundations were grouped under the name of 'Collegi riuniti per le figlie del popolo'.
Another twenty-five were grouped under the name of 'Istituti riuniti di educazione
professionale femminile', and another two under the name of 'Educandato S. Eligio'.
Three further groups would be formed respectively by eight conservatori and ritiri
aimed at the rehabilitation of fallen women, eleven hospitals, and three hospices for
the blind. No groupings were planned for male educational charities. According to
prefect Cavasola they were too few and destitute to stand any chance of success once
grouped together. The grouping of the female educational charities went ahead without
excessive trouble, but the grouping of hospitals encountered strong obstructionism
which as late as 1903 had not been completely overcome. As for the shelters for the
blind, the opposition was so strong that their grouping was effectively dropped.
Almost needless to say, the strongest opposition came from the administrative board
of the Albergo dei Poveri, to which were annexed one of the blind hospices and several
of the hospitals to be grouped 49. It seems however that the result of the grouping of
conservatori was much below expectation. According to the Royal Commission of
Inquiry that inspected the charities of Naples in 1903, the plan had not been
supported by adequate research, and the covert opposition of those concerned ensured
that mismanagment and abuses continued undisturbed 50.
47 'Per il riordinamento della beneficenza in Roma' (report attached to a bill by Giolitti of
23 Nov. 1893), R.B.P., No. 2, 1894, pp. 117-38.
48 As late as January 1897 all that the congregation of charity of Naples could agree upon
was the grouping of two confraternities. See Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli,
Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli (Bertero, Rome, 1903),
vol. I, p. 21.
49 Circular from the prefect Cavasola, Naples, 26 July 1898, to the Superintendants and
Governors of the Establishments for female education and shelter, of the Hospitals, of
the Institutes for the blind. Object: Grouping of charities of the city of Naples to apply
the act 2 August 1897, No. 348, pp. 1-18; Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli,
Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli, vol. I, cit., pp. 22-4. Plans
to group and modernize conservatorii and the like had been elaborated also by the
French in 1810 and the Bourbons in 1830-31. See: Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per
Napoli, Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza di Napoli , vol. I, cit., pp. 9-
15.
50 Reale Commissione d'lnchiesta per Napoli, Relazione sulle istituzioni pubbliche di
beneficenza di Napoli, vol. V, pp. 635-7.
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As for Basilicata we have no information to explain its high proportion of
concentrations, but there is evidence that the poor did not benefit from the reform.
According to an inquiry on the living conditions of the peasants conducted by Nitti in
1910, there were congregations of charity in all communes of Basilicata, but they
were so destitute that they could not help all those in need. Thereby the poverty line
was drawn at a very low level. Those miserable wage labourers who happened to own
a hovel, a morsel of land, or a few animals, were excluded from the free services of
the medico condotto and the distribution of free medicines by the congregation. As a
consequence many could not afford to call the doctor, or called him when it was too
late. The other charities were generally poorly-endowed, including hospitals and
poorhouses. The 1902 statistics on the assistance to children, those unable to work,
and almoner charities revealed that Basilicata had no foundling homes, two extremely
destitute poorhouses, and only nine hospitals, with a patrimony of 620,364 lire and
a revenue of 36,282 lire: respectively 0.1 and 0.08% of the national total.
Occasional forms of relief such as soup kitchens were unknown. The deterioration of
the welfare services of the region was confirmed by the statistics of 1900 on the
charities' financial situation. Whereas nationwide the welfare expenditure had
increased on average by nearly 30% from 1880 to 1900, that of Basilicata and
Calabria had decreased respectively by 11.9 and 11.4% 51.
The other regions where the reforms prescribed by the 1890 act had some limited
impact were Venetia, the Marches, Abruzzi Molise, and Sicily, but nowhere had the
reform affected more than 17% of the charitable revenues. Those unaffected by the
reform accounted for 83% (Abruzzi Molise) to 97% (Liguria and Umbria). The
pattern is shown in the three following charts 52.
P. Villani, A. Massafra (eds.), F.S. Nitti, Scritti sulla questione meridionale, vol. 4,
Inchiesta sulle condizioni dei contadini in Basilicata e in Calabria (1910), (Laterza, Bari,
1968), part 1, pp. 323-28. A. Pironti, Le condizioni patrimoniali e finanziarie delle
Istituzioni Pubbliche di Beneficenza..., cit., pp. CXVIII-CXXI. Underfunding of relief
agencies and consequent restriction of eligibility to poor relief were commonplace also
in France. See Roger Price, 'Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
France', European Studies Review, vol. 13 (Oct. 1983), pp. 423-53, passim, and
especially 429-35.
52 See also tables 9, 10 and 11 in appendix 9.
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Chart 9.4.3. Revenue of the charities concentrated, grouped and transformed in the
period 1891-1903 in the North as a percentage of the gross patrimonial revenue,
net of the revenue of the congregations of charity, but including the revenue of
confraternities.
Pie Lig Lorn Ven
■ conc. SI group. 11 transf. 11 no change
Source: M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 386-
7, 428-9, 470-1 ;M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904),
pp.9,32, 50-51; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), pp. XXIV-XXVI; M.A.I.C„
Statistica delle confraternite (1898), vol. II, p. XII.
Chart 9.4.4. Revenue of the charities concentrated, grouped and transformed in the period
1891-1903 in the Centre as a percentage of the gross patrimonial revenue, net of the
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Source: M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 386-
7, 428-9, 470-1; M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903
(1904), pp.9,32, 50-51; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), pp. XXIV-XXVI;
M.A.I.C., Statistica delle confraternite (1898), vol. II, p. XII.
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Chart 9.4.5. Revenue of the charities concentrated, grouped and transformed in the period
1891-1903 in the South as a percentage of the gross patrimonial revenue, net of the
revenue of the congregations of charity, but including the revenue of confraternities.
H conc. HI group. H transf. H no change
Source: M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 386-
7, 428-9, 470-1; M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903
(1904), pp.9,32, 50-51; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), pp. XXIV-XXVI;
M.A.I.C., Statistica delle confraternite (1898), vol. II, p. XII.
The reforms continued at a slow pace. As late as 1908 the Interior ministry
reckoned that 92% of charities subject to concentration had been concentrated, with
a revenue amounting to 82% of the total charitable revenue subject to concentration.
Those grouped were nearly 79% of the total to be grouped, with a revenue equivalent
to 90% of the total revenue subject to grouping. Only 40% of those charities
subject to transformation had been transformed, with a revenue equivalent to 49%
of the total revenue to be trasformed. Out of a total of 9,121 almoner charities, three
quarters had had their statutes revised 53.
More research in the records of charities and congregations of charity, particularly
at local level, would probably clarify the picture and show the full extent of the
different outcome of the 1890 act in the different areas of the peninsula.
Nevertheless, it seems plain that the 1890 reform failed to deliver a fair and
egalitarian system of relief, since it did not address the issue of funding.
Concentrations of minor charities into the congregations, and transformations of
obsolete foundations, were indeed devised as a means of injecting fresh financial
resources into the mainstream of charity dispensation, but the tiny portion of
33 A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 5, 1964,
cit., pp. 1236-7, 1252.
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revenue that effectively changed destination cannot be regarded as a dominant factor
of modernization of the system. The byzantine machinery set up by Crispi to
modernize the elephantine Italian charity system was very much like a mountain
delivering a mouse. As Giacomo De Martino put it in his speech in the Chamber in the
autumn of 1900, concentrations, groupings and transformations had been devised to
solve a social problem. But the law was the outcome of too many compromises
between conflicting groups of interest, with the result that the reforms were not
made compulsory. The forces of trasformismo made sure that the law remained
largely a dead letter. As a result, Crispi's act appeared more a declaration of
principles than an effective legislative tool. Above all - as De Martino stressed - no
reform of the kind devised by Crispi could ever compensate for the basic uneveness of
the distribution of the charities' assets throughout the country 54.
9.5. The debate on the rationalization of out-door relief dispensation.
About fifteen years after its enactment, the law of 1890 was showing all the
features of a child of trasformismo, born with congenital malformations and further
crippled by her father during infancy. But philanthropists and the like were not only
concerned with the failure of the act to reform obsolete charities and ameliorate
guardianship and surveillance. Their criticism still focused on the need to modernize
and rationalize the dispensation of benefits, as in the 1880s. Crispi had presented his
reform as a means of achieving that objective, but the legislative text was defective
and ambiguous in that respect. GPAs and Interior officials were not given a clear
mandate to take the initiative to re-organize the welfare services, and therefore
limited their action to the purely administrative sphere. Article 64 of the 1890 act
forbade the congregations of charity to grant regular benefits to the able-bodied, and
article 107 of the administrative regulations of 5 February 1891 prescribed that
almoner charities share the lists of their recipients to avoid duplication of benefits.
But again, these were merely administrative prescriptions that did not address any of
the complex organizational issues involved in a radical reshuffle of relief
dispensation. As late as 1901, 5,126 congregations of charity out of a total of 8,269
kept regular note of their recipients and related benefits (about 62%), but those
which shared these lists with the other charities of the commune were only 1,487
54 'Lo Stato e la beneficenza pubblica' (report on the Interior budget by Giacomo De
Martino), cit., R.B.P., No. 12, 1900, pp. 815-16, 819.
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(about 18%) 55. In the same year the recipients of benefits from communes,
registered, and unregistered charities were about 6% of the total population in
Piedmont, Lombardy, and the ex-Duchies of Modena and Parma, around 5% in Apulia
and Latium, 2% in Umbria, the Marches and Sicily, 1.8% in Basilicata, 1.6% in
Sardinia, 1.5% in Abruzzi-Molise, 0.8% in Calabria. The average annual benefits
ranged from 62 lire in Latium and 55 in Liguria, to 13 in Calabria, 12 in Basilicata,
and 8 in Sicily 56. As far as out-door relief was concerned, the gap between North
and South was basically the same as before the reform.
The problem was first discussed during the congresses of the charities held in
Florence in 1893 and in Genoa in 1896, and was the main theme of that of Turin in
1898. The arguments in favour of a system where the distribution of relief was
tightly controlled and coordinated were the same as those used during the
international welfare congress of Milan in 1880, but there were major differences
as to how the objective must be achieved. In 1880 most philanthropists argued that
modernization of the relief distribution network was a matter pertaining exclusively
to the charities. The duty of the State was to supervise the administrative regularity
of the system and oversee its gradual re-organization. But direct State interference
in the charities' internal organization was definitely ruled out. In those years the
only voices in favour of outright State intervention were those of some southern
prefecture bureaucrats, who could not share the optimism of their northern
counterparts, given the nature of their first-hand experience. In the 1890s debate,
little if any trace could be found of that confidence in the auto-regenerating and self-
regulating ability of the charities. Now the general argument was that the State must
directly reform the obsolete charities - scrapping both popular initiative and right
of appeal for the charities - and set up a mandatory system to coordinate out-door
relief distribution at local and central level. Administration and distribution must be
ruled separately. A simpler and less bureaucratic administrative law must be
accompanied by separate laws to regulate hospitals, foundling homes, lunatic
asylums, educational establishments, and poorhouses. A further law was requested to
set the criteria on whose basis a number of charities must devote all their resources
55 M.I., D.G.A.C., Rilevamento Statistico-amministrativo circa le condizioni dell'assistenza
all'infanzia ed agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e delta beneficenza elemosiniera
(Mantellate, Rome, 1905), p. 87. See also S. D'Amelio, La beneficenza nel diritto
italiano , vol. 1, oit., pp. 234, 291-92; C. Peano, 'II concentramento delle Istituzioni di
beneficenza nelle Congregazioni di Carita e la erogazione delle rendite', R.B.P., No. 11,
1891, pp. 861-64.
5 6 M.I., D.G.A.C., Rilevamento Statistico-amministrativo circa le condizioni dell'assistenza
all'infanzia ed agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e delta beneficenza elemosiniera , cit., p.
88. See also table 14, appendix 9.
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to support other charities and lose autonomy. A Central Welfare Office must be
created to study and coordinate reform and update statistics 57. In 1880 the congress
of Milan had set a number of ambitious targets for the charities, warning the State
not to meddle in their affairs. But the charities had failed to take up the challenge,
showing themselves too old and short-sighted to modernize and live up to their
paladins' expectations and plans. Therefore in the late 1890s the request for direct
State intervention amounted to an open admission of failure. A failure that the 1890
act had not caused but simply brought to full light.
Self-confidence and autonomistic pride were now replaced by a widespread sense of
impotence. The baffling question recurring in most of the philanthropists' writings
was: 'how is it that the charities' assets have grown so much, and the finances of
communes and provinces are overstretched by welfare expenditure, and yet
pauperism is on the increase?' The most common answer was still that offered by
Ludovico Ricci, the Enlightenment in general, and De Gerando: indiscriminate relief
was no solution to poverty, for it fostered idleness and improvidence, and hence
aggravated pauperism. Carlo Biancoli, new editor of the Rivista della Beneficenza
Pubblica after the death of Giuseppe Scotti, saw poverty as a purely moral disease of
society, depending largely upon voluntary factors. He therefore blamed the increase
of pauperism on the availability of too abundant and free relief, and asked the State to
put things right 58. His opinion was shared by a number of other writers. Some
proposed no solution, but some did. Bertoglio-Pisani reckoned that locking up
beggars in poorhouses was a waste of resources and time. They should be put to work
in workhouses. Rodolfo Laschi offered a mixed bag of remedies. On the one hand he
suggested strengthening the fragile network of 'societa di patronato' - voluntary
private associations of benevolent people to support ex-prisoners, deserted
children, mentally ill, beggars, etc. On the other, he questioned the fitness of old
institutions like the congregations of charity to perform the new tasks required by
industrial society, and suggested that all benefits be abolished and replaced by
compulsory workfare schemes for the unemployed. Lue wanted the benefits to be
57 'IV Congresso delle OO.PP. a Torino', R.B.P., No. 9, 1898, pp. 791-807, and partic.
801-5. See also: 'II 3° Congresso delle istituzioni di beneficenza in Firenze', R.B.P., No.
3, 1893, pp. 245-75 (on this congress see also A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia
dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 5, 1964, cit., pp. 1232-35); 'Atti del
Comitato Permamente dei Congressi delle Opere pie', R.B.P., No. 2, 1896, pp. 178-82;
'II III Congresso Nazionale delle Oper pie in Genova', R.B.P., No. 11-12, 1896, pp. 838-
81; 'II IV Congresso delle Opere pie a Torino', R.B.P., No. 10, 1898, pp. 904-16; 'II IV
Congresso delle Opere pie a Torino', R.B.P., No. 12, 1898, pp. 1041-47. For the debate
in the 1880s and the International congress of Milan see above, 7.4. and 7.5.
88 C. Biancoli, 'L'avvenire della beneficenza', R.B.P., No. 1, 1900, pp. 1-7. Scotti died on
28 January 1899, aged 58 (see his obituary in R.B.P., No. 2, 1899, pp. 81-85).
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exactly and carefully targetted only on those labouring poor who deserved help. After
studying a number of statutes of almoner charities he concluded that no organic
principles regulated the dispensation of benefits, and elaborated a detailed plan
where he categorized all the possible predicaments in which the labouring poor could
fall, proposing that corresponding benefits be granted, after careful means
testing59.
The only discordant voice in this chorus hosted by the Rivista della Benefic^enza
Pubblica was that of Cristoforo Scotti, author of an enquiry into the conditions of the
poor supported by the congregation of charity of Bergamo. His investigations
revealed that about a quarter of Bergamo's population was subsidized by public
charity, and that about 41% of those subsidized were employed. A survey of the
housing conditions of the 2,764 subsidized families showed that only 45% lived in
decent houses, whilst 20% lived in totally insalubrious houses which should be
demolished, and 35% in degraded houses which could be repaired. The average annual
rents ranged from 69 lire for the decent dwellings, to 58 lire for those of mediocre
quality, to 57 lire for the uninhabitable ones, but in many urban parishes the worst
houses were more expensive than the good ones. A survey of the salaries revealed
that - after rent was deducted, and unpaid festivities and occasional sickness taken
into account - each of the 10,840 subsidized enjoyed an average daily income
available for food and clothing ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 lire. Contrary to the current
opinion that benefits prevented the poor from becoming industrious workers, this
evidence proved that even those who worked needed some support to survive.
Cristoforo Scotti concluded that the benefits doled out by the congregation of charity
served indirectly to subsidize avid and unlawful landlords and capitalists. Thanks to
the wage supplements granted to the poor by the congregation, the former could
afford to exact usurious rents for their decaying buildings, and the latter could
keep wages below the subsistence level. Hence Scotti proposed scrapping all benefits
but those for the unemployable and children, and devote the rest of the resources of
the congregation to housing schemes to provide decent new homes to the labouring
poor. This would break the monopoly of the housing market held by the urban
59 C. Turchetti, 'Previdenza o beneficenza?', R.B.P., No. 5, 1893, pp. 417-32; N.
Bertoglio-Pisani, 'L'inabilita al lavoro e le leggi al riguardo', R.B.P., No. 1, 1894, pp. 5-
13; R. Laschi, 'II patronato in Italia', R.B.P., No. 11, 1898, pp. 961-71; Idem, 'Le
Congregazioni di Carita nel presente e nell' avvenire', cit., R.B.P., No. 4, 1899, pp.
340-2; Idem, 'Raggruppamento delle istituzioni di beneficenza in Verona', cit., R.B.P.,
No. 5, 1899, pp. 402-3; A. Magnani, 'Mali e rimedi della beneficenza pubblica', R.B.P.,
1903, pp. 465-71; G. Lue, 'La necessita di riformare gli attuali sistemi erogativi dei
sussidi elemosinieri', R.B.P., 1904, pp. 417-26; G. Faraggiana, Pauperismo e
beneficenza (Lattes, Turin, 1908), pp. 9-10, 27-28; Idem, La funzione sociale della
Congregazione di Carita (Lattes, Turin, 1908), pp. 8-10.
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rentiers, and persuade the capitalists to pay fair wages 'because otherwise the
workers themselves will compel them by force'. These proposals to reform almoner
charity were also supported with the traditional arguments against the 'professional
poor', the despicable propensity of the lower classes to breed excessively, and be
improvident. But these appeared additional rather than central arguments. Scotti
might have inserted them to make his writings more acceptable to an audience that
was notoriously impermeable to any classist approach. Indeed, at the core of Scotti's
analysis was the awareness of the illusiveness of all hopes that the industrial age
would bring about better living standards for the poor. Quoting from Leo Xlll's
Rerum Novarum and from the Catholic Congress held in Ferrara in 1899, he had no
doubt that in modern society the affluence of the few was built on the slavery of the
many, and made it clear that he did not belong with those who pleased the capitalists
by depicting the labouring masses as optimistic insatiables 60.
We have no evidence on the fate met by Scotti's plans to sanitize Bergamo's slums,
but there is some evidence that the ideas of those who aimed at a better-coordinated
and more selective benefit dispensation were to develop into practical proposals in
Milan. In 1905 the Municipal council and the 'Societa Umanitaria' elaborated a plan
to create a Central office of the charities, modelled on the London Charity
Organization Society, the Parisian Office central des oeuvres de bienfaisance, and the
Elberfeld system - that were broadly based on the model outlined by De Gerando in
De la bienfaisance publique. In the early 1880s the congregation of charity of Milan
already availed itself of a number of 'visitors of the poor' to check the claimants'
needs and provide selective assistance. But as late as 1905 the congregation managed
only twenty-four out of 110 registered charities. Another four were managed by the
Council of the orphanages, three by the Council of the hospitals and seventy-nine
were autonomous. Therefore the mass of the needy got easily lost in such a jungle,
and often did not even know of the existence of many of these autonomous charities,
which in turn - it was alleged - were constantly under siege by hordes of
'professional poor' who knew all the tricks to extract benefits. Some 'uffici
d'indicazione' - aimed at guiding the poor in the search for a charity suitable to their
needs, assisting them in filling in the claim forms, and distinguishing the deserving
claimants from the 'professional poor' - had been set up at the turn of the century
by the 'Unione femminile', the 'Soccorso fraterno pei poveri della citta e sobborghi
60 C. Scotti, 'Alcuni dati statistici sullo stato della classe povera di Bergamo.
Considerazioni e proposte per una graduale riforma della erogazione elemosiniera',
R.B.P., No. 2, 1900, pp. 65-80; No. 3, pp. 146-65. For the housing question see
Catharina Lis, Social change and the labouring poor. Antwerp, 1770-1860 (Yale Univ.
Press, New Haven & London, 1986), pp. 64-83.
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di Milano', and the 'Societa contro I'accattonaggio e per I'assistenza ai poveri', but
they did not cover the whole territory and were not coordinated with one another. The
Central office of the charities proposed by the Commune and the 'Umanitaria' would
provide the entire city with a network of 'uffici d'indicazione' set in each district,
organically coordinated with one another and with the charities. These would be
helped to draw up comprehensive registers of claimants. The deserving poor would
get all the necessary guidance and assistance, and the undeserving ones would be
singled out and forced to stop cheating the charitable organizations 61.
This example seems to indicate that the arguments of those who wanted to modernize
the benefit dispensation system by making it more rigorous and selective responded
to the labour market requirements of the big and fast developing centres 62.
However, in our opinion these arguments contained two principal flaws. One was the
failure to take into account the structure of the charity system, which privileged the
North and the big cities as opposed to the South and the rural areas. The proposition
that relief was everywhere so easy to obtain and abundant as to foster idleness among
the lower classes was indeed questionable, but it provided an easy answer to an
otherwise intractable question. For - and this was the second flaw - people like
Biancoli, Lue, Laschi, Faraggiana, etc. failed to see that the dramatic changes taking
place in Italian society had little to do with the will of the poor to get out of their
trap. The matter was that pauperism was on the increase because Italy was entering
the industrial age. More factories, more internal trade, more capitalistic farming
meant the breaking down of the traditional fabric of society, the social dislocation of
great numbers of people, an overall impoverishment of the labouring masses which
no charity could heal 63. With the exception of Cristoforo Scotti and Pasquale Villari,
all authors whose writings we have examined seemed partly aware of the social
'Relazione-progetto per la costituzione di un consorzio dell'assistenza pubblica e per la
creazione di un Ufficio Centrale delle istituzioni di beneficenza in Milano', R.B.P., 1905,
pp. 95-130; M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 1, pp. 282-3 (28 April 1883). For De Gerando's model
see above, 2.3.
32 For the development of the industrial cities, and the growth of Milan and Turin in
particular see Stefano Merli, Proletariate) di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. II caso
italiano: 1880-1900 (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1972), vol. I, pp. 124-33; Patrizia
Audenino, 'Dati strutturali sulla classe operaia all'inizio del Novecento', in A. Agosti,
G.M. Bravo (eds.), Storia del movimento operaio del socialismo e delle lotte sociali in
Piemonte, vol. 2, L'eta giolittiana, la guerra e il dopoguerra (De Donato, Bari, 1979),
pp. 13-42; F. Delia Peruta, Milano lavoro e fabbrica. 1815-1914 (Angeli, Milan,
1987), pp. 48-96.
63 For an extensive description of the working and living conditions of the early industrial
proletariat see S. Merli, Proletariate di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. II caso
italiano: 1880-1900, vol. I, cit., passim, and partic. pp. 15-16, 31-84, 99-139, 143-
333, 427-57; F. Delia Peruta, Milano lavoro e fabbrica. 1815-1914 , cit., pp. 96-186.
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effects of these changes, but none was able to link them directly and conclusively to
the increase of pauperism. Natural predisposition to idleness, drunkness, vice, and
improvidence remained for most philanthropists the key explanations to pauperism,
which was depicted as a social problem depending upon the shortfalls of the single
individuals, rather than upon the social conditions into which the indivuals were
forced to live. Therefore it was convenient to pretend that almoner relief was
abundant and easily obtainable all over Italy, and forget that as late as 1887 eighteen
hundred communes had no charities at all 64. On the other hand, the argument against
freely available relief and in favour of its rational distribution only to those truly in
need was functional to the requirements of the modern labour market. Such a
discourse had been in fashion amongst philanthropists and economists allover
Western Europe from the eighteenth century onwards, providing the theoretical
framework of charity reforms aimed at freeing labour and keeping wages low 65.
Thereby it was only natural that in the early 1900s most Italian philanthropists
voiced the interests of the capitalistic entrepreneurs, effectively asking the state to
ensure that the labour market be not distorted or hindered by relief
indiscriminately granted , and in the mean time the poor be kept quiet by minimal
benefits. People like Cristoforo Scotti - who reversed the entire argument by
suggesting that recourse to charity was inescapable also for those in work, and that
in the end the real beneficiaries were the rich - were rare. His arguments remind
C. Scotti, 'Alcuni dati statistici sullo stato della classe povera di Bergamo.
Considerazioni e proposte per una graduale riforma della erogazione elemosiniera', cit.,
P. Villari, 'La riforma della beneficenza', cit., pp. 329-36. Trajano Mozzoni,
'Beneficenza libera e beneficenza legale', R.B.P., No. 1, 1896, pp. 25-36, was one of
the very few who stressed the inadequacy of the Italian charity system and its basic
distortions. Like others who favoured legal charity funded by the State, he was much in
favour of the English workhouse system, which he praised as an eminently humane
institution. A partial and contradictory acknowledgement of the social effects of
industrialization can be found in G. Faraggiana, Pauperismo e beneficenza , cit., pp. 10-
12.
6 5 Catharina Lis, Hugo Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe (Harvester
Press, 1982), pp. 194-214; C. Jones, Charity and bienfaisance. The treatment of the
poor in the Montpeiiier region 1740-1815 , cit., pp. 2-3.
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us of Polanyi's, where he stressed that those who solely benefited from the
Speenhamland system were squires and parsons 66.
Still, the relevance for us of these arguments ultimately revolves less around their
origins or motivations, than around the question whether they were consistent with
the real situation of poor relief in Italy. The case of Milan seems to indicate that the
plea for rationalization of out-door relief dispensation was to some extent justified
in some big centres. On the other hand the case of Bergamo indicates that even where
benefit dispensation was apparently 'rationally' managed by a single organization,
the relative number of claimants was high, for low wages and high rents forced many
labourers on to the dole. Those who perpetuated the image of poverty as a moral
disease of society fostered by alms were largely misleading themselves and their
readers. First, because they mechanically super-imposed their model on to the
general situation of the whole peninsula, without taking into account the huge
regional disparities of welfare resources which characterized the system. It might
be that benefits were indiscriminately available in some cities. But certainly that
was not the universal rule. Secondly, because they implicitly assumed that the
spreading of the capitalist mode of production would automatically entail the
amelioration of the living standards of the masses, and hence failed to see - as the
case of Bergamo suggests - that mass pauperization did not depend on benefit
availability, but on those very socio-economic changes on which the philanthropists
based their hopes. More research will, however, be necessary before any more
definite conclusions can be reached on the importance and implications of the plea of
the philanthropists for a selective distribution of relief.
9.6. Conclusions on the act of 1890. Rationalization - or patching up?
Recently the 1890 act has been variously assessed. According to Carlo Arturo
Jemolo the 1890 act on charities was
... among the best achievements of Crispi's legislative action. [...] Law of sound
liberal reform, on the track of those principles which, from the French revolution,
led to liberalism and hence to the nineteenth century State. That law was not based
on sterile doctrine, but on the perfect knowledge of the mechanisms and life of the
6® Karl Polanyi, Origins of our time. The great transformation (Gollancz, London, 1945),
pp. 96, 100-1, 125-6. For Polanyi's view of the allowance system as a major obstacle
to the development of a free labour market see ibidem, pp. 82-90, 95-6. For criticism
of this view, and further discussion of the allowance system see J. R. Poynter, Society
and Pauperism. English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795-1834 (Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1969), pp. 13-7, 45-8, 76-85; R. Romanelli, 'Ritorno a Speenhamland.
Discutendo la legge inglese sui poveri', in Quaderni storici, No. 53, 1983, pp. 625-78,
passim and partic. 625-31, 639-45, 654-57; C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in
pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 197-200.
3 55
Italian welfare foundations. It was a beautiful battle, firmly fought, but without
excesses. A battle fought, and won 87.
Giuseppe Olivero has stressed the importance of the act as the last step of the
extension of state control on ecclesiastical foundations that started with the act of 25
August 1848, expelling the Jesuits from the Savoyard state, and continued with the
Piedmontese acts of 1850 and 1855, and the Italian laws of 1866 and 1867,
suppressing the religious orders and all those ecclesiastical foundations with no care
of souls 68.
Arnaldo Cherubini - whose work is the more complete secondary source on Italian
welfare legislation - has instead based his evaluation on the social implications of
the 1890 act. This established the theoretical supremacy of the lay state in the
welfare field, and a partial and imperfect recognition of the right of the needy to
assistance, but was by no means a departure from a voluntary and charitable
approach to the problems of poverty. In this sense the debate on the bill, within and
without Parliament, abundantly showed that neither the opponents nor the
proponents had any intention of stepping over the traditional boundaries of charity
and philanthropy. The opponents - clericals, moderates, landed aristocracy -
defended their traditional centres of power and political patronage, especially those
forms of charity such as dowry trusts and alms which could be best used as patronage
tokens. The proponents fought to gain control of the vital ganglions of the system,
rather than alter it substantially. The battle was between two groups that basically
agreed on the tenet that poor relief was a matter to be sorted out by charity, not by a
welfare system funded and run by the state. The law was thus a compromise
... between the recognition of the need for state rule and the will to respect
particular autonomies...
Inevitably it was incapable of addressing the requirements of modern society, as its
implementation showed. The much-claimed laicization was more a myth than a
reality, the reforms were slowly and only partially implemented, and so on. In
67 A. C. Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni , cit., p. 350. See also: Id.,
Crispi (Le Monnier, Florence, 1970), pp. 105, 108-9.
68 G. Olivero, 'Gli enti ecclesiastici secolari e regolari', in P. A. D'Avack (ed.), La
legislazione ecclesiastica (Pozza, Vicenza, 1967), pp. 403-4. The same evaluation in L.
Spinelli, 'L'assistenza privata con particolare riguardo agli enti ecclesiastici. (Problemi
e prospettive)', in Studi in memoria di Carlo Esposito (Padua, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 1025-
26.
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short, the industrial bourgeosie chose what seemed the most economic way to squeeze
as much as possible out of the charities 69.
The evaluation recently expressed by Umberto Levra is similar. The 1890 act
enhanced public controls, gave a better definition of the responsibilities of the
charities' administrators, and greater importance to the congregations of charity,
but did not basically depart from the guidelines set by the 1862 act, for it did not
replace the old notion of charity with a modern concept of assistance. No parameters
were given to measure the state of need which gave right to assistance, while this
remained dependent on territorial criteria (domicilio di soccorso). Hence it was
an incisive law [...] but not a radical one, and by no means revolutionary
and it failed to transform the system 70.
The most controversial and least convincing interpretation of the evolution of the
Italian welfare legislation is that of Valeria Fargion 71. The conclusion reached by
Fargion is not different from those of Cherubini and Levra, since she too sees the
1890 act as an attempt to make more of the existing welfare resources without
increasing state welfare expenditure. What is not convincing are the arguments
supporting the model. The target of better exploiting the charitable assets would be
met by reducing administrative autonomy - and hence reducing the misuse of
resources - and by expelling the clergy from the administrative boards. This shift
of attitude, which however precluded any substantial change in welfare policy, is
explained by three interacting factors. The process of nation-building was complete,
and therefore the State could afford further to reduce the traditional role of the
Church within society. The decline of the landed aristocracy and rise of industrial
capitalists enhanced the political influence of liberal and anticlerical lobbies. The
pressure from the lower classes did not stimulate a more advanced social legislation.
The labour movement was in the first stage of its auto-organization and under
violent attack by the State, as it was not institutionalized yet. Thus its targets
concerned exclusively the conquest of better wages and the legitimation of its own
contractual role. Some sectors of the socialist party even regarded any positive
committment of the State in the social field as harmful to the unity of the labouring
69 A. Cherubini, 'Per una storia dell'assistenza pubblica in Italia', R.P.S., No. 4, 1964,
cit., pp. 589-96; No. 5, 1964, cit., pp. 1216-55 (quotation, p. 1231).
70 U. Levra, preface to II catasto delta beneficenza. Ipab e ospedali in Piemonte 1861-1985
(Regione Piemonte, Turin, 1986), p. 15.
7^ V. Fargion, 'L'assistenza pubblica in Italia dall'unita al fascismo: primi elementi per
un'analisi strutturale', Rivista trimestrale di scienza dell'amministrazione, No. 2,
1983, pp. 38-49.
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masses and likely to castrate their revolutionary opportunities. Fargion admits that
the outcome of the act was much below expectation, and that the major beneficiaries
of the reduction of clerical interference in the charities were the local political
cliques, but argues that such results do not affect an assessment of the intrinsic
value of the law, thereby implicitly claiming no other aim for her model but an
assessment of the intentions of the legislator. To our mind this in itself greatly
reduces the usefulness of the model. There are, however, other key points that
appear questionable. One concerns the acritical acceptance of the contention that
more administrative controls result in better use of welfare resources. This was the
central argument used by Crispi to support his bill, but even some of his
contemporaries could see from the outset that arbitrary and perverted use of welfare
resources would not be exorcised by simply strengthening administrative controls.
It follows that half her model is not supported by an independent assessment of the
law under examination, but only based on its value as alleged by the legislator. The
debate on out-door relief dispensation that we have analysed above proved - if
nothing else - that the act in itself offered few practical means for a more rational
use of welfare resources, as this part of the reform depended entirely on local
initiative. Another unconvincing point is the assumption that the 1890 act ousted the
clergy from all administrative boards. This is simply untrue, as a careful reading of
articles 4 and 11 of the act shows. It follows that also the second half of the model is
based on a false assumption taken from the myth surrounding the act. A further weak
point can be found in the first explanation of the timing of the act. It is stated that the
completion and consolidation of the nation-building process allowed a further
secularization of social life. One might wonder how such logic explains the laws of
1866 and 1867, open acts of war against the Church waged in a moment when the
nation-building process was far from complete and consolidated. The concept that a
state wages war in its own backyard only when politically stabilized - used to
explain the timing and content of both the 1862 and 1890 acts - makes perfect sense
in theory, but fails to explain most of the Italian ecclesiastical legislation. Indeed,
the act of 1890 was passed in a climate of internal tension surrounding Church-
State relations, after the failure of the negotiations of 1887. And - just to add
another example - the bills proposed by Nicotera in 1877 were certainly not
dropped for reasons of internal or international instability. Moreover, the second
explanation of the timing of the act is questionable. It is assumed that the act was
entirely and solely functional to the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, whose
influence is seen as definitely prevailing over those of the landed aristocray. On the
contrary, it seems to us that this very act clearly shows that the contrast continued.
35 8
As noted first by deputy De Martino and later by Cherubini, it was the outcome of a
compromise between conflicting groups of interest. The last explanation offered by
Fargion of the timing of the act seems all right, but on the whole, her interpretation
seems to us to suffer from excessive abstractness and insufficient attention paid to
the legislative text and to the historical and ideological complexities of the issue. The
over-simplification of historical events runs parallel to the overlooking of the
ideological terrain that provided the breeding ground of legislative action. It seems to
us that the ideas of Cavour, Minghetti and Crispi about the role of the state in the
economic and social field were far from marginal to the choices made with regard to
the charities' legislation, yet the whole ideological background is ignored by
Fargion's model. Moreover, the model is based on the assumption that the intentions
declared by the legislator coincided with the effective functions of the law. This in
itself does impinge on the intrinsic evaluation of an act. On the whole Fargion's model
appears logically flawed, historically imprecise, and does not tell us much that is
new.
The evaluation expressed by Cherubini best describes the nature of the 1890 act: a
compromise between different elites which ran the country, thereby incapable in
itself of altering the structural Unbalances of the relief system, and pretty
disastrous with respect to its implementation. There remain however several
unanswered questions. Were coordination between the charities and rationalization of
out-door relief distribution achieved? To what extent and where? Did the charities
become publicly accountable in the long term? Was permanent out-relief to the
able-bodied stopped, as article 64 prescribed? Flow did the Italian poor fare -
whithin and without institutions - under the new law? Only fresh research will
tell. The official figures suggest that on the whole little changed, but localized
research in the files of congregations of charity and institutions, and in municipal
archives might reveal a more varied picture, and suggest different interpretations.
Perhaps it might indicate that only selected areas of the country required a more
sophisticated system of relief, and that the 1890 act helped them to build it. The
evidence gathered in this work suggests that the Italian charity system could hardly
be blamed of being over-generous towards the recipients of relief. Despite the
allegations of some philanthropists, it would seem that it was no hindrance to the
labour market. Out relief was very low, and labour supply exceeded demand, as high
emigration rates bear witness. Furthermore, recent research on Italian
industrialization suggests that in the textile sector proto-industrial modes of
production co-existed with the factory system well into the twentieth century. This
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contributed to keep wages down and supplied the entrepreneurs with a flexible
workforce, integrated in rural family-village systems 72.
Perhaps this might explain what intrinsic rationale lay behind the apparently
unworkable solution given by Crispi to Italy's poverty problem. The 1890 act
contained some of the basic ingredients of welfare reform as attempted in other
western European countries between the end of the eighteen and the early nineteenth
centuries: partial centralization of the welfare assets in locally-based
administrations, general lists of the needy to be shared by the charities, prohibition
of permanent benefits to the able-bodied 73. But these ingredients were diluted by a
variety of byzantine legal procedures, and no strict guidelines were set up for relief
dispensation. Moreover, the rules for setting up the administrative boards of the
charities had not been substantially modified. Crispi's reform was an extremely
watered-down version of its models. It provided no supplementary funds through
taxation and depended entirely for its implementation on the will and ability of local
72 Giuseppe Berta, 'Dalla manifattura al sistema di fabbrica: razionalizzazione e conflitti
del lavoro', Storia d'ltalia, Annali, 1 (Einaudi, Turin, 1978), pp. 1081-1106; Brunello
Mantelli, 'Emigrazione', in Storia d'ltalia, 1 (La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1978), pp. 281-
89; M. Paci, 'Mercato del lavoro', Ibidem, 2, pp. 629-36; R. Romanelli, L'ltalia liberate
(1861 -1900), cit., pp. 285-305; Ercole Sori, L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unita alia
seconda guerra mondiale (II Mulino, Bologna, 1979); Salvatore Ciriacono,
'Protoindustria, lavoro a domicilio e sviluppo economico nelle campagne venete in epoca
moderna', in Quademi storici, No. 52 (1983), pp. 57-80; Alain Dewerpe, 'Genesi
protoindustriale di una regione sviluppata: I'ltalia settentrionale', in A. De Clementi
(ed.), La societa' inafferrabile (Lavoro, Rome, 1986), pp. 31-50; Roberto Romano, 'Le
basi sociali di una localizzazione industriale: I'industria cotoniera lombarda', ibidem, pp.
51-62; P. Corner, 'Manodopera agricola e industria manifatturiera nella Lombardia
postunitaria', ibidem, pp. 63-72; S. Ciriacono, 'L'industria a domicilio nel Veneto. Note
a margine di un modello', Ibidem, pp. 73-92 (these four articles originally appeared on
Annates E.S.C., 1984, pp. 896-914; Storia urbana, No. 4, 1978, pp. 1-19; Studi
storici, 1984, pp. 1019-27; A. Lazzarini (ed.), Trasformazioni economiche e sociali
nel Veneto tra XIX e XX secolo (Istituto per le ricerche di storia sociale e di storia
religiosa, Vicenza, 1984), pp. 567-88); S. Woolf, 'The poor, proto-industrialization and
the working class; Italy (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries)' in id., The Poor in Western
Europe (Methuen, 1986), pp. 47-75 and notably 60-71.
73 C. Lis, H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe , cit., pp. 194-214; C.
Lis, Social change and the labouring poor. Antwerp, 1770-1860 , cit., pp. 12-14; M. A.
Crowther, The workhouse system 1834-1929 (Methuen, London, 1983), passim and
partic. pp. 11-29; Michael M. Rose, 'Introduction', in Michael M. Rose (ed.), The poor
and the city: the English poor law in its urban context, 1834-1914 (Leicester Univ.
Press, 1985), pp. 2-13; Keith Gregson, 'Poor law and organized charity: the relief of
exceptional distress in north-east England, 1870-1910', ibidem, pp. 94-125; A. Digby,
British welfare policy. Workhouse to Workfare (Faber, London, 1989), partic. pp. 29-
47, 126-31.The English reform of 1834 theoretically abolished out-door relief, but this
target proved impossible to meet, both in the cities and the countryside. The
implementation of the New Poor Law was particularly awkward in the industrial cities,
for the workhouses could not cope with the high number of unemployed at recession
time. The Poor Law commissioners had to compromise, and flexible temporary out-
relief was eventually set up, with the help of independent charities.
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authorities to overcome the resistance of the traditional monopolists of charity. All
these elements appear as weaknesses, if one has in mind an ideal model of social
justice. But, if we put them into a context where the industrial workforce was still
strongly integrated in an agricultural background likely to provide subsistence
minima and traditional forms of support - family and village solidarity - in case of
recession, and where the labour supply was overabundant, they might be seen in a
different perspective, for rationalization of benefit dispensation was perhaps
necessary only in selected areas. The case of Milan - where city authorities and the
socialists of the Umanitaria joined to perfect the system and make it more rigorously
selective - is an isolated, yet important example. Further research might show that
other fast-developing centres followed the same path. When observed in this
perspective Crispi's reform might appear quite a flexible tool, likely to promote
change only where the labour market required it. Wherever the traditional patterns
of charity were not challenged by economic development, things could well remain as
they stood. The charities would continue to perform their traditional role in
supporting religious worship, or the local political cliques, or both. As to the
surplus poor, who had no job opportunities and no benefits to rely on, they were
already flocking from the country in their hundreds of thousands. Not only they saved
relief funds, but also enriched the country with their remittances. Between 1901
and 1913 these were over a half of the total invisible earnings, which amounted to
12,291 million lire 74. In this perspective the dynamism or inertia of municipal
and provincial councils, congregations of charity, and prefects in concentrating and
transforming the charities would cease to appear as external factors - merely linked
to the good will, honesty, and eagerness of those concerned with enforcing the law -
and would acquire the feature of resultants of those socio-economic forces - not
always pulling all in the same direction - which provided the political setting of
villages, towns, cities, and regions.
Therefore it might turn out that - after all - Crispi's reform offered some means
of achieving a degree of rationalization, provided that the meaning of the term is
defined by relating the effects of the reform to the socio-economic context in which
it was to operate. Undoubtedly the 1890 act was riddled with technical flaws, but
their hindering effect could be misleading if taken in isolation. Certainly they
ensured that only a minimal part of assets changed hands and destination. But it could
be that, being the result of the political compromise on which the law was based,
74 Valerio Castronovo, 'La storia economica', in Storia d'ltalia , vol. 4, part 1 (Einaudi,
Turin, 1975), p. 149; E. Sori, L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unita alia seconda guerra
mondiale , cit., pp. 73-4, 119-23.
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they acted as a system of checks and balances capable of slowing down the
transformation of the system in those areas where a change of the traditional charity
patterns would not be convenient to political and economic elites alike. Hence those
characterstics of the law that seem irrational from an 'external' point of view, would
appear intrinsically rational from an 'internal' point of view. That is, from a point
of view that takes into account not only the results of the reform, but also the
politico-economical context in which it operated. That context was not one of uniform
and fast economic growth, but of highly differentiated economic zones, where fast
industrialization co-existed with proto-industrial forms of production, or lived
next to nearly pre-capitalistic economies. Trasformismo - the indelible scourge of
Italian politics - was the parliamentary expression of that structural contradiction.
And a welfare law born of it necessarily bore its stigma. But as trasformismo had its
structural function and raison d'etre, so did the 1890 act. But this is an hypothesis.
Only further research at local level may confirm or disprove it.
Was Crispi fully aware of the implications of his choices and decisions? His
determination to streamline the benefits doled out in Palermo suggests that the
prohibition to the congregations of charity to grant permanent benefits to the able-
bodied, and the stipulation that charities and congregations must share their
recipients' lists, were not - in his intention - marginal issues. Perhaps he
overestimated the impact of these and other stipulations, and failed to realize that
they were not enough to obtain a complete overhauling of the benefit distribution
mechanisms. One may spot a contradiction in all this. For Crispi set out with the bold
intention of modernizing and rationalizing the system, but chose a pretty traditional
strategy, as he did not depart from the guidelines set by Victor Amadeus II, Charles
Albert, and Cavour. The substance of these guidelines was that the State must oversee
welfare administration, but never directly interfere with it, for State funds must
not be made available to relieve poverty. If it is true that Crispi drew inspiration
from a variety of models of European charity reform, it is also true that he never
departed from the principles laid down by his political ancestors. By making
charities pay for the extra-welfare expenditure required by growing social needs,
he stuck to the old Piedmontese tenets of sound domestic economy. By attempting to
force confraternities and devotional foundations to foot the welfare bill, he completed
- at least in theory - that Church asset-stripping exercise which runs through the
Risorgimento as a red thread. In this sense Crispi patched up his reform in the best
Piedmontese tradition, probably pushed by a very personal and somewhat obsessive
hatred for the excesses of southern devotionalism.
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As some critics pointed out, the reform fell short of redressing the structural
Unbalances of the charitable assets distribution throughout the country. This could
be obtained only by injecting fresh resources into the weak points. But, one could
argue, how would tax-payers and Parliament have reacted to a hypothetical bill that
proposed pumping more public funds into a relief system which - on the whole -
appeared prosperous and extremely well-endowed? The universal complaint was
that local authorities already spent too much on welfare, and the general mood was to
praise the big figures revealed by the statistics, ignoring their real message. To
Crispi's credit, one may say that the task of modernizing the Italian charity system
without forking out a penny of State funds, was of biblical proportions. As for the
criticism uttered in the early 1900s by Biancoli and his fellows of the Rivista della
Beneficenza Pubblica, that the law was not radical enough, and that the charities
should be stripped of their autonomy with no regard for appeal procedures, it was
probably not totally unfounded, but it sounded a bit hypocritical, as it came from the
very journal which had unconditionally defended the autonomy of the charities for
over thirty years. Again, Crispi's bill encountered strong opposition in Parliament,
and to overcome it he had to water it down considerably and threat to call the general
elections. Had his bill been more radical - which he would have probably loved - the
chances of success would have been very slim indeed. Crispi was determined to
reshape the charities to the requirements of the modern economy. But the
constraints imposed by the powerful charity lobby, and the conflicts between the
political forces which kept him in power suggested cautious action. So he created a
hibrid mechanism whereby the affluent and fast developing areas of the peninsula
would eventually get a more rational system of relief, whereas those areas lagging
behind in pre-capitalistic fashion would not. In this sense the 1890 act might be
seen as a first timid step towards rationalization. But only further research will
show to what extent this hypothesis is sustenable.
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10. General conclusions.
Before unification Italy was an administrative and legislative mosaic. Charities
administration was no exception. Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Duchies of Modena and
Parma had broadly similar systems, in that the charities were autonomous but
subject to some form of public control. In Lombardy state interference went further,
for the charities were administered by state officials, and the state provided a wider
range of welfare services. In the Papal States the clergy was fully in control and
public accountability did not exist. The Bourbon charity system was theoretically
highly sophisticated, but practically in a considerable mess. Charitable and pious
foundations were supposed to finance the welfare services indirectly through
contributions (ratizzi) to the provincially-based Councils of the Hospices, and
directly via the Local Welfare Administrations, also called Communal Committees. In
practice the clergy's determination to regain the terrain lost under French rule
meant that from the 1830s welfare expenditure was progressively squeezed in
favour of devotional duties. This was a consequence of the peculiar role of the
southern charities within an ecclesiastical structure which provided little or no
independent sources of income for the maintenance of priests, the supply of holy
furnishings, and the upkeep of churches. Furthermore, the Councils of the Hospices
themselves were hotbeds of maladministration and corruption, and hence incapable
of bringing the charities to heel, or to dispense welfare services in an equitable way.
In 1859 and 1860 the provisional governments in central and southern Italy were
soon faced with major social problems. Their immediate response was to look for
administrative solutions. The reordering of the administrative framework of poor
relief would in itself improve the efficiency of welfare organization and hence the lot
of the poor. Within this approach there were however, remarkable variations.
Lombardy, the first area directly annexed by Piedmont, offered an alternative to the
Piedmontese model. It was a tightly State-controlled system, shaped by the Theresian
and Napoleonic reforms, and oriented towards the same sort of rationalization
pursued throughout Europe during the industrial revolution. Whatever its efficiency
- which is hard to assess given the present lack of thorough studies - this model was
found unacceptable by the Piedmontese Council of State on the grounds that it entailed
excessive state interference, and it was scrapped without further consideration.
Central Italy was the setting of some experiments during the relatively long period
of provisional rule. In Tuscany Ricasoli left things as they were, and Farini in
Emilia immediately implemented the Piedmontese legislation. But the governors of
the Romagna, the Marches, and Umbria showed greater ambition and independence.
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They shaped their welfare decrees on the Napoleonic model, attempting a radical
restructuring aimed at centralizing the welfare funds and laicizing their
administration. Albicini, Valerio, and Pepoli behaved as representatives ante
litteram of those capitalist interests which were scarcely present in the area, and
singled out the pervasive influence of the Catholic Church as the major obstacle to
economic and social development. The plans elaborated by the welfare central
committee of Bologna had no practical consequences, yet they witnessed to a serious
concern of the local bourgeosie to set up a system of efficiently-run and selective
out-relief. The experiments taking place in central Italy were short-lived, but
touched a very sensitive point. They proved that clerical power was very strong, and
that the success of any restructuring of the charity system depended on the ability of
the new rulers to oust the clergy from the administrative boards and the internal
management of the welfare institutions.
In the South, first Garibaldi, and later Farini, Mancini, Lamarmora and Cialdini,
faced a medieval reality where the charities were integrated in an unique
ecclesiastical structure which was largely terra incognita . The solutions attempted
by Garibaldi and his acolytes to tackle Neapolitan poverty showed that they lacked
both theoretical and practical preparation, although they were partly aware of the
social dimensions of their military enterprise. In the end popular hunger for land
and social justice degenerated into banditry and widespread revolts - dutifully and
bloodily repressed by the Piedmontese army - whilst the southern provisional
governments confined their efforts to try and trim the charities' devotional
expenditure, sanitize the Councils of the Hospices' staff, and reduce the fixed
benefits. This strategy indicated that some of the critical issues of the Bourbon
welfare system had been grasped, but its largely unsuccessful implementation
showed how resilient the old structures were, and how frail and unprepared the new
administration supposed to deal with them was. The southern charities were another
world. Their resilience depended upon their being profoundly intertwined with an
ecclesiastical structure that probably had no equal throughout Western Europe.
Thirty years later, statistical evidence would prove that nothing much had changed.
The whole problem of poor relief probably deserved more attention than the scanty
one usually paid to it by the makers of the Risorgimento. The origins and
development of the Piedmontese charity legislation showed that the Savoyard State
had endured a long struggle to bring its own charities under partial control. The
evidence emerged during the provisional rule suggested that the Piedmontese
legislative model could work in Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Duchies of Modena and
Parma. But in the Bourbon and Papal States it was a recipe for disaster. The
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Southern charities in particular required studies whose importance was not
perceived either by democrats or moderates. However, there was no time to study.
By 1861 all experiments set up by the provisional governments drew to a close.
With the passage to central rule, the dogma of the respect of the charities' autonomy
was imposed almost everywhere under the form of the Piedmontese legislation. Only
in the South provisional legislation remained in force. During the Spring of 1861
Minghetti proposed a cautious plan of administrative de-centralization which
included a bill on charities. This was far from revolutionary, for Minghetti was a
strong advocate of private charity. Nevertheless, this bill proposed a system of local
checks and balances which might have enhanced the chances of forcing public
accountability upon the charities. But turmoil in the South made even cautious de¬
centralization appear exceedingly risky. Minghetti's charities' bill was shelved
alongside the others.
However, Parliament felt that a new bill on charities was needed. This was drafted
again by Minghetti, but this time it contained no devices capable of ensuring public
accountability. He even scrapped the auditing of budgets, for he strongly believed
that private charity was the best panacea for poverty. And private charity must be
free, budget auditing was an excessive infringment of autonomy. His fellow
moderates by and large shared Minghetti's fondness of private charity. This could be
erratic and indiscriminate, but a solution to this had been found by Baron De
Gerando: public bienfaisance, whereby independent charity agents would come
together in an orderly and selective system of public relief. Old Piedmontese
moderates like Petitti di Roreto, and even Cavour, held different views. The former
advocated a mixed system, where the state would set up and fund workhouses to stamp
out vagrancy, while private charity - monitored by the state - took care of out-door
relief. In his youth Cavour had been a great admirer of Senior and Chadwick and their
workhouse system. But he was uncertain whether such a system - which he deemed
humane and fair - could be afforded by Piedmont. As late as 1858 he reckoned that
the Piedmontese economy was not ready for such a reform, which required a high
level of industrialization. Over the years he had shown himself to favour a publicly
accountable system of private charity, in which the state would enjoy a greater
reforming power than that which Minghetti was prepared to grant.
In 1862, during the parliamentary debate, some deputies of the Left proposed
amendments to enhance the powers of the congregations of charity and municipal
councils, and re-introduce budget audits. These were not despicable suggestions. But
the fact that no democratic deputy raised any of the many questions ignored by the
bill - such as the treatment of inmates in institutions, the mechanisms of out-relief
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dispensation, the question of poverty itself - suggested that they too perceived
private charity as the best solution to poverty, and could not see that beyond the
issue of sound financial administration lay a variety of problems and miseries not
addressed by the act. This,together with a previous bill on charities proposed by the
democrat Ricciardi, and the whole handling of the social question by the democrats
during the unification process, showed how little the Right and Left differed on
matters of poverty, welfare, and social justice. Also the administrative lesson
emerging from the experience of the provisional governments was not fully debated
in Parliament. The events of 1859 and 1860 seemed far away, already enshrouded in
the mist of the past. Parliament appeared incapable of using those experiences in a
constructive way. Consequently, the act of 3 August 1862 did not adequately address
the issues of public accountability, clerical interference, collusion between charity
administrators and local authorities, and completely ignored those issues related to
the treatment of the recipients of charity within and without institutions. It was the
best deal which the clergy and local monopolists of charity could get - although they
did not immediately grasp how lucky they were.
The gap between legislators and local administrators entailed a waste of knowledge
and experience whose price would be paid dearly over the next thirty years. In
addition, the unwillingness of the government to upset the charities' autonomy, and
to re-think their role within the country's socio-economic structure also indicated
how distant the requirements of a modern industrial economy still were. The new
State preferred to leave the charities to their traditional masters - clergy and local
notables - rather than bring them under its own control, for the assumption of poor
relief administration by the central and local authorities entailed high expenditure
and small advantages. Whether relief was too abundant and indiscriminate, or too
scarce, did not matter, as long as the poor posed no excessive threat to internal
stability. And wherever they did - as in the South - the army would take care of
them. By leaving the Church in charge of poor relief, Italy's founding fathers chose
what appeared at the moment a minor evil, a small contradiction. The contradiction
widened when the country started to industrialize. Then, the administrative and
social flaws of the 1862 act came under scrutiny.
It became increasingly evident that the lack of sound administrative controls
allowed unscrupulous administrators to waste and plunder the charitable assets,
while the financial committment of the local administrations towards welfare kept
growing. The prefects appeared unable to exert effective control. Their offices were
chronically understaffed, and there was too much on their plate. The Provincial
Deputations were not only inept and understaffed, but were also often directly
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involved in swindles and corruption. Mismanagment was only one aspect of the
problem. Poor treatment of the inmates of institutions was the other, but this
attracted much less attention, both in the press and the ministerial quarters. From
the mid 1870s politicians, ministry officials, and philanthropists alike, started to
request administrative reform. First came Cantelli's ill-fated circulars. Then
followed Nicotera's bill, and Depretis' draft of mini-reform. They all came to
nothing, for resistance to reform was strong, despite much talk. Flence Depretis
resorted to an enquiry, to find out the truth about the charities, and perhaps to grant
them some more years of respite. Giuseppe Bodio, head of the Central Statistical
Office, suggested sampling and selective in-loco investigations. Most Royal
Commissioners were suspicious of such methods. So they chose to investigate every
single charity in the land by means of bulky questionnaires, and it took them almost
ten years to gather and digest the data. They also failed to elaborate part of them,
which perhaps still lies in some dusty ministerial cellar. This was a pity, for these
were data about the treatment of inmates and levels of out-door relief, that could
have been very interesting.
However, the statistics were also interesting. They showed that allegations about
excessive administrative expenditure and inefficient patrimonial management were
not wholly unfounded. They also showed that the southern charities still retained a
relevant function within that ecclesiastical structure, and that charitable assets
were greatly fragmented into a myriad of tiny foundations, and unevenly distributed
throughout the country. Welfare resources tended to concentrate in the North and the
big cities. Rural areas in general, and the South lagged far behind. The message from
the statistics was not one to justify optimism, if read carefully. But - with a few
exceptions - the press preferred to comment only the big initial figures. The
charities were rich, the patrimony of the poor was safe in their hands.
The Royal Commission also produced a very moderate and conservative bill, which
Crispi scrapped altogether. He was tired of statistics, and wanted to get down to
business. His act on charities contained radical features as well as byzantine
procedures. Its implementation did not seem to have changed the picture very much,
but only further research could clarify this point. What seems plain is that it was a
compromise between those economic forces which required a free workforce
efficiently controlled and selectively cared for, and those which had an interest in
perpetuating pre-industrial forms of production, and were opposed to radical
changes. The long-lasting debate among philanthropists about the need to coordinate
the action of the charities, and rationalize the distribution of relief, suggests that
pressure in this sense was considerable. But the long time elapsed between
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Nicotera's bill and Crispi's act, and the strong opposition aroused within and without
Parliament to every project of welfare reform, indicate that the conflict between
industrialists and landowners was even deeper. Crispi drew inspiration from the
Western European models of charity reform, particularly the Napoleonic ones, but
stuck to the old Piedmontese principle that no poor tax should be introduced to
compensate for the system's unbalances. Hence a law that imposed public
accountability upon the charities, forced them to surrender their autonomy and
regroup under centralized administration, and compelled them to assist the poor only
when the latter where unable to work, but did not redress the uneven distribution of
welfare resources. Official publications suggest that results fell short of the
expectations of the legislator, for implementation appeared generally slow and
patchy. Finally, we have hypothetical^ argued that the new law might have favoured
a certain level of rationalization wherever the economy was fast growing and
charities were rich and abundant, whereas it probably made no substantial
difference where charities were few and poor and the economy was stagnant. If future
research proves this hypothesis is tenable, then it will be correct to say that the
1890 act was a timid step towards relief rationalization. A rationalization geared to
the north-south, rich-poor, developing-underdeveloped division, which was






1. Beaaarv in the Piedmontese provinces of Cuneo. Alba. Mondovi and Saluzzo in
1832.
Source: A.S.T., Sez. I, Segreteria Interni, Opere Pie in genere, Statistiche e notizie,
M.15.
Stato dimostrativo dei poveri tanto abili, quanto inabili riconosciuti esistere in
ciascun Comune delta Provincia di Cuneo e dei mezzi che risultano per procurare ai
medesimi il necessario sostentamento.
Id. Id., provinces of Alba, Mondovi and Saluzzo.
The four Stati were sent by the Governor of the Division of Cuneo (Ufficio 3°,
No.677) on 30 March 1832 to the First Secretary of State for the the Interior. In
his letter the Governor said that he had enforced the orders given with Circular 29
October 1831 (No.1608, Gabinetto Particolare) [No record of that Circular is
preserved in the file]. The collection of data and drawing up of the Stati was a
personal initiative of the Governor, who thought that his findingd could be of interest
to his superiors. The gathering of data took a long time, and was far from complete:
Sebbene attualmente siano mancanti ancora molti schiarimenti per dare una giusta
idea della situazione di tutte le Comuniti della Divisione, cio non di meno essendosi
riuniti nella massima parte gli materiali occorrenti ho creduto di non differire piu
oltre la formazione e la spedizione dei qui compiegati quattro Stati.... Non dird gia
che detti Stati offrano un quadro esatto della Provincia cui si riferiscono, e
convengo anzi esservi in essi non poche imperfezioni, giacche alcune Comunitd non
hanno dichiarato il numero preciso dei loro poveri, altre hanno dato un
interpretazione chi piu chi meno estesa a questa espressione, limitandola le une ai
soli mendicanti, ed estendendola alcune altre a tutti coloro che sono privi di beni di
fortuna, e senza veruna professione, cioe i semplici giornalieri. Finalmente neanche
le risorse per provvedere al mantenimento dei rispettivi poveri vennero ovunque
spiegate in modo ben chiaro. Tuttavia siccome in siffatte materie resta impossibile
d'ottenere una precisione matematica, ed ordinariamente si cercano solo delle
nozioni approssimative, cosl credo che gli Stati da me spediti a V.S. III.ma
potranno bastare per metterla in grado di concepire una ragionevole opinione, e
portare un fondato giudizio sulla condizione in cui trovasi ciascuna delle quattro
Provincie di questa Divisione sotto il rapporto dei rispettivi poveri...
The Secretary for the Interior welcomed the initiative of the Governor of Cuneo: a
note written on his letter on the 2nd of April 1832 said that such work would be used
as a speciman for an inquiry to be carried out each year before winter and intented to
provide the Ministry with the necessary information to set up appropriate
provisions. However, we found no evidence that such statistical exercises took place.
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Table 1. Number of able-bodied and disabled beggars. Division of Cuneo, 1832.
Province Comm.No. Population Able-bod. % Disabled % No information from
CUNEO 60 144,184 5,021 3.48 4,584 3.18 4 Communes
ALBA 77 105,670 1 ,849 1.75 2,275 2.15 6 Inf. gen. vague
MONDOVI' 71 129,521 1,383 1.07 1,203 0.93 _
SALUZZO 52 1 30,650 8,542 6.54 4,025 3.08 1 Commune
TOTALS 260 510,025 16,795 3.3 12,087 2.4 11 Communes
Table 2. Provisions available for disabled and unemployed in sixty communes of the
Division of Cuneo, 1832.
CUNEO % ALBA % MONDOVI' % SALUZZO %
Communes able to provide
work and alms to all poor 43 71 .6 45 58.4 46 64.8 41 78.8
Communes able to help the
disabled. Able-bod. migrate 3 5 1 1.9
Communes without means:
begging licences inevitable 2 3.3 6 7.8 5 7 1 0 1 9.2
Communes without poor 1 2 20 26 33.8 20 28.2 _ _
Totals 60 99.9 77 1 00 71 1 00 52 99.9
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Table 3. Begging licences issued in 1832 to able-bodied and disabled beggars in
twenty-four communes of the Division of Cuneo.
B E G GSING L I C E N C E S
PROV. COMMUNE POP. ABLE-BOD. % DISABLED % TOT. BEGG %
CUNEO CASTELMAGNO 1,129 _ _ 6 0.53 6 0.53
VOTTIGNASCO 660 _ _ 21 3.18 21 3.18
ALBA BALDISSERO 1,020 31 3.04 16 1 .57 47 4.61
CERESOLE 1,600 100 6.25 90 5.63 190 11.88
MONFORTE 1,981 7 0.35 3 0.15 10 0.5
MONTALDO ROER O 1,330 15 1.13 26 1 .95 41 3.08
MONTEU ROERO 2,800 34 1.21 20 0.71 54 1.92
ROCCHETTE BELE O 350 4 1.14 11 3.14 14 4.28
MONDOVI' CASTELNUOV( ) 323 8 2.48 3 0.93 11 3.41
MAGLIANO 1,800 20 1.11 10 0.55 30 1.66
MARSAGLIA 900 10 1.11 6 0.66 16 1.77
MOROZZO 1,494 100 6.69 10 0.67 110 7.36
PRIERO 1,039 7 0.67 13 1 .25 20 1.92
SALUZZO SALUZZO 11,72 3 1,300 11.08 500 4.26 1,800 4.26
CARDE' 1,429 208 14.55 20 1.4 228 15.95
COSTIGLIOLE 2,015 70 3.47 25 1 .24 95 4.71
FRASSINO 1,369 _ _ 8 0.58 8 0.58
LAGNASCO 1,555 20 1 .3 22 1 .41 42 2.71
MARTINIANA 1,405 _ _ 40 2.85 40 2.85
PAESANA 4,397 220 5 250 5.68 470 10.69
RACCONIGI 8,842 150 1 .7 200 2.26 350 3.96
SAVIGLIANO 16,031 1,750 10.92 315 1 .96 2,065 12.9
VERZUOLO 3,264 200 6.13 _ _ 200 6.13
VILLANOVASOLAF I 1,466 200 13.64 180 12.28 380 25.92
TOTAL 69,927 4,454 6.37 1,795 2.57 6,429 8.94
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Appendix 4.
1. Projects elaborated bv the Welfare Committee of Boloana in the Autumn of
1959-
Sources:
A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 102: Bologna, Governo delle
Romagne, Ministero..., cit., Prot. No. 335, minutes of the meeting 8 Oct. 1859 and
enclosure E (Massei's draft: Progetto di Legge o Decreto per la definitiva
organizzazione delta Pubblica Beneficenza nelle Romagne)-, Prot. No. 336, minutes of
the meeting 21 Oct. 1859 and enclosure A; Prot. No. 337, minutes of the meeting 26
Oct. 1859 and enclosure A (Bondi and Marescotti's draft); Prot. No. 338, minutes of
the meeting 29 Oct. 1859; f. 102-: Vice-Royal Decrees issued by Eugene Napoleon,
Prefettura del Reno, 17 July 1807: Istituzione della Congregazione di Carita per
Bologna ; and 5 Sept. 1807: Nuovo ordinamento dell'Amministrazione di Pubblica
Beneficenza per tutto il Regno ; f.2: enclosure B (Massei's Project of Regulations);
enclosure A (Bondi's draft).
The first draft by Massei was preceeded by a preface in fifteen points, spelling out
the principles on which the whole Committee agreed. The solution of the poverty
problem required direct Government action. This must be directed both to ensure a
uniform and proper administration of the charitable patrimonies, and to obtain a
correct distribution of relief. Since both centralization and de-centralization were
largely defective, the best system was a middle way between the two, in order to
harmonize the administration of local needs and situations. A better administration
would increase the income of the charities; but this would always be inferior to
needs - given the absence of general statistics distinguishing between the true and the
false poor. Indeed, the present increase of beggary was precisely due to the lack of
such a distinction. The imposition of a local poor-tax was regarded as dangerous
because it was likely to damage the poorer Communes. Long-term leases were
recommended as the best system to ensure a maximum constant income from the
charities' landed properties, since it left the administrators free from duties other
than the distribution of relief. The following diagram synthesizes the basic features
of the first draft of the bill in twenty one articles elaborated by Massei.
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Fir3t Ma33ei Bill - Ba3ic features.
ALL CHARITIES ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTIONS.
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A comparison between this draft and the inventory-summary of the Decrees
concerning the Congregations of Charity issued by Eugene Napoleon in 1807 (Albicini
requested the inventory from the Intendant of Bologna on 21 September 1859, and
returned it on 6 December), shows substantial, but not absolute similarities. The
part concerning the three Sections and their administrative rules was identical,
while that concerning the Congregations, was a re-elaboration, since in the
Napoleonic decrees there was no mention of different levels of Congregations
implying different tasks. Also the Committee for the Statistic of the Poor was a new
feature, which was much appreciated by Marescotti during the discussion that
followed the reading of the draft. Conversely, the part concerning the Congregations
of Charity was criticized because it differed from the model outlined in the decree of
19 August, and was likely to delay their establishment. Marescotti also suggested the
abolition of all administrative norms, since they would fit better into the
forthcoming Regulations for the Congregations, rather than in the bill. At the third
meeting of the Welfare Committee, held on 21 October 1859, Massei produced a
second draft, which was slimmer (17 articles instead of 21), and contained no
details of the administrative rules, as suggested by Marescotti. There was one
novelty: the Parish Congregations, whose functions however were unspecified. The
diagram below synthesizes the basic features of this second draft.
Second M833ei Bill (modified version of the first)
Relief distri¬
bution etc.
A3 i n fi rst
draft.
MINISTRY OF W E L F A R E ... As i n fi rst draft.
Central Congregations of Charity...
A3 in fir3t draft.
/ \ \
\ Z
Subsidiary Congregations of Charity...
A3 in fir3t draft.
I n each town and village Committee for the Statistics
of the Poor... A3 in first draft.
All charities are grouped in three 3ection3, a3 in
fi r3t draft.
Municipal Congreg. No neec
where there are Central or
Subsidiary Congregations.
NEW. In each Parish a Pa¬
rochial Congregation of Cha
rity formed by the Parish




Again the Committee's conclusions were not completely favourable to Massei's
proposals. His draft still differed in some parts from the guidelines given by the
decree of 19 August. Marescotti and Bondi were hence asked to modify it accordingly.
Only Albicini, Bondi, Marescotti and the Secretary Ferrari were present at the
fourth meeting, held on 26 October. Massei was absent: probably his pride had been
hurt by the little enthusiasm aroused by his innovative ideas. However he had
entrusted a newly elaborated Project of Regulations for the Congregations of Charity
to the Secretary, who read them to the commissioners after they had examined the
draft re-elaborated by Bondi and Marescotti. This was a much simplified version of
Massei's drafts, with some novelties. The various levels of Congregations were
eliminated, but the Congregations of the cities chief of Province retained the
particular functions which Massei had attributed to them, plus that of assessing and
imposing a local poor-tax, a feature that Massei had explicitly ruled out, for fear of
penalizing the poorest Communes. The system appeared simplified but also more
rigid, since many functions that in Massei's system were flexibly distributed at the
various levels, were now all centralized in the Cities chief of province. The Parish
Congregations were maintained and - an interesting novelty - they assumed the
function of those local Committees for the Statistics of the Poor that in the two Massei
drafts had been left unconnected to the rest of the structure. Yet how the statistical
information would flow from the basis to the top was not specified. The part
concerning the three sections, into which all charities should be grouped, was not
modified. The other novelty was the unspecified role of Welfare Inspectors,
attributed to the Central Committee's members. The welfare inspectors were not




The draft Regulations produced by Massei was much more interesting. Despite the
title, this was the only organic bill preserved among the minutes of the Committee's
meetings. The general structure, while imperfectly outlined in the two previous
drafts was now clearly defined as a comprehensive and flexible network of
Congregations able to adapt itself to the local situation. A hamlet would have a Parish
Congregation, sufficient to provide all basic relief and assistance; a big town would
enjoy a far more complex Central Congregation, which would coordinate rather than
centralize the relief distribution. We will firstly look, with the help of a diagram, at
the general structure of the system.
Ma33ei '3 draft Regulations for the Congregations of Charitu established
bu Decree^ 9 August 1 859. General structure.
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At the core of the structure was the Parish Congregation where the issue of the
poor-tax was solved by tranforming it into a voluntary contribution. The Parish
Congregation functioned as a Statistical Committee, directly supplying the data to the
nearest Central or Subsidiary Congregation, and assessing on that basis the relief
quota necessary for the Parish; it managed the distribution of relief according to
local needs, provided jobs for the unemployed and basic sanitary assistance. How all
this was to be achieved is better understood from the following diagram.
Ma33ei draft Regulations for the Congregations of Charitu established
bu decree. 19 August 1859.
Structure and functions of the Parish Congregations.
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Another important structural novelty of this system concerned the internal
organization of the Central, Subsidiary and Municipal Congregations. In all previous
drafts the charities were said to be grouped in three Sections unconnected with the
structure of the Congregations. Integration was now achieved by dividing the
Congregations vertically. The members of each Congregation (excluded the Parochial
ones that had their distinct features) were divided into three groups, each attending
to the administration of one Section. This structure was mirrored in the Committee of
the Three, where in turn all the Congregation's members would collaborate. No
member could stay idle, or merely attend the general meetings. The diagram below
illustrates the concept.
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Ma33ei '3 draft Regulations for the Congregations of Charity e3tabli3hed
by decree, 1 9 August 1859.
Ba3ic structure and functions of the Central. Sub3idiaru and Municipal Congregations.
SUBSIDIARY CONGREGATIONS.
Formed by: the Sub-lntendant
(Pres.); the Bi3hop or higher
ecclesiastic; the tovn'3 Mayor;
the Mayors of all dependent
Communes and Appodiati; a
fixed number of appointed
members.
CENTRAL CONGREGATIONS.
Formed by: the Intendant (Pre3.)
the Bi3hop;one Provincial Admi
ni3trator; the Chief Town'3 Ma¬
yor; the Mayors of all dependent
town3 and Appodiati; a fixed num
ber of appointed members.
MUNICIPAL CONGREGATIONS.
Formed by: all the local Magi¬
strates; the representatives
of the towns/ villages; the
Cathedral Priest;
i n the country-3ide:
the local Magistrates and the
Vicario Foraneo.
The members, chosen by the Intendant and appointed by the Minister of Welfare,
3tay i n office for a maxi mum of three years and are renewed by a thi rd each year.
Duties of the Congregations: administration of all Charities; control of the Charities'
employees; rendering of budgets and accounts each year; distribution of relief.
To better perform these ta3k3, each Congregation id divided i nto three Sections. Each
Section is attended by a proportional number of members of the Congregation, and draws
up a partial budget every year.
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Finally, the Central and Subsidiary Congregations had two additional features which
corresponded to those of the Parish Congregations: the Permanent Committee of the
Statistics of the Poor and the Aid Central Office, a sort of rudimentary Health Centre.
Mas3ei '3 draft Regulations for the Congregations of Charitu established bu
decree. 1 9 August 1 859.
Central and Subsidiary Congregations. Particular 3tructure3 and functions.
PERMANENT COMMUTE OF THE
STATISTICS OF THE POOR.
Formed by 2 or 3 people. Sits in the
C. of C. Office. Keeps up to date the Sta¬
tistics of the poor in 3trict collabora¬
tion with the Parish Deputations. Sup-
lies Sections and Congregations with the
i nformation to 833es3 the nature, dura¬
tion and quantity of relief. The Commit¬
tee also proposes relief during the first
gat he ri ng of the Statistics. Once the ba¬
sis of the Statistics i3 established, the
proposal of relief i3 entrusted to the
Parish Congregations.
AID CENTRAL OFFICE.
Formed by an adequate number of
paid doctors. Depends on the H03pital3
Section. The Aid Central Office 3it3 in
the office of the Congregation of Chari¬
ty, i3 open 24 hours a day, i ncl udi ng
festivities, and provides the sick poor
with health care at home and in
hospital.
This Project, equipped with detailed administrative and disciplinary rules that we
will spare the reader, did not attract much interest. Those present agreed that the
Marescotti-Bondi draft and Massei's Regulations should be amalgamated into one
single document. Bondi, entrusted with the re-elaboration, was recommended to
discard all hierarchical relationships between the Congregations (i.e. the flexible
elements of the system), and all details concerning the Parish Congregations (i.e. the
very core of the system), which would become optional. The concept of Welfare
Inspectors was to be developed instead. Thus all the originality of Massei's Project
was dismissed as mere 'detail'. The last two meetings took place on 29 October and
14 November. During the first, Bondi read his new draft, which was a very limited
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version of Massei's Project. All flexible links between the various levels of
Congregations had gone. The Parish Congregations were made optional and deprived of
their specific functions and structure: they were generically supposed to collect
alms, distribute relief, etc.; no trace remained of their key position in the gathering
of the Statistics of the Poor. Also the local and Central Aid Offices had disappeared,
while the Medical Deputations were maintained as features to be decided by the single
Congregations. These were still vertically divided into three Sections: a happy idea of
Massei that was appreciated. As instructed, Bondi had developed the concept of
Welfare Inspectors, taking it almost identically from the decree of 5 September
1807. The only difference was the addition of one Inspector for the City of Bologna.
Bondi '3 draft Regulations for the Congregations of Charity established
bg decree. 1 9 Auqu3t 1 859.
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2. Boloana and Pesaro. Good will and aborted reforms
The vicissitudes of the congregations of charity of Bologna and Pesaro exemplify the
early problems faced by the congregations in reorganizing the charities. The story of
the congregation of Bologna belongs to the transition period between provisional and
central rule, and typifies the political conflicts that arose at this stage. The parallel
story of Pesaro already has the taste of the early post-unification period, when the
new administrative mechanisms were starting to move and when everything looked
excitingly fresh.
The city council of Bologna had appointed the congregation of charity only on 1
December 1859, after numerous entreaties and reprimands by Albicini and the
Intendant. The delay was caused by the difficulty of finding honest and skilled citizens
who were prepared to undertake a major responsibility that would certainly involve
open conflicts with the clergy - a situation which, as we saw, was by no means
peculiar to Bologna 1. It appears that all the members of the congregation rapidly
resigned. The new members started to work only in June 1860; and, even then, the
congregation did not succeed in taking control of all Bologna's charities. According to
Renato Eugenio Righi - who unfortunately does not quote his sources - it actually
managed only forty-eight foundations and twenty welfare establishments out of a total
of 140 charities; but later evidence suggests that the number of independent
charities was much higher 2. Nevertheless, when the act of 20 November1859 was
enforced, the Interior Ministry ordered this congregation to continue its activity
under the supervision of the Provincial Deputation. A second congregation was to be
1 A.S.T., Sez. Riun., Gov. Prow., Romagne, M. 45, f. 2: the Welf. Min., Bologna, 18 Nov.
1859, No.265 to the Int., Bologna, cit.; the Town Council, Bologna, 24 Nov. 1859, No.
4666, to the Int., Bologna; the latter, Bologna, 27 Nov. 1859, No. 6371, Sect. 1, to the
Welf. Min., Bologna; the latter, Bologna, 29 Nov. 1859, No. 289 to Farini, Modena;
printed manifesto announcing the establishment of the Congregation on 1st Dec. 1859
and minute of letter by Albicini, Bologna 6 Dec. 1859, No. 320, to the Int., Bologna.
Copies of all these but the last two documents also in A.S.T., Sez.I, Gov. Prow., Prov.
deU'Emilia, M.I., Gabinetto, M. 13, f. 42.
2 The original members, according to the manifesto quoted above were: Francesco
Argelati, Rodolfo Baroni, Severino Bonora, Pietro Buratti, Pietro Gamberini, Luigi
Loup, Alessandro Morelli, Gaetano Persiani, Luigi Rivani, Paolo Sarti. At 9 September
1862 this was the list of the members of the Congregation of Bologna: Luigi Giusti, Don
Giacomo Cassani, Canon G. Battista Bonta, Giulio Carini, Giuseppe Galloni, Giovanni
Veronesi, Alessandro Bernardi, Giacomo Cazzani, Achille Masi, Giuseppe Mauri,
Agostino Boldrini, Giovanni Valdem (see A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f.
26011/0-2°: the C.of C., Bologna, 9 Sept. 1862, No. 569, to M.I., Turin). See also:
ibidem, the Prefect, Bologna, 27 Nov. 1862, No. 678, to M.I., Turin; R.E. Righi , La
trasformazione..., cit., pp. 420, 429; Aristide Rava, 'Sulle opere pie bolognesi', R.B.P.,
No. 3, 1874, pp. 193-203; Idem, 'Sul concentramento di varie opere pie a Bologna',
R.B.P., No. 6, 1874. See also chapt. 7.
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formed in the mean time, in accordance with the act of 1859. The reason for this
special instruction probably lay in the Ministry's awareness of the importance and
difficulty of the reforms that congregation No.1 was slowly carrying out 1. There
were no grounds for conflict between the two congregations, which had basically
different tasks, nor is there any evidence of such conflict. Serious clashes were
however to explode between congregation No. 1 and the Provincial Deputation. They
are worth noting for three reasons. First, they show that, while the forced
abandoning of the reform plans of the Welfare Central Committee apparently did not
cause political rows, the seeds sown by the Committee had taken root in Bologna, and
the attempt by the Provincial Deputation to stop the planned reforms caused
considerable resistance that can be seen as a local reflection of the general
contradictions underlying the transition from provisional to central rule. Secondly,
the outcome of the conflicts helps to explain why the charities of Bologna remained
steadily under the clergy's control. Thirdly, they are a good example of the
overlapping effects of three different acts introduced over three and a half years. The
above-mentioned Ministerial Instruction, keeping congregation No. 1 in office after
the enforcement of the 1859 Act, encouraged its members to elaborate and publish a
project for the reform of Bologna's charities. Such a project, issued in the Spring of
1862, did not meet the favour of the Provincial Deputation entrusted with the
charities' supervision, according to article 33 of the same act. The congregation
proposed to merge the charities in four groups (indoor relief, outdoor relief,
education and hospitals) to be administered by a Supreme Managing Council. The idea
of a unique administrative board for the charitable foundations was contrary to the
basic criteria of the 1859 act, which insisted on total respect for the administrative
autonomy of the various charities, according to the founders' intentions. Futhermore,
the merger into four groups was contrary to the ministerial Instructions of 19
December1861 which suggested a less radical concentration, respecting the specific
purposes of each foundation. Cautiously the prefect invited the Provincial Deputation
to evaluate these proposals, but the Deputation never let its opinion be officially
known. According to the new act of 3 August 1862, just approved by Parliament and
active from 1 January 1863, the reordering of the charities pertained exclusively to
the Provincial Deputations (art.32). That of Bologna clearly felt itself unfettered by
any previous obligation towards the congregation. On the other hand the relationship
between the two had always been sour. There had already been modest proposals,
elaborated by the congregation since December 1861, for statutes and better
1 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-2°: the Prefect, Bologna, 27 Nov.
1862, No. 678..., cit. The ministerial instruction was of 19 Dec. 1861.
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accommodation in four colleges for boys, the Conservatorii delle figlie del popolo and
the Orphanage of the Mendicants; but these had been ignored by the Provincial
Deputation. According to the Prefect, the Deputation disliked the radical attitude of
the Congregation, while the latter was rigid in its position, and ill-disposed to accept
the authority of the Deputation. The congregation bitterly resented being pushed aside
and deprived of power. In September 1862 all the members announced their
irrevocable decision to resign on 1 January 1863, with the enforcement of the new
act on charities. Their ideas and methods belonged to the past, while the Provincial
Deputation and city council had their own project ready. Four months were certainly
sufficient to implement it. In reality this was the revenge of the congregation, which
was aware that the Provincial Deputation could obstruct its reforming initiatives,
while it was unable to govern the charities without its collaboration. Since the
prefect had failed to persuade the congregation's members to compromise, the
Interior Minister put himself to some pains, dispensing both compliments and
threats. According to the second part of article 32 of the act of 3 August 1862, the
congregation was not allowed to resign, since any old administrative board would
cease to hold office only on the appointment of new ones. This, the congregation
argued, was likely to cause indefinite delays to the detriment of the charities, already
suffering from an overlong period of uncertainty. The unspoken and crucial point of
these negotiations, as the prefect and the Minister knew only too well, was that in
Bologna the creation of a new congregation of charity would be extremely difficult
without the collaboration of the members of the old. The Minister's compliments to
the congregation and his requests for suggestions, regularly ignored when answered,
with which the Minister rewarded the congregation, were solely intended to mollify
its offended members for the sake of future administrative regularity 1. The new
congregation was at last appointed in April 1863 2. How little it achieved in the
laicization of the administration of the charities was to become evident in 1874,
when a prefectural enquiry revealed that 335 charities, with a declared patrimony
of 2,657,064.02 lire and a revenue of 109,113.59 lire, were still managed by the
1 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-2°: the Congr. of Ch„ Bologna, 9 and
10 Sept. 1862, No. 569 and 25 Sept. 1862, No. 609, to M.I., Turin; idem, Bologna, 17
Sept. 1862, No. 592, to the Prefect, Bologna; the latter, Bologna, 11 Sep. 1862, No.
12220 to the Congreg., Bologna; the Prefect, Bologna, 27 Nov. 1862, No. 678, to M.I.,
Turin, cit.; the latter, Turin, 17 Sept. 1862, Div. V, Sect. 3, No. 5674; 12 Nov. 1862,
Div. V, Sect. 3, No. 6191; 4 Dec. 1862, No. 8419, to the former; M.I., Turin, 12 Nov.
1862, Div. V, Sect. 3, No. 6191, to the Congreg., Bologna.
2 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 65, f. 26011/0-8°: list of the members of the C.of C.
sent to M.I., on 21 April 1863.
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clergy 1. It can be argued that the old congregation would have been only partially
successful in the implementation of its reforms, since a handful of men were not
enough to defeat a host of economic interests and legal technicalities. Yet some
initiative had been taken in Bologna, as a late outcome of the Cipriani decree. It was to
be stopped, however, before it could produce any tangible effect - an obstruction
made in the name of an administrative and legislative uniformity that was no solution
either to the administrative disorder of the charities or, ultimately, to the needs of
the poor.
In Bologna the reforms had been stopped by the Provincial Deputation. In Pesaro, on
the other hand, the Provincial Deputation and the congregation of charity were
working in harmony; and here the reforms were stopped by the Council of State,
which had final authority in these matters. For this reason the story of Pesaro
foreshadows a later period. In the relevant files of the late 1860s and 1870s there is
abundant evidence of the restrictive attitude of the Council of State towards the
proposals of the local authorities for reforms of the charities. The case of Pesaro
anticipated a trend that would become clear with the passing of time. The
congregation of Pesaro reckoned that the local charities needed a lot of reforms; but
for the moment the most urgent concerned the Conservatorio of the Orphans, the
Home for abandoned children and the Conservatorio for the Converted women. The
first of these institutes had been founded a few years before with private donations
and was subsidized by the Commune with 2,128 lire a year. Before being put under
the congregation's control, it was administered by a board of laymen and ecclesiastics
dominated by the bishop. The institution was in total decay: the building, small and
insalubrious, sheltered only 20 inmates who were given little food and no education
of any sort, since there was no money to pay for it. The Home for abandoned children
was just a project. In 1846 the Papal Government had conceded to the promotors of
the home some urban properties valued at 18,000 lire. In 1858 the capital had been
increased by a legacy of 15,960 lire. The bishop had appointed a committee of parish
priests for the supervision of the construction works which, in 1861, were still
unfinished. According to the congregation it was inadvisable to complete them, given
the lack of funds. The Conservatorio for Converted women, founded in 1619, was
originally intended to shelter repentant prostitutes. With the passing of time it lost
its inmates and was transformed into a sort of reformatory where the prostitutes
were forcibly sent to repent. Since that also failed, all attempts to save the souls of
Pesaro's fallen women were abandoned: in 1861 the only inmates of the
Conservatorio were two old converts and a prioress. The congregation proposed to
1 Aristide Rava, 'Sulle opere pie bolognesi', R.B. P., No. 3, 1874, cit., pp. 200 ff.
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merge the two first establishments, as their purpose was the same, and to suppress
the third, devolving its income (3,200 lire a year) upon the new institute. This
would be administered by an honorary committee and internally managed by a paid
rector.
The Interior Ministry fully agreed, emphasizing in its report to the Council of State
that the Conservatorio was both a monument to hypocrisy and a parasitic
institution1. But the Council of State vetoed the merger of the two orphanages on the
pedantic grounds that article 6 of the Valerio decree prescribed the separate
administration of such charities. The fact that one of them did not actually exist was
not even mentioned in the decision. The proposal for a special administrative board
plus a paid rector was dismissed with an equally restricive interpretation of article
4 of the same decree. Finally the suppression of the Conservatorio for the Converted
was judged inadmissible, not only by virtue of article 6, but also on the grounds that
the suppression of a 'moral body' exceeded the powers of the executive. Moreover,
argued the Council, the social utility of the Conservatorio was not over. All the
Council vaguely conceded was the drawing up of new statutes linking the two
orphanages and restoring the original purposes of the Conservatorio 2.
The Council of State had dampened the enthusiasm of Pesaro's philanthropic
patriots, but not killed their good will. During a meeting of the Provincial Council on
21 December 1861 Councillor Professor Ugolini delivered a speech that was
unanimously approved, printed and distributed to congregations and Communes.
Ugolini pointed to the need to eradicate clerical influence from the charities, notably
the educational ones. To that end the local Authorities must use all the means offered
by the newly enforced act of 1859. He stressed the importance of article 199 of the
related regulations of 18 August 1860: each charity needed a statute. Most local
charities, especially in the mountains, had none: and this was an opportunity not to
be missed. All mixed charities were responsible for their charitable duties to the
congregations of charity (articles 2 and 4 of the regulations). That was another point
on which the Provincial Council and the Deputation must take action. Ugolini invited
the councillors to take their responsibilities seriously, and to make practical
1 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 363, f. 26047/0-4°: M.I., Turin, 10 July 1861, Div.
V, No. 46093/5519, report to the Council of State. For the origins of convents and
conservatorii for repentant prostitutes in the sixteen century see B. Pullan, La politica
sociale delta Ftepubblica di Venezia, 1500-1620 (II Veltro, Rome, 1982), vol. I, Le
scuole grandi, I'assistenza e le leggi sui poveri , pp. 410-27.
2 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 363, f. 26047/0-4°: Sentence of the Council of State,
Section of the Interior and Finance, 19 July 1861.
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proposals and use the law as best they could 1. How effective these suggestions were,
we do not know. However it seems that things were better in the province of Pesaro
than elsewhere. In 1864 almost all Communes were implementing article 32 of the
act of 3 August 1862 . This prescribed in the ex-Papal states the replacement of the
administrations, created according to the Provisional Commissioners' decrees, with
special boards appointed by Royal decree. After inspecting the ten major Communes,
the Prefect reported in 1866 to the Interior Ministry that the situation of the
charities was quite satisfactory, though ripe for amelioration 2.
^ A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 363, f. 26047/0-4°: copy (dated 30 April 1862) of the
speech delivered by Prof. Ugolini to the Provincial Council of Pesaro-Urbino, 21 Dec.
1861.
2 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 363, f. 26047/0-4°: the Prefect, Pesaro, 16 April
1864 and 7 June 1866 to M.I.
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2. Governor De Luca's proposals to save the Councils of the Hospices
Reform proposals were made in 1861 by the chairman of the Council of Avellino.
Parliament ignored them, but they shed some light on the expectations of the staff of
the Councils. The first proposals took their cue from a circular of 18 September
1861 recommending that the charities sell their landed properties and buy state
bonds in order to simplify their administration 1. The circular stressed that, given
the imminence of the new act, radical proposals would be premature, but De Luca was
not deterred. His project was laid out on a local and a Government level. Instead of the
current system, where the Councils of the Hospices controlled the separately
administered charities, he would substitute a system of stronger local control. De
Luca's complicated plan can be better grasped with the help of the scheme below:
LOCAL ORGANIZATION
In every Commune:
A strong state control of the charities would be guaranteed by the reinforcement of
the Councils. They should be enlarged by adding two Councillors and should be
entrusted with the full control of the charities' accounts, abolishing the interference
of the Councils of the Prefecture. The secretaries of the Councils of the Hospices
would become responsible for all administrative action and the Councils would
1 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.35: Avellino, 30 September 1861 to M.I.
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become officially part of the provincial administration with uniform regulations. The
annual ratizzi for the maintenance of the Councils would provide a fixed government
fund, and would be exacted via Finance officers. A new ratizzo on dowry foundations
would be fixed to create orphanages in all provinces. The fear that the Councils of the
Hospices might be suppressed was evident in this second part of the proposal. The
first part was perhaps more ambiguous. It was intended to improve local control over
the charities, but was likely to result in a complete take-over of the local welfare
committees by the confraternities, which were notoriously prone to devotional
rather than charitable expenditure. Conversely, De Luca believed that the new
charitable duties - which were imposed on the confraternities as a condition of their
exerting greater power over the local welfare structures - would diminsh the
number of their members but improve their quality. Moreover the merger of
confraternities and chapels would reduce administrative expenditure; and in the
province of Avellino the number of charities would fall from 626 to 311. Another
advantage would be the creation of kindergartens in every Commune: a great
improvement, as there was none in the province. The dignity of both the Councils and
the Communal welfare Committees would also improve, since the former would get
rid of their lower administrative tasks and the latter would more effectively control
the local charities. It was, however, a rough plan of reform, probably not deeply
pondered, as it did not take into account a quantity of other foundations that were not
chapels or confraternities - and clearly intended solely to defend the autonomy of
Councils of the Hospices and local administrations. Turin remained uncommitted. The
Ministry did not comment on the proposed reforms, welcomed De Luca's general good
work, and asked for more detailed information on the province's charities, requesting
that he send some statutes and further information on any reform proposals 1.
So De Luca elaborated a second proposal which left prudently aside any suggestion
concerning the Councils' reorganization, and concentrated on the local plan. De Luca
started with a general reflection about the variety, fragmentation and weakness of the
charities. The State could not make them more efficient, even in the event that it
could control them all. Thus he proposed to concentrate the charities and put them
under stronger local control. Chaplaincies of unknown origins should merge. In the
province of Avellino this would reduce their number from 346 to 115. It was
impossible to merge the patrimonies of the confraternities, but some improvement
could be obtained by entrusting the management of the sisterhoods to the officials of
1 A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B.35: Avellino, 8 January 1862, to M.I.: Delia esistenza
organica morale ed amministrativa dl tutti i Luoghi Pii delle Provincie Napoletane e delle
riforme piu necessarie.
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the original male confraternities. Any charity derived from another should be
similarly administratively unified. All Monti of the same kind (Monti di Pieta', di
elemosine, di doti, etc.) should be merged. In every commune a - formed by the
aldermen - should be appointed. The Pious Watch Committee would appoint an unpaid
tax-collector who would act as a Government controller, thus assuming the function
of the Council officials. These would only control budgets and legal acts. Again, this
plan was an attempt to save local autonomy. Again, Turin showed great caution. De
Luca sent his proposal in January 1862 and got a very vague answer only in May: the
Ministry would not comment on the suggested reforms until more detailed
information were furnished about the province's charities. Since De Luca had already
produced a quantity of detailed reports on his province's charities, it was clear now
that any interest previously shown by Turin was merely intended to ascertain the
expectations of the Southerners, whose suggestions did not stand any chance of being
taken into serious consideration. Anxiety for the future of the Councils was evident in
De Luca's reply. He quoted a declaration made by Savoy-Rollin on 4 Pluviose XII
about the duty of the nation to administer the public patrimonies, expressing great
concern that the new act could decrease state control over the charities and
effectively terminate the system of legal charity. He also timidly suggested
entrusting the Ecclesiastical Fund with the management of the devotional foundations,
and proposed that the Communal Committees' members should be appointed by the
Government and not locally elected, but it was too late to try and convince Turin 1.
On the other hand, not everyone in the southern welfare administration shared De
Luca's concern for the future of the Councils. The communal council of Messina and
the provincial council of Palermo petitioned the King, invoking the enforcement of
the act of 20 November 1859. The governor of Cosenza was not so explicit, but
stressed the need for a less chaotic, easier to interpret, and more effective legislation
than the present one. In the mean time the charities, well aware that the enforcement
of the communal and provincial act anticipated independence also for them, were
refusing to pay the ratizzi , and behaved as if the Piedmontese regime of charities'
freedom were already in force 2. The enthusiasm of the southern charities for the
Piedmontese law was much as that of their sisters in the ex-Papal States, but it
^ A.C.S., M.I., O.P., 1861-73, B. 35: Avellino, 5 June 1862, to M.I.: Voti d'immegliare il
regime delta Pubblica Beneficenza per la nuova Legge su le Opere Pie.
2 A.S.T., Sez. I, Carte Sella, Prov. Meridionali, Opere pie e Sanita, 1861-62, f. 40:
Luogotenenza Gen. del Re nelle Prov. Siciliane, M.I., Div. I, Sect. 2, No. 3436, Palermo,
10 July 1861, to M.I., Turin; f. 43: The Communal Council, Messina, 19 July 1861, to
the King. Ibidem, Carte Sella, Prov. Nap., Benefic., Cart. 1a, f. 3: L. Vercillo, governor
and chairman of the Council of the Hospices, Cosenza, 12 and 18 March 1861, to the
Council of Luogotenenza, Naples.
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seems plain that there was no reason to save the Councils. A notable quantity of honest
and painstaking work must be credited to De Luca, yet - in June 1862 - he was just
pleading for pity on behalf of a parasitic corporation. The Councils of the Hospices, as
a whole, had offered a bad performance to the new rulers, had proved to be nests of
corruption and maladministration, and had displayed neither dynamism nor
cooperation. In the weak and ill-considered plans for reform produced by the Council
of Avellino nothing could be found comparable to the spirit that pervaded the projects
proposed by Giovanni Massei to the Welfare Committee of Bologna . The plans of De
Luca were merely the outcome of a justified fear of an inevitable clean-up, and were
solely intended to preserve the past. The tangled problem of the Southern charities
and the risks and difficulties involved in the reform of their management were
discussed in Parliament, but not a word was said to save the Councils of the Hospices.
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Appendix 6.
1 .The debate in the Chamber. The general discussion and article 4.
The bill was presented to the Chamber on 8 March 1862, and discussed in June 1.
The short general debate was dominated by the Piedmontese opposition deputy
Borella, who pointed out the basic weakness of the bill. In his opening speech
Minghetti, on behalf of the Commission, had promised reform; yet this was not a
reforming bill. Borella reminded his Piedmontese collegues how strongly a radical
reform of the charities had been desired in Piedmont, because even there the clergy
enjoyed excessive power over them. The Commission, basing the bill on respect for
the founders' will, still underestimated the enormous power which the clergy exerted
through the charities. The act was useless, ill-adapted to the present-day necessities.
It was unlikely to extract any financial or moral profit from the huge patrimonies of
the charities. It left the clergy too powerful a weapon to damage the state. Borella
conceded that the 1859 act, prepared in great hurry during the troublesome period
of the unification, could not aim at reform. But now the unification was completed,
radical changes had been introduced. He could not understand why the charities had
been treated by the Commission with such cautiousness and respect. He went on to
describe in detail the obsolescence of many institutions where concern for the dead
and religious practices was greater than that for the inmates and their medical needs.
Charities like the hostels for converts were an insult to civilization; dowry trusts
were contrary to the modern principles of economy; the schools of latinity, intended
to prepare young peasants for the seminaries, were institutions of the past. Much
better to transform them into technical schools, or friendly societies. History offered
countless examples of charities whose purpose had been modified according to the
changing needs of society. Throughout the centuries the clergy kept modifying the
purposes of its charities as the needs changed, yet the Commission was too scared to
implement reforms. Borella hinted that all obsolete charities, whose purpose did not
correspond to the modern social needs, must be radically reformed and entrusted to
the communes; but he did not develop this point. Rather he stressed the inner
contradiction of the bill. Parliament had no real knowledge about the number of the
Italian charities, their assets, their administrative characteristics. How then could
Parliament dare talk of reforming them?
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2496-2632 (17-24 June 1862).
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Borella's arguments were supported and echoed by Nisco and Sineo, and refuted by
Minghetti. The basic reason for this bill was the wish for rapid administrative
unification. Such a wish had been clearly expressed by the provisional governments,
hence it was too late for gradual reforms or, as Borella suggested, for a preliminary
collection of data. Ricasoli had proposed a straightforward extension of the 1859 act.
This was quite excessive; but, on the other hand, the Commission was not in the
position to undo the basic concepts underlying all Parliament's activity. Hence the
Commission chose to respect the principle of administrative unification, introducing
the most necessary reforms. Borella wanted to destroy (or at least radically modify)
the charity system. This was unacceptable because it was contrary to the liberal
principle of respecting individual liberty in the course of reform. Borella's
proposals, if accepted, would end private charity, and lead to legal charity. True,
many charities were obsolete, but article 24 provided large opportunities for
reform. As far as the clergy's power was concerned, the Provincial Deputations'
guardianship gave all the necessary guarantees to the civil society 1. On this
unequivocal statement the general debate was closed; and the discussion of the single
articles started.
The most debated articles were those that provided the general guidelines for the
administration of the charities and for defining the powers of the local and central
authorities. At the core of the bill was article 4, which granted the charities the
right to administer themselves freely in accordance to their foundation deeds,
statutes and specific regulations - or, in their absence, the ancient traditions of the
charities. Panattoni, a member of the Commission, warned the deputies that this
article was the corner-stone of the bill and as such was irrevocable. He exorted the
Chamber not to use the debate as an opportunity for making a totally new reforming
law, since the government and the Commission were determined to get this bill
approved quickly and with a minimum of fuss 2. This warning was repeated by
Minghetti, and Rattazzi tried to put a prejudicial question, to stop any debate, and
oblige the deputies to vote the basic parts of the act immediatly 3. Nevertheless the
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2496-2507, 2509. About the
widespread habit of the clergy of modifying the purposes of the charities, especially in
the Papal States see Matteo Maggetti, La genesi e I'evoluzione della beneficenza
(Ravenna, 1890), pp. XXXIIl-XXXIV; about the merger of small hospitals into larger
institutions from the 1450s and the outcoming political conflicts see Alessandro
Pastore, 'Strutture assistenziali fra Chiesa a Stati nelI'ltalia della Controriforma',
Storia D'ltalia , Annali 9 (Einaudi, Turin, 1986), pp. 435-437.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2530-32.
3 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2537-40.
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opposition was determined to make its voice heard. None of the amendments proposed
to article 4 was passed, but they suggest alternative solutions which could have been
adopted, had the government been less rigidly concerned for individual freedom.
The proposed amendments were all intended to limit the freedom of the charities'
administrative boards, lest old abuses be maintained or restored, while improving
the powers of the congregations of charity, which should become the back-bone of the
system 1. Borella, warning the Chamber of the consequences of passing article 4 as it
was, synthezised the arguments of all those who opposed it. The approval of that
article entailed the legalization all foundation deeds, statutes, and ancient traditions.
Should the Government, in response to overwhelming complaints, be obliged to
reform some charity, it would be obstructed not only by a host of foundation deeds,
documents, etc., but by the very fact that all those documents were made legal by
Parliament. This was a formidable obstacle to any future reform of the charities.
True, Parliament was free to undo its decisions and introduce reforms. But if the
Chamber was now so reluctant to touch the foundation's deeds, it would be very
difficult for a future Government to repeal a law which legalized those deeds 2.
Borella's predictions were well-founded, as the next thirty years would prove; but
in 1862 a quick administrative unification mattered more than setting up workable
administrative machinery. All amendments were rejected by the Chamber and
article 4 was passed as proposed by the Commission 3.
2-The debate in the Chamber. The charities' guardianship: their reforms : and
the congregating Qf charity.
The discussion of article 4 had shown the determination of the Commission and the
government to avoid any substantial amendment to the bill. Yet the opposition did not
completely renounce its right to fight for modification, although the debate was cooled
by the growing awareness of the hopelesness of its efforts. The hottest moments of the
debate were reached during the discussion of articles 14 and 15, concerning the
guardianship of the charities. This was entrusted to the Provincial Deputation, which
would approve organic and internal regulations, accounts, and all activities involving
increase or decrease of patrimony. To understand fully the terms of the debate it is
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2532-34, 2538, 2540-48.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, p. 2545.
3 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, p. 2548.
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necessary to bear in mind that the Commission had substantially modified the
corresponding articles of the 1859 act. The approval of budgets was abolished, and
that of organic and internal regulations was tranferred from the government to the
Provincial Deputations. The first attack came from Imbriani, who proposed that the
charities should be controlled by their respective communes, leaving to the
provincial authorities the control only of those charities belonging to several
communes . For Imbriani it was paramount that the communes be restored to full
autonomy, to allow the development of their civil and democratic potential. Hence he
opposed the communal law of 23 October 1859, which hampered such autonomy by
interposing between the communes and the state a new body, the Provincial
Deputation, formed by a restricted number of provincial councillors, who too often
were strangers to the real interests of the commune. For logistic reasons, the
communes were in a better position than the Provincial Deputation to know and
control their charities. Moreover, the Provincial Deputation had a number of other
tasks to perform: it acted on behalf of the Provincial Council and executed all its
decisions; it approved many communal decisions. How could it satisfactorily check
the accounts of all the charities of the province? This would be a huge job for the
Deputations, and mistakes and delays would be inevitable. The Provincial Deputations
would be unable to gather all the elements necessary for a proper control of the
charities' expenditure. Hence the accounts would not be properly checked, and
mistakes would be difficult to mend. Everything would become much easier if the
communes looked after their own charities. The provinces could then properly
control the larger charities belonging to the province, and the state would look after
the charities of national interest 1.
For Minghetti, this amendment was unacceptable, because it would upset the very
base of the communal and provincial laws 2. The argument that the charities' act
must harmonise with the provincial and communal laws was inescapable, yet it
brought the discussion onto slippery terrain. As Imbriani promptly retorted, the act
of 23 October 1859 was on the verge of being discussed and modified. The new draft
was already published; and why its discussion had been preceded by that of the
charities act was a mystery and a nonsense. Since it depended on the communal and
provincial laws, the act on charities was a secondary one. Hence it was necessary to
discuss first the reform of the act of 23 October 1859, and then draft a bill for the
charities in accordance with the new law. Otherwise the destiny of the
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2565-68.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, p. 2568.
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administrative law reform was all too easy to forecast. The Chamber would now pass
the charities' act as proposed by the Commission, on the grounds that any substantial
modification would upset the present administrative legislation. When the time would
come to discuss the administrative reform, any radical change would be obstructed on
the grounds that it upset the laws dependant on the administrative laws already in
force. It was a vicious circle to which there was no end, unless it was broken
immediately. What mattered was not to pass a law for the sake of passing laws, but to
pass good laws. Hence, since the obstacle was the act of 23 October1859, the only
solution was to suspend the debate, discuss the general administrative reform , and
only thereafter legislate on the charities 1.
It was a strong argument, and Rattazzi's reply appeared weak. The Prime Minister
agreed in theory. He had proposed to delay the discussion of this act until after the
discussion of the communal and provincial act in the next Session. But the Chamber
had decided to proceed with this bill, and since its discussion had already consumed
four meetings, it was thought better to not to finish with it, rather than waste
precious time. On the other hand, the communal and provincial laws of 1859 were
already in force in the south, but the law on charities was not, so it was urgent to
pass this act in order to extend its beneficial effects also to those provinces.
However, it would be easy to modify the charities act in accordance with any future
alteration of the administrative system of provinces and communes. It was a
questionable answer indeed. Apart from the absurdity of passing a law only because
thirteen of its thirty-six articles had already been discussed and approved, doubts
could be cast about the benefits which the southern poor would extract from this act.
But the Chamber was unconcerned with both the effects of the act on the beneficiaries
of the charities, and the question of principle which had been raised by Imbriani. His
proposal was not supported; hence he withdrew it 2.
The other argument put forward by Imbriani - that the Provincial Deputations
would be unable to cope with the work-load involved in the guardianship of the
charities - was supported by Alfieri and Lanza. The latter agreed about the necessity
to devolve controls to the communes, and noted that the project elaborated by
Minghetti in 1861 contained similar clauses. Alfieri had no confidence in the
reliability of many small town councils, and hence proposed to put the charities
under the guardianship of committees appointed by the provincial councils 3.
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2569, 2573.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2573, 2575.
3 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2568- 72.
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Minghetti's only reply was that the charities act must not conflict with the communal
and provincial laws, whereas Rattazzi showed a better understanding of his
opponents' arguments. He supported Minghetti's position, but partly agreed with
Alfieri. The councils of the big cities would be undoubtedly able to control their
charities, but he knew that entrusting such controls to the small communes would be
ruinuous. Too many businesses would be dealt with 'in the family', to the detriment of
the charities' assets 1. Predictably, none of the amendments proposed to article 14
was passed, yet its discussion created some embarassment to the government. The
soundness and efficiency of the Provincial Deputations had been questioned, and the
issue of real decentralization had been raised once more. Though on different issues,
the future would prove both Imbriani and Rattazzi right. The guardianship exerted
by many Provincial Deputations would prove inefficient and purely formal, whilst
the lack of civic zeal displayed by many minor communes would confirm that it had
been wise not to grant them too much independence.
We saw above that in article 15 the Commission had substantially modified the tasks
of the Provincial Deputations. It had devolved to them the approval of the charities'
internal and organic regulations, which had formerly belonged to the Interior
Ministry, and it had abolished any check on their budgets. The latter novelty, was
presented as a 'decentralizing' feature, but was simply to reduce the work-load of the
Provincial Deputations. Its practical consequences were serious, because the
Provincial Deputations were thus deprived of any means of influencing the charities'
management. By checking only the accounts, they could question and eventually negate
their consensus, only after the expenditure had already occurred. Since the act did
not provide the Deputations with any strong deterrent against unlawful
administrators, such as imprisonment or heavy fines, control of the accounts was a
merely formal procedure, deprived of any practical efficacy. Moreover, as remarked
by Restelli during the debate, the charities were free to inflate their own
administrative expenditure, to the detriment of the charitable expenditure. The
control of budgets would have allowed the Deputations to supervise the administrative
boards more effectively, and make sure that administrative and devotional
expenditure did not overwhelm charitable expenditure. Indeed he was right, as the
public outcry at the findings of the mid 1870s would prove. Yet his proposal to
restore budgets' controls was not firmly supported by the opposition. Only
Grillenzoni and Lanza showed some concern in this sense. Minghetti replied that the
charities must not be hampered by too many detailed controls, since charity could
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2571- 74.
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flourish only in a regime of total freedom; and thie response showed once again how
out of touch was he with administrative reality. Again, the article was passed in the
form proposed by the Commission 1.
The Chamber seemed more interested in article 24, which concerned the charities'
reforming procedures. We saw above that these procedures were surrounded by such
precautions as to inhibit reforms, although the Commission presented this article as
a revolutionary feature. The debate was between those who wanted to ease, and those
who wanted to complicate still further, the reforming procedure. The Commission
conceded two points: the required meetings of the provincial and communal councils
were reduced to one, and the necessary majority was reduced from three quarters to
a half plus one 2. This was one of the two articles on which the Commission
compromised. The reforming procedures were simplified; but we must bear in mind
that the pre-condition for proposing reforms was restricted to two cases only: when
the purpose of a charity ceased to exist, or corresponded no longer to its statutes. And
all reforms must be as respectful as possible of the founders' will. It was a wording
which prevented any progressive interpretation. As Setti argued in 1880 on the
Nuova Antologia , only three kinds of charities could be reformed: the leper hospitals,
because there was no leprosy in Italy; the foundations for prisoners, because the
state did not permit private interference in prison matters; and the dowry trusts for
nuns, because of the suppression of the religious orders. The concept that a charity
might have lost any social relevance, and therefore its aim should be completely
modified, was still out of sight. Also, the Commission's choice to leave the final
decision to the Council of State was crucial and would greatly hamper any reforming
initiative by the local authorities. The case of the Conservatorio for the convert
women of Pesaro, to which some attention has been devoted above, was a typical
example of the restrictive and conservative attitude usually shown by the Council of
State towards the charities' reform 3.
The discussion of the section concerning the congregations of charity caused few
difficulties for the Commission. Although the opposition made some attempts to win
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2577- 83.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2594- 2607.
3 A. Setti, 'Ludovico Ricci o la beneficenza pubblica nel secolo scorso', in Nuova
Antologia, 2nd series, vol. 23 (1 Sept. 1880), cit., pp. 450-454 and notably p. 453.
That leprosy had completely disappeared in Italy seems untrue. Frank M. Snowden,
Violence and Great Estates in the South of Italy. Apulia 1900-1922 (Cambridge
University Press, 1986), p. 57, affirms that in the early 1900s it was endemic in
Apulia. For a fuller discussion of the right and duty for the State to reform the charities
see G. Capitani, Stato beneficenza e previdenza pubblica , cit., pp. 105-120; for Pesaro
see appendix 4.
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more powers for the Congregations, the battle to put them at the core of the system
had already been lost during the discussion of article 4; hence little ground was left
for questioning their lateral function. The most interesting aspect of the debate
concerned the method of appointing of the members of the Congregations. These were
no longer to be chosen by the Interior Ministry from lists furnished by the Prefects,
but were to be directly appointed by the town councils. Several deputies feared that
this would result, especially in the small communes, in a takeover of the
congregations by the clergy. The only way to avoid such a danger seemed to be a
return to the former system. While Minghetti defended the Commission's choice by
denying any such risk, Rattazzi was adamant in his explanation why the former
method must not be restored. In principle he favoured a centralized appointment of
the congregations' members, since he recognized the risks involved in this kind of
devolution; but the amount of work for the Interior Ministry would be excessive.
Hence the appointments would be effectively made by the Prefects and simply ratified
by the Minister. It was better not to legalize a situation where the Ministry's
authority was reduced to a rubber stamp. The opposition seemed happy with this
explanation, not noticing that another decentralizing feature of the bill had revealed
itself to be merely a practical device which had nothing to do with the real issue of
decentralization 1.
3.The debate in the Chamber. Interim arrangements.
The final part of the debate was devoted to the transitional arrangements, regarding
the implementation of the act in those areas where the dismantling of the existing
systems required special attention, notably the ex-Papal States and the South.
Deputies from those regions - Luzi and Gabrielli for the ex-Papal States, Nisco,
Caracciolo, Crispi and Pisanelli for the South - had tried several times during the
debate to push the Chamber into a wide discussion on the consequences and risks of a
rigid application of the act to those charities. They were mainly concerned with the
foreseable effect of article 4. In the ex-Papal States it was likely to become a
dangerous weapon in the hands of the clergy, who would use it to regain full control of
those charities which the Cipriani, Pepoli, and Valerio decrees had entrusted to the
congregations of charity. The beneficial effects of a long, difficult, and often
continuing struggle, were in danger of being cancelled; and all the old abuses would be
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2607-09.
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restored with the sanction of the law. In the South, article 4 risked resuscitating
administrative boards which had been abolished by the French and had not been
restored since. There the congregations of charity, which would replace the Local
Welfare Committees, ought to inherit and keep all the assets which had formed their
patrimony since 1806. Otherwise the whole network of local charity would collapse
and the clergy would regain a power which even the Bourbons had not restored 1.
These were central issues; but the Commission managed to keep them at bay during
the debate, on the grounds that these matters had been provided for in the interim
arrangements. When the latter were discussed, it became clear that the Commission
had ignored the arguments of those who best knew the local situation.
The ex-Papal States were dealt with by article 32. The merged administrations
created by the decrees of the special commissioners would be replaced by special
administrations of each charity, according to article 4, and by the existing
congregations of charity. The merged administrations set up by the commissioners
could provisionally remain in office until the above dispositions were implemented.
The deputy Gabrielli tried to persuade the Commission to keep the congregations in
charge of all charities in Umbria, the Marches and the Romagna, and he proposed an
amendment which inverted the concept expressed in article 32: the Provincial
Deputation would set up separate administrations only for those charities whose
particular purposes required autonomy, whereas the bulk of the charities would
remain under the congregations' administration. But Minghetti did not give in. Such
arrangements contradicted the basic principle of the uniqueness of the single
charities on which the law was based. Any merger under the congregations of charity
was inadmissible. Gabrielli warned that the dismantling of the provisional
governments' work would create chaos; but he was not supported by other deputies,
and article 32 was approved by the Chamber 2. Later a further article (No.36) was
added by the Commission, to please and placate Gabrielli. This article abolished any
special administrative boards existing under the past governments 3. It plainly
contradicted the whole substance of the act. If taken seriously, this article would
compromise the interpretation and implementation of article 4, since any
administrative boards existing under the past regimes whould be dismantled, despite
their stemming from legitimate foundation deeds. But, as the absence of any debate
^ A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2496-99 (Nisco), 2528-30
(Caracciolo, Crispi), 2543-44 (Luzi), 2610-12 (Gabrielli, Pisanelli).
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2613-15.
3 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, p. 2628.
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showed, nobody took it seriously in the Chamber. Nor is there any other evidence
indicating that it mattered in the implementation of the act.
The South was dealt with by article 34. The Councils of the Hospices were dissolved
and replaced by the Provincial Deputations. The Local Welfare Committes were also
dismantled and replaced by the congregations of charity which would temporarily
administer the charities merged under the Local Committees, until special
administrative boards were set up by royal decree, on the proposal of the Provincial
Deputations (article 4). Again the mention of article 4 alarmed the southern
opposition. Pisanelli insisted on keeping the congregations in charge of all charities,
without setting up any special administration. Minghetti firmly resisted; but, due to
Rattazzi and to the firm opposition of the Southerners, a compromise was reached,
following a proposal by Imbriani. The initiative for setting up the special
administrations was extended to the communal councils, and any specific reference to
article 4 was cancelled in the final version of the act. The rest of the article
concerned the complicated problem of the Councils of the Hospices. Until 1 January
1865 the Provincial Deputations would exact the ratizzi imposed on the charities
for these sole purposes: salaries to the Councils' staff - who could be compelled to
work in the Provincial Deputations' offices -, pensions to the Councils' staff when
the revenues of the Councils - transferred to the Provincial Deputations - were
insufficient, fixed subsidies to the establishments of the districts, provinces, or
consortia, and fixed benefits to single individuals, with the right of the Provincial
Deputations to revise their lists. During 1863 the provincial councils would decide
how to provide for the above expenses for the time being. From 1 January 1863 the
sum presently imposed on the charities for the asylum of Aversa and the
establishment of St. Nicola alia Strada would be met by the state. The charities
formerly dependent on the Interior ministry would provisionally depend on the
prefect, until a new law could provide for them 1. At Mancini's suggestion a further
article was also added, asserting the validity of the decrees of 23 October 1860 and of
17 February 1861, which limited the clergy's interference in the lay foundations.
The Piedmontese Michelini ridiculed such an addition as a pleonasm, but it could be
justified by the concern of the government to reassure the Southern deputies 2. All
things considered, the Southerners' determination produced some results, forcing the
Government to compromise; yet article 34 left many questions unanswered. The
future of the Councils' staff, which was numerous and determined to win privileges,
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 2616-27.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, p. 2627.
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was ill defined. Also it was unclear how the provincial councils would finance the
salaries and pensions to that staff, plus subsidies and benefits, once the ratizzi were
abolished. The only solution appeared to be a further increase of the already heavy
land-tax.
4-The debate in the Senate.
The Chamber approved the act by 168 votes to 55. The Senate discussed it on 28 and
29 July 1862, and approved it by 63 votes to16 1. None of the amendments proposed
by the Senate's central office was approved, but the tone of the debate and the nature
of these amendments are of some interest. The most relevant of the amendments
proposed by the Senate concerned the third section of article 15, which subjected the
charities to the act of 5 June 1850 on mortmain, also known as the Siccardi act.
This was a point on which only one deputy had objected, without stirring any interest
or consensus in the Chamber. The amendment proposed by the Senate's central office
was that, since the1850 act was not yet implemented in the South, it was better to
leave things as they stood. The southern charities' acquisitions would be subject only
to the approval of the Provincial Deputations, in respect of the various local
legislations. The argument was that the 1850 act would soon be reformed and
extended to the whole kingdom, and thus its introduction in the South, through the act
on charities, seemed redundant. In reality this was an attempt to preserve the
liberty of the southern charities to sell, purchase, and inherit; and it tried to create
an island of privilege by introducing a loophole which the subsequent implementation
of the 1850 act was unlikely to modify. Rattazzi was firm in defence of the
Government's stand point and was usefully supported by Lauzi, Pinelli, Amari and
Arrivabene; but the length of the discussion proved that the southern charities' lobby
was quite strong in the Senate 2.
The other important amendment was proposed by Coppi and Giulini to the second
section of article 15. Like the deputies Lanza, Grillenzoni and Restelli, the two
senators wanted the checks of the Provincial Deputations extended to the budgets of
the charities, so as to guarantee the rights of the poor. But Rattazzi argued that such a
basic modification would require the return of the act to the Chamber. This decided
1 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, cit., p. 2632; A.P., Senato,
Discussioni, Sess. 1861-62, p. 1905.
2 A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess. 1861-62, Vol.V, pp. 1183-90; for the suppression of
section 3 of art. 15 proposed by the deputy Alfieri see A.P., Discussioni, Camera, Sess.
1861-62, Vol.V, cit., p. 2581. A.P., Senato, Discussioni, Sess. 1861-62, pp. 1891-96;
1903-04.
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Coppi to withdraw - and the assembly to vote against Giulini's proposal. Article 32
went unobstructed, but it gave the opportunity for senator Spada to express his
judgement on Valerio's action in the Marches. According to Spada, the decree on
charities issued by the Royal Commissoner was utterly unjust and provoked
widespread indignation and complaints. He welcomed article 32, but was worried
that the interference of the Provincial Deputations could hamper the restoration of
the legitimate administrative boards. Rattazzi fulsomely assured Spada of the
Government's eagerness to re-instate the dethroned chairmen of the charities,
stressing the strategic relevance of article 4 1.
The Senate debate had no practical consequences for the text of the act, yet it was
instructive. In the Chamber the major objections had been raised by the Left and
were aimed at widening the controls on the charities, in the context of an uncertain
local autonomy. But the Senate was mostly concerned to guarantee the rights of the
charities. The attempt to safeguard the privileges of the southern charities was
matched by Senator Spada's concern for the dismantling of the system introduced by
the provisional governments in the ex-Papal States. Equally, other minor
observations and suggestions made about articles 10 and 11 highlighted the fear that
the act could impose too strict an accountability on the administrators. Only the
amendment regarding the budgets stemmed from a genuine concern for the recipients
of charity, and was courageously sustained only by the Lombard Giulini. The Chamber
debate had mirrored the variety of its components in a magma of arguments and
squabbles in which idealism and enthusiasm were not always synonymous with
impracticability. Some practicable alternative solutions were indeed offered which
would have substantially modified the act, and made it more efficient, had the
Government not decided to sacrifice all alternatives and reform opportunities on the
altar of the right to freedom. Which of course was the freedom for the charities to
squander their assets. The Senate debate by comparison with that in the Chamber,
was a down-to-earth discussion centred almost exclusively on the petty defence of
lobbyist interests. Before it, Rattazzi stood as a champion of democracy.
1 A.P., Senato, Discussioni, Sess. 1861-62, pp. 1891-96, 1903-04.
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Appendix 7.
Source of tables Nos. 1 to 9: 'Le opere pie nel 1873', R.B.P., No. 7, 1874, pp. 530-
536.
Table 1. Overall data for 1873. Number %
charities 1 9,441
charities without treasurer 1,991 1 0.24
treasurers without deposit 5,719 32.77
charities without register 1,330 6.84
charities without inventory 4,429 22.78
budgets drawn up 5,236 26.93
accounts not rendered for financial year 7,452 38.33
total accounts in arrears from charities 25,448
total accounts not dispatched by P.D. 15,21 1
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Table 2. Charities treasurers. 1873
North Centre South
All charities with Alessandria Arezzo Bari
treasurer Cuneo Grosseto Lecce








Most charities Turin Lucca Aquila
with treasurer Novara Pisa Avellino
Cremona Massa Carrara Benevento











Table 3. Deposits given by treasurers . 1873.
North Centre South
All treasurers Milan Lighorn Catanzaro
with deposit Belluno Siena Chieti
Trapani
Sassari
Most treasurers Porto Maurizio Arezzo Benevento




Most treasurers Como Aquila








Table 4. Charities registers and archives. 1873.
North Centre South
All charities with Turin Florence Chieti














Partially without Mantua Liqhorn Aquila









Table 5. Charities inventories. 1873.
North Centre South
























Table 6. Budgets 1 873 .
North Centre South


















No budgets at all Cuneo Ascoli Caltanissetta
Piacenza
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Table 7. Accounts 1 873.
North Centre South
All accounts rendered Cremona Arezzo
Grosseto




















Table 8. Accounts in arrears from the charities in 1873.
North Centre South
No arrears Cremona Arezzo
Grosseto
Minimum arrears Cuneo Massa Carrara Bari
Benevento








Table 9. Accounts to be cleared by the Provincial Deputations in 1873.
North Centre South

















Table 1. Charities administration (1880)1.
Region Spec. adm. C.of Ch. Loc. auth. Found. Clergy Confrat. Vestry b. Jew.un.
Piedmont 645 1,367 60 34 289 30 19 18
Liguria 195 227 9 8 10 3 2
Lombardy 429 2,166 1 43 257 690 264 5
Venetia 226 740 59 24 70 5 21 0 18
Emilia-Rom. 333 902 46 13 151 7 7 9
Tuscany 251 100 67 12 68 73 1 56
Marches 80 573 17 20 29 29 3
Umbria 31 354 2 2 3 11
Latium 180 159 19 24 97 213 1
Abr.-Mol. 28 1,488 4 1 14 328
Campania 294 1,251 12 11 47 1 ,301
Basilicata 4 173 5 2 23
Apulia 90 682 3 4 29 519
Calabria 17 369 8 133
Sicily 633 867 9 38 174 990
Sardinia 29 77 7 3 19 15
Kingdom 3,465 1 1,495 457 456 1 ,700 3,680 504 1 09
Table 1a. Charities administration by geographical area (1880)2.
North % Centre % South % Kingdom %
Spec, administr. 1,495 18.18 875 22.19 1,095 1 1 .29 3,465 1 5.85
Congr. of Ch. 4,500 54.73 2,088 52.95 4,907 50.58 1 1,495 52.57
Loc. authorities 271 3.30 151 3.83 35 0.36 457 2.09
Founders 323 3.93 71 1.80 62 0.64 456 2.09
Clergy 1,059 12.88 348 8.83 293 3.02 1,700 7.77
Confraternities 38 0.46 333 8.45 3,309 34.1 1 3,680 16.83
Vestry boards 495 6.02 9 0.23 504 2.30
Jewish Univ. 41 0.50 68 1.72 109 0.50
Total 8,222 1 00 3,943 100 9,701 1 00 21,866 1 00
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. X.
2 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. X.
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Table 2. Charities grouped by size of income (1880) 1.
Income's size No. of charities %
up to 500 lire 10,635 49.99
from 500 to 1,500 lire 4,141 19.46
from 1,500 to 5,000 lire 3,323 15.62
from 5,000 to 20,000 lire 2,098 9.86
from 20,000 to 100,000 lire 877 4.12
over 100,000 lire 202 0.95
Total 21,276 100
Table 3. Distribution of the Charities assets in 1880 by region 2.
Region char. No. tot. gross patr. % tot. pop. % av.ch.patr. gr.patr/pop
Piedmont 2,462 272,240,552 14.3 3.179,323 1 1 110,577 85.63
Liquria 456 86,191,398 4.5 926,152 3.2 189,016 93.06
Lombardy 3,954 424,956,075 22.4 3,750,051 1 3 107,475 113.32
Venetia 1,350 134,051,068 7.1 2,873,961 9.9 99,297 46.64
Em.-Rom. 1,468 208,972,981 11 2,227,346 7.7 142,352 93.82
Tuscany 628 126,813,364 6.7 2,242,476 7.8 201,932 56.55
Marches 751 55,233,530 2.9 972,466 3.4 73,547 56.8
Umbria 403 34,241,499 1.8 581,450 2 84,967 58.89
Latium 693 124,642,179 6.6 864,851 3 179,859 144.12
Abr.-Mol. 1,863 25,051,768 1 .3 1,382,966 4.7 13,447 18.11
Campania 2,916 190,904,303 10.1 2,929,460 10.1 65,468 65.17
Basilicata 207 6,606,720 0.3 539,258 1.9 31,916 12.25
Apulia 1,327 52,140,180 2.7 1,588,317 5.5 39,292 32.83
Calabria 527 10,869,818 0.6 1,281,799 4.4 20,626 8.48
Sicily 2,711 136,193,457 7.2 2,933,154 10.1 50,237 46.23
Sardinia 150 8,550,330 0.5 680,450 2.3 57,002 12.57
Kingdom 21 ,866 1 ,897,659,222 1 00 28,953,480 1 00 86,786 65.54
1 R.B.P., No.7, 1889, 'Suite istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza' (report to the Chamber
on 13 June 1889 by Odoardo Luchini, chairman of the Chamber's committee set up to
study Crispi's bill on charities), p. 592.
2 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV.
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Table 4. Charitable bequests 1881-1896 by region 1.
Region Bequests 1881-96 % North




Emilia-Rom. 15,780,745 6.02 Centre




Abruzzi-Mol. 1,227,267 0.47 South






Kingdom 261 ,957,346 100 1 0 0
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. LX.
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Table 5. Charities assets as a percentage of gross patrimony (1880) 2.
Region Rural est. Urban est. tot. est. State bonds Other bonds &inv. tot.bonds etc.
Piedmont 27.91 14.61 42.52 39.84 1 7.64 57.48
Liquria 4.03 32.27 36.30 32.1 9 31 .51 63.70
Lombardy 49.91 6.93 56.84 18.8 24.36 43.16
Venetia 32.23 11.11 43.34 23.31 33.35 56.66
Em.-Rom. 56.16 6.95 63.11 10.07 26.82 36.89
Tuscany 6.04 9.55 15.59 34.86 49.55 84.4 1
Marches 60.86 10.4 71.26 5.95 22.79 28.74
Umbria 54.12 8.09 62.21 7.83 29.96 37.79
Latium 24.45 26.1 9 50.64 22.4 26.96 49.3 6
Abr.-Mol. 21 .99 6.77 28.76 22.22 49.02 7 1.24
Campania 1 8.32 32.08 50.4 23.4 26.2 49.6
Basilicata 24.64 10.31 34.95 28.26 36.79 65.0 5
Apulia 41 .49 13.6 55.09 18.67 26.24 44.9 1
Calabria 22.58 14.4 36.98 33.75 29.27 63.02
Sicily 9.87 9.46 19.33 32.4 48.27 80.67
Sardinia 8.72 25.94 34.66 21 .89 43.45 65.34
Kingdom 32.82 14.08 46.9 24.1 4 28.96 53.1
2 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XVI-XXI
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Table 6. Gross patrimony and revenue by region (1880) 3.
Region gross patrimony gross revenue %
Piedmont 272,240,552 13,1 65,422 4.84
Liguria 86,191,398 3,544,053 4.11
Lombardy 424,956,075 20,456,41 6 4.81
Venetia 134,051,068 6,341,653 4.73
Emilia-Rom. 208,972,981 1 0,320,005 4.94
Tuscany 126,813,364 5,241,428 4.13
Marches 55,233,530 2,684,790 4.86
Umbria 34,241,499 1,640,411 4.79
Latium 124,642,179 6,115,180 4.9
Abr.-Molise 25,051,768 1,209,984 4.83
Campania 190,904,303 9,638,423 5.05
Basilicata 6,606,720 315,735 4.78
Apulia 52,140,180 2,584,967 4.96
Calabria 10,869,818 498,933 4.6 i
Sicily 136,193,457 6,316,436 4.64
Sardinia 8,550,330 372,610 4.36
Kingdom 1 ,897,659,222 90,446,446 4.77
3 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXII-XXVII.
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Table 7. Overall devotional expenditure by region (1880) 4.
Region total devotional expend. as a % of the total North




Emilia-Rom. 323,397 5.03 Centre




Abr.-Molise 237,147 3.69 South






Kingdom 6,422,731 1 00 1 0 0
4 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXXII.
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Table 8. Composition of the devotional expenditure by region (1880) 5.
Region tot. dev. expend. oneri di culto % other dev. expenditure" %
Piedmont 389,250 216,663 55.66 172,587 44.34
Liquria 153,600 87,577 57.02 66,023 42.98
Lombardy 706,335 475,470 67.32 230,865 32.68
Venetia 223,176 137,979 61.83 85,197 38.17
Emilia-Rom. 323,397 219,935 6 8 103,462 3 2
Tuscany 404,543 207,656 5 1.33 196,887 48.67
Marches 99,472 51,897 52.17 47,575 47.83
Umbria 73,449 37,829 51.64 35,620 4 8.36
Latium 318,262 132,645 41.68 185,617 5 8.32
Abr.-Mol. 237,147 29,721 12.53 207,426 87.47
Campania 2,132,580 235,518 11.04 1,897,062 88.96
Basilicata 30,724 2,620 8.53 28,104 9 1.47
Apulia 394,701 24,373 6.18 370,328 93.82
Calabria 65,055 2,653 4.08 62,402 95.92
Sicily 855,157 221,820 25.94 633,337 74.06
Sardinia 15,883 7,801 49.12 8,082 50.88
Kingdom 6,422,731 2,092,157 32.57 4,330,731 67.43
*
including spese per lo scopo dell'istituzione and spese volontarie di culto.
5 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXXII.
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Table 9. Composition of the funds available for welfare by region (1880) 6.
Region tot. avail, for welf. net. patr. revenue % non patrim. income %
Piedmont 15,131,822 8,892,228 58.76 6,239,594 41.24
Liquria 5,040,114 2,198,051 43.61 2,842,063 56.39
Lombardy 17,802,458 1 1,490,664 64.54 6,311,794 35.46
Venetia 9,300,755 3,561,097 38.29 5,739,658 6 1.71
Emilia-Rom. 10,404,357 5,587,989 53.71 4,816,368 46.29
Tuscany 8,420,326 3,127,115 37.14 5,293,211 62.86
Marches 2,755,790 1,427,145 51.79 1,328,645 48.21
Umbria 1,682,107 881,020 52.37 801,087 47.63
Latium 5,877,247 3,290,757 5 6 2,586,490 4 4
Abr.-Molise 1,055,404 715,174 67.76 340,230 32.24
Campania 9,192,684 5,070,627 55.16 4,122,057 44.84
Basilicata 352,946 182,861 51.81 170,085 48.19
Apulia 2,377,193 1,420,053 59.74 957,140 40.26
Calabria 769,840 285,597 37.1 484,243 62.9
Sicily 5,863,651 3,411,565 58.18 2,452,086 41.82
Sardinia 482,377 222,347 46.1 260,030 53.9
Kingdom 96,509,071 51,764,290 53.64 44,744,781 46.36
® Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. XXII.
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Table 10. Charities welfare expenditure in the cities chief of province or district and
in the other communes in 1880 1.
Region tot. pop. gross income* welf. exp. % welf.ex/pop.
Piedmont 3,179,323 1 9,405,01 6 1 3,422.1 64 69.2 4.22
major cities 611,352 13,417,867 9,464,503 70.5 15.48
other towns 2,567,971 5,987,149 3,957,661 66.1 1.54
Liguria 926,152 6,386,1 1 6 4,798,385 75.1 5.2
major cities 278,385 5,496,804 4,188,845 76.2 1 5.04
other towns 647,767 889,312 609,540 68.5 0.94
Lombardy 3,750,051 26,768,21 0 1 6,1 86,021 60.5 4.32
major cities 804,642 21,229,773 12,843,217 60.5 1 5.96
other towns 2,945,409 5,538,437 3,342,804 60.4 1.13
Venetia 2,873,961 12,081,311 8 , 7 0 4j 6 2 7 7 2 3.02
major cities 905,659 11,363,187 8,203,635 72.2 9.05
other towns 1,968,302 718,124 500,992 68.9 0.25
Emilia-Rom. 2,227,346 1 5,1 36,373 9,71 2,558 64.2 4.36
major cities 746,824 12,704,136 8,305,767 65.4 11.12
other towns 1,480,522 2,432,237 1,406,791 57.8 0.95
Tuscany 2,242,476 1 0,534,639 7,974,805 75.7 3.55
major cities 602,978 8,774,464 6,814,751 77.7 1 1.30
other towns 1,639,408 1,760,175 1,160,054 65.9 0.7
Marches 972,466 4,013,435 2,580,1 15 64.3 2.65
major cities 160,087 1,769,180 1,265,469 71 .5 7.9
other towns 812,379 2,244,255 1,314,646 58.6 1.62
Umbria 581,450 2,441,498 1,576,973 64.6 2.71
major cities 143,845 1,405,003 990,262 70.5 6.88
other towns 437,605 1,036,495 586,711 56.6 1 .34
Latium 864,851 8,701,670 5,236,861 60.2 6.05
major cities 332,684 7,839,449 4,667,930 59.5 14.03
other towns 532,167 862,221 568,931 66 1 .06
Abr.-Molise 1,382,966 1,550,21 4 895,1 87 57.7 0.65
major cities 161,118 595,148 443,368 74.5 2.75
other towns 1,221,848 955,066 451,819 47.3 _j 0.37
Campania 2,929,460 1 3,760,480 8,955,041 65.1 3.05
major cities 750,453 9,205,834 5,986,399 65 7.97
other towns 2,179,007 4,554,646 2,968,642 65.2 1.36
Basilicata 539,258 485,820 316,210 65.1 0.59
major cities 52,226 163,874 117,692 71 .8 2.25
other towns 487,032 321,946 198,518 61 .7 0.41
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXXIV-XXXV.
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Region tot. pop. gross income* welf. exp. % welf.ex/pop.
Apulia 1 ,588,317 3,542,107 2,252,516 63.6 1.42
major cities 268,153 860,468 641,283 74.5 2.39
other towns 1,320,164 2,681,639 1,611,233 60.1 1.22
Calabria 1,281,799 983,176 691,165 70.3 0.54
major cities 175,567 696,114 530,522 76.2 3.02
other towns 1,106,232 288,062 160,643 55.8 0.15
Sicily 2,933,1 54 8,768,522 5,365,378 61.2 1.82
major cities 926,406 6,899,822 4,273,474 61 .9 4.61
other towns 2,006,748 1,868,700 1,090,904 58.4 0.54
Sardinia 680,450 632,640 434,1 09 68.6 0.63
major cities 129,132 576,586 402,723 69.8 3.1 1
other towns 551,318 56,054 31,386 56 0.05
Kingdom 28,953,480 135,191,277 89,101,115 65.9 3.08
major cities 7,049,511 102,996,709 69,139,840 67.1 9.81
other towns 21,903,969 32,194,518 19,961,275 62 0.91
* patrimonial and non-patrimonial
Table 11. Benefits and recipients in 1887 1.
Region Recipients as a % of tot. pop.* Average benefit per recipient
Piedmont 4.3 10.9
major cities 8.7 9.3
other communes 3.3 1 2
Liguria 2 14.2
major cities 4.7 14.5
other communes 1 13.5
Lombardy 4 . 6 1 8.5
major cities 8.2 24.6
other communes 3.6 14.7
Venetia 2.9 21.2
major cities 3.6 22.7
other communes 2.6 20.3
Emilia-Romagna 3 . 2 16.7
major cities 4.6 19.6
other communes 2.4 13.9
Tuscany 1 . 8 16.6
major cities 3.8 18.1
other communes 1.1 14.7
1 M.I., A.C.R.I.O.P., 9, pp. 107-09
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Region Recipients as a % of tot. pop." Average benefit per recipient
Marches 1 .9 9.6
major cities 3.2 8.8
other communes 1.6 9.9
Umbria 1 . 6 7.1
major cities 0.9 5.3
other communes 1.8 7.4
Latium 2 . 2 18.8
major cities 3 24.9
other communes 1.5 9.7
Abruzzi Molise 1 .4 7.8
major cities 1.3 9.4
other communes 1 .4 7.5
Campania 3 . 2 7.8
major cities 4.9 8.1
other communes 2.6 7.5
Basilicata 1 . 1 12.6
major cities 1.2 1 1.6
other communes 1.1 12.8
Apulia 2.3 12.1
major cities 2.8 1 9.2
other communes 2.2 1 0.3
Calabria 0.8 5.4
major cities 1.2 4.5
other communes 0.7 5.7
Sicily 0.9 9.3
major cities 1 13.5
other communes 0.9 6.9
Sardinia 0.4 10.6
major cities 0.5 19.2
other communes 0.3 7.3
Kingdom 2 . 6 14.3
major cities 4.2 16.9
other communes 2.1 12.5
* Population calculated at 31 December 1886.
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of C. of C.
Piedm. 2,642 959 36.3 272,240,552 28,526,492 10.5 29,746.08
Lip. 456 103 22.6 86,191,398 1,842,830 2.1 17,891.55
Lomb. 3,954 423 1 0.7 424,956,075 1 5,358,883 3.6 36,309.42
Ven. 1,350 94 6.9 134,051,068 1,650,591 1.23 17,559.47
Em.-R. 1,468 20 1.36 208,972,981 2,588,387 1.24 129,41 9.35
Tusc. 628 6 0.95 126,813,364 169,057 0.13 28,176.16
March. 751 _ _ 55,233,530 _ _
Umbr. 403 _ _ 34,241,499 _ _ .
Latium 693 4 0.6 124,642,179 2,600,793 2.09 650,198.25
Abr-M 1,863 62 3.33 25,051,768 2,280,374 9.1 36,780.22
Camp. 2,916 119 4.08 190,904,303 5,852,938 3.06 49,184.35
Bas. 207 44 21.26 6,606,720 1,744,543 26.4 39,648.7
Apulia 1,327 21 1.6 52,140,180 1,149,260 2.2 54,726,66
Calab. 527 12 2.3 10,869,818 247,734 2.3 20,644.5
Sicily 2,711 8 0.3 136,193,457 346,981 0.25 43,372.62
Sard. 150 15 1 0 8,550,330 1,032,310 12.07 68,820.66
Kingd. 21,866 1 ,890 8.64 1 ,897,659,222 65,421,173 3.45 34,614.37
Table 13. Charities assets grouped in four main categories (1880)2.
Kind of charity Gross patrimony %
Congregations of Charity 65,421,173 3.45
Out-door relief 586,194,657 30.9
Education 388,230,153 20.45
Indoor relief 857,813,239 45.2
Total 1 ,897,659,222 1 00
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. VI; XIII-XIV.
2 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
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Table 14. Charities assets by category (1880) 1.
Kind of charity Gross patrimony %
Congregations of Charity 65,421,173 3.45
Alms 200,869,438 10.58





Health care at home 70,430,190 3.71
Transport to hospital 6,321 0
Burial 92,001 0
Dowries 61,341,232 3.23
Benefits to parturient women 735,289 0.04
Benefits for wet-nursing 1,228,761 0.06
Benefits to orphans etc. 962,722 0.05
Benefits to widows 1,156,197 0.06
Studentships 40,309,199 2.12
Maternity homes 3,985,399 0.21




Orphanages, consevatori, etc. 313,748,776 1 6.53
Reformatories 5,111,116 0.3
Deaf-dumb homes 6,991,495 0.4
Blind homes 3,931,160 0.2
Homes for children with rickets 211,236 0.01
Ospizi marini 1,108,269 0.06
Widows' shelters 851,747 0.04
Hospitals 602,341,196 31.74
Chronically ill & incurables 21,050,558 1.11
Lunatic Asylums 19,151,595 1
Poorhouses 114,041,242 6
Workhouses 3,949,030 0.21
Total 1 ,897,659,222 1 00.
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
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Table 15. Charities assets grouped into eleven categories (1880)1.
Kind of charity Gross patrimony %
Congregations of Charity 65,421,173 3.45
Alms, devotion, variuos aims 449,386,006 23.68
Dowries 61,341,232 3.23
Specific purposes 75,467,419 4
Mother & child 84,185,711 4.43
Disabled children 12,242,160 0.65
Poorhouses etc. 118,842,019 6.26
Hospitals 602,341,196 CO -vl ■n.
Chronically ill & incurables 21,050,558 1.1 1
Lunatic Asylums 19,151,595 1
Education 388,230,153 20.45
Total 1 ,897,659,222 100
1 Statistics delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XIII-XIV.
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Table 16. Regional distribution of the assets of general hospitals and hospitals for
the chronically ill and incurables (1880) 1.
Region General hospitals % Chronics & incurables %
Piedmont 1 03,774,666 17.23 3,237,669 15.38
Liguria 20,380,154 3.38 4,647,461 22.08
Lombardy 1 65,746,51 7 27.52 6,565,767 31.19
Venetia 35,983,477 5.97 477,068 2.27
Emilia-Rom. 60,413,002 10.03 2,569,210 12.20
Tuscany 53,306,147 8.85 1,248,305 5.93
Marches 16,485,942 2.74 1,634,271 7.76
Umbria 11,029,922 1.83 562,395 2.67
Latium 62,170,804 10.32 32,495 0.15
Abruzzi-Mol. 2,036,612 0.34 _ _
Campania 31,088,899 5.16 _ _
Basilicata 711,365 0.12 _ _
Apulia 9,143,966 1.52 _ _
Calabria 2,847,209 0.47 _ _
Sicily 23,648,410 3.93 14,700 0.07
Sardinia 3,574,104 0.59 61,217 0.29
Kingdom 602,341 ,196 1 00 21 ,050,558 1 00
1 Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., pp. XXIII-XIV.
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Table 17. Charitable bequests by category (1881-1896) 1.
Kind of charity Bequests 1881-96 %
Congr.of Ch. 18,022,199 6.88
Alms 1 6,670,773 6.36




Health care at home 2,398,788 0.91
Dowries 3,201,087 1.22
Benefits to parturient women 513,929 0.2
Benefits for wet-nursinq 1,114,750 0.42
Benefits to orphans etc. 617,815 0.23
Benefits to widows 262,723 0.1
Studentships 4,466,334 1.7
Maternity homes 396,975 0.15






Deaf-dumb homes 3,567,993 1.36
Blind homes 9,117,748 3.5
Homes for rickets affected ch. 2,296,295 0.88
Ospizi marini 1,610,095 0.61
Widows' shelters 20,885 0
Hospitals 80,026,075 30.55
Chronically ill & incurables 7,618,562 2.9
Lunatic Asylums 133,239 0.05
Poorhouses 25,739,673 9.83
Workhouses 10,404,743 4
Total 261 ,957,346 1 00
^ Statistica delle Opere pie (1897), Vol.X, cit., p. LX.
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Piedmont 2,762 1,912 69.23 850 30.77
Liguria 714 342 47.90 372 52.1 0
Lombardy 1,733 183 25.63 1 ,550 74.37
Venetia 685 86 12.55 599 87.45
Emilia-Rom. 1,443 460 31.88 983 68.12
Tuscany 1,928 298 15.46 1 ,630 84.54
Marches 1,566 1,241 79.25 325 20.75
Umbria 1,333 1,252 93.92 81 06.08
Latium 1,052 951 90.40 101 09.60
Abruzzi-Mol. 468 333 71.15 135 28.85
Campania 1,777 1,497 84.24 280 15.76
Apulia 611 530 86.74 81 13.26
Basilicata 131 43 32.82 88 67.1 8
Calabria 292 182 62.33 110 37.67
Sicily 1,212 1,000 82.51 212 1 7.49
Sardinia 412 334 00 —L. o •vl 78 1 8.93
Kingdom 18,119 1 0,644 58.74 7,475 41 .26
Table 2. Regional distribution of the assets of the endowed confraternities (1898) 2.











Campania 43,233,654 24.1 4
Apulia 14,794,445 08.26
Basilicata 292,331 00.1 6
Calabria 1,139,355 00.64
Sicily 19,742,168 1 1 .02
Sardinia 3,499,348 o CD cn
Kingdom 179,085,863 1 00
1 M.A.I.C., Statistics delle confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. IX.
2 M.A.I.C., Statistics delle confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XI.
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Table 3. Distribution of the assets of the endowed confraternities according to pre-
unification boundaries (1898)1 .
State patrimony %




Papal States 60,797,851 33.94
Bourbon King. 84,588,850 47.23
Total 1 79,085,863 1 00
Table 4. Expenditure of the endowed confraternities 2.
Region taxes patr.burdens administration devotion welfare
Piedmont 126,055 16,777 103,454 634,998 35,566
Liguria 18,499 8,595 22,426 161,945 16,411
Lombardy 9,691 1,396 6,490 60,541 1,599
Venetia 5,487 1,548 5,226 35,747 3,625
Emilia-Rom. 145,387 16,294 59,981 231,573 91,931
Tuscany 23,316 11,395 39,484 124,628 46,194
Marches 147,696 24,886 105,258 346,231 45,272
Umbria 102,285 15,101 75,227 242,728 40,116
Latium 447,531 122,730 473,827 639,270 407,669
Abruzzi-Mol. 48,551 7,649 36,887 151,149 56,813
Campania 435,710 146,190 457,507 1,460,641 601,839
Apulia 115,442 43,630 97,772 275,843 222,280
Basilicata 3,449 1,764 4,080 21,149 2,596
Calabria 13,559 2,643 10,487 49,295 6,450
Sicily 119,258 68,870 163,346 468,954 82,012
Sardinia 46,611 2,688 26,022 123,634 18,463
Kingdom 1,808,527 492,156 1,687,474 5,028,326 1 ,678,836
^ M.A.I.C., Statistica delle confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XI.


























































































































































Table 5. Number and revenue of charities concentrated and to be concentrated by
1903 1.
Charities Number % Revenue %
concentrated 5,475 COCOoo 3,239,1 12.69 71 .54
to be concentrated 1 ,216 18.17 1 ,288,407.28 28.46
total 6,691 100 4,527,519.97 100
Table 6. Number and revenue of charities grouped and to be grouped by 1903 2.
Charities Number % Revenue %
grouped 331 68.67 6,407,214.92 83.61
to be grouped 151 31 .33 1 ,255,795.27 1 6.39
total 482 1 00 7,663,010.1 9 1 00
1 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc... 1902-1903 (1904), p.13.
2 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), p. 35.
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Table 7. Number and revenue of charities transformed and to be transformed by
19031.
Charities Number % Revenue %
still to be transformed 2,900 70.85 2,649,562.69 69.66
transformed 1 ,1 93 29.15 1 ,1 53,868.85 30.34
total 4,093 1 00 3,803,431 .54 1 00
Table 8. Revenue of charities transformed and to be transformed by 1903, by
category 2.
Charities Transformed % To be transformed %
of various kind 642,030.5 55.64 306,618.35 1 1 .57
Confraternities 380,096.87 32.94 2,1 60,1 69.1 6 81 .53
Catecumeni 22,933.97 1.99 8,600 0.32
Monti Frumentari 108,807.51 9.43 174,175.18 6.58
Total 1,153,868.85 100 2,649,562.69 100
1 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc... 1902-1903 (1904), p. 47.
2 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), p. 47.
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Table 9. Gross patrimonial revenue of the charities concentrated in the period
1891-1903 related to gross patrimonial revenue of the charities in 1880,
net of the revenue of the congregations of charity, but including the revenue
of the endowed confraternities 1.
Region total gross revenue* concentrated revenue %
Piedmont 12,476,860 456,071.07 3.66
Liquria 3,559,057 73,985.94 2.08
Lombardy 1 9,752,472 660,770.48 3.35
Venetia 6,294,900 367,977.48 5.85
Emilia-Rom. 10,692,939 233,546.12 2.18
Tuscany 5,325,941 284,307.66 5.34
Marches 3,225,596 108,050.75 3.35
Umbria 2,064,952 30,274.54 1.47
Latium 7,675,906 80,287.51 1.05
Abruzzi-Mol. 1,126,648 94,929.01 8.43
Campania 9,485,271 151,834.82 1.60
Basilicata 233,339 102,391.45 43.88
Apulia 2,533,689 130,203.8 5.14
Calabria 488,679 26,634.97 5.45
Sicily 6,380,269 233,810.42 3.66
Sardinia 517,533 16,838.01 3.25
Kingdom 91,834,051 3,051 ,914.03 3.32
* Net of revenue of congregations of charity, but including that of the endowed
confraternities.
^ M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 386-7;
M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), p.9; M.A.I.C.,
Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), pp. XXIV-XXVI; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle
Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XII.
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Table 10. Gross patrimonial revenue of the charities grouped in the period 1891-
1903 related to gross patrimonial revenue of the charities in 1880, net of
the revenue of the congregations of charity, but including the revenue of
the endowed confraternities 1.
Region total gross revenue* grouped revenue %
Piedmont 1 2,476,860 223,970.25 1.80
Liquria 3,559,057 16,277.85 0.46
Lombardy 1 9,752,472 16,899.6 0.09
Venetia 6,294,900 343,736.1 5.46
Emilia-Rom. 1 0,692,939 203,069.42 1.90
Tuscany 5,325,941 33,836.45 0.64
Marches 3,225,596 97,888.73 3.03
Umbria 2,064,952 _ _
Latium 7,675,906 1 ,967,483 25.63
Abruzzi-Mol. 1,126,648 31,040 2.76
Campania 9,485,271 2,944,082.31 CO o ■E*.
Basilicata 233,339 1,250 0.54
Apulia 2,533,689 5,090 0.20
Calabria 488,679 _ _
Sicily 6,380,269 480,591.21 7.53
Sardinia 517,533 _ _
Kingdom 91 ,834,051 6,365,214.92 6.93
* Net of revenue of congregations of charity, but including that of the endowed
confraternities.
1 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 428-9;
M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), p. 32;
M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), PP- XXIV-XXVI; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle
Confraternite (1898), vol. 2, p. XII.
460
Table 11. Gross patrimonial revenue of the charities transformed in the period
1891-1903 related to gross patrimonial revenue of the charities in 1880,
net of the revenue of the congregations of charity, but including the revenue
of the endowed confraternities 1.
Region total gross revenue* transformed revenue** %
Piedmont 12,476,860 80,024.82 0.64
Liguria 3,559,057 9,042.5 0.25
Lombardy 19,752,472 143,522.21 0.73
Venetia 6,294,900 24,387.47 0.39
Emilia-Rom. 1 0,692,939 264,1 80.05 2.47
Tuscany 5,325,941 8,759.75 0.16
Marches 3,225,596 90,161.26 2.80
Umbria 2,064,952 33,423.81 1 .62
Latium 7,675,906 33,623.93 0.44
Abruzzi-Mol. 1,126,648 66,044.08 5.86
Campania 9,485,271 27,343.67 0.29
Basilicata 233,339 2,647.26 1.13
Apulia 2,533,689 45,478.2 1 .79
Calabria 488,679 1,211.69 0.25
Sicily 6,380,269 144,530.76 2.27
Sardinia 517,533 12,408.57 2.40
Kingdom 91 ,834,051 986,790.03 1 .07
Net of revenue of congregations of charity, but including that of the endowed
confraternities.
** Not including those foundations not included in the 1880 statistics (Monti frumentari,
Casse di prestanza agraria, Monti di Piet&).
1 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc. 1891-1902 (1903), pp. 470-1;
M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), pp. 50-51;
M.A.I.C., Statistica delle Opere Pie (1897), pp. XXIV-XXVI; M.A.I.C., Statistica delle
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Table 12. Charitable revenues concentrated by 1903 1.
Kind of charity Revenue %
educational aid 205,727.6 6.75
benefit to widows 27,600.51 0.91
benefits for wet nursing 11,638.17 0.38
benefit to orphans 43,763.61 1.44
health care at home 291,315.05 9.55
benefit to parturient women 17,508.27 0.57
benefit to disabled 58,762.67 1.93
alms in kind 59,675.15 1.96
alms to the shamefaced 29,876.01 0.98
alms 905,844.4 29.71
dowries 643,078.3 21.09
monte frumentari 170,791.39 5.60
rural credit 12,803.87 0.42






^ M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc...1902-1903 (1904), PP.16-17.
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Table 13. Charitable revenues grouped by 1903 2.
Kind of charity Revenue %
babies & foundlings 1,583 0.03
kindergartens & nurseries 152,224.31 2.47
hospitals & lunatic asylums 3,148,047.78 51 .13





2 M.I, D.G.A.C., Relaz. concentr., raggr., trasf., ecc... 1902-1903 (1904), p. 36.
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Piedmont 72.7 6.1 1 8
Liguria 69.2 2.3 55
Lombardy 1 02 5.7 28
Venetia 74.6 3.9 27
Tuscany 46.7 3.7 1 9
Ex-Duchies 53.9 6.1 1 8
Romaqne 83.4 3.1 39
Marches 25.7 2 1 8
Umbria 25.3 2 1 9
Latium 76.2 4.6 62
Abruzzi-Mol. 17.7 1.5 20
Campania 40.1 3.7 1 8
Basilicata 20.8 1.8 1 2
Apulia 30 4.7 1 6
Calabria 7.5 0.82 1 3
Sicily 10.3 2.1 8
Sardinia 12.2 1.6 1 9
Kingdom 52.1 3.7 2 1
3 M.I., D.G.A.C., Rilevamento statistico-amministrativo circa le condizioni dell'assistenza
all'infanzia ed agli indigenti inabili al lavoro e della beneficenza elemosiniera
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